33.200 - Telecontrol. Telemetering
ICS 33.200 Details
Telecontrol. Telemetering
Fernuberwachung. Fernsteuerung
Telecommande. Telemesure
Daljinsko krmiljenje, daljinske meritve (telemetrija)
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IEC 61970-457:2024 specifies a standard interface for exchanging dynamic model information needed to support the analysis of the steady state stability (small-signal stability) and/or transient stability of a power system or parts of it. The schema(s) for expressing the dynamic model information are derived directly from the CIM, more specifically from IEC 61970-302.
The scope of this document includes only the dynamic model information that needs to be exchanged as part of a dynamic study, namely the type, description and parameters of each control equipment associated with a piece of power system equipment included in the steady state solution of a complete power system network model. Therefore, this profile is dependent upon other standard profiles for the equipment as specified in IEC 61970-452: CIM static transmission network model profiles, the topology, the steady state hypothesis and the steady state solution (as specified in IEC 61970-456: Solved power system state profiles) of the power system, which bounds the scope of the exchange. The profile information described by this document needs to be exchanged in conjunction with IEC 61970-452 and IEC 61970-456 profiles’ information to support the data requirements of transient analysis tools. IEC 61970-456 provides a detailed description of how different profile standards can be combined to form various types of power system network model exchanges.
This document supports the exchange of the following types of dynamic models:
• standard models: a simplified approach to exchange, where models are contained in predefined libraries of classes interconnected in a standard manner that represent dynamic behaviour of elements of the power system. The exchange only indicates the name of the model along with the attributes needed to describe its behaviour.
• proprietary user-defined models: an exchange that would provide users the ability to exchange the parameters of a model representing a vendor or user proprietary device where an explicit description of the model is not described in this document. The connections between the proprietary models and standard models are the same as described for the standard models exchange. Recipient of the data exchange will need to contact the sender for the behavioural details of the model.
This document builds on IEC 61970-302, CIM for dynamics which defines the descriptions of the standard dynamic models, their function block diagrams, and how they are interconnected and associated with the static network model. This type of model information is assumed to be pre-stored by all software applications hence it is not necessary to be exchanged in real-time or as part of a dynamics model exchange.
- Standard780 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
IEC 61970-457:2024 specifies a standard interface for exchanging dynamic model information needed to support the analysis of the steady state stability (small-signal stability) and/or transient stability of a power system or parts of it. The schema(s) for expressing the dynamic model information are derived directly from the CIM, more specifically from IEC 61970-302. The scope of this document includes only the dynamic model information that needs to be exchanged as part of a dynamic study, namely the type, description and parameters of each control equipment associated with a piece of power system equipment included in the steady state solution of a complete power system network model. Therefore, this profile is dependent upon other standard profiles for the equipment as specified in IEC 61970-452: CIM static transmission network model profiles, the topology, the steady state hypothesis and the steady state solution (as specified in IEC 61970-456: Solved power system state profiles) of the power system, which bounds the scope of the exchange. The profile information described by this document needs to be exchanged in conjunction with IEC 61970-452 and IEC 61970-456 profiles’ information to support the data requirements of transient analysis tools. IEC 61970-456 provides a detailed description of how different profile standards can be combined to form various types of power system network model exchanges. This document supports the exchange of the following types of dynamic models: • standard models: a simplified approach to exchange, where models are contained in predefined libraries of classes interconnected in a standard manner that represent dynamic behaviour of elements of the power system. The exchange only indicates the name of the model along with the attributes needed to describe its behaviour. • proprietary user-defined models: an exchange that would provide users the ability to exchange the parameters of a model representing a vendor or user proprietary device where an explicit description of the model is not described in this document. The connections between the proprietary models and standard models are the same as described for the standard models exchange. Recipient of the data exchange will need to contact the sender for the behavioural details of the model. This document builds on IEC 61970-302, CIM for dynamics which defines the descriptions of the standard dynamic models, their function block diagrams, and how they are interconnected and associated with the static network model. This type of model information is assumed to be pre-stored by all software applications hence it is not necessary to be exchanged in real-time or as part of a dynamics model exchange. This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2021. This edition constitutes a technical revision. This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition: a) The majority of issues detected in IEC 61970-302:2018 and fixed in IEC 61970-302:2022 led to update of this document; b) IEEE 421.5-2016 on Excitation systems is fully covered; c) IEEE turbine report from 2013 was considered and as a result a number of gas, steam and hydro turbines/governors are added; d) IEC 61400-27-1:2020 on wind turbines is fully incorporated; e) WECC Inverter-Based Resource (IBR) models, Hybrid STATCOM models and storage models are added; f) The user defined models approach was enhanced in IEC 61970-302:2022 adding a model which enables modelling of a detailed dynamic model. This results in the creation of two additional pr
- Standard780 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
IEC 61970-302:2024 specifies a Dynamics package which contains part of the CIM to support the exchange of models between software applications that perform analysis of the steady-state stability (small-signal stability) or transient stability of a power system as defined by IEEE / CIGRE, Definition and classification of power system stability IEEE/CIGRE joint task force on stability terms and definitions.
The model descriptions in this document provide specifications for each type of dynamic model as well as the information that needs to be included in dynamic case exchanges between planning/study applications.
The scope of the CIM Dynamics package specified in this document includes:
• standard models: a simplified approach to describing dynamic models, where models representing dynamic behaviour of elements of the power system are contained in predefined libraries of classes which are interconnected in a standard manner. Only the names of the selected elements of the models along with their attributes are needed to describe dynamic behaviour.
• proprietary user-defined models: an approach providing users the ability to define the parameters of a dynamic behaviour model representing a vendor or user proprietary device where an explicit description of the model is not provided by this document. The same libraries and standard interconnections are used for both proprietary user-defined models and standard models. The behavioural details of the model are not documented in this document, only the model parameters.
• A model to enable exchange of models’ descriptions. This approach can be used to describe user defined and standard models.
• A model to enable exchange of simulation results.
This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2018. This edition constitutes a technical revision.
This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) The majority of issues detected in IEC 61970-302:2018 are addressed;
b) IEEE 421.5-2016 on Excitation systems is fully covered;
c) The IEEE turbine report from 2013 was considered and as a result a number of gas, steam and hydro turbines/governors are added;
d) IEC 61400-27-1:2020 on wind turbines is fully incorporated;
e) WECC Inverter-Based Resource (IBR) models, Hybrid STATCOM models and storage models are added;
f) The user defined models are enhanced with a model which enables modelling of detailed dynamic model;
g) A model to enable exchange of simulation results is added;
h) The work on the HVDC models is not complete. The HVDC dynamics models are a complex domain in which there are no models that are approved or widely recognised on international level, i.e. there are only project-based models. At this stage IEC 61970-302:2022 only specifies some general classes. However, it is recognised that better coverage of HVDC will require a further edition of this document;
i) Models from IEEE 1547-2018 "IEEE Standard for Interconnection and Interoperability of Distributed Energy Resources with Associated Electric Power Systems Interfaces" are added.
j) Statements have been added to certain figures, tables, schemas, and enumerations throughout the document that indicate that they are reproduced with the permission of the UCA International User Group (UCAIug). These items are derived from the CIM.
- Standard894 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
- Corrigendum3 pagesEnglish and French languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
This draft European standard is applicable to the physical and link layer parameters of baseband communication over twisted pair (M Bus) for meter communication systems. It is especially applicable to thermal energy meters, heat cost allocators, water meters and gas meters.
NOTE It is usable also for other meters (like electricity meters) and for sensors and actuators. For generic descriptions concerning communication systems for meters and remote reading of meters see EN 13757-1.
- Standard38 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
IEC 61970-302:2024 specifies a Dynamics package which contains part of the CIM to support the exchange of models between software applications that perform analysis of the steady-state stability (small-signal stability) or transient stability of a power system as defined by IEEE / CIGRE, Definition and classification of power system stability IEEE/CIGRE joint task force on stability terms and definitions. The model descriptions in this document provide specifications for each type of dynamic model as well as the information that needs to be included in dynamic case exchanges between planning/study applications. The scope of the CIM Dynamics package specified in this document includes: • standard models: a simplified approach to describing dynamic models, where models representing dynamic behaviour of elements of the power system are contained in predefined libraries of classes which are interconnected in a standard manner. Only the names of the selected elements of the models along with their attributes are needed to describe dynamic behaviour. • proprietary user-defined models: an approach providing users the ability to define the parameters of a dynamic behaviour model representing a vendor or user proprietary device where an explicit description of the model is not provided by this document. The same libraries and standard interconnections are used for both proprietary user-defined models and standard models. The behavioural details of the model are not documented in this document, only the model parameters. • A model to enable exchange of models’ descriptions. This approach can be used to describe user defined and standard models. • A model to enable exchange of simulation results. This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2018. This edition constitutes a technical revision. This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition: a) The majority of issues detected in IEC 61970-302:2018 are addressed; b) IEEE 421.5-2016 on Excitation systems is fully covered; c) The IEEE turbine report from 2013 was considered and as a result a number of gas, steam and hydro turbines/governors are added; d) IEC 61400-27-1:2020 on wind turbines is fully incorporated; e) WECC Inverter-Based Resource (IBR) models, Hybrid STATCOM models and storage models are added; f) The user defined models are enhanced with a model which enables modelling of detailed dynamic model; g) A model to enable exchange of simulation results is added; h) The work on the HVDC models is not complete. The HVDC dynamics models are a complex domain in which there are no models that are approved or widely recognised on international level, i.e. there are only project-based models. At this stage IEC 61970-302:2022 only specifies some general classes. However, it is recognised that better coverage of HVDC will require a further edition of this document; i) Models from IEEE 1547-2018 "IEEE Standard for Interconnection and Interoperability of Distributed Energy Resources with Associated Electric Power Systems Interfaces" are added. j) Statements have been added to certain figures, tables, schemas, and enumerations throughout the document that indicate that they are reproduced with the permission of the UCA International User Group (UCAIug). These items are derived from the CIM.
- Standard894 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
IEC TR 61850-80-5:2024, which is a Technical Report, specifies the mapping rules for building and configuring a system using both IEC 61850 and IEC 61158-6 (Industrial communication networks - Fieldbus specification, CPF Type 15, Modbus) protocols by utilizing gateways between IEC 61850 and IEC 61158-6 IEDs / subsystems. The objective is to enable operational run-time data exchange among these IEDs / subsystems, and to automate the configuration of a gateway as much as possible.
Please note that for the purposes of this document, "Modbus" is used to represent both serial Modbus (Modbus RTU) and IEC 61158-6 (Modbus TCP).
Within the capability of each protocol, some configuration attributes (IEC 61850-7-3:2010+AMD1:2020 attributes with functional constraint CF) are also mapped in addition to the operational real-time data.
The rules specified in this document are based on the published standards and do not make any proposed changes to IEC 61850 or 61158-6. This standard does not specify any rules for an IEC 61850 IED to directly communicate with a Modbus IED and vice versa, except through a gateway.
This document does not mandate which data items that a particular IED shall support, regardless of whether the implementation uses Modbus or IEC 61850. Instead this document provides rules specifying how a gateway maps any given data item from one protocol to the other, given that the data item is already available and is transmitted using one of the protocols.
Similarly, this document does not mandate which mapping rules a given gateway shall support. When this document is republished as a Technical Specification, conformance requirements will be identified.
This document recognizes that there will be situations in which a user will require that a gateway perform non-standard protocol mappings. Non-standard mappings are outside the scope of this document.
This document also recognizes that gateways typically manipulate the data passing through them in a variety of ways. Some of these functions include alarm trigger grouping, data suppression, interlocking and command blocking. Conformance to this document does not preclude a gateway from performing such functions, even though this document primarily specifies "straight through" mapping of Modbus data to IEC 61850-7-3:2010+AMD1:2020 data. Subclause 7.4 of this document describes how some of these functions may be specified to a gateway by a mapping tool using equation notation in XML. However, some of these functions may be too complex for a mapping tool to specify in an automated manner.
The mapping architecture for the exchange of the run-time information consists of four parts:
1) Conceptual architecture of a gateway and associated use case
2) Mapping of the information model (Assign semantic to the Modbus data)
3) Mapping of the data (which is in fact part of the information model)
4) Mapping of the services (out of scope for this document)
- Technical report47 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
IEC 61970-457:2024 specifies a standard interface for exchanging dynamic model information needed to support the analysis of the steady state stability (small-signal stability) and/or transient stability of a power system or parts of it. The schema(s) for expressing the dynamic model information are derived directly from the CIM, more specifically from IEC 61970-302.
The scope of this document includes only the dynamic model information that needs to be exchanged as part of a dynamic study, namely the type, description and parameters of each control equipment associated with a piece of power system equipment included in the steady state solution of a complete power system network model. Therefore, this profile is dependent upon other standard profiles for the equipment as specified in IEC 61970-452: CIM static transmission network model profiles, the topology, the steady state hypothesis and the steady state solution (as specified in IEC 61970-456: Solved power system state profiles) of the power system, which bounds the scope of the exchange. The profile information described by this document needs to be exchanged in conjunction with IEC 61970-452 and IEC 61970-456 profiles’ information to support the data requirements of transient analysis tools. IEC 61970-456 provides a detailed description of how different profile standards can be combined to form various types of power system network model exchanges.
This document supports the exchange of the following types of dynamic models:
• standard models: a simplified approach to exchange, where models are contained in predefined libraries of classes interconnected in a standard manner that represent dynamic behaviour of elements of the power system. The exchange only indicates the name of the model along with the attributes needed to describe its behaviour.
• proprietary user-defined models: an exchange that would provide users the ability to exchange the parameters of a model representing a vendor or user proprietary device where an explicit description of the model is not described in this document. The connections between the proprietary models and standard models are the same as described for the standard models exchange. Recipient of the data exchange will need to contact the sender for the behavioural details of the model.
This document builds on IEC 61970-302, CIM for dynamics which defines the descriptions of the standard dynamic models, their function block diagrams, and how they are interconnected and associated with the static network model. This type of model information is assumed to be pre-stored by all software applications hence it is not necessary to be exchanged in real-time or as part of a dynamics model exchange.
This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2021. This edition constitutes a technical revision.
This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) The majority of issues detected in IEC 61970-302:2018 and fixed in IEC 61970-302:2022 led to update of this document;
b) IEEE 421.5-2016 on Excitation systems is fully covered;
c) IEEE turbine report from 2013 was considered and as a result a number of gas, steam and hydro turbines/governors are added;
d) IEC 61400-27-1:2020 on wind turbines is fully incorporated;
e) WECC Inverter-Based Resource (IBR) models, Hybrid STATCOM models and storage models are added;
f) The user defined models approach was enhanced in IEC 61970-302:2022 adding a model which enables modelling of a detailed dynamic model. This results in the creation of two additional profiles in this document. These are the Detailed Model Configuration profile and Detailed Model Parameterisation profile;
g) A model to enable exchange of simulation results was added in IEC 61970-302:2022. This results in the creation of two additional profiles in this document. These are the Simulation Settings profile and Simulation Results profile;
h) The work on the
- Standard1549 pagesEnglish and French languagesale 15% off
IEC 61970-302:2024 specifies a Dynamics package which contains part of the CIM to support the exchange of models between software applications that perform analysis of the steady-state stability (small-signal stability) or transient stability of a power system as defined by IEEE / CIGRE, Definition and classification of power system stability IEEE/CIGRE joint task force on stability terms and definitions.
The model descriptions in this document provide specifications for each type of dynamic model as well as the information that needs to be included in dynamic case exchanges between planning/study applications.
The scope of the CIM Dynamics package specified in this document includes:
• standard models: a simplified approach to describing dynamic models, where models representing dynamic behaviour of elements of the power system are contained in predefined libraries of classes which are interconnected in a standard manner. Only the names of the selected elements of the models along with their attributes are needed to describe dynamic behaviour.
• proprietary user-defined models: an approach providing users the ability to define the parameters of a dynamic behaviour model representing a vendor or user proprietary device where an explicit description of the model is not provided by this document. The same libraries and standard interconnections are used for both proprietary user-defined models and standard models. The behavioural details of the model are not documented in this document, only the model parameters.
• A model to enable exchange of models’ descriptions. This approach can be used to describe user defined and standard models.
• A model to enable exchange of simulation results.
This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2018. This edition constitutes a technical revision.
This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) The majority of issues detected in IEC 61970-302:2018 are addressed;
b) IEEE 421.5-2016 on Excitation systems is fully covered;
c) The IEEE turbine report from 2013 was considered and as a result a number of gas, steam and hydro turbines/governors are added;
d) IEC 61400-27-1:2020 on wind turbines is fully incorporated;
e) WECC Inverter-Based Resource (IBR) models, Hybrid STATCOM models and storage models are added;
f) The user defined models are enhanced with a model which enables modelling of detailed dynamic model;
g) A model to enable exchange of simulation results is added;
h) The work on the HVDC models is not complete. The HVDC dynamics models are a complex domain in which there are no models that are approved or widely recognised on international level, i.e. there are only project-based models. At this stage IEC 61970-302:2022 only specifies some general classes. However, it is recognised that better coverage of HVDC will require a further edition of this document;
i) Models from IEEE 1547-2018 "IEEE Standard for Interconnection and Interoperability of Distributed Energy Resources with Associated Electric Power Systems Interfaces" are added.
j) Statements have been added to certain figures, tables, schemas, and enumerations throughout the document that indicate that they are reproduced with the permission of the UCA International User Group (UCAIug). These items are derived from the CIM.
- Standard1752 pagesEnglish and French languagesale 15% off
This Technical Report contains additional information to the requirements determined in EN 13757-2, EN 13757-3 and EN 13757-7, in particular examples for the implementation, Datagram examples secured by security mechanism of part 7 and additional non-normative requirements beyond meter communication itself.
- Technical report90 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
This draft European standard is applicable to the physical and link layer parameters of baseband communication over twisted pair (M Bus) for meter communication systems. It is especially applicable to thermal energy meters, heat cost allocators, water meters and gas meters.
NOTE It is usable also for other meters (like electricity meters) and for sensors and actuators. For generic descriptions concerning communication systems for meters and remote reading of meters see EN 13757-1.
- Standard38 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
This Technical Report contains additional information to the requirements determined in EN 13757-2, EN 13757-3 and EN 13757-7, in particular examples for the implementation, Datagram examples secured by security mechanism of part 7 and additional non-normative requirements beyond meter communication itself.
- Technical report90 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
IEC TS 63191:2023 specifies recommendations about power quality measurement and assessment within installations.
This document outlines the various phases needed for the establishment of a demand-side power quality measurement plan for buildings and industry installations.
Such a power quality measurement plan will enable the optimization of the energy availability and efficiency, improve the assets lifetime and facilitate the resolutions of power quality problems. A power quality measurement plan encompasses the following phases:
• definition of the context, objectives and constraints;
• assessment of the initial power quality situation;
• definition of an action plan for the improvement of the power quality situation;
• implementation of the power quality measuring system;
• exploitation of the measurement system for the improvement of the power quality situation;
• maintenance of the measurement system.
This document will also help facility managers tailor their measurement plan to the specific needs of the electrical system under their control. It addresses all the disturbances present in such networks, but does not cover the disturbances present in public electrical distribution networks (supply side) as they are governed by specific documents such as EN 50160 and IEC TS 62749.
IEC TS 63191:2023 cancels and replaces IEC TR 63191, published in 2018. This edition constitutes a technical revision.
This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) a new informative Annex A describing a tool to report the ability to assess the power quality of an electrical installation.
- Technical specification94 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
IEC TS 62351-100-4:2023, which is a technical specification, describes test procedures for interoperability conformance testing of data and communication security for power system automation and protection systems which implement MMS, IEC 61850-8-1 (MMS), IEC 61850-8-2 (XMPP) or any other protocol implementing IEC 62351-4:2018/AMD1:2020. The tests described in this document cover only E2E security testing and do not evaluate A-security profile implementation. Thus, citing conformance to this document does not imply that any particular security level has been achieved by the corresponding product, or by the system in which it is used.
The goal of this document is to enable interoperability by providing a standard method of testing protocol implementations, but it does not guarantee the full interoperability of devices. It is expected that using this document during testing will minimize the risk of non interoperability. Additional testing and assurance measures will be required to verify that a particular implementation of IEC 62351-4:2018/AMD1:2020 has correctly implemented all the security functions and that they can be assured to be present in the delivered products. This topic is covered in other IEC standards, for example IEC 62443.
The scope of this document is to specify available common procedures and definitions for conformance and/or interoperability testing of IEC 62351-4:2018/AMD1:2020.
This document deals mainly with cyber security conformance testing; therefore, other requirements, such as safety or EMC are not covered. These requirements are covered by other standards (if applicable) and the proof of compliance for these topics is done according to these standards.
T-profile testing is to be performed prior to E2E security profile testing. T-profile testing is described in IEC 62351-100-3 in the context of IEC 61850-8-1. T-profile testing for IEC 61850-8-2 is to be described in the corresponding IEC 61850-8-2 test specification.
- Technical specification109 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
This document describes the functionalities and specifies the requirements of an adaptation layer to be
applied when transporting M-Bus upper layers using a wireless communication protocol other than
wireless M-Bus. These alternative radio technologies developed outside CEN/TC 294 can be based on
Internet Protocol or not and operate either in licensed or unlicensed frequency bands.
- Standard72 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
This document describes the functionalities and specifies the requirements of an adaptation layer to be applied when transporting M-Bus upper layers using a wireless communication protocol other than wireless M-Bus. These alternative radio technologies developed outside CEN/TC 294 can be based on Internet Protocol or not and operate either in licensed or unlicensed frequency bands.
- Standard72 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
- Corrigendum3 pagesEnglish and French languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
IEC TS 63266:2023 specifies a structure for representation of exchanged information that is essential for testing and maintenance of the devices in power utility automation systems. It is mainly intended to be applied to communication equipment that communicate information in accordance with IEC 61850 (all parts) in at least one part of their communication flow.
The following communication equipment is included within the scope:
– optical instrument transformer;
– conventional instrument transformers related to IEC 61850 traffic;
– merging unit;
– stand-alone merging unit;
– protection, control and measuring devices with at least one IEC 61850 interface;
– switchgear control unit (breaker IED);
– switchgear providing IEC 61850 interface;
– IEC 61850 time synchronization device;
– IEC 61850 gateway (RTU) and station HMI;
– digital disturbance recorder / digital fault recorder;
– digital communication protocol gateways with at least one IEC 61850 interface;
– protection, control and measuring devices that utilise a proprietary protocol for communication with devices that have at least one IEC 61850 interface.
The following communication equipment, scheme and protocols are excluded from the scope:
– IEC 61850 Ethernet switches and network topology;
– PMU phasor measurement unit with at least one IEC 61850 interface;
– the full path of substation-to-substation communication;
EXAMPLE 1: The description of RGOOSE Publisher in substation A does not include the description of R GOOSE Subscriber in substation B.
– functions with only hardwired communication, e.g. direct analogue copper wired connection;
EXAMPLE 2: A current transformer connected to a protection relay with hardwired tripping of a circuit breaker.
– functions using only proprietary communication protocol systems;
EXAMPLE 3: A dedicated system for collecting disturbance recorder files with courier protocol or path from IEC 608705103 to IEC 60870-5-101 will not be presented in this document.
– protocol mappings to XMPP (IEC 61850-8-2).
This document forms a supplement to other documentation standards in power utility automation.
It also harmonizes the representation of the logical data flow structures based on IEC 61850 communication among different devices in order to provide a reference document that can be created for any IEC 61850 substation.
This document focuses in principle on the visualization of the digital information exchanged between IEDs and control or measurement devices in a power utility automation system. The information visualization does not refer to any graphical modelling but to a tabular format of presentation. The data in tabular format can be used as a basis for other kinds of visual presentation outside the scope of this document.
For representing all kinds of substation information, a single suitable tabular form is not possible to find. This document instead presents a limited number of high visual performance representation formats.
Presentation formats described in this document provide interactive visualization that assists users in analysing data and identifying some important and essential information in a more efficient way.
- Technical specification31 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
IEC 62351-9:2023 specifies cryptographic key management, primarily focused on the management of long-term keys, which are most often asymmetric key pairs, such as public-key certificates and corresponding private keys. As certificates build the base this document builds a foundation for many IEC 62351 services (see also Annex A). Symmetric key management is also considered but only with respect to session keys for group-based communication as applied in IEC 62351-6. The objective of this document is to define requirements and technologies to achieve interoperability of key management by specifying or limiting key management options to be used.
This document assumes that an organization (or group of organizations) has defined a security policy to select the type of keys and cryptographic algorithms that will be utilized, which may have to align with other standards or regulatory requirements. This document therefore specifies only the management techniques for these selected key and cryptography infrastructures. This document assumes that the reader has a basic understanding of cryptography and key management principles.
The requirements for the management of pairwise symmetric (session) keys in the context of communication protocols is specified in the parts of IEC 62351 utilizing or specifying pairwise communication such as:
• IEC 62351-3 for TLS by profiling the TLS options
• IEC 62351-4 for the application layer end-to-end security
• IEC TS 62351-5 for the application layer security mechanism for IEC 60870-5-101/104 and IEEE 1815 (DNP3)
The requirements for the management of symmetric group keys in the context of power system communication protocols is specified in IEC 62351-6 for utilizing group security to protect GOOSE and SV communication. IEC 62351-9 utilizes GDOI as already IETF specified group-based key management protocol to manage the group security parameter and enhances this protocol to carry the security parameter for GOOSE, SV, and PTP.
This document also defines security events for specific conditions which could identify issues which might require error handling. However, the actions of the organisation in response to these error conditions are beyond the scope of this document and are expected to be defined by the organizations security policy.
In the future, as public-key cryptography becomes endangered by the evolution of quantum computers, this document will also consider post-quantum cryptography to a certain extent. Note that at this time being no specific measures are provided.
This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2017. This edition constitutes a technical revision.
This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) Certificate components and verification of the certificate components have been added;
b) GDOI has been updated to include findings from interop tests;
c) GDOI operation considerations have been added;
d) GDOI support for PTP (IEEE 1588) support has been added as specified by IEC/IEEE 61850-9-3 Power Profile;
e) Cyber security event logging has been added as well as the mapping to IEC 62351-14;
f) Annex B with background on utilized cryptographic algorithms and mechanisms has been added.
- Standard147 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
IEC TR 61850-90-7:2023 is available as IEC TR 61850-90-7:2023 RLV which contains the International Standard and its Redline version, showing all changes of the technical content compared to the previous edition.IEC TR 61850-90-7:2023, which is a Technical Report, describes functions for power converter-based distributed energy resources (DER) systems, focused on DC-to-AC and AC-to-AC conversions and including photovoltaic systems (PV), battery storage systems, electric vehicle (EV) charging systems, and any other DER systems with a controllable power converter. The functions defined in this document were used to help define the information models described in IEC 61850-7-420 and which can be used in the exchange of information between these power converter-based DER systems and the utilities, energy service providers (ESPs), or other entities which are tasked with managing the volt, var, and watt capabilities of these power converter-based systems. These power converter-based DER systems can range from very small grid-connected systems at residential customer sites, to medium-sized systems configured as microgrids on campuses or communities, to very large systems in utility-operated power plants, and to many other configurations and ownership models. They may or may not combine different types of DER systems behind the power converter, such as a power converter-based DER system and a battery that are connected at the DC level. This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2013. This edition is primarily an editorial revision in order to be consistent with the publication of Edition 2 of IEC 61850-7-420:2021. This edition includes the following significant changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) Clause 3 has been updated.
b) Clause 8 (IEC 61850 information models for power converter-based functions) has been deleted. This clause defined data models with the transitional namespace “(Tr) IEC 61850-90-7:2012”. The data models are now defined in IEC 61850-7-420.
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- Technical report163 pagesEnglish languagesale 15% off
IEC 62351-3:2023 specifies how to provide confidentiality, integrity protection, and message level authentication for protocols that make use of TCP/IP as a message transport layer and utilize Transport Layer Security when cyber-security is required. This may relate to SCADA and telecontrol protocols, but also to additional protocols if they meet the requirements in this document.
IEC 62351-3 specifies how to secure TCP/IP-based protocols through constraints on the specification of the messages, procedures, and algorithms of Transport Layer Security (TLS) (TLSv1.2 defined in RFC 5246, TLSv1.3 defined in RFC 8446). In the specific clauses, there will be subclauses to note the differences and commonalities in the application depending on the target TLS version. The use and specification of intervening external security devices (e.g., "bump-in-the-wire") are considered out-of-scope.
In contrast to previous editions of this document, this edition is self-contained in terms of completely defining a profile of TLS. Hence, it can be applied directly, without the need to specify further TLS parameters, except the port number, over which the communication will be performed. Therefore, this part can be directly utilized from a referencing standard and can be combined with further security measures on other layers. Providing the profiling of TLS without the need for further specifying TLS parameters allows declaring conformity to the described functionality without the need to involve further IEC 62351 documents.
This document is intended to be referenced as a normative part of other IEC standards that have the need for providing security for their TCP/IP-based protocol exchanges under similar boundary conditions. However, it is up to the individual protocol security initiatives to decide if this document is to be referenced.
The document also defines security events for specific conditions, which support error handling, security audit trails, intrusion detection, and conformance testing. Any action of an organization in response to events to an error condition described in this document are beyond the scope of this document and are expected to be defined by the organization’s security policy.
This document reflects the security requirements of the IEC power systems management protocols. Should other standards bring forward new requirements, this document may need to be revised.
This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2014, Amendment 1:2018 and Amendment 2:2020. This edition constitutes a technical revision.
This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) Inclusion of the TLSv1.2 related parameter required in IEC 62351-3 Ed.1.2 to be specified by the referencing standard. This comprises the following parameter:
• Mandatory TLSv1.2 cipher suites to be supported.
• Specification of session resumption parameters.
• Specification of session renegotiation parameters.
• Revocation handling using CRL and OCSP.
• Handling of security events.
b) Inclusion of a TLSv1.3 profile to be applicable for the power system domain in a similar way as for TLSv1.2 session.
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- Standard52 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
IEC TR 61850-90-27:2023, which is a Technical Report, is to provide basic aspects that need to be considered when using IEC 61850 for information exchange between systems and components to support applications for thermal systems connected to electric power networks. Thermal systems isolated from electric power networks are outside the scope of this document.
From the perspective of category, this document considers thermal systems that provide thermal energy services for residential and/or commercial buildings and districts. In other words, industrial thermal systems are outside the scope of this document.
From the perspective of energy transformation, this document deals with ones between electricity and thermal energy. Other types of energy such as gas will be documented in a future report.
From the perspective of resource, this document considers generic aspects of thermal energy generators, storage, and loads that may contribute to the operations and management of electric power networks. It also deals with specific types of resources that have electric parts such as power to heat (P2H) that is a kind of electric load, and combined heat and power (CHP) that is an electric generator. This document models the characteristics for such specific units of resources including alarms and ratings. On the other hand, it does not deal with other types of specific units according to the scope of this document. For example, gas boilers, thermal energy tanks, heat exchangers, HVAC, auxiliary devices for thermal systems are not modelled as logical nodes in this document.
As a summary, this document
- gives an overview of thermal energy resources connected to electric power networks.
- provides use cases for typical operations of thermal system and deducts exchanged information necessary for information modelling.
- provides mapping of requirements on LNs based on the use cases.
- defines generic logical nodes for resources in thermal systems.
- defines logical nodes for specific unit types of P2H and CHP.
- defines logical nodes for operations that may contribute to the operations of electric power networks.
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IEC 62351-9:2023 specifies cryptographic key management, primarily focused on the management of long-term keys, which are most often asymmetric key pairs, such as public-key certificates and corresponding private keys. As certificates build the base this document builds a foundation for many IEC 62351 services (see also Annex A). Symmetric key management is also considered but only with respect to session keys for group-based communication as applied in IEC 62351-6. The objective of this document is to define requirements and technologies to achieve interoperability of key management by specifying or limiting key management options to be used. This document assumes that an organization (or group of organizations) has defined a security policy to select the type of keys and cryptographic algorithms that will be utilized, which may have to align with other standards or regulatory requirements. This document therefore specifies only the management techniques for these selected key and cryptography infrastructures. This document assumes that the reader has a basic understanding of cryptography and key management principles. The requirements for the management of pairwise symmetric (session) keys in the context of communication protocols is specified in the parts of IEC 62351 utilizing or specifying pairwise communication such as: • IEC 62351-3 for TLS by profiling the TLS options • IEC 62351-4 for the application layer end-to-end security • IEC TS 62351-5 for the application layer security mechanism for IEC 60870-5-101/104 and IEEE 1815 (DNP3) The requirements for the management of symmetric group keys in the context of power system communication protocols is specified in IEC 62351-6 for utilizing group security to protect GOOSE and SV communication. IEC 62351-9 utilizes GDOI as already IETF specified group-based key management protocol to manage the group security parameter and enhances this protocol to carry the security parameter for GOOSE, SV, and PTP. This document also defines security events for specific conditions which could identify issues which might require error handling. However, the actions of the organisation in response to these error conditions are beyond the scope of this document and are expected to be defined by the organizations security policy. In the future, as public-key cryptography becomes endangered by the evolution of quantum computers, this document will also consider post-quantum cryptography to a certain extent. Note that at this time being no specific measures are provided. This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2017. This edition constitutes a technical revision. This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition: a) Certificate components and verification of the certificate components have been added; b) GDOI has been updated to include findings from interop tests; c) GDOI operation considerations have been added; d) GDOI support for PTP (IEEE 1588) support has been added as specified by IEC/IEEE 61850-9-3 Power Profile; e) Cyber security event logging has been added as well as the mapping to IEC 62351-14; f) Annex B with background on utilized cryptographic algorithms and mechanisms has been added.
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IEC 62351-3:2023 specifies how to provide confidentiality, integrity protection, and message level authentication for protocols that make use of TCP/IP as a message transport layer and utilize Transport Layer Security when cyber-security is required. This may relate to SCADA and telecontrol protocols, but also to additional protocols if they meet the requirements in this document. IEC 62351-3 specifies how to secure TCP/IP-based protocols through constraints on the specification of the messages, procedures, and algorithms of Transport Layer Security (TLS) (TLSv1.2 defined in RFC 5246, TLSv1.3 defined in RFC 8446). In the specific clauses, there will be subclauses to note the differences and commonalities in the application depending on the target TLS version. The use and specification of intervening external security devices (e.g., "bump-in-the-wire") are considered out-of-scope. In contrast to previous editions of this document, this edition is self-contained in terms of completely defining a profile of TLS. Hence, it can be applied directly, without the need to specify further TLS parameters, except the port number, over which the communication will be performed. Therefore, this part can be directly utilized from a referencing standard and can be combined with further security measures on other layers. Providing the profiling of TLS without the need for further specifying TLS parameters allows declaring conformity to the described functionality without the need to involve further IEC 62351 documents. This document is intended to be referenced as a normative part of other IEC standards that have the need for providing security for their TCP/IP-based protocol exchanges under similar boundary conditions. However, it is up to the individual protocol security initiatives to decide if this document is to be referenced. The document also defines security events for specific conditions, which support error handling, security audit trails, intrusion detection, and conformance testing. Any action of an organization in response to events to an error condition described in this document are beyond the scope of this document and are expected to be defined by the organization’s security policy. This document reflects the security requirements of the IEC power systems management protocols. Should other standards bring forward new requirements, this document may need to be revised. This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2014, Amendment 1:2018 and Amendment 2:2020. This edition constitutes a technical revision. This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition: a) Inclusion of the TLSv1.2 related parameter required in IEC 62351-3 Ed.1.2 to be specified by the referencing standard. This comprises the following parameter: • Mandatory TLSv1.2 cipher suites to be supported. • Specification of session resumption parameters. • Specification of session renegotiation parameters. • Revocation handling using CRL and OCSP. • Handling of security events. b) Inclusion of a TLSv1.3 profile to be applicable for the power system domain in a similar way as for TLSv1.2 session.
- Standard52 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
- Standard52 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
IEC 62351-3:2023 specifies how to provide confidentiality, integrity protection, and message level authentication for protocols that make use of TCP/IP as a message transport layer and utilize Transport Layer Security when cyber-security is required. This may relate to SCADA and telecontrol protocols, but also to additional protocols if they meet the requirements in this document.
IEC 62351-3 specifies how to secure TCP/IP-based protocols through constraints on the specification of the messages, procedures, and algorithms of Transport Layer Security (TLS) (TLSv1.2 defined in RFC 5246, TLSv1.3 defined in RFC 8446). In the specific clauses, there will be subclauses to note the differences and commonalities in the application depending on the target TLS version. The use and specification of intervening external security devices (e.g., "bump-in-the-wire") are considered out-of-scope.
In contrast to previous editions of this document, this edition is self-contained in terms of completely defining a profile of TLS. Hence, it can be applied directly, without the need to specify further TLS parameters, except the port number, over which the communication will be performed. Therefore, this part can be directly utilized from a referencing standard and can be combined with further security measures on other layers. Providing the profiling of TLS without the need for further specifying TLS parameters allows declaring conformity to the described functionality without the need to involve further IEC 62351 documents.
This document is intended to be referenced as a normative part of other IEC standards that have the need for providing security for their TCP/IP-based protocol exchanges under similar boundary conditions. However, it is up to the individual protocol security initiatives to decide if this document is to be referenced.
The document also defines security events for specific conditions, which support error handling, security audit trails, intrusion detection, and conformance testing. Any action of an organization in response to events to an error condition described in this document are beyond the scope of this document and are expected to be defined by the organization’s security policy.
This document reflects the security requirements of the IEC power systems management protocols. Should other standards bring forward new requirements, this document may need to be revised.
This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2014, Amendment 1:2018 and Amendment 2:2020. This edition constitutes a technical revision.
This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) Inclusion of the TLSv1.2 related parameter required in IEC 62351-3 Ed.1.2 to be specified by the referencing standard. This comprises the following parameter:
• Mandatory TLSv1.2 cipher suites to be supported.
• Specification of session resumption parameters.
• Specification of session renegotiation parameters.
• Revocation handling using CRL and OCSP.
• Handling of security events.
b) Inclusion of a TLSv1.3 profile to be applicable for the power system domain in a similar way as for TLSv1.2 session.
- Standard103 pagesEnglish and French languagesale 15% off
IEC 62351-9:2023 specifies cryptographic key management, primarily focused on the management of long-term keys, which are most often asymmetric key pairs, such as public-key certificates and corresponding private keys. As certificates build the base this document builds a foundation for many IEC 62351 services (see also Annex A). Symmetric key management is also considered but only with respect to session keys for group-based communication as applied in IEC 62351-6. The objective of this document is to define requirements and technologies to achieve interoperability of key management by specifying or limiting key management options to be used.
This document assumes that an organization (or group of organizations) has defined a security policy to select the type of keys and cryptographic algorithms that will be utilized, which may have to align with other standards or regulatory requirements. This document therefore specifies only the management techniques for these selected key and cryptography infrastructures. This document assumes that the reader has a basic understanding of cryptography and key management principles.
The requirements for the management of pairwise symmetric (session) keys in the context of communication protocols is specified in the parts of IEC 62351 utilizing or specifying pairwise communication such as:
• IEC 62351-3 for TLS by profiling the TLS options
• IEC 62351-4 for the application layer end-to-end security
• IEC TS 62351-5 for the application layer security mechanism for IEC 60870-5-101/104 and IEEE 1815 (DNP3)
The requirements for the management of symmetric group keys in the context of power system communication protocols is specified in IEC 62351-6 for utilizing group security to protect GOOSE and SV communication. IEC 62351-9 utilizes GDOI as already IETF specified group-based key management protocol to manage the group security parameter and enhances this protocol to carry the security parameter for GOOSE, SV, and PTP.
This document also defines security events for specific conditions which could identify issues which might require error handling. However, the actions of the organisation in response to these error conditions are beyond the scope of this document and are expected to be defined by the organizations security policy.
In the future, as public-key cryptography becomes endangered by the evolution of quantum computers, this document will also consider post-quantum cryptography to a certain extent. Note that at this time being no specific measures are provided.
This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2017. This edition constitutes a technical revision.
This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) Certificate components and verification of the certificate components have been added;
b) GDOI has been updated to include findings from interop tests;
c) GDOI operation considerations have been added;
d) GDOI support for PTP (IEEE 1588) support has been added as specified by IEC/IEEE 61850-9-3 Power Profile;
e) Cyber security event logging has been added as well as the mapping to IEC 62351-14;
f) Annex B with background on utilized cryptographic algorithms and mechanisms has been added.
- Standard296 pagesEnglish and French languagesale 15% off
- Corrigendum3 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
- Corrigendum3 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for1 day
This Protection Profile describes a set of security requirements for smart meters, based on the ‘minimum security requirements’ for components of AMI infrastructures in [5]. The requirements in [5] were based on the concept that there are a common/generic set of underlying ‘minimum’ security requirements associated with smart metering requirement specifications in a number of EU Member States
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IEC TS 63384-1:2023 provides guidance for power system stability control framework design. It covers the uniform use of terms and definitions, general objectives and principles for power system stability control, the classification of power system stability control, and the framework combining several types of stability controls in a coordinated and cost-effective (risk-based) manner.
In accordance with this guideline, the framework is designed to cope with disturbances of different probabilities of occurrence and impact on power system security and stability. Effective control approaches are designed to prevent or minimize the scope of future blackouts.
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This part of IEC 62351 defines the application authentication mechanism (A-profile) specifying messages, procedures and algorithms for securing the operation of all protocols based on or derived from IEC 60870-5: Telecontrol Equipment and Systems - Transmission Protocols. This Standard applies to at least those protocols listed in Table 1. [Table 1] The initial audience for this International Standard is intended to be the members of the working groups developing the protocols listed in Table 1. For the measures described in this standard to take effect, they must be accepted and referenced by the specifications for the protocols themselves. This document is written to enable that process. The working groups in charge of take this standard to the specific protocols listed in Table 1 may choose not to do so. The subsequent audience for this specification is intended to be the developers of products that implement these protocols. Portions of this standard may also be of use to managers and executives in order to understand the purpose and requirements of the work. This document is organized working from the general to the specific, as follows: - Clauses 2 through 4 provide background terms, definitions, and references. - Clause 5 describes the problems this specification is intended to address. - Clause 6 describes the mechanism generically without reference to a specific protocol. - Clauses 7 and 8 describe the mechanism more precisely and are the primary normative part of this specification. - Clause 9 define the interoperability requirements for this authentication mechanism. - Clause 10 describes the requirements for other standards referencing this specification Unless specifically labelled as informative or optional, all clauses of this specification are normative.
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IEC 62351-5:2023 defines the application profile (A-profile) secure communication mechanism specifying messages, procedures and algorithms for securing the operation of all protocols based on or derived from IEC 60870-5, Telecontrol Equipment and Systems – Transmission Protocols.
For the measures described in this document to take effect, they must be accepted and referenced by the specifications for the protocols themselves. This document is written to enable that process.
The subsequent audience for this document is intended to be the developers of products that implement these protocols.
Portions of this document may also be of use to managers and executives in order to understand the purpose and requirements of the work.
This document is organized working from the general to the specific, as follows:
• Clauses 2 through 4 provide background terms, definitions, and references.
• Clause 5 describes the problems this specification is intended to address.
• Clause 6 describes the mechanism generically without reference to a specific protocol.
• Clauses 7 and 8 describe the mechanism more precisely and are the primary normative part of this specification.
• Clause 9 define the interoperability requirements for this secure communication mechanism.
• Clause 10 describes the requirements for other standards referencing this document.
The actions of an organization in response to events and error conditions described in this document are expected to be defined by the organization’s security policy and they are beyond the scope of this document.
This International Standard cancels and replaces IEC TS 62351-5 published in 2013. It constitutes a technical revision. The primary changes in this International Standard are:
a) The secure communication mechanism is performed on per controlling station/controlled station association.
b) User management to add, change or delete a User, was removed.
c) Symmetric method to change the Update Key was removed.
d) Asymmetric method to the change Update Key was reviewed.
e) Challenge/Reply procedure and concepts were removed.
f) Aggressive Mode concept was replaced with the Secure Data message exchange mechanism.
g) Authenticated encryption of application data was added.
h) The list of permitted security algorithms has been updated.
i) The rules for calculating messages sequence numbers have been updated
j) Events monitoring and logging was added
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This Protection Profile describes a set of security requirements for smart meters, based on the ‘minimum security requirements’ for components of AMI infrastructures in [5]. The requirements in [5] were based on the concept that there are a common/generic set of underlying ‘minimum’ security requirements associated with smart metering requirement specifications in a number of EU Member States
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IEC 61755-2-1:2022 defines a set of prescribed conditions for a single-mode fibre optic connection that is maintained in order to satisfy the requirements of attenuation and return loss (RL) performance in a randomly mated pair of non-angled polished physically contacting (PC) fibres. The model uses a Gaussian distribution of light intensity over the specified mode field diameter (MFD) for determination of attenuation performance grades, based on MFD mismatch and the amount of lateral and angular fibre core offsets. Attenuation and RL performance grades are defined in IEC 61755-1. This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2006. This edition constitutes a technical revision. This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
addition of normative references and visual requirement tables;
reconsideration of the whole parts of the text to avoid misuse of the standard.
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IEC TS 62351-100-6:2022 (E), which is a technical specification, is part of the IEC 62351 suite of standards, which describes test cases for interoperability conformance testing of data and communication security for Substation Automation Systems [SAS] and telecontrol systems which implement IEC TS 62351-6. The tests described in this part do not evaluate the security of the implementation. Thus, citing conformance to this part does not imply that any particular security level has been achieved by the corresponding product, or by the system in which it is used.
The goal of this part of IEC 62351 is to enable interoperability by providing a standard method of testing protocol implementations, but it does not guarantee the full interoperability of devices. It is expected that using this specification during testing will minimize the risk of non-interoperability. Additional testing and assurance measures will be required to verify that a particular implementation of IEC TC 62351-6 has correctly implemented all the security functions and that they can be assured to be present in all delivered products. This topic is covered in other IEC standards, for example IEC 62443.
The scope of this document is to specify common available procedures and definitions for conformance and/or interoperability testing of IEC 62351-6, the IEC 61850-8-1, IEC 61850-9-2 and also their recommendations over IEC 62351-3 for profiles including TCP/IP and IEC 62351 4 for profiles including MMS. These are the security extensions for IEC 61850 and derivatives to enable unambiguous and standardized evaluation of IEC TS 62351-6 and its companion standards protocol implementations.
The detailed test cases per companion standard, containing among others mandatory and optional mandatory test cases per Secure Communication Application Function, secure ASDU (Application Service Data Unit) and transmission procedures, will become available as technical specifications (TS). Other functionality may need additional test cases, but this is outside the scope of this part of IEC 62351. This document is such a technical specification for the mentioned companion standard.
This document deals mainly with data and communication security conformance testing; therefore, other requirements, such as safety or EMC (Electromagnetic compatibility) are not covered. These requirements are covered by other standards (if applicable) and the proof of compliance for these topics is done according to these standards.
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This document describes how IEC 61970-450 (all parts), IEC 61970-600 (all parts) profile specifications are structured and created. Profile specifications describe a subset of the Canonical CIM dedicated to a specific data exchange. The Canonical CIM is described in IEC 61970-300 (all parts) as well as in IEC 61968-11. Rules for creation or extension of Canonical CIM are outside the scope of this document. This document specifies the structure of a profile specification and the rules for selecting subsets of information from the Canonical CIM. It standardizes the operations used to create the profile elements from the Canonical CIM. As Canonical CIM is described in UML the operations are described in terms of UML classes, attributes, and roles. It is possible to map UML to RDFS or OWL, so any of the languages UML, RDFS or OWL can be used to describe the created profiles. Specification of languages (UML, RDFS or OWL) used to describe profiles as well as how profiles are presented and edited in user interfaces are outside the scope of this document. Languages used to describe profiles are specified in other specifications. Relevant specifications are referenced in Clause 2. UML supports adding free text that describes further restrictions on UML constructs, e.g. classes, attribute values, association roles and cardinalities. Languages such as OCL and SHACL are dedicated to describing constraints. OCL is used to describe constraints for object data described in UML while SHACL is used to describe constraints on graph data described by RDFS or OWL. OCL is within the scope of this document, but SHACL is not. This document supports profiles describing data exchanged as CIMXML datasets or messages. The exchange format within the scope is in accordance with IEC 61970-552 but other formats are possible. Tool interoperability and serialisation formats are outside the scope of this document.
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This document specifies data exchange and communications for meters in a generic way.
This document establishes a protocol specification for the Application Layer for meters and establishes several protocols for meter communications which can be applied depending on the application being fulfilled.
This document also specifies the overall structure of the Object Identification System (OBIS) and the mapping of all commonly used data items in metering equipment to their identification codes.
NOTE Electricity meters are not covered by this document, as the standardization of remote readout of electricity meters is a task for CENELEC/IEC.
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This part of IEC 62325 specifies a UML package for the HVDC Link scheduling business
process and its associated document contextual models, assembly models and XML schemas
for use within the European style electricity markets.
This part of IEC 62325 is based on the European style market contextual model
(IEC 62325-351). The business process covered by this part of IEC 62325 is described in
Subclause 5.3.
The relevant aggregate core components (ACCs) defined in IEC 62325-351 have been
contextualised into aggregated business information entities (ABIEs) to satisfy the requirements
of the European style market HVDC Link scheduling business process.
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1.1 General
This International Standard is Part 100 of IEC 61968. It defines how messages may be exchanged between co-operating systems in order to facilitate the transfer of application-specific data. Such application-specific data include but are not limited to the message payloads defined in IEC 61968 (Parts 3-9 and Part 13), IEC 61970 and IEC 62325.
1.2 About This International Standard
This International Standard provides normative definitions for:
- a set of message archetypes (clause 5);
- a set of message exchange patterns that both sending and receiving systems are expected to implement (clause 6);
- the exact format of the messages that are to be transmitted over the various integration technologies including a precise description of the information that each message must contain (clause 7);
- a set of constraints and conventions to which applications must adhere in order to facilitate message exchange using IEC 61968-100 (clause 8);
- the details of how IEC 61968-100 messages should be implemented using various underlying transport mechanisms (clause 9).
1.3 What is not covered by this International Standard
Security considerations lie outside the scope of IEC 61968-100. This document defers to the IEC 62351 series for definitions and practices relating to the secure transmission of messages.
1.4 Future Considerations
1.4.1 Choice of Encoding Mechanisms
IEC 61968-100:2021 prescribes XML as the normative encoding mechanism for all messages defined by this International Standard.
Future editions of IEC 61968-100 may specify additional normative encoding methods including support for IEC 62361-104. The latter defines encodings to facilitate the exchange of information in the form of JSON documents whose semantics are defined by the IEC CIM and whose syntax is defined by an IETF JSON schema.
1.4.2 Choice of Web Service Technologies
IEC 61968-100:2021 provides normative definitions for the use of SOAP Web Services (clause 9.2) and Java Messaging Service (clause 9.3) for the transport of messages.
Future editions of IEC 61968-100 may specify additional normative web service technologies such as REST.
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The specifications of this document refer to general, respectively core, communication
requirements of the application functions in all domains of power utility automation systems.
Dedicated communication requirements and most examples of application functions in this
document are from the domain substation automation but may be reused in or extended to other
domains within power utility automation systems. Note that sometimes instead of the term
substation automation domain the term substation domain is used, especially if both the
switchyard devices (primary system) and the automation system (secondary system) are
regarded.
The description of the application functions is not used to standardize these functions, but to
identify communication requirements between Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) hosting
these functions within plants and substations in the power system, between such stations (e.g.
between substation for line protection) and between the plant or substation and higher-level
remote operating places (e.g. network control centres) and maintenance places. In addition
interfaces to remote technical services (e.g. maintenance centres) are considered. The general
scope is the communication requirements for power utility automation systems. The basic goal
is interoperability for all interactions providing a seamless communication system for the overall
power system management. Another prerequisite for interoperability is a commonly defined
method for time synchronization.
Standardizing application functions and their implementation is completely outside the scope of
this document. Therefore, it cannot be assumed a single philosophy of allocating application
functions to devices. To support the resulting request for free allocation of these functions, a
proper breakdown of these functions into parts relevant for communication is defined. The
exchanged data and their required performance are defined.
The same or similar IEDs from substations like protective and control devices are found in other
domains like power plants also. Using this document for such devices in these plants facilitates
the system integration e.g. between the power plant control and the related substation
automation system. For some of such other application domains like wind power plants, hydro
power plants and distributed energy resources specific standard parts according to the
IEC 61850 series have been already defined and published.
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IEC 61970-401:2022 describes how IEC 61970-450 (all parts), IEC 61970-600 (all parts) profile specifications are structured and created. Profile specifications describe a subset of the Canonical CIM dedicated to a specific data exchange. The Canonical CIM is described in IEC 61970 300 (all parts) as well as in IEC 61968-11.
Rules for creation or extension of Canonical CIM are outside the scope of this document.
This document specifies the structure of a profile specification and the rules for selecting subsets of information from the Canonical CIM. It standardizes the operations used to create the profile elements from the Canonical CIM. As Canonical CIM is described in UML the operations are described in terms of UML classes, attributes, and roles.
It is possible to map UML to RDFS or OWL, so any of the languages UML, RDFS or OWL can be used to describe the created profiles. Specification of languages (UML, RDFS or OWL) used to describe profiles as well as how profiles are presented and edited in user interfaces are outside the scope of this document. Languages used to describe profiles are specified in other specifications. Relevant specifications are referenced in Clause 2.
UML supports adding free text that describes further restrictions on UML constructs, e.g. classes, attribute values, association roles and cardinalities. Languages such as OCL and SHACL are dedicated to describing constraints. OCL is used to describe constraints for object data described in UML while SHACL is used to describe constraints on graph data described by RDFS or OWL. OCL is within the scope of this document, but SHACL is not.
This document supports profiles describing data exchanged as CIMXML datasets or messages. The exchange format within the scope is in accordance with IEC 61970-552 but other formats are possible.
Tool interoperability and serialisation formats are outside the scope of this document.
This first edition cancels and replaces IEC TS IEC 61970-401 published in 2005. This edition constitutes a technical revision.
This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) The previous edition of IEC TS 61970-401:2005 provided an overview of the Component Interface Specifications (CIS) IEC 61970-402, IEC 61970-403, IEC 61970-404, IEC 61970-405, and IEC 61970-407. IEC 61970-402 to IEC 61970-407 are duplicates of existing OPC interfaces from OPC Foundation and the DAIS/HDA interfaces from OMG. Hence IEC 61970-402 to IEC 61970-407 have been withdrawn and IEC TS 61970-401:2005 no longer serves a purpose.
b) IEC 61970-401 (this document) does not contain an overview of Component Interface Specifications (CIS) but instead a description of how to create profile specifications that describes dataset contents (or message contents). Hence it has been renamed "Profile framework". The profile specifications IEC 61970-450 (all parts) and IEC 61970-600 (all parts) describe dataset contents. The purpose of this document is to define the rules to be followed in the process of creating profile specifications.
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PUBLICATION EXPECTED BY 2022-04-27
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IEC 62325-451-8:2022 specifies a UML package for the HVDC Link scheduling business process and its associated document contextual models, assembly models and XML schemas for use within the European style electricity markets. This part of IEC 62325 is based on the European style market contextual model (IEC 62325-351). The business process covered by this part of IEC 62325 is described in Subclause 5.3. The relevant aggregate core components (ACCs) defined in IEC 62325-351 have been contextualised into aggregated business information entities (ABIEs) to satisfy the requirements of the European style market HVDC Link scheduling business process.
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This part of IEC 61968 specifies the information content of a set of message types that can be used to support many of the business functions related to records and asset management. Typical uses of the message types defined in this document include network extension planning, copying feeder or other network data between systems, network or diagram edits and asset inspection. Message types defined in other parts of IEC 61968 may also be relevant to these use cases.
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This part of IEC 61970 belongs to the IEC 61970-450 to IEC 61970-499 series that, taken as a
whole, defines at an abstract level the content and exchange mechanisms used for data
transmitted between power system analyses applications, control centres and/or control centre
components.
The purpose of this document is to rigorously define the subset of classes, class attributes, and
roles from the CIM necessary to describe the result of state estimation, power flow and other
similar applications that produce a steady-state solution of a power network, under a set of use
cases which are included informatively in this document.
This document is intended for two distinct audiences, data producers and data recipients, and
can be read from those two perspectives. From the standpoint of model export software used
by a data producer, the document defines how a producer may describe an instance of a
network case in order to make it available to some other program. From the standpoint of a
consumer, the document defines what that importing software must be able to interpret in order
to consume power flow cases.
There are many different use cases for which use of this document is expected and they differ
in the way that the document will be applied in each case. Implementers are expected to
consider what use cases they wish to cover in order to know the extent of different options they
must cover. As an example, the profiles defined in this document will be used in some cases to
exchange starting conditions rather than solved conditions, so if this is an important use case,
it means that a consumer application needs to be able to handle an unsolved state as well as
one which has met some solution criteria
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