33.200 - Telecontrol. Telemetering
ICS 33.200 Details
Telecontrol. Telemetering
Fernuberwachung. Fernsteuerung
Telecommande. Telemesure
Daljinsko krmiljenje, daljinske meritve (telemetrija)
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IEC TR 61850-90-7:2023 is available as IEC TR 61850-90-7:2023 RLV which contains the International Standard and its Redline version, showing all changes of the technical content compared to the previous edition.IEC TR 61850-90-7:2023, which is a Technical Report, describes functions for power converter-based distributed energy resources (DER) systems, focused on DC-to-AC and AC-to-AC conversions and including photovoltaic systems (PV), battery storage systems, electric vehicle (EV) charging systems, and any other DER systems with a controllable power converter. The functions defined in this document were used to help define the information models described in IEC 61850-7-420 and which can be used in the exchange of information between these power converter-based DER systems and the utilities, energy service providers (ESPs), or other entities which are tasked with managing the volt, var, and watt capabilities of these power converter-based systems. These power converter-based DER systems can range from very small grid-connected systems at residential customer sites, to medium-sized systems configured as microgrids on campuses or communities, to very large systems in utility-operated power plants, and to many other configurations and ownership models. They may or may not combine different types of DER systems behind the power converter, such as a power converter-based DER system and a battery that are connected at the DC level. This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2013. This edition is primarily an editorial revision in order to be consistent with the publication of Edition 2 of IEC 61850-7-420:2021. This edition includes the following significant changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) Clause 3 has been updated.
b) Clause 8 (IEC 61850 information models for power converter-based functions) has been deleted. This clause defined data models with the transitional namespace “(Tr) IEC 61850-90-7:2012”. The data models are now defined in IEC 61850-7-420.
- Technical report163 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
IEC 62351-3:2023 specifies how to provide confidentiality, integrity protection, and message level authentication for protocols that make use of TCP/IP as a message transport layer and utilize Transport Layer Security when cyber-security is required. This may relate to SCADA and telecontrol protocols, but also to additional protocols if they meet the requirements in this document.
IEC 62351-3 specifies how to secure TCP/IP-based protocols through constraints on the specification of the messages, procedures, and algorithms of Transport Layer Security (TLS) (TLSv1.2 defined in RFC 5246, TLSv1.3 defined in RFC 8446). In the specific clauses, there will be subclauses to note the differences and commonalities in the application depending on the target TLS version. The use and specification of intervening external security devices (e.g., "bump-in-the-wire") are considered out-of-scope.
In contrast to previous editions of this document, this edition is self-contained in terms of completely defining a profile of TLS. Hence, it can be applied directly, without the need to specify further TLS parameters, except the port number, over which the communication will be performed. Therefore, this part can be directly utilized from a referencing standard and can be combined with further security measures on other layers. Providing the profiling of TLS without the need for further specifying TLS parameters allows declaring conformity to the described functionality without the need to involve further IEC 62351 documents.
This document is intended to be referenced as a normative part of other IEC standards that have the need for providing security for their TCP/IP-based protocol exchanges under similar boundary conditions. However, it is up to the individual protocol security initiatives to decide if this document is to be referenced.
The document also defines security events for specific conditions, which support error handling, security audit trails, intrusion detection, and conformance testing. Any action of an organization in response to events to an error condition described in this document are beyond the scope of this document and are expected to be defined by the organization’s security policy.
This document reflects the security requirements of the IEC power systems management protocols. Should other standards bring forward new requirements, this document may need to be revised.
This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2014, Amendment 1:2018 and Amendment 2:2020. This edition constitutes a technical revision.
This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) Inclusion of the TLSv1.2 related parameter required in IEC 62351-3 Ed.1.2 to be specified by the referencing standard. This comprises the following parameter:
• Mandatory TLSv1.2 cipher suites to be supported.
• Specification of session resumption parameters.
• Specification of session renegotiation parameters.
• Revocation handling using CRL and OCSP.
• Handling of security events.
b) Inclusion of a TLSv1.3 profile to be applicable for the power system domain in a similar way as for TLSv1.2 session.
- Standard52 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
IEC TR 61850-90-27:2023, which is a Technical Report, is to provide basic aspects that need to be considered when using IEC 61850 for information exchange between systems and components to support applications for thermal systems connected to electric power networks. Thermal systems isolated from electric power networks are outside the scope of this document.
From the perspective of category, this document considers thermal systems that provide thermal energy services for residential and/or commercial buildings and districts. In other words, industrial thermal systems are outside the scope of this document.
From the perspective of energy transformation, this document deals with ones between electricity and thermal energy. Other types of energy such as gas will be documented in a future report.
From the perspective of resource, this document considers generic aspects of thermal energy generators, storage, and loads that may contribute to the operations and management of electric power networks. It also deals with specific types of resources that have electric parts such as power to heat (P2H) that is a kind of electric load, and combined heat and power (CHP) that is an electric generator. This document models the characteristics for such specific units of resources including alarms and ratings. On the other hand, it does not deal with other types of specific units according to the scope of this document. For example, gas boilers, thermal energy tanks, heat exchangers, HVAC, auxiliary devices for thermal systems are not modelled as logical nodes in this document.
As a summary, this document
- gives an overview of thermal energy resources connected to electric power networks.
- provides use cases for typical operations of thermal system and deducts exchanged information necessary for information modelling.
- provides mapping of requirements on LNs based on the use cases.
- defines generic logical nodes for resources in thermal systems.
- defines logical nodes for specific unit types of P2H and CHP.
- defines logical nodes for operations that may contribute to the operations of electric power networks.
- Technical report180 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
IEC 62351-3:2023 specifies how to provide confidentiality, integrity protection, and message level authentication for protocols that make use of TCP/IP as a message transport layer and utilize Transport Layer Security when cyber-security is required. This may relate to SCADA and telecontrol protocols, but also to additional protocols if they meet the requirements in this document. IEC 62351-3 specifies how to secure TCP/IP-based protocols through constraints on the specification of the messages, procedures, and algorithms of Transport Layer Security (TLS) (TLSv1.2 defined in RFC 5246, TLSv1.3 defined in RFC 8446). In the specific clauses, there will be subclauses to note the differences and commonalities in the application depending on the target TLS version. The use and specification of intervening external security devices (e.g., "bump-in-the-wire") are considered out-of-scope. In contrast to previous editions of this document, this edition is self-contained in terms of completely defining a profile of TLS. Hence, it can be applied directly, without the need to specify further TLS parameters, except the port number, over which the communication will be performed. Therefore, this part can be directly utilized from a referencing standard and can be combined with further security measures on other layers. Providing the profiling of TLS without the need for further specifying TLS parameters allows declaring conformity to the described functionality without the need to involve further IEC 62351 documents. This document is intended to be referenced as a normative part of other IEC standards that have the need for providing security for their TCP/IP-based protocol exchanges under similar boundary conditions. However, it is up to the individual protocol security initiatives to decide if this document is to be referenced. The document also defines security events for specific conditions, which support error handling, security audit trails, intrusion detection, and conformance testing. Any action of an organization in response to events to an error condition described in this document are beyond the scope of this document and are expected to be defined by the organization’s security policy. This document reflects the security requirements of the IEC power systems management protocols. Should other standards bring forward new requirements, this document may need to be revised. This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2014, Amendment 1:2018 and Amendment 2:2020. This edition constitutes a technical revision. This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition: a) Inclusion of the TLSv1.2 related parameter required in IEC 62351-3 Ed.1.2 to be specified by the referencing standard. This comprises the following parameter: • Mandatory TLSv1.2 cipher suites to be supported. • Specification of session resumption parameters. • Specification of session renegotiation parameters. • Revocation handling using CRL and OCSP. • Handling of security events. b) Inclusion of a TLSv1.3 profile to be applicable for the power system domain in a similar way as for TLSv1.2 session.
- Standard52 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
IEC 62351-9:2023 specifies cryptographic key management, primarily focused on the management of long-term keys, which are most often asymmetric key pairs, such as public-key certificates and corresponding private keys. As certificates build the base this document builds a foundation for many IEC 62351 services (see also Annex A). Symmetric key management is also considered but only with respect to session keys for group-based communication as applied in IEC 62351-6. The objective of this document is to define requirements and technologies to achieve interoperability of key management by specifying or limiting key management options to be used.
This document assumes that an organization (or group of organizations) has defined a security policy to select the type of keys and cryptographic algorithms that will be utilized, which may have to align with other standards or regulatory requirements. This document therefore specifies only the management techniques for these selected key and cryptography infrastructures. This document assumes that the reader has a basic understanding of cryptography and key management principles.
The requirements for the management of pairwise symmetric (session) keys in the context of communication protocols is specified in the parts of IEC 62351 utilizing or specifying pairwise communication such as:
• IEC 62351-3 for TLS by profiling the TLS options
• IEC 62351-4 for the application layer end-to-end security
• IEC TS 62351-5 for the application layer security mechanism for IEC 60870-5-101/104 and IEEE 1815 (DNP3)
The requirements for the management of symmetric group keys in the context of power system communication protocols is specified in IEC 62351-6 for utilizing group security to protect GOOSE and SV communication. IEC 62351-9 utilizes GDOI as already IETF specified group-based key management protocol to manage the group security parameter and enhances this protocol to carry the security parameter for GOOSE, SV, and PTP.
This document also defines security events for specific conditions which could identify issues which might require error handling. However, the actions of the organisation in response to these error conditions are beyond the scope of this document and are expected to be defined by the organizations security policy.
In the future, as public-key cryptography becomes endangered by the evolution of quantum computers, this document will also consider post-quantum cryptography to a certain extent. Note that at this time being no specific measures are provided.
This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2017. This edition constitutes a technical revision.
This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) Certificate components and verification of the certificate components have been added;
b) GDOI has been updated to include findings from interop tests;
c) GDOI operation considerations have been added;
d) GDOI support for PTP (IEEE 1588) support has been added as specified by IEC/IEEE 61850-9-3 Power Profile;
e) Cyber security event logging has been added as well as the mapping to IEC 62351-14;
f) Annex B with background on utilized cryptographic algorithms and mechanisms has been added.
- Standard296 pagesEnglish and French languagesale 15% off
IEC 62351-3:2023 specifies how to provide confidentiality, integrity protection, and message level authentication for protocols that make use of TCP/IP as a message transport layer and utilize Transport Layer Security when cyber-security is required. This may relate to SCADA and telecontrol protocols, but also to additional protocols if they meet the requirements in this document.
IEC 62351-3 specifies how to secure TCP/IP-based protocols through constraints on the specification of the messages, procedures, and algorithms of Transport Layer Security (TLS) (TLSv1.2 defined in RFC 5246, TLSv1.3 defined in RFC 8446). In the specific clauses, there will be subclauses to note the differences and commonalities in the application depending on the target TLS version. The use and specification of intervening external security devices (e.g., "bump-in-the-wire") are considered out-of-scope.
In contrast to previous editions of this document, this edition is self-contained in terms of completely defining a profile of TLS. Hence, it can be applied directly, without the need to specify further TLS parameters, except the port number, over which the communication will be performed. Therefore, this part can be directly utilized from a referencing standard and can be combined with further security measures on other layers. Providing the profiling of TLS without the need for further specifying TLS parameters allows declaring conformity to the described functionality without the need to involve further IEC 62351 documents.
This document is intended to be referenced as a normative part of other IEC standards that have the need for providing security for their TCP/IP-based protocol exchanges under similar boundary conditions. However, it is up to the individual protocol security initiatives to decide if this document is to be referenced.
The document also defines security events for specific conditions, which support error handling, security audit trails, intrusion detection, and conformance testing. Any action of an organization in response to events to an error condition described in this document are beyond the scope of this document and are expected to be defined by the organization’s security policy.
This document reflects the security requirements of the IEC power systems management protocols. Should other standards bring forward new requirements, this document may need to be revised.
This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2014, Amendment 1:2018 and Amendment 2:2020. This edition constitutes a technical revision.
This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) Inclusion of the TLSv1.2 related parameter required in IEC 62351-3 Ed.1.2 to be specified by the referencing standard. This comprises the following parameter:
• Mandatory TLSv1.2 cipher suites to be supported.
• Specification of session resumption parameters.
• Specification of session renegotiation parameters.
• Revocation handling using CRL and OCSP.
• Handling of security events.
b) Inclusion of a TLSv1.3 profile to be applicable for the power system domain in a similar way as for TLSv1.2 session.
- Standard103 pagesEnglish and French languagesale 15% off
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- Corrigendum3 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
This Protection Profile describes a set of security requirements for smart meters, based on the ‘minimum security requirements’ for components of AMI infrastructures in [5]. The requirements in [5] were based on the concept that there are a common/generic set of underlying ‘minimum’ security requirements associated with smart metering requirement specifications in a number of EU Member States
- Technical specification72 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
IEC TS 63384-1:2023 provides guidance for power system stability control framework design. It covers the uniform use of terms and definitions, general objectives and principles for power system stability control, the classification of power system stability control, and the framework combining several types of stability controls in a coordinated and cost-effective (risk-based) manner.
In accordance with this guideline, the framework is designed to cope with disturbances of different probabilities of occurrence and impact on power system security and stability. Effective control approaches are designed to prevent or minimize the scope of future blackouts.
- Technical specification15 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
- Standard1 pageEnglish and French languagesale 15% off
This part of IEC 62351 defines the application authentication mechanism (A-profile) specifying messages, procedures and algorithms for securing the operation of all protocols based on or derived from IEC 60870-5: Telecontrol Equipment and Systems - Transmission Protocols. This Standard applies to at least those protocols listed in Table 1. [Table 1] The initial audience for this International Standard is intended to be the members of the working groups developing the protocols listed in Table 1. For the measures described in this standard to take effect, they must be accepted and referenced by the specifications for the protocols themselves. This document is written to enable that process. The working groups in charge of take this standard to the specific protocols listed in Table 1 may choose not to do so. The subsequent audience for this specification is intended to be the developers of products that implement these protocols. Portions of this standard may also be of use to managers and executives in order to understand the purpose and requirements of the work. This document is organized working from the general to the specific, as follows: - Clauses 2 through 4 provide background terms, definitions, and references. - Clause 5 describes the problems this specification is intended to address. - Clause 6 describes the mechanism generically without reference to a specific protocol. - Clauses 7 and 8 describe the mechanism more precisely and are the primary normative part of this specification. - Clause 9 define the interoperability requirements for this authentication mechanism. - Clause 10 describes the requirements for other standards referencing this specification Unless specifically labelled as informative or optional, all clauses of this specification are normative.
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- Technical specification12 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
IEC TS 61850-7-7:2018(E) specifies a way to model the code components of IEC 61850 data model (e.g., the tables describing logical nodes, common data classes, structured data attributes, and enumerations) in an XML format that can be imported and interpreted by tools. The purpose of this document is limited to the publication of the XML format which should support the data model part of any IEC 61850 related standard.
- Technical specification122 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
- Technical specification69 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
IEC 62351-5:2023 defines the application profile (A-profile) secure communication mechanism specifying messages, procedures and algorithms for securing the operation of all protocols based on or derived from IEC 60870-5, Telecontrol Equipment and Systems – Transmission Protocols.
For the measures described in this document to take effect, they must be accepted and referenced by the specifications for the protocols themselves. This document is written to enable that process.
The subsequent audience for this document is intended to be the developers of products that implement these protocols.
Portions of this document may also be of use to managers and executives in order to understand the purpose and requirements of the work.
This document is organized working from the general to the specific, as follows:
• Clauses 2 through 4 provide background terms, definitions, and references.
• Clause 5 describes the problems this specification is intended to address.
• Clause 6 describes the mechanism generically without reference to a specific protocol.
• Clauses 7 and 8 describe the mechanism more precisely and are the primary normative part of this specification.
• Clause 9 define the interoperability requirements for this secure communication mechanism.
• Clause 10 describes the requirements for other standards referencing this document.
The actions of an organization in response to events and error conditions described in this document are expected to be defined by the organization’s security policy and they are beyond the scope of this document.
This International Standard cancels and replaces IEC TS 62351-5 published in 2013. It constitutes a technical revision. The primary changes in this International Standard are:
a) The secure communication mechanism is performed on per controlling station/controlled station association.
b) User management to add, change or delete a User, was removed.
c) Symmetric method to change the Update Key was removed.
d) Asymmetric method to the change Update Key was reviewed.
e) Challenge/Reply procedure and concepts were removed.
f) Aggressive Mode concept was replaced with the Secure Data message exchange mechanism.
g) Authenticated encryption of application data was added.
h) The list of permitted security algorithms has been updated.
i) The rules for calculating messages sequence numbers have been updated
j) Events monitoring and logging was added
- Standard263 pagesEnglish and French languagesale 15% off
This Protection Profile describes a set of security requirements for smart meters, based on the ‘minimum security requirements’ for components of AMI infrastructures in [5]. The requirements in [5] were based on the concept that there are a common/generic set of underlying ‘minimum’ security requirements associated with smart metering requirement specifications in a number of EU Member States
- Technical specification72 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
IEC 61755-2-1:2022 defines a set of prescribed conditions for a single-mode fibre optic connection that is maintained in order to satisfy the requirements of attenuation and return loss (RL) performance in a randomly mated pair of non-angled polished physically contacting (PC) fibres. The model uses a Gaussian distribution of light intensity over the specified mode field diameter (MFD) for determination of attenuation performance grades, based on MFD mismatch and the amount of lateral and angular fibre core offsets. Attenuation and RL performance grades are defined in IEC 61755-1. This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2006. This edition constitutes a technical revision. This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
addition of normative references and visual requirement tables;
reconsideration of the whole parts of the text to avoid misuse of the standard.
- Standard24 pagesEnglish and French languagesale 15% off
IEC TS 62351-100-6:2022 (E), which is a technical specification, is part of the IEC 62351 suite of standards, which describes test cases for interoperability conformance testing of data and communication security for Substation Automation Systems [SAS] and telecontrol systems which implement IEC TS 62351-6. The tests described in this part do not evaluate the security of the implementation. Thus, citing conformance to this part does not imply that any particular security level has been achieved by the corresponding product, or by the system in which it is used.
The goal of this part of IEC 62351 is to enable interoperability by providing a standard method of testing protocol implementations, but it does not guarantee the full interoperability of devices. It is expected that using this specification during testing will minimize the risk of non-interoperability. Additional testing and assurance measures will be required to verify that a particular implementation of IEC TC 62351-6 has correctly implemented all the security functions and that they can be assured to be present in all delivered products. This topic is covered in other IEC standards, for example IEC 62443.
The scope of this document is to specify common available procedures and definitions for conformance and/or interoperability testing of IEC 62351-6, the IEC 61850-8-1, IEC 61850-9-2 and also their recommendations over IEC 62351-3 for profiles including TCP/IP and IEC 62351 4 for profiles including MMS. These are the security extensions for IEC 61850 and derivatives to enable unambiguous and standardized evaluation of IEC TS 62351-6 and its companion standards protocol implementations.
The detailed test cases per companion standard, containing among others mandatory and optional mandatory test cases per Secure Communication Application Function, secure ASDU (Application Service Data Unit) and transmission procedures, will become available as technical specifications (TS). Other functionality may need additional test cases, but this is outside the scope of this part of IEC 62351. This document is such a technical specification for the mentioned companion standard.
This document deals mainly with data and communication security conformance testing; therefore, other requirements, such as safety or EMC (Electromagnetic compatibility) are not covered. These requirements are covered by other standards (if applicable) and the proof of compliance for these topics is done according to these standards.
- Technical specification32 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
This document describes how IEC 61970-450 (all parts), IEC 61970-600 (all parts) profile specifications are structured and created. Profile specifications describe a subset of the Canonical CIM dedicated to a specific data exchange. The Canonical CIM is described in IEC 61970-300 (all parts) as well as in IEC 61968-11. Rules for creation or extension of Canonical CIM are outside the scope of this document. This document specifies the structure of a profile specification and the rules for selecting subsets of information from the Canonical CIM. It standardizes the operations used to create the profile elements from the Canonical CIM. As Canonical CIM is described in UML the operations are described in terms of UML classes, attributes, and roles. It is possible to map UML to RDFS or OWL, so any of the languages UML, RDFS or OWL can be used to describe the created profiles. Specification of languages (UML, RDFS or OWL) used to describe profiles as well as how profiles are presented and edited in user interfaces are outside the scope of this document. Languages used to describe profiles are specified in other specifications. Relevant specifications are referenced in Clause 2. UML supports adding free text that describes further restrictions on UML constructs, e.g. classes, attribute values, association roles and cardinalities. Languages such as OCL and SHACL are dedicated to describing constraints. OCL is used to describe constraints for object data described in UML while SHACL is used to describe constraints on graph data described by RDFS or OWL. OCL is within the scope of this document, but SHACL is not. This document supports profiles describing data exchanged as CIMXML datasets or messages. The exchange format within the scope is in accordance with IEC 61970-552 but other formats are possible. Tool interoperability and serialisation formats are outside the scope of this document.
- Standard36 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
- Technical specification10 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
This document specifies data exchange and communications for meters in a generic way.
This document establishes a protocol specification for the Application Layer for meters and establishes several protocols for meter communications which can be applied depending on the application being fulfilled.
This document also specifies the overall structure of the Object Identification System (OBIS) and the mapping of all commonly used data items in metering equipment to their identification codes.
NOTE Electricity meters are not covered by this document, as the standardization of remote readout of electricity meters is a task for CENELEC/IEC.
- Standard129 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
- Draft130 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
1.1 General
This International Standard is Part 100 of IEC 61968. It defines how messages may be exchanged between co-operating systems in order to facilitate the transfer of application-specific data. Such application-specific data include but are not limited to the message payloads defined in IEC 61968 (Parts 3-9 and Part 13), IEC 61970 and IEC 62325.
1.2 About This International Standard
This International Standard provides normative definitions for:
- a set of message archetypes (clause 5);
- a set of message exchange patterns that both sending and receiving systems are expected to implement (clause 6);
- the exact format of the messages that are to be transmitted over the various integration technologies including a precise description of the information that each message must contain (clause 7);
- a set of constraints and conventions to which applications must adhere in order to facilitate message exchange using IEC 61968-100 (clause 8);
- the details of how IEC 61968-100 messages should be implemented using various underlying transport mechanisms (clause 9).
1.3 What is not covered by this International Standard
Security considerations lie outside the scope of IEC 61968-100. This document defers to the IEC 62351 series for definitions and practices relating to the secure transmission of messages.
1.4 Future Considerations
1.4.1 Choice of Encoding Mechanisms
IEC 61968-100:2021 prescribes XML as the normative encoding mechanism for all messages defined by this International Standard.
Future editions of IEC 61968-100 may specify additional normative encoding methods including support for IEC 62361-104. The latter defines encodings to facilitate the exchange of information in the form of JSON documents whose semantics are defined by the IEC CIM and whose syntax is defined by an IETF JSON schema.
1.4.2 Choice of Web Service Technologies
IEC 61968-100:2021 provides normative definitions for the use of SOAP Web Services (clause 9.2) and Java Messaging Service (clause 9.3) for the transport of messages.
Future editions of IEC 61968-100 may specify additional normative web service technologies such as REST.
- Standard251 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
This part of IEC 62325 specifies a UML package for the HVDC Link scheduling business
process and its associated document contextual models, assembly models and XML schemas
for use within the European style electricity markets.
This part of IEC 62325 is based on the European style market contextual model
(IEC 62325-351). The business process covered by this part of IEC 62325 is described in
Subclause 5.3.
The relevant aggregate core components (ACCs) defined in IEC 62325-351 have been
contextualised into aggregated business information entities (ABIEs) to satisfy the requirements
of the European style market HVDC Link scheduling business process.
- Standard56 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
The specifications of this document refer to general, respectively core, communication
requirements of the application functions in all domains of power utility automation systems.
Dedicated communication requirements and most examples of application functions in this
document are from the domain substation automation but may be reused in or extended to other
domains within power utility automation systems. Note that sometimes instead of the term
substation automation domain the term substation domain is used, especially if both the
switchyard devices (primary system) and the automation system (secondary system) are
regarded.
The description of the application functions is not used to standardize these functions, but to
identify communication requirements between Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) hosting
these functions within plants and substations in the power system, between such stations (e.g.
between substation for line protection) and between the plant or substation and higher-level
remote operating places (e.g. network control centres) and maintenance places. In addition
interfaces to remote technical services (e.g. maintenance centres) are considered. The general
scope is the communication requirements for power utility automation systems. The basic goal
is interoperability for all interactions providing a seamless communication system for the overall
power system management. Another prerequisite for interoperability is a commonly defined
method for time synchronization.
Standardizing application functions and their implementation is completely outside the scope of
this document. Therefore, it cannot be assumed a single philosophy of allocating application
functions to devices. To support the resulting request for free allocation of these functions, a
proper breakdown of these functions into parts relevant for communication is defined. The
exchanged data and their required performance are defined.
The same or similar IEDs from substations like protective and control devices are found in other
domains like power plants also. Using this document for such devices in these plants facilitates
the system integration e.g. between the power plant control and the related substation
automation system. For some of such other application domains like wind power plants, hydro
power plants and distributed energy resources specific standard parts according to the
IEC 61850 series have been already defined and published.
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IEC 61970-401:2022 describes how IEC 61970-450 (all parts), IEC 61970-600 (all parts) profile specifications are structured and created. Profile specifications describe a subset of the Canonical CIM dedicated to a specific data exchange. The Canonical CIM is described in IEC 61970 300 (all parts) as well as in IEC 61968-11.
Rules for creation or extension of Canonical CIM are outside the scope of this document.
This document specifies the structure of a profile specification and the rules for selecting subsets of information from the Canonical CIM. It standardizes the operations used to create the profile elements from the Canonical CIM. As Canonical CIM is described in UML the operations are described in terms of UML classes, attributes, and roles.
It is possible to map UML to RDFS or OWL, so any of the languages UML, RDFS or OWL can be used to describe the created profiles. Specification of languages (UML, RDFS or OWL) used to describe profiles as well as how profiles are presented and edited in user interfaces are outside the scope of this document. Languages used to describe profiles are specified in other specifications. Relevant specifications are referenced in Clause 2.
UML supports adding free text that describes further restrictions on UML constructs, e.g. classes, attribute values, association roles and cardinalities. Languages such as OCL and SHACL are dedicated to describing constraints. OCL is used to describe constraints for object data described in UML while SHACL is used to describe constraints on graph data described by RDFS or OWL. OCL is within the scope of this document, but SHACL is not.
This document supports profiles describing data exchanged as CIMXML datasets or messages. The exchange format within the scope is in accordance with IEC 61970-552 but other formats are possible.
Tool interoperability and serialisation formats are outside the scope of this document.
This first edition cancels and replaces IEC TS IEC 61970-401 published in 2005. This edition constitutes a technical revision.
This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) The previous edition of IEC TS 61970-401:2005 provided an overview of the Component Interface Specifications (CIS) IEC 61970-402, IEC 61970-403, IEC 61970-404, IEC 61970-405, and IEC 61970-407. IEC 61970-402 to IEC 61970-407 are duplicates of existing OPC interfaces from OPC Foundation and the DAIS/HDA interfaces from OMG. Hence IEC 61970-402 to IEC 61970-407 have been withdrawn and IEC TS 61970-401:2005 no longer serves a purpose.
b) IEC 61970-401 (this document) does not contain an overview of Component Interface Specifications (CIS) but instead a description of how to create profile specifications that describes dataset contents (or message contents). Hence it has been renamed "Profile framework". The profile specifications IEC 61970-450 (all parts) and IEC 61970-600 (all parts) describe dataset contents. The purpose of this document is to define the rules to be followed in the process of creating profile specifications.
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PUBLICATION EXPECTED BY 2022-04-27
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IEC 62325-451-8:2022 specifies a UML package for the HVDC Link scheduling business process and its associated document contextual models, assembly models and XML schemas for use within the European style electricity markets. This part of IEC 62325 is based on the European style market contextual model (IEC 62325-351). The business process covered by this part of IEC 62325 is described in Subclause 5.3. The relevant aggregate core components (ACCs) defined in IEC 62325-351 have been contextualised into aggregated business information entities (ABIEs) to satisfy the requirements of the European style market HVDC Link scheduling business process.
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This part of IEC 61968 specifies the information content of a set of message types that can be used to support many of the business functions related to records and asset management. Typical uses of the message types defined in this document include network extension planning, copying feeder or other network data between systems, network or diagram edits and asset inspection. Message types defined in other parts of IEC 61968 may also be relevant to these use cases.
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This part of IEC 61970 belongs to the IEC 61970-450 to IEC 61970-499 series that, taken as a
whole, defines at an abstract level the content and exchange mechanisms used for data
transmitted between power system analyses applications, control centres and/or control centre
components.
The purpose of this document is to rigorously define the subset of classes, class attributes, and
roles from the CIM necessary to describe the result of state estimation, power flow and other
similar applications that produce a steady-state solution of a power network, under a set of use
cases which are included informatively in this document.
This document is intended for two distinct audiences, data producers and data recipients, and
can be read from those two perspectives. From the standpoint of model export software used
by a data producer, the document defines how a producer may describe an instance of a
network case in order to make it available to some other program. From the standpoint of a
consumer, the document defines what that importing software must be able to interpret in order
to consume power flow cases.
There are many different use cases for which use of this document is expected and they differ
in the way that the document will be applied in each case. Implementers are expected to
consider what use cases they wish to cover in order to know the extent of different options they
must cover. As an example, the profiles defined in this document will be used in some cases to
exchange starting conditions rather than solved conditions, so if this is an important use case,
it means that a consumer application needs to be able to handle an unsolved state as well as
one which has met some solution criteria
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1.1 General This International Standard is Part 100 of IEC 61968. It defines how messages may be exchanged between co-operating systems in order to facilitate the transfer of application-specific data. Such application-specific data include but are not limited to the message payloads defined in IEC 61968 (Parts 3-9 and Part 13), IEC 61970 and IEC 62325. 1.2 About This International Standard This International Standard provides normative definitions for: - a set of message archetypes (clause 5); - a set of message exchange patterns that both sending and receiving systems are expected to implement (clause 6); - the exact format of the messages that are to be transmitted over the various integration technologies including a precise description of the information that each message must contain (clause 7); - a set of constraints and conventions to which applications must adhere in order to facilitate message exchange using IEC 61968-100 (clause 8); - the details of how IEC 61968-100 messages should be implemented using various underlying transport mechanisms (clause 9). 1.3 What is not covered by this International Standard Security considerations lie outside the scope of IEC 61968-100. This document defers to the IEC 62351 series for definitions and practices relating to the secure transmission of messages. 1.4 Future Considerations 1.4.1 Choice of Encoding Mechanisms IEC 61968-100:2021 prescribes XML as the normative encoding mechanism for all messages defined by this International Standard. Future editions of IEC 61968-100 may specify additional normative encoding methods including support for IEC 62361-104. The latter defines encodings to facilitate the exchange of information in the form of JSON documents whose semantics are defined by the IEC CIM and whose syntax is defined by an IETF JSON schema. 1.4.2 Choice of Web Service Technologies IEC 61968-100:2021 provides normative definitions for the use of SOAP Web Services (clause 9.2) and Java Messaging Service (clause 9.3) for the transport of messages. Future editions of IEC 61968-100 may specify additional normative web service technologies such as REST.
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IEC 61970-301:2020 lays down the common information model (CIM), which is an abstract model that represents all the major objects in an electric utility enterprise typically involved in utility operations. By providing a standard way of representing power system resources as object classes and attributes, along with their relationships, the CIM facilitates the integration of network applications developed independently by different vendors, between entire systems running network applications developed independently, or between a system running network applications and other systems concerned with different aspects of power system operations, such as generation or distribution management. SCADA is modeled to the extent necessary to support power system simulation and inter-control centre communication. The CIM facilitates integration by defining a common language (i.e. semantics) based on the CIM to enable these applications or systems to access public data and exchange information independent of how such information is represented internally.
This edition reflects the model content version ‘IEC61970CIM17v38’, dated ‘2020-01-21’, and includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) Added Feeder modelling;
b) Added ICCP configuration modelling;
c) Correction of issues found in interoperability testing or use of the standard;
d) Improved documentation;
e) Updated Annex A with custom extensions;
f) Added Annex B Examples of PST transformer modelling;
g) Added Annex C HVDC use cases.
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IEC 61968-100:2022 defines how messages may be exchanged between cooperating systems in order to facilitate the transfer of application-specific data. Such application-specific data include but are not limited to the message payloads defined in IEC 61968 (Parts 3 to 9 and Part 13), IEC 61970 and IEC 62325.
This IEC 61968-100:2022 edition cancels and replaces the IEC 61968-100:2013 edition published in 2013. This edition constitutes a technical revision.
a) This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition: IEC 61968-100:2022 has been refined to remove ambiguities and redundancies. Informative and normative clauses are marked as such and, in the latter case, appropriate verbal forms of language are used;
b) The messages defined by IEC 61968-100:2022 are in general not backwards compatible with those of IEC 61968-100:2013. Annex I lists the significant technical changes introduced since the publication of IEC 61968-100:2013 and provides appropriate suggestions for migrating to IEC 61968-100:2022.
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IEC 61970-456:2021 belongs to the IEC 61970-450 to IEC 61970-499 series that, taken as a whole, defines at an abstract level the content and exchange mechanisms used for data transmitted between power system analyses applications, control centres and/or control centre components. The purpose of this document is to rigorously define the subset of classes, class attributes, and roles from the CIM necessary to describe the result of state estimation, power flow and other similar applications that produce a steady-state solution of a power network, under a set of use cases which are included informatively in this document. This document is intended for two distinct audiences, data producers and data recipients, and can be read from those two perspectives. From the standpoint of model export software used by a data producer, the document defines how a producer may describe an instance of a network case in order to make it available to some other program. From the standpoint of a consumer, the document defines what that importing software must be able to interpret in order to consume power flow cases. There are many different use cases for which use of this document is expected and they differ in the way that the document will be applied in each case. Implementers are expected to consider what use cases they wish to cover in order to know the extent of different options they must cover. As an example, the profiles defined in this document will be used in some cases to exchange starting conditions rather than solved conditions, so if this is an important use case, it means that a consumer application needs to be able to handle an unsolved state as well as one which has met some solution criteria. This third edition cancels and replaces the second edition published in 2018. This edition constitutes a technical revision. It is based on the IEC 61970 UML version ‘IEC61970CIM17v40’, dated 2020-08-24. This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition: a) Updated to support CIM17 (IEC 61970-301:2020+AMD1) and align with IEC 61970‑452:ED4. b) The classes PowerElectronicsConnection, PowerElectronicsUnit and PowerElectronicsWindUnit are added to the Steady State Hypothesis (SSH) profile to match the changes done for Edition 4 of IEC 61970-452 , Core Equipment profile. c) Added relevant terms used in this document. d) Clarified use of Equipment.inService and Equipment.normallyInService.
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IEC TR 61850-10-3:2022(E), which is a technical report, is applicable to testing of applications within substations. It is intended to give practical guidelines to perform the stages of quality assurance defined in IEC 61850-4:2011. However, while the quality assurance in that document begins with the IED manufacturer development stage and focuses on the role of the system integrator this document focuses on end-user requirement fulfilment.
The report may be useful to users applying IEC 61850 to other domains, however testing of IEC 61850 systems outside the substation domain is not within the scope of this document.
This document describes:
• A methodical approach to the verification and validation of a substation solution
• The use of IEC 61850 resources for testing in Edition 2.1
• Recommended testing practices for different use cases
• Definition of the process for testing of IEC 61850 based devices and systems using communications instead of hard wired system interfaces (ex. GOOSE and SV instead of hardwired interfaces)
• Use cases related to protection and control functions verification and testing
This document does not cover the conformance testing of devices according to IEC 61850-10 or methodologies for testing of abstract device independent functions.
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1.1 General This part of IEC 61850 specifies a method of exchanging data through any kinds of network, including public networks. Among the various kinds of services specified in IEC 61850-7-2, only the client/server and time synchronization services are considered so far. NOTE Client/server services of GOOSE and SMV models are mapped as well (see Table 1). For the client/server services, the principle is to map the objects and services of the ACSI (Abstract Communication Service Interface defined in IEC 61850-7-2) to XML messages transported over XMPP. The mapping description includes mainly three aspects: - The usage of the XMPP protocol itself, describing in details which features are really used and how they are used by the mapping (see Clause 6). - How to achieve end-to-end secured communications (see Clause 7). - The description of the XML payloads corresponding to each ACSI service thanks in particular to the XML Schema and XML message examples (starting at Clause 9). NOTE 1 This document does not address the detailed usage of the XMPP protocol. NOTE 2 This document does not address system management services. NOTE 3 For the information of people familiar with the mapping defined in IEC 61850-8-1, the XML messages defined in the present document are derived from those defined in IEC 61850-8-1 but with an XML encoding instead of a binary one. In this way implementing gateways between IEC 61850-8-1 and IEC 61850-8-2 is very straightforward in both directions. However reading IEC 61850-8-1 is not necessary to understand the present document except when it is used in conjunction with one of the GOOSE mappings described in IEC 61850-8-1. 1.2 Namespace name and version This new section is mandatory for any IEC 61850 namespace (as defined by IEC 61850-7-1). The parameters which identify this release of the SCSM_8_2 namespace xmlns="http://www.iec.ch/61850/2018/SCSM_8_2" are: - Namespace Version: 2018 - Namespace Revision: A - Namespace Release: 1 - Namespace release date: 2018-12 Edition Publication date Webstore Namespace Edition 1.0 2018-12 IEC 61850-8-2:2018 IEC 61850-8-2:2018 1.3 Code Component distribution The Code Components included in this IEC standard are also available as electronic machine readable file at: http://www.iec.ch/tc57/supportdocuments/IEC_61850-8-2.2018_ed1.0.XSD.2018A1.full.zip The Code Component(s) included in this IEC standard are potentially subject to maintenance works and users shall select the latest release in the repository located at: https://www.iec.ch/tc57/supportdocuments. The latest version/release of the document will be found by selecting the file IEC 61850-8- 2.2018_ed1.0.XSD.{VersionStateInfo}.full.zip with the filed VersionStateInfo of the highest value. In case of any differences between the downloadable code mentioned above and the IEC pdf published content, the downloadable code(s) is(are) the valid one; it may be subject to updates. See history files.
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This part of IEC 61850 defines the IEC 61850 information models to be used in the exchange
of information with distributed energy resources (DER) and Distribution Automation (DA)
systems. DERs include distribution-connected generation systems, energy storage systems,
and controllable loads, as well as facility DER management systems, including aggregated
DER, such as plant control systems, facility DER energy management systems (EMS), building
EMS, campus EMS, community EMS, microgrid EMS, etc. DA equipment includes equipment
used to manage distribution circuits, including automated switches, fault indicators, capacitor
banks, voltage regulators, and other power management devices.
The IEC 61850 DER information model standard utilizes existing IEC 61850-7-4 logical nodes
where possible, while defining DER and DA specific logical nodes to provide the necessary data
objects for DER and DA functions, including for the DER interconnection grid codes specified
by various countries and regions.
Although this document explicitly addresses distribution-connected resources, most of the
resource capabilities, operational functions, and architectures are also applicable to
transmission-connected resources
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This document is one of the IEC 61970-450 to 499 series that, taken as a whole, defines at an abstract level the content and exchange mechanisms used for data transmitted between control centres and/or control centre components, such as power systems applications.
The purpose of this document is to define the subset of classes, class attributes, and roles from the CIM necessary to execute state estimation and power flow applications. The North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) Data Exchange Working Group (DEWG) Common Power System Modelling group (CPSM) produced the original data requirements, which are shown in Annex E. These requirements are based on prior industry practices for exchanging power system model data for use primarily in planning studies. However, the list of required data has been extended starting with the first edition of this standard to facilitate a model exchange that includes parameters common to breaker-oriented applications. Where necessary this document establishes conventions, shown in Clause 6, with which an XML data file must comply in order to be considered valid for exchange of models.
This document is intended for two distinct audiences, data producers and data recipients, and may be read from two perspectives.
From the standpoint of model export software used by a data producer, the document describes a minimum subset of CIM classes, attributes, and associations which must be present in an XML formatted data file for model exchange. This standard does not dictate how the network is modelled, however. It only dictates what classes, attributes, and associations are to be used to describe the source model as it exists.
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This part of IEC 61970 is a member of the IEC 61970-450 to 499 series that, taken as a whole, defines, at an abstract level, the content and exchange mechanisms used for data transmitted between control centre components. Included in this part of IEC 61970 are the general use cases for exchange of diagram layout data, and guidelines for linking the layout definitions with CIM data. Guidelines for management of schematic definitions through multiple revisions are also included.
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1.1 General This part of IEC 62351 extends the scope of IEC TS 62351-4:2007 [1]1 by specifying a compatibility mode that provides interoperation with implementation based on IEC TS 62351- 4:2007 and by specifying extended capabilities referred to as native mode. This part of IEC 62351 specifies security requirements both at the transport layer and at the application layer. While IEC TS 62351-4:2007 primarily provided some limited support at the application layer for authentication during handshake for the Manufacturing Message Specification (MMS) based applications, this document also provides support for extended integrity and authentication both for the handshake phase and for the data transfer phase. It provides for shared key management and data transfer encryption at the application layer and it provides security end-to-end (E2E) with zero or more intermediate entities. While IEC TS 62351-4:2007 only provides support for systems based on the MMS, i.e. systems using an Open Systems Interworking (OSI) protocol stack, this document also provides support for application protocols using other protocol stacks, e.g. an Internet protocol suite (see 4.1). This support is extended to protect application protocols using XML encoding. This extended security at the application layer is referred to as E2E-security. In addition to E2E security, this part of IEC 62351 also provides mapping to environmental protocols carrying the security related information. Only OSI and XMPP environments are currently considered. It is intended that this part of IEC 62351 be referenced as a normative part of standards that have a need for using application protocols, e.g., MMS, in a secure manner. It is anticipated that there are implementations, in particular Inter-Control Centre Communications Protocol (ICCP) implementations that are dependent on the IEC TS 62351- 4:2007 specifications of the T-profile and the A-security-profile. The specifications from IEC TS 62351-4:2007 are therefore included in this part of IEC 62351. Implementations supporting these specifications will interwork with implementation based on IEC TS 62351-4:2007. NOTE The A-security-profile is in the strict sense not a profile, but the term is here kept for historical reasons. This document represents a set of mandatory and optional security specifications to be implemented to protect application protocols. The initial audience for this document is the members of the working groups developing or making use of protocols. For the measures described in this part of IEC 62351 to take effect, they shall be accepted and referenced by the specifications for the protocols themselves. The subsequent audience for this document is the developers of products that implement these protocols and the end user that want to specify requirements for its own environment. Portions of this document may also be of use to managers and executives in order to understand the purpose and requirements of the work.
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This document specifies data exchange and communications for meters in a generic way.
This document establishes a protocol specification for the Application Layer for meters and establishes several protocols for meter communications which can be applied depending on the application being fulfilled.
This document also specifies the overall structure of the OBject Identification System (OBIS) and the mapping of all commonly used data items in metering equipment to their identification codes.”
NOTE Electricity meters are not covered by this document, as the standardization of remote readout of electricity meters is a task for CENELEC/IEC.
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This document is one of the IEC 61970-450 to 499 series that, taken as a whole, defines at an abstract level the content and exchange mechanisms used for data transmitted between control centres and/or control centre components, such as power systems applications. The purpose of this document is to define the subset of classes, class attributes, and roles from the CIM necessary to execute state estimation and power flow applications. The North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) Data Exchange Working Group (DEWG) Common Power System Modelling group (CPSM) produced the original data requirements, which are shown in Annex E. These requirements are based on prior industry practices for exchanging power system model data for use primarily in planning studies. However, the list of required data has been extended starting with the first edition of this standard to facilitate a model exchange that includes parameters common to breaker-oriented applications. Where necessary this document establishes conventions, shown in Clause 6, with which an XML data file must comply in order to be considered valid for exchange of models. This document is intended for two distinct audiences, data producers and data recipients, and may be read from two perspectives. From the standpoint of model export software used by a data producer, the document describes a minimum subset of CIM classes, attributes, and associations which must be present in an XML formatted data file for model exchange. This standard does not dictate how the network is modelled, however. It only dictates what classes, attributes, and associations are to be used to describe the source model as it exists.
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This part of IEC 61850 defines the IEC 61850 information models to be used in the exchange of information with distributed energy resources (DER) and Distribution Automation (DA) systems. DERs include distribution-connected generation systems, energy storage systems, and controllable loads, as well as facility DER management systems, including aggregated DER, such as plant control systems, facility DER energy management systems (EMS), building EMS, campus EMS, community EMS, microgrid EMS, etc. DA equipment includes equipment used to manage distribution circuits, including automated switches, fault indicators, capacitor banks, voltage regulators, and other power management devices. The IEC 61850 DER information model standard utilizes existing IEC 61850-7-4 logical nodes where possible, while defining DER and DA specific logical nodes to provide the necessary data objects for DER and DA functions, including for the DER interconnection grid codes specified by various countries and regions. Although this document explicitly addresses distribution-connected resources, most of the resource capabilities, operational functions, and architectures are also applicable to transmission-connected resources. [...]
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This document specifies the minimum requirements for secure remote services (e. g. via IP connections) to the following systems:
a) fire safety systems including, but not limited to, fire detection and fire alarm systems, fixed firefighting systems, smoke and heat control
systems,
b) security systems including, but not limited to, intruder and hold-up alarm systems, electronic access control systems, external perimeter security systems and video surveillance systems,
c) social alarm systems,
d) a combination of such systems
The scope doesn´t cover:
a) the alarm transmission infrastructure,
b) the use of remote access performed by end-users
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IEC 62841-2-1:2017 applies to hand-held drills and impact drills, including diamond core drills. This standard also applies to drills that can be used for driving screws by attaching screwdriver bits.The rated voltage is not more than 250 V for single-phase a.c. or d.c. tools, and 480 V for three-phase a.c. tools. The rated input is not more than 3 700 W. The limits for the applicability of this standard for battery tools are given in K.1 and L.1. This standard deals with the hazards presented by tools which are encountered by all persons in the normal use and reasonably foreseeable misuse of the tools. Hand-held electric tools, which can be mounted on a support or working stand for use as fixed tools without any alteration of the tool itself, are within the scope of this standard and such combination of a hand-held tool and a support is considered to be a transportable tool and thus covered by the relevant Part 3.
This standard does not apply to rotary hammers, even if they can be used as a drill.
This Part 2-1 is to be used in conjunction with the first edition of IEC 62841-1:2014.
The attention of National Committees is drawn to the fact that equipment manufacturers and testing organizations may need a transitional period following publication of a new, amended or revised IEC publication in which to make products in accordance with the new requirements and to equip themselves for conducting new or revised tests.
It is the recommendation of the committee that the content of this publication be adopted for implementation nationally not earlier than 36 months from the date of publication
Key words: Drill, Impact Drill, Hand-held tool, Safety
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IEC 61970-452:2021 defines the subset of classes, class attributes, and associations from the CIM necessary to execute state estimation and power flow applications between control centres and/or control centre components, such as power systems applications.
The North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) Data Exchange Working Group (DEWG) Common Power System Modelling group (CPSM) produced the original data requirements, which are shown in Annex F. These requirements are based on prior industry practices for exchanging power system model data for use primarily in planning studies. However, the list of required data has been extended starting with the first edition of this standard to facilitate a model exchange that includes parameters common to breaker-oriented applications. Where necessary this document establishes conventions, shown in Clause 6, with which an XML data file must comply in order to be considered valid for exchange of models.
The data exchange use cases which this standard is meant to support are described in Annex A. The idea of a modelling authority as the source responsible for the modeling of a given region is described in Annex B. The concept of a boundary between regions is explained in Annex C. Annex D explains the processing of multiple profiles such as the three profiles described in this standard. The use of different curve styles to define ReactiveCapabilityCurve-s is explained in Annex E.
This document is intended for two distinct audiences, data producers and data recipients, and may be read from two perspectives.
From the standpoint of model export software used by a data producer, this document describes a minimum subset of CIM classes, attributes, and associations which must be present in an XML formatted data file for model exchange. This document does not dictate how the network is modelled, however. It only dictates what classes, attributes, and associations are to be used to describe the source model as it exists.
This fourth edition cancels and replaces the third edition published in 2017. This edition constitutes a technical revision. It is based on the IEC 61970 UML version ‘IEC61970CIM17v40’, dated 2020-08-24.
This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) The classes PowerElectronicsConnection, PowerElectronicsUnit and PowerElectronicsWindUnit are added to the Core Equipment profile.
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