This document:
• provides requirements and recommendations for the overall Electrical Power System. In
particular, it covers interruptible and uninterruptible Electrical Power Systems including
the systems supplying the I&C systems;
• is consistent and coherent with IEC 61513. Like IEC 61513, this document also highlights
the need for complete and precise requirements, derived from the plant safety goals.
Those requirements are prerequisites for generating the comprehensive requirements for
the overall Electrical Power System architecture, and for the electrical power supply subsystems;
• has to be considered in conjunction with and at the same level as IEC 61513. These two
standards provide a complete framework establishing general requirements for
instrumentation, control, and Electrical Power System for Nuclear Power Plants.
This document establishes:
• the high level specification and requirement to implement a suitable Electrical Power
System in a NPP that supports reactor systems important to safety. It also enables
electrical energy production providing the transmission grid with active and reactive power
and electro-mechanical inertia;
• the relationships between:
– the plant safety requirements and the architecture of the overall Electrical Power
System and its sub-systems (see Figure 1) including:
a) the contribution to the plant Defence in Depth;
b) the independency and redundancy provisions;
– the electrical requirements and the architecture of the Electrical Power System and its
sub-systems;
– the functional requirements and the architecture of the Electrical Power System and its
sub-systems;
– the requirements associated with the maintenance strategy and the architecture of the
Electrical Power System and its sub-systems;
• the design of Electrical power sub-systems (e.g. interruptible and uninterruptible);
• the requirements for supporting systems of Electrical Power System (HVAC, I&C, etc.);
• the Electrical Power System life-cycle framework.
This document does not cover the specification of:
• I&C systems;
• the transmission lines connecting to substations outside the NPP;
• electrical equipment requirements already defined in the industrial IEC standards;
• electrical power for security systems (e.g., fences, surveillance systems, entrance
control);
• lighting and socket facility.
This document does not consider power production requirements.

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This International Standard describes methods for establishing seismic qualification procedures
that will yield quantitative data to demonstrate that the equipment can meet its performance
requirements. This document is applicable to electrical, mechanical, instrumentation and control
equipment/components that are used in nuclear facilities. This document provides methods and
documentation requirements for seismic qualification of equipment to verify the equipment’s
ability to perform its specified performance requirements during and/or after specified seismic
demands. This document does not specify seismic demand or performance requirements. Other
aspects, relating to quality assurance, selection of equipment, and design and modification of
systems, are not part of this document. As seismic qualification is only a part of equipment
qualification, this document is used in conjunction with IEC/IEEE 60780-323.
The seismic qualification demonstrates equipment’s ability to perform its safety function(s)
during and/or after the time it is subjected to the forces resulting from at least one safe shutdown
earthquake (SSE/S2). This ability is demonstrated by taking into account, prior to the SSE/S2,
the ageing of equipment and the postulated occurrences of a given number of lower intensity
operating basis earthquake (OBE/S1). Ageing phenomena to be considered, if specified in the
design specification, are those which could increase the vulnerability of equipment to vibrations
caused by an SSE/S2.

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IEC 61468:2021 applies to in-core neutron detectors, viz. self-powered neutron detectors (SPNDs), which are intended for application in systems important for nuclear reactor safety: protection, instrumentation and control. This document contains SPND characteristics and test methods. In this document, the main sources of errors, and the possibilities for their minimization are also considered. This document contains requirements, recommendations and instructions concerning selection of SPND type and characteristics for various possible applications.
This document about SPNDs uses the basic requirements of IEC 61513 and IEC 60568 and complements them with more specific provisions in compliance with IAEA Safety Guides.
This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition, published in 2000, and its Amendment 1, published in 2003.
This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a. Title modified.
b. Justify the requirements for SPND characteristics in terms of influencing factors.
c. Align the terminology with the current state of the regulatory framework.

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IEC/IEEE 63113:2021 provides criteria for spent fuel pool instrumentation for nuclear power generating stations and other nuclear facilities. The document applies to water filled spent fuel pools where the water volume is necessary to prevent a release of fission products that exceeds allowed operational limits. The purpose of this document is to establish design, performance, qualification, and display criteria for spent fuel pool instrumentation for normal operation, anticipated operational occurrences, design basis events, and design extension conditions (including severe accident conditions).

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IEC TR 63335:2021 identifies a number of issues of particular importance to light water Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), which are not currently adequately addressed by existing IEC SC 45A standards, and that could be considered when revising existing publications or that could be the object of new work item proposals. Whether each of these issues will indeed be addressed, and if so in which publication, will be the decision of each SC 45A working group. Though there are a number of advanced Generation IV SMR projects underway, their specific needs are not covered by this document.

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IEC 60987:2021 provides requirements and recommendations for the hardware aspects of I&C systems whatever the technology and applies for all safety classes in a graded manner (as defined by IEC 61513). The requirements defined within this document guide, in particular, the selection of pre-existing components, hardware aspects of system detailed design and implementation and equipment manufacturing.
This third edition cancels and replaces the second edition published in 2007. This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) Title modified;
b) Take account of the fact that hardware requirements apply to all I&C technologies, including conventional hardwired equipment, programmable digital equipment or by using a combination of both types of equipment;
c) Align the standard with the new revisions of IAEA documents SSR-2/1, which include as far as possible an adaptation of the definitions;
d) Replace, as far as possible, the requirements associated with standards published since the edition 2.1, especially IEC 61513, IEC 60880, IEC 62138, IEC 62566 and IEC 62566‑2;
e) Review the existing requirements and update the terminology and definitions;
f) Extend the scope of the standard to all hardware (computerized and non-computerized) and to all safety classes 1, 2 and 3;
g) Complete, update the IEC and IAEA references and vocabulary;
h) Check possible impact of other IAEA requirements and recommendations considering extension of the scope of SC 45A;
i) Highlight the use of IEC 62566 and IEC 62566-2 for HPD development;
j) Introduce specific activities for pre-existing items (selection, acceptability and/or mitigation);
k) Introduce clearer requirements for electronic module-level design, manufacturing and control;
l) Complete reliability assessment methods;
m) Introduce requirements when using automated tests or control activities;
n) Complete description of manufacturing control activities (control process, assessment of manufactured equipment, preservation of products);
o) Define and ensure the inclusion of a graded approach for dealing with the 3 different classes of equipment and related requirements.

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This document specifies minimum nuclear criticality safety training requirements for operations staff, operations supervisors, and management. This document is applicable to areas, processes or facilities containing quantities of fissile material for which nuclear criticality safety assessment is required as defined in ISO 1709. This document is not applicable to the transport of fissile materials outside the boundaries of nuclear establishments.

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This part of IEC 62566 provides requirements for achieving highly reliable HDL-Programmed
Devices (HPDs), for use in I&C systems of nuclear power plants performing functions of safety
category B or C as defined by IEC 61226.
The programming of HPDs relies on Hardware Description Languages (HDL) and related
software tools. They are typically based on blank Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) or
similar micro-electronic technologies such as Programmable Logic Devices (PLD), Complex
Programmable Logic Devices (CPLDs), etc. General purpose integrated circuits such as
microprocessors are not HPDs. Annex B.8 provides descriptions of a number of different types
of integrated circuits.
This document provides requirements on:
a) a dedicated HPD life-cycle addressing each phase of the development of HPDs, including
specification of requirements, design, implementation, integration and validation, as well as
verification activities associated with each phase,
b) planning and complementary activities such as modification and production,
c) selection of pre-developed components. This includes micro-electronic technologies and
Pre-Developed Blocks (PDBs),
d) tools used to design, implement and verify HPDs.
This document does not put requirements on the development of the micro-electronic
technologies, which are usually available as "commercial off-the-shelf" items and are not
developed under nuclear quality assurance standards. It addresses the developments made
with these micro-electronic technologies in an I&C project with HDLs and related tools.
This document provides guidance to avoid as far as possible latent faults remaining in HPDs,
and to reduce the susceptibility to single failures as well as to potential Common Cause Failures
(CCFs).
Reliability aspects related to environmental qualification and failures due to ageing or physical
degradation are not handled in this document. Other standards, especially IEC 60987,
IEC/IEEE 60780-323 and IEC 62342, address these topics.
This document does not cover cybersecurity for HDL aspects of I&C systems. IEC 62645
provides requirements for security programmes for I&C programmable digital systems.
This document provides guidance and requirements to produce verifiable HPD designs and
implementations requiring justification due for their role in carrying out category B or C safety
functions. This document describes the activities to develop HPDs, organized in the framework
of a dedicated life-cycle. It also describes activities and guidelines to be used in addition to the
requirements of IEC 61226 for system classification and IEC 61513 for system integration and
validation when HPDs are included.

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This document specifies requirements for the ice plug technique with liquid nitrogen or dry ice as refrigerant (cryogenic medium) on metal pipes of nuclear power plants. The freezing liquid can be water or water mixture (e.g. boric acid mixture). This document specifies technical requirements of ice plug generation, formation judgment and removal, measures before, during and after ice plugging and requirements for personnel and non-destructive testing. The application of the ice plug isolation technique is principally not allowed on cladded pipes or pipes with internal coatings. The application for pressure test is not in the scope of this document and will be qualified separately.

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This document specifies the basic requirements of thermal insulation design of reactor coolant system (RCS) equipment and piping. Among thermal insulation of various RCS equipment and piping, the following two kinds of thermal insulations are described in detailed based on common design logic and requirements: — thermal insulation of reactor pressure vessel (RPV); — thermal insulation of RCS piping and other equipment. This document is valid for two types of thermal insulation: — metallic thermal insulation; — non-metallic thermal insulation. This document mainly applies to nuclear power plants with pressurized water reactor (PWR). For other reactor types, this document can be taken as reference.

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IEC 63046:2020 provides requirements and recommendations for the overall Electrical Power System. In particular, it covers interruptible and uninterruptible Electrical Power Systems including the systems supplying the I&C systems; This document is consistent and coherent with IEC 61513. Like IEC 61513, this document also highlights the need for complete and precise requirements, derived from the plant safety goals. Those requirements are prerequisites for generating the comprehensive requirements for the overall Electrical Power System architecture, and for the electrical power supply sub-systems. This document establishes the high level specification and requirement to implement a suitable Electrical Power System in a NPP that supports reactor systems important to safety. It also enables electrical energy production providing the transmission grid with active and reactive power and electro-mechanical inertia.

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IEC/IEEE 60980-344:2020 describes methods for establishing seismic qualification procedures that will yield quantitative data to demonstrate that the equipment can meet its performance requirements. This document is applicable to electrical, mechanical, instrumentation and control equipment/components that are used in nuclear facilities. This document provides methods and documentation requirements for seismic qualification of equipment to verify the equipment’s ability to perform its specified performance requirements during and/or after specified seismic demands. This document does not specify seismic demand or performance requirements. Other aspects, relating to quality assurance, selection of equipment, and design and modification of systems, are not part of this document. As seismic qualification is only a part of equipment qualification, this document is used in conjunction with IEC/IEEE 60780-323.
The seismic qualification demonstrates equipment’s ability to perform its safety function(s) during and/or after the time it is subjected to the forces resulting from at least one safe shutdown earthquake (SSE/S2). This ability is demonstrated by taking into account, prior to the SSE/S2, the ageing of equipment and the postulated occurrences of a given number of lower intensity operating basis earthquake (OBE/S1). Ageing phenomena to be considered, if specified in the design specification, are those which could increase the vulnerability of equipment to vibrations caused by an SSE/S2.

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IEC 62003:2020 establishes requirements for electromagnetic compatibility testing of instrumentation, control, and electrical equipment supplied for use in systems important to safety at nuclear power plants and other nuclear facilities. The document lists the applicable IEC standards (principally the IEC 61000 series) which define the general test methods, and provides the necessary application-specific parameters and criteria to ensure that nuclear safety requirements are met.
This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2009. This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) title modified.
b) expand the scope to encompass Electromagnetic Magnetic Compatibility (EMC) considerations for electrical equipment.
c) provide guidance for addressing the use of wireless technology.
d) enhance the description of the electromagnetic environment to provide clarification when selecting custom test levels or for test exemptions.
e) include example information to be contained within an EMC test plan.
f) provide guidance for characterization of the electromagnetic environment at the point of installation within a nuclear facility.

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This document provides a framework to manage the interactions between safety and
cybersecurity for nuclear power plant (NPP) systems, taking into account the current SC 45A
standards addressing these issues and the specifics of nuclear I&C programmable digital
systems.
NOTE In this document (as in IEC 62645), cybersecurity relates to prevention of, detection of, and reaction to
malicious acts perpetrated by digital means (cyberattacks). In this context, it does not cover considerations related
to non-malevolent actions and events such as accidental failures, natural events or human errors (except those
degrading cybersecurity). Those aspects are of course of prime importance but they are covered by other SC 45A
documents and standards, and are not considered as cybersecurity related in this document.
This document establishes requirements and guidance to:
– integrate cybersecurity provisions in nuclear I&C architectures and systems, which are
fundamentally tailored for safety;
– avoid potential conflicts between safety and cybersecurity provisions;
– aid the identification and the leveraging of the potential synergies between safety and
cybersecurity.
This document is intended to be used for designing new NPPs, or modernizing existing NPPs,
throughout I&C programmable digital systems lifecycle. It is also applicable for assessing the
coordination between safety and cybersecurity of existing plants. It may also be applicable to
other types of nuclear facilities.
This document addresses I&C programmable digital systems important to safety and I&C
programmable digital systems not important to safety. It does not address programmable
digital systems dedicated to site physical security, room access control and site security
surveillance.
This document is limited to I&C programmable digital systems of NPPs, including their on-site
maintenance and configuration tools.
Annex A provides a rationale for and comments about the scope definition and the document
application, in particular about the exclusions and limitations previously mentioned.
This document comprises three normative clauses:
• Clause 5 deals with the overall I&C architecture;
• Clause 6 focuses on the system level;
• Clause 7 deals with organizational and operational issues.

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This document establishes requirements and provides guidance for the development and
management of effective computer security programmes for I&C programmable digital
systems. Inherent to these requirements and guidance is the criterion that the power plant
I&C programmable digital system security programme complies with the applicable country’s
requirements.
This document defines adequate measures for the prevention of, detection of and reaction to
malicious acts by digital means (cyberattacks) on I&C programmable digital systems. This
includes any unsafe situation, equipment damage or plant performance degradation that could
result from such an act, such as:
– malicious modifications affecting system integrity;
– malicious interference with information, data or resources that could compromise the
delivery of or performance of the required I&C programmable digital functions;
– malicious interference with information, data or resources that could compromise operator
displays or lead to loss of management of I&C programmable digital systems;
– malicious changes to hardware, firmware or software at the programmable logic controller
(PLC) level.
Human errors leading to violation of the security policy and/or easing the aforementioned
malicious acts are also in the scope of this document.
This document describes a graded approach scheme for assets subject to digital compromise,
based on their relevance to the overall plant safety, availability, and equipment protection.
Excluded from the scope of this document are considerations related to:
– non-malevolent actions and events such as accidental failures, human errors (except
those impacting the performance of cybersecurity controls) and natural events. In
particular, good practices for managing applications and data, including back-up and
restoration related to accidental failure, are out of scope;
NOTE 1 Although such aspects are often covered by security programme in other normative contexts (e.g., in
the ISO/IEC 27000 series or in the IEC 62443 series), this document is only focused on the protection against
malicious acts by digital means (cyberattacks) on I&C programmable digital systems. The main reason is that
in the nuclear generation domain, other standards and practices already cover accidental failures,
unintentional human errors, natural events, etc. The focus of IEC 62645 is made to provide the maximum
consistency and the minimum overlap with these other nuclear standards and practices.
– site physical security, room access control and site security surveillance systems. These
systems, while not specifically addressed in this document, are to be covered by plant
operating procedures and programmes;
NOTE 2 This exclusion does not deny that cybersecurity has clear dependencies on the security of the
physical environment (e.g., physical protection, power delivery systems, heating/ventilation/air-conditioning
systems (HVAC), etc.).
– the aspect of confidentiality of information about I&C digital programmable systems is out
of the scope of this document (see 5.4.3.2.3).
Annex A provides a rationale for and comments about the scope, definition and the
document's application, and in particular about the exclusions and limitations previously
mentioned.
Standards such as ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO/IEC 27002 are not directly applicable to the cyber
protection of nuclear I&C programmable digital systems. This is mainly due to the specificities
of these systems, including the regulatory and safety requirements inherent to nuclear
facilities. However, this document builds upon the valid high level principles and main
concepts of ISO/IEC 27001:2013, adapts them and completes them to fit the nuclear context.
This document follows the general principles given in the IAEA reference manual NSS17.

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IEC 63260:2020 provides a structured framework for the incorporation of human reliability analysis (HRA) into probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs).
This document is to enhance the analysis of human-system interactions in PRAs, to help ensure reproducible conclusions, and to standardize the documentation of such assessments. To do this, a specific HRA framework is developed from standard practices to serve as a benchmark to assess alternative ways of incorporating HRA into PRA. This standard is an adoption of IEEE 1082-2017 by IEC.

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IEC 62566-2:2020 provides requirements for achieving highly reliable HDL-Programmed Devices (HPDs), for use in I&C systems of nuclear power plants performing functions of safety category B or C as defined by IEC 61226.
The programming of HPDs relies on Hardware Description Languages (HDL) and related software tools. They are typically based on blank Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) or similar micro-electronic technologies such as Programmable Logic Devices (PLD), Complex Programmable Logic Devices (CPLDs), etc. General purpose integrated circuits such as microprocessors are not HPDs.
This document provides requirements on:
a) a dedicated HPD life-cycle addressing each phase of the development of HPDs, including specification of requirements, design, implementation, integration and validation, as well as verification activities associated with each phase,
b) planning and complementary activities such as modification and production,
c) selection of pre-developed components. This includes micro-electronic technologies and Pre-Developed Blocks (PDBs),
d) tools used to design, implement and verify HPDs.

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IEC 61226:2020 establishes, for nuclear power plants , a method of assignment of the functions specified for the plant into categories according to their importance to safety. Subsequent classification of the I&C and electrical power systems performing or supporting these functions, based on the assigned category, then determines relevant design criteria.
The design criteria, when applied, ensure the achievement of each function in accordance to its importance to safety. In this document, the criteria are those of functionality, reliability, performance, environmental qualification (e.g. seismic) and quality assurance (QA).
This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
- to align on IAEA requirements, recommendations and terminology, particularly to take into account the replacement of NS-R-1 by SSR 2/1 and publication of SSG 30;
- to extend the scope to electrical power systems;
- to move the detailed requirements applying to functions and I&C systems to a normative annex, which will be removed after updating IEC 61513.

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This document specifies the performance and the functional characteristics of the low voltage
static uninterruptible power supply (SUPS) systems in a nuclear power plant and, for
applicable parts, in general for nuclear facilities. An uninterruptible power supply is an
electrical equipment which draws electrical energy from a source, stores it and maintains
supply in a specified form by means inside the equipment to output terminals. A static
uninterruptible power supply (SUPS) has no rotating parts to perform its functions.
The specific design requirements for the components of the power supply system are covered
by IEC standards and standards listed in the normative references and are otherwise outside
the scope of this document.

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IEC 61225:2019 specifies the performance and the functional characteristics of the low voltage static uninterruptible power supply (SUPS) systems in a nuclear power plant and, for applicable parts, in general for nuclear facilities. An uninterruptible power supply is an electrical equipment which draws electrical energy from a source, stores it and maintains supply in a specified form by means inside the equipment to output terminals. A static uninterruptible power supply (SUPS) has no rotating parts to perform its functions. This third edition cancels and replaces the second edition published in 2005. This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition: a) the principal objective of this edition is to address the requirements on the static uninterruptible power supplies in nuclear power plants; b) in addition to Instrumentation and Control (I&C) power supplies include all static uninterruptible power supplies; c) emphasize that the static uninterruptible power supplies shall protect the connected equipment (loads) from transients on the on-site AC distribution system (the immunity concept); d) in accordance with the defence-in-depth concept, this standard applies to static uninterruptible power supplies for all equipment, not only for equipment important to safety, with a graded approach to verification and validation; e) addition of the requirement that, when batteries are connected in parallel under abnormal operating conditions, they shall be properly protected with isolation devices to avoid any failure that may impair more than one division of the uninterruptible power supply.

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IEC 62003:2020 establishes requirements for electromagnetic compatibility testing of instrumentation, control, and electrical equipment supplied for use in systems important to safety at nuclear power plants and other nuclear facilities. The document lists the applicable IEC standards (principally the IEC 61000 series) which define the general test methods, and provides the necessary application-specific parameters and criteria to ensure that nuclear safety requirements are met.
This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2009. This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) title modified.
b) expand the scope to encompass Electromagnetic Magnetic Compatibility (EMC) considerations for electrical equipment.
c) provide guidance for addressing the use of wireless technology.
d) enhance the description of the electromagnetic environment to provide clarification when selecting custom test levels or for test exemptions.
e) include example information to be contained within an EMC test plan.
f) provide guidance for characterization of the electromagnetic environment at the point of installation within a nuclear facility.

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IEC 62645:2019 establishes requirements and provides guidance for the development and management of effective computer security programmes for I&C programmable digital systems. Inherent to these requirements and guidance is the criterion that the power plant I&C programmable digital system security programme complies with the applicable country’s requirements.
This document defines adequate measures for the prevention of, detection of and reaction to malicious acts by digital means (cyberattacks) on I&C programmable digital systems. This includes any unsafe situation, equipment damage or plant performance degradation.
This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2014. This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) to align the standard with the new revisions of ISO/IEC 27001;
b) to review the existing requirements and to update the terminology and definitions;
c) to take account of, as far as possible, requirements associated with standards published since the first edition;
d) to take into account the fact that cybersecurity techniques, but also national practices evolve.

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IEC TR 63214:2019 provides a summary of arguments and a technical basis for the development of a new Human Factors Engineering IEC standard and the alignment of IEC 60964. Based on the provided argumentation, the participating members will vote for such an approach. The proposed content of the new standard provides the basis for fruitful discussion within IEC SC 45A WG 8 and raises interest in the development of the new standard.
The scope of the new HFE IEC standard will follow a holistic approach towards the design of the plant-wide control rooms and all HMI, including e.g. the local control stations located throughout the plant. The general principle is to consider the complete nuclear installation design as a sociotechnical system, in a holistic and integrated way.

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IEC/IEEE 62582-6:2019 contains methods for condition monitoring of organic and polymeric materials in instrumentation and control cables using insulation resistance measurements in the detail necessary to produce accurate and reproducible results during simulated accident conditions. It includes the requirements for the measurement system and measurement procedure, and the reporting of the measurement results.
NOTE Measurement of insulation resistance during simulated accident conditions with the aim of determining the lowest value during the accident in order to assess cable performance involves special requirements given in this document. Methods for measurement under stable (non-accident) conditions are available in other international standards, e.g. IEC 62631-3-3.
The different parts of the IEC/IEEE 62582 series are measurement standards, primarily for use in the management of ageing in initial qualification and after installation. IEC/IEEE 62582-1 includes requirements for the application of the other parts of the IEC/IEEE 62582 series and some elements which are common to all methods. Information on the role of condition monitoring in qualification of equipment important to safety is found in IEC/IEEE 60780-323.

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This document specifies requirements for the software of computer-based instrumentation and
control (I&C) systems performing functions of safety category B or C as defined by
IEC 61226. It complements IEC 60880 which provides requirements for the software of
computer-based I&C systems performing functions of safety category A.
It is consistent with, and complementary to, IEC 61513. Activities that are mainly system level
activities (for example, integration, validation and installation) are not addressed exhaustively
by this document: requirements that are not specific to software are deferred to IEC 61513.
The link between functions categories and system classes is given in IEC 61513. Since a
given safety-classified I&C system may perform functions of different safety categories and
even non safety-classified functions, the requirements of this document are attached to the
safety class of the I&C system (class 2 or class 3).
This document is not intended to be used as a general-purpose software engineering guide. It
applies to the software of I&C systems of safety classes 2 or 3 for new nuclear power plants
as well as to I&C upgrading or back-fitting of existing plants.
For existing plants, only a subset of requirements is applicable and this subset has to be
identified at the beginning of any project.
The purpose of the guidance provided by this document is to reduce, as far as possible, the
potential for latent software faults to cause system failures, either due to single software
failures or multiple software failures (i.e. Common Cause Failures due to software).
This document does not explicitly address how to protect software against those threats
arising from malicious attacks, i.e. cybersecurity, for computer-based systems. IEC 62645
provides requirements for security programmes for computer-based systems.

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This document specifies requirements for the software of computer-based instrumentation and control (I&C) systems performing functions of safety category B or C as defined by IEC 61226. It complements IEC 60880 which provides requirements for the software of computer-based I&C systems performing functions of safety category A. It is consistent with, and complementary to, IEC 61513. Activities that are mainly system level activities (for example, integration, validation and installation) are not addressed exhaustively by this document: requirements that are not specific to software are deferred to IEC 61513. The link between functions categories and system classes is given in IEC 61513. Since a given safety-classified I&C system may perform functions of different safety categories and even non safety-classified functions, the requirements of this document are attached to the safety class of the I&C system (class 2 or class 3). This document is not intended to be used as a general-purpose software engineering guide. It applies to the software of I&C systems of safety classes 2 or 3 for new nuclear power plants as well as to I&C upgrading or back-fitting of existing plants. For existing plants, only a subset of requirements is applicable and this subset has to be identified at the beginning of any project. The purpose of the guidance provided by this document is to reduce, as far as possible, the potential for latent software faults to cause system failures, either due to single software failures or multiple software failures (i.e. Common Cause Failures due to software). This document does not explicitly address how to protect software against those threats arising from malicious attacks, i.e. cybersecurity, for computer-based systems. IEC 62645 provides requirements for security programmes for computer-based systems.

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This International Standard provides strategies, technical requirements, and recommended
practices for the management of normal ageing of cabling systems that are important to
safety in nuclear power plants. The main requirements are presented in the body of this
International Standard followed by a number of informative annexes with examples of cable
testing techniques, procedures, and equipment that are available for the nuclear industry to
use to ensure that ageing degradation will not impact plant safety.
This International Standard covers cables and their accessories (e.g., connectors) installed in
nuclear power plants (inside and outside the containment). It provides requirements to
perform cable testing for the purposes of predictive maintenance, troubleshooting, ageing
management, and assurance of plant safety. It is concerned with Instrumentation and Control
(I&C) cables, signal cables, and power cables of voltages less than 1 kV. More specifically,
this International Standard focuses on in-situ testing techniques that have been established
for determining problems in cable conductors (i.e., copper wire) and, to a lesser extent, on
insulation material (i.e., polymer). It follows the IEC 62342 standard on “Management of
Ageing” that was prepared to provide general guidelines for management of ageing of I&C
components in nuclear power plants, including cables. It should be pointed out that cable
testing technologies are evolving and new methods are becoming available that are not
covered in this International Standard. More specifically, this International Standard covers
typical cable testing methods that have been in use in the nuclear power industry over the last
decade. It should also be pointed out that a single cable testing technique is unlikely to
provide conclusive results, and a reliable diagnosis normally requires a combination of
techniques.

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This standard establishes requirements for the whole life cycle of operating procedures that the designer wishes to computerise. It also provides guidance for making decisions about which types of procedures should be computerised and to what extent. Once computerised, procedures are designated as "computer-based procedures" (CBP).

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This document establishes requirements for data communication which is used in systems
performing category A functions in nuclear power plants.
It covers also interface requirements for data communication of equipment performing
category A functions with other systems including those performing category B and C
functions and functions not important to safety.
The scope of this document is restricted to the consideration of data communication within the
plant I&C safety systems. It does not cover communication by telephone, radio, voice, fax,
email, public address, etc.
The internal operation and the detailed technical specification of data communication
equipment are not in the scope of this document. This document is not applicable to the
internal connections and data communication of a processor unit, its memory and control logic.
It does not address the internal processing of instrumentation and control computer based
systems.
This document gives requirements for functions and properties of on-line plant data
communication by reference to IEC 60880 and IEC 60987, produced within the framework of
IEC 61513. It requires categorisation of the communication functions in accordance with
IEC 61226, which in turn requires environmental and seismic qualification (i.e., the
environment where the safety function is required to operate) according to
IEC/IEEE 60780-323 and IEC 60980.

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See the technical scope of the amendment of IEC 62808 in 45A/1134/CDV that was unchanged for the preparation of the proposal of FDIS to be circulated in parallel in CENELEC.

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This document is applicable to nuclear power plant instrumentation and control (I&C) and
electrical systems and equipment, whose functions are required to be independent due to
their contribution to:
• a redundant or diverse safety group;
• different defence in depth levels;
• different safety classes and also with non-classified (NC) systems.
It is also applicable to temporary installations which are part of those I&C and electrical
systems important to safety (for example, auxiliary equipment for commissioning tests and
experiments or mobile power supply systems). Clause 7 is intended particularly for electrical
isolation, Clause 8 is intended particularly for the cabling and the arrangement of equipment
of I&C and electrical systems important to safety.
This document applies to I&C and electrical systems of new nuclear power plants and to I&C
and electrical upgrading or back-fitting of existing plants. For existing plants see 1.2 and 5.4.
Where independence is required by general safety standards such as IAEA safety guides,
IEC 61513 (for I&C), IEC 63046 (for electrical systems) and other project constraints, one
aspect of achieving this independence is physical separation and electrical isolation between
the systems and their equipment that perform safety functions. This document defines the
assessments needed and the technical requirements to be met for I&C and electrical systems,
equipment or cables for which separation is required. Those means are to achieve adequate
physical separation and electrical isolation between redundant sections of a system and
between a higher and lower class systems. This separation is needed to prevent or minimise
the impact on safety that could result from faults and failures which could be propagated or
affect several sections of a system or several systems.
The requirements for functions, and their associated systems and equipment, to be
independent are normally defined in detail in the project documentation; the method of
determining and defining these requirements is not the subject of this document.
Following IAEA SSR-2/1 Requirement 21, separation means by physical separation, electrical
isolation, functional independence and independence of communication are considered. In
this document physical separation and electrical isolation are treated. Functional
independence and independence of communication are not considered in this document.
More details referring to functional independence, independence from control systems and
independence of communication are given in Annex D.

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IEC 60964:2018 is available as IEC 60964:2018 RLV which contains the International Standard and its Redline version, showing all changes of the technical content compared to the previous edition.

IEC 60964:2018 establishes requirements for the human-machine interface in the main control rooms of nuclear power plants. The document also establishes requirements for the selection of functions, design consideration and organization of the human-machine interface and procedures which are used systematically to verify and validate the functional design. These requirements reflect the application of human factors engineering principles as they apply to the human-machine interface during plant operational states and accident conditions (including design basis and design extension conditions), as defined in IAEA SSR-2/1 and IAEA NP-T-3.16. This third edition cancels and replaces the second edition published in 2009. This edition constitutes a technical revision. This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) to review the usage of the term “task” ensuring consistency between IEC 60964 and IEC 61839;
b) to clarify the role, functional capability, robustness and integrity of supporting services for the MCR to promote its continued use at the time of a severe accident or extreme external hazard;
c) to review the relevance of the standard to the IAEA safety guides and IEC SC 45A standards that have been published since IEC 60964:2009 was developed;
d) to clarify the role and meaning of “task analysis”,
e) to further delineate the relationships with derivative standards (i.e. IEC 61227, IEC 61771, IEC 61772, IEC 61839, IEC 62241 and others of relevance to the control room design);
f) to consider its alignment with the Human Factors Engineering principles, specifically with the ones of IAEA safety guide on Human Factors (DS-492) to be issued.

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ISO 16639:2017 provides best practices and performance-based criteria for the use of air sampling devices and systems, including retrospective samplers and continuous air monitors. Specifically, this document covers air sampling program objectives, design of air sampling and monitoring programs to meet program objectives, methods for air sampling and monitoring in the workplace, and quality assurance to ensure system performance toward protecting workers against unnecessary inhalation exposures.
The primary purpose of the surveillance of airborne activity concentrations in the workplace is to evaluate and mitigate inhalation hazards to workers in facilities where these can become airborne. A comprehensive surveillance program can be used to
- determine the effectiveness of administrative and engineering controls for confinement,
- measure activity concentrations of radioactive substances,
- alert workers to high activity concentrations in the air,
- aid in estimating worker intakes when bioassay methods are unavailable,
- determine signage or posting requirements for radiation protection, and
- determine appropriate protective equipment and measures.
Air sampling techniques consist of two general approaches. The first approach is retrospective sampling, in which the air is sampled, the collection medium is removed and taken to a radiation detector system and analysed for radioactive substance, and the concentration results made available at a later time. In this context, the measured air concentrations are evaluated retrospectively. The second approach is continuous real-time air monitoring so that workers can be warned that a significant release of airborne radioactivity may have just occurred. In implementing an effective air sampling program, it is important to achieve a balance between the two general approaches. The specific balance depends on hazard level of the work and the characteristics of each facility.
A special component of the second approach which can apply, if properly implemented, is the preparation of continuous air monitoring instrumentation and protocols. This enables radiation protection monitoring of personnel that have been trained and fitted with personal protective equipment (PPE) that permit pre-planned, defined, extended stay time in elevated concentrations of airborne radioactive substances. Such approaches can occur either as part of a planned re-entry of a contaminated area following an accidental loss of containment for accident assessment and recovery, or part of a project which involves systematic or routine access to radioactive substances (e.g. preparing process material containing easily aerosolized components), or handling objects such as poorly characterized waste materials that may contain radioactive contaminants that could be aerosolized when handled during repackaging. In this special case, the role of continuous air monitoring is to provide an alert to health physics personnel that the air concentrations of concern have exceeded a threshold such that the planned level of protection afforded by PPE has been or could be exceeded. This level would typically be many 10's or 100's of times higher than the derived air concentration (DAC) established for unprotected workers. The monitoring alarm or alert would therefore be designed not to be confused with the normal monitoring alarm, and the action taken in response would be similarly targeted at the specific site and personnel involved.
The air sampling strategy should be designed to minimize internal exposures and balanced with social, technical, economic, practical, and public policy considerations that are associated with the use of the radioactive substance.

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See the scope of the revised IEC 60709 in 45A/1113/CDV that was unchanged for the preparation of the proposal of FDIS to be circulated in parallel in CENELEC.

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See the scope of IEC 62465:2010. Adoption of IEC 62465 is to be done without modification.

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IEC 60964:2018 is available as IEC 60964:2018 RLV which contains the International Standard and its Redline version, showing all changes of the technical content compared to the previous edition.IEC 60964:2018 establishes requirements for the human-machine interface in the main control rooms of nuclear power plants. The document also establishes requirements for the selection of functions, design consideration and organization of the human-machine interface and procedures which are used systematically to verify and validate the functional design. These requirements reflect the application of human factors engineering principles as they apply to the human-machine interface during plant operational states and accident conditions (including design basis and design extension conditions), as defined in IAEA SSR-2/1 and IAEA NP-T-3.16. This third edition cancels and replaces the second edition published in 2009. This edition constitutes a technical revision. This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition: a) to review the usage of the term “task” ensuring consistency between IEC 60964 and IEC 61839; b) to clarify the role, functional capability, robustness and integrity of supporting services for the MCR to promote its continued use at the time of a severe accident or extreme external hazard; c) to review the relevance of the standard to the IAEA safety guides and IEC SC 45A standards that have been published since IEC 60964:2009 was developed; d) to clarify the role and meaning of “task analysis”, e) to further delineate the relationships with derivative standards (i.e. IEC 61227, IEC 61771, IEC 61772, IEC 61839, IEC 62241 and others of relevance to the control room design); f) to consider its alignment with the Human Factors Engineering principles, specifically with the ones of IAEA safety guide on Human Factors (DS-492) to be issued.

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See the technical scope of the amendment of IEC 62808 in 45A/1134/CDV that was unchanged for the preparation of the proposal of FDIS to be circulated in parallel in CENELEC.

  • Amendment
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See the scope of the revised IEC 60709 in 45A/1113/CDV that was unchanged for the preparation of the proposal of FDIS to be circulated in parallel in CENELEC.

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See the scope of IEC 62646:2016. Adoption of IEC 62646 is to be done without modification

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IEC 61225:2019 specifies the performance and the functional characteristics of the low voltage static uninterruptible power supply (SUPS) systems in a nuclear power plant and, for applicable parts, in general for nuclear facilities. An uninterruptible power supply is an electrical equipment which draws electrical energy from a source, stores it and maintains supply in a specified form by means inside the equipment to output terminals. A static uninterruptible power supply (SUPS) has no rotating parts to perform its functions.
This third edition cancels and replaces the second edition published in 2005. This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) the principal objective of this edition is to address the requirements on the static uninterruptible power supplies in nuclear power plants;
b) in addition to Instrumentation and Control (I&C) power supplies include all static uninterruptible power supplies;
c) emphasize that the static uninterruptible power supplies shall protect the connected equipment (loads) from transients on the on-site AC distribution system (the immunity concept);
d) in accordance with the defence-in-depth concept, this standard applies to static uninterruptible power supplies for all equipment, not only for equipment important to safety, with a graded approach to verification and validation;
e) addition of the requirement that, when batteries are connected in parallel under abnormal operating conditions, they shall be properly protected with isolation devices to avoid any failure that may impair more than one division of the uninterruptible power supply.

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The document provides: — guidelines for determining the thermal effects to consider on fire barriers inside a given room; — guidelines for determining the global performance of the fire barriers based on standard test characterization; — guidelines for assessing the need for additional tests to verify the robustness of the solution. Requirements of applicable standards, numerical tools validation and verification (V&V), and the expected qualification of fire resistance laboratories are detailed. The limitations of the method's applicability and scope are discussed. The purpose and justification of this document is to describe a new methodology for the verification of the efficiency of fire barriers, which is initially based on a standardized fire resistance test. The significance of this work relates to the fact that the present methodology will enhance the level of safety by providing more realism to hazards analysis in combination with standardized test data. It completes the standard ISO-fire rating required for justifying the performance. The most relevant benefit of this method concerns the determination of the global performance of a barrier in a fire of extended duration compared to the classification given by the ISO-fire rating.

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IEC 62765-2:2019 identifies minimum requirements and applicable practices for correcting and preventing any potential impacts on nuclear power plant (NPP) safety due to the ageing of temperature sensors, such as NPP resistance temperature detectors (RTDs) and thermocouples (TCs).
This document provides strategies, technical requirements, and recommended practices for the management of the ageing of temperature sensors important to safety in nuclear power plants (NPPs) to ensure that ageing can be identified and that suitable remedial actions are undertaken as necessary to demonstrate that the safety of the plant will not be impaired. This document is aligned with IEC 62342, which provides guidance on ageing management for instrumentation and control (I&C) systems important to safety in NPPs

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IEC 62954:2019 presents the requirements for the on-site emergency response facilities (referred to hereinafter as the “ERF”) which are to be used in case of incidents or accidents occurring on the associated Nuclear Power Plant (NPP).
The ERF consists of the Emergency Response Centre (ERC), the Technical Support Centre (TSC) and the Operational Support Centre (OSC).
It establishes requirements for the ERF features and ERF I&C equipment to:
· coordinate on-site operational efforts with respect to safety and radioprotection;
· optimize the design in terms of environment control, lighting, power supplies and access control of the ERF;
· enhance the identification and resolution of potential conflicts between the traditional operational means and emergency means (MCR/SCR and ERF, operating staff and emergency teams, operational procedures and emergency procedures);
· aid the identification and the enhancement of the potential synergies between the traditional operational means and emergency means.

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IEC 60964:2018 is available as IEC 60964:2018 RLV which contains the International Standard and its Redline version, showing all changes of the technical content compared to the previous edition.
IEC 60964:2018 establishes requirements for the human-machine interface in the main control rooms of nuclear power plants. The document also establishes requirements for the selection of functions, design consideration and organization of the human-machine interface and procedures which are used systematically to verify and validate the functional design. These requirements reflect the application of human factors engineering principles as they apply to the human-machine interface during plant operational states and accident conditions (including design basis and design extension conditions), as defined in IAEA SSR-2/1 and IAEA NP-T-3.16. This third edition cancels and replaces the second edition published in 2009. This edition constitutes a technical revision. This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) to review the usage of the term “task” ensuring consistency between IEC 60964 and IEC 61839;
b) to clarify the role, functional capability, robustness and integrity of supporting services for the MCR to promote its continued use at the time of a severe accident or extreme external hazard;
c) to review the relevance of the standard to the IAEA safety guides and IEC SC 45A standards that have been published since IEC 60964:2009 was developed;
d) to clarify the role and meaning of “task analysis”,
e) to further delineate the relationships with derivative standards (i.e. IEC 61227, IEC 61771, IEC 61772, IEC 61839, IEC 62241 and others of relevance to the control room design);
f) to consider its alignment with the Human Factors Engineering principles, specifically with the ones of IAEA safety guide on Human Factors (DS-492) to be issued.

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This document specifies the requirements applicable to the design and use of airborne confinement systems that ensure safety and radioprotection functions in nuclear worksites and in nuclear installations under decommissioning to protect from radioactive contamination produced: aerosol or gas. The purpose of confinement systems is to protect the workers, members of the public and environment against the spread of radioactive contamination resulting from operations in nuclear worksites and from nuclear installations under decommissioning. The confinement of nuclear worksites and of nuclear installations under decommissioning is characterized by the temporary and evolving (dynamic) nature of the operations to be performed. These operations often take place in area not specifically designed for this purpose. This document applies to maintenance or upgrades at worksites which fit the above definition. NOTE The requirements for the design and use of ventilation and confinement systems and for liquid confinement in nuclear reactors or in nuclear installations other than nuclear worksites and nuclear installations under decommissioning are developed in other ISO standards.

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IEC 62138:2018 is also available as IEC 62138:2018 RLV which contains the International Standard and its Redline version, showing all changes of the technical content compared to the previous edition.
IEC 62138:2018 specifies requirements for the software of computer-based instrumentation and control (I&C) systems performing functions of safety category B or C as defined by IEC 61226. It complements IEC 60880 which provides requirements for the software of computer-based I&C systems performing functions of safety category A. It is consistent with, and complementary to, IEC 61513. Requirements that are not specific to software are deferred to IEC 61513. This new edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
- align the standard with standards published or revised since the first edition, in particular IEC 61513, IEC 60880, IEC 62645 and IEC 62671;
- merge two clauses in order to avoid repetitions of text;
- introduce requirements on traceability in consistency with IEC 61513;
- introduce new annexes.

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