Nuclear power plants - Control rooms - Supplementary control room for reactor shutdown without access to the main control room

IEC 60965:2016 establishes requirements for the Supplementary Control Room provided to enable the operating staff of nuclear power plants to shut down the reactor, where previously operating, and maintain the plant in a safe shut-down state in the event that control of the safety functions can no longer be exercised from the Main Control Room, due to unavailability of the Main Control Room or its facilities. The design has to ensure that the Supplementary Control Room is protected against the hazards, including any localised extreme hazards, leading to the unavailability of the Main Control Room. This new edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition: - requirements associated with regular testing of the supplementary control room (SCR); - requirements to assess the time available during which the reactor will be safe but unattended, in order to move from the main control room (MCR) to the SCR and for the SCR to become operational; - taking into account new requirements laid down by the IAEA.

Kernkraftwerke - Warten - Notsteuerstelle für das Abfahren des Reaktors ohne Verbindung zur Hauptwarte

Centrales nucléaires de puissance - Salles de commande - Salle de commande supplémentaire pour l’arrêt des réacteurs sans accès à la salle de commande principale

L'IEC 60965:2016 établit des exigences applicables à la salle de commande supplémentaire permettant au personnel d'exploitation des centrales nucléaires d'arrêter le réacteur, si celui-ci était en fonctionnement, et de maintenir l'installation dans un état d'arrêt sûr, pour le cas où les fonctions de sûreté ne pourraient plus être commandées de la salle de commande principale, en cas d'indisponibilité de celle-ci ou de ses équipements. La conception doit garantir que la salle de commande supplémentaire est protégée contre les risques, y compris les risques extrêmes locaux, entraînant l'indisponibilité de la salle de commande principale. Cette norme fournit aussi des exigences pour le choix des fonctions, la conception et l'organisation de l'interface homme-machine, ainsi que des procédures qui doivent être utilisées systématiquement pour vérifier et valider la conception fonctionnelle de la salle de commande supplémentaire. Les principales modifications techniques par rapport à l'édition précédente sont les suivantes: - exigences portant sur les essais classiques réalisés sur les SCS (salles de commande supplémentaires); - exigences permettant d'évaluer le temps disponible durant lequel le réacteur est en état sûr mais non surveillé, de façon à pouvoir se rendre de la SCP (salle de commande principale) à la SCS et à ce que la SCS devienne opérationnelle; - prise en compte de nouvelles exigences définies par l'AIEA.

Jedrske elektrarne - Nadzorne sobe - Dodatne nadzorne točke za prekinitev obratovanja reaktorja brez dostopa do glavne nadzorne sobe (IEC 60965:2016)

Ta mednarodni standard določa zahteve za dodatno nadzorno sobo, iz katere lahko operativno osebje jedrske elektrarne prekine obratovanje reaktorja in ohranja stanje njene varne zaustavitve, kadar nadzor varnostnih funkcij iz glavne nadzorne sobe ni več mogoč zaradi nerazpoložljivosti glavne nadzorne sobe ali njenih predelov. Dodatna nadzorna soba mora biti zasnovana tako, da zagotavlja zaščito pred nevarnostmi, vključno z morebitnimi lokaliziranimi izrednimi nevarnostmi, zaradi katerih glavna nadzorna soba ni razpoložljiva.
Standard določa tudi zahteve za izbiro funkcij, zasnove in ureditve vmesnika človek-stroj ter postopke, ki se morajo sistematično uporabljati za preverjanje in validacijo funkcionalne zasnove dodatne nadzorne sobe. Predvideva se, da se dodatna nadzorna soba, ki je na voljo za izvajanje postopkov zaustavitve zunaj glavne nadzorne sobe, v času običajnega obratovanja elektrarne ne uporablja, razen za namene rednega preskušanja. Zahteve odražajo uporabo načel človeškega inženiringa, saj se uporabljajo za vmesnik človek-stroj pri tovrstnem rednem preskušanju in neobičajnih pogojih v elektrarni.
Ta standard ne obravnava posebnih prostorov za odziv na izredne razmere (npr. center za tehnično podporo) ali prostorov, namenjenih za ravnanje z radioaktivnimi odpadki. Zunaj področja uporabe tega standarda je tudi podrobna zasnova opreme.
Ta standard upošteva načela posebnih varnostnih zahtev SSR-2/1 in varnostnih napotkov NS-G-1.3 Mednarodne agencije za atomsko energijo (IAEA).
Namen tega standarda je podajanje zahtev glede funkcionalne zasnove, ki se uporabljajo pri zasnovi dodatne nadzorne sobe jedrske elektrarne za izpolnitev varnostnih zahtev.
Ta standard je namenjen za uporabo za dodatno nadzorno sobo, katere konceptualna zasnova je vzpostavljena po izdaji tega standarda. Če ga želite uporabiti za obstoječe elektrarne ali zasnove, bodite še posebej previdni pri zagotavljanju dosledne podlage za zasnovo. To se navezuje na primer na dejavnike, kot je doslednost med dodatno nadzorno sobo in glavno nadzorno sobo, ergonomski vidik, stopnjo avtomatizacije in informacijsko tehnologijo, ter obseg sprememb za uvajanje v merilnih in nadzornih sistemih.

General Information

Status
Published
Publication Date
15-Sep-2016
Current Stage
6060 - Document made available
Due Date
16-Sep-2016
Completion Date
16-Sep-2016

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SLOVENSKI STANDARD
SIST EN 60965:2016
01-november-2016
1DGRPHãþD
SIST EN 60965:2011
-HGUVNHHOHNWUDUQH1DG]RUQHVREH'RGDWQHQDG]RUQHWRþNH]DSUHNLQLWHY
REUDWRYDQMDUHDNWRUMDEUH]GRVWRSDGRJODYQHQDG]RUQHVREH ,(&

Nuclear power plants - Control rooms - Supplementary control room for reactor shutdown

without access to the main control room (IEC 60965:2016)
Kernkraftwerke - Warten - Notsteuerstelle für das Abfahren des Reaktors ohne
Verbindung zur Hauptwarte (IEC 60965:2016)
Centrales nucléaires de puissance - Salles de commande - Salle de commande

supplémentaire pour l’arrêt des réacteurs sans accès à la salle de commande principale

(IEC 60965:2016)
Ta slovenski standard je istoveten z: EN 60965:2016
ICS:
27.120.20 Jedrske elektrarne. Varnost Nuclear power plants. Safety
SIST EN 60965:2016 en

2003-01.Slovenski inštitut za standardizacijo. Razmnoževanje celote ali delov tega standarda ni dovoljeno.

---------------------- Page: 1 ----------------------
SIST EN 60965:2016
---------------------- Page: 2 ----------------------
SIST EN 60965:2016
EUROPEAN STANDARD EN 60965
NORME EUROPÉENNE
EUROPÄISCHE NORM
September 2016
ICS 27.120.20 Supersedes EN 60965:2011
English Version
Nuclear power plants - Control rooms - Supplementary control
room for reactor shutdown without access to the main control
room
(IEC 60965:2016)

Centrales nucléaires de puissance - Salles de commande - Kernkraftwerke - Warten - Notsteuerstelle für das Abfahren

Salle de commande supplémentaire pour l'arrêt des des Reaktors ohne Verbindung zur Hauptwarte

réacteurs sans accès à la salle de commande principale (IEC 60965:2016)
(IEC 60965:2016)

This European Standard was approved by CENELEC on 2016-07-18. CENELEC members are bound to comply with the CEN/CENELEC

Internal Regulations which stipulate the conditions for giving this European Standard the status of a national standard without any alteration.

Up-to-date lists and bibliographical references concerning such national standards may be obtained on application to the CEN-CENELEC

Management Centre or to any CENELEC member.

This European Standard exists in three official versions (English, French, German). A version in any other language made by translation

under the responsibility of a CENELEC member into its own language and notified to the CEN-CENELEC Management Centre has the

same status as the official versions.

CENELEC members are the national electrotechnical committees of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic,

Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,

Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,

Turkey and the United Kingdom.
European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization
Comité Européen de Normalisation Electrotechnique
Europäisches Komitee für Elektrotechnische Normung
CEN-CENELEC Management Centre: Avenue Marnix 17, B-1000 Brussels

© 2016 CENELEC All rights of exploitation in any form and by any means reserved worldwide for CENELEC Members.

Ref. No. EN 60965:2016 E
---------------------- Page: 3 ----------------------
SIST EN 60965:2016
EN 60965:2016
European foreword
This document (EN 60965:2016) consists of the text of IEC 60965:2016 prepared by

SC 45A “Instrumentation, control and electrical systems of nuclear facilities” of IEC/TC 45 “Nuclear

instrumentation".
The following dates are fixed:
(dop) 2017-07-18
• latest date by which the document has to be
implemented at national level by
publication of an identical national
standard or by endorsement
• latest date by which the national (dow) 2019-07-18
standards conflicting with the
document have to be withdrawn
This document supersedes EN 60965:2011.

Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of

patent rights. CENELEC [and/or CEN] shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such

patent rights.

As stated in the nuclear safety directive 2009/71/EURATOM, Chapter 1, Article 2, item 2, Member

States are not prevented from taking more stringent safety measures in the subject-matter covered by

the Directive, in compliance with Community law. In a similar manner, this European standard does

not prevent Member States from taking more stringent nuclear safety measures in the subject-matter

covered by this standard.
Endorsement notice

The text of the International Standard IEC 60965:2016 was approved by CENELEC as a European

Standard without any modification.

In the official version, for Bibliography, the following notes have to be added for the standards indicated:

IEC 60880 NOTE Harmonized as EN 60880.
IEC 61227 NOTE Harmonized as EN 61227.
IEC 61508-1 NOTE Harmonized as EN 61508-1.
IEC 61508-2 NOTE Harmonized as EN 61508-2.
IEC 61508-3 NOTE Harmonized as EN 61508-3.
IEC 61508-4 NOTE Harmonized as EN 61508-4.
IEC 61772 NOTE Harmonized as EN 61772.
IEC 61839 NOTE Harmonized as EN 61839.
IEC 62138 NOTE Harmonized as EN 62138.
IEC 62241 NOTE Harmonized as EN 62241.
IEC 9241 Series NOTE Harmonized as EN ISO 9241 Series.
---------------------- Page: 4 ----------------------
SIST EN 60965:2016
EN 60965:2016
Annex ZA
(normative)
Normative references to international publications
with their corresponding European publications

The following documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document and are

indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated

references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

NOTE 1 When an International Publication has been modified by common modifications, indicated by (mod), the relevant

EN/HD applies.

NOTE 2 Up-to-date information on the latest versions of the European Standards listed in this annex is available here:

www.cenelec.eu
Publication Year Title EN/HD Year
IEC 60709 - Nuclear power plants - Instrumentation EN 60709 -
and control systems important to safety -
Separation
IEC 60964 2009 Nuclear power plants - Control rooms - EN 60964 2010
Design
IEC 61226 - Nuclear power plants - Instrumentation EN 61226 -
and control important to safety -
Classification of instrumentation and
control functions
IEC 61513 - Nuclear power plants - Instrumentation EN 61513 -
and control important to safety - General
requirement for systems
IEC 61771 - Nuclear power plants - Main control-room - - -
Verification and validation of design
IEC 62646 - Nuclear power plants - Control rooms - - -
Computer based procedures
ISO 11064 Series Ergonomic design of control centres EN ISO 11064 Series
ISO 11064-1 - Ergonomic design of control centres - EN ISO 11064-1 -
Part 1: Principles for the design of control
centres
ISO 11064-3 - Ergonomic design of control centres - EN ISO 11064-3 -
Part 3: Control room layout
ISO 11064-6 - Ergonomic design of control centres - EN ISO 11064-6 -
Part 6: Environmental requirements for
control centres
IAEA SSR-2/1 2012 Safety of nuclear power plants: Design
IAEA NS-G-1.3 2002 Instrumentation and Control Systems
Important to Safety in Nuclear Power
Plants (to be replaced by SSG-39)
---------------------- Page: 5 ----------------------
SIST EN 60965:2016
---------------------- Page: 6 ----------------------
SIST EN 60965:2016
IEC 60965
Edition 3.0 2016-02
INTERNATIONAL
STANDARD
NORME
INTERNATIONALE
Nuclear power plants – Control rooms – Supplementary control room for reactor
shutdown without access to the main control room
Centrales nucléaires de puissance – Salles de commande – Salle de commande
supplémentaire pour l’arrêt des réacteurs sans accès à la salle de commande
principale
INTERNATIONAL
ELECTROTECHNICAL
COMMISSION
COMMISSION
ELECTROTECHNIQUE
INTERNATIONALE
ICS 27.120.20 ISBN 978-2-8322-3203-3

Warning! Make sure that you obtained this publication from an authorized distributor.

Attention! Veuillez vous assurer que vous avez obtenu cette publication via un distributeur agréé.

® Registered trademark of the International Electrotechnical Commission
Marque déposée de la Commission Electrotechnique Internationale
---------------------- Page: 7 ----------------------
SIST EN 60965:2016
– 2 – IEC 60965:2016 © IEC 2016
CONTENTS

FOREWORD ......................................................................................................................... 3

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 5

1 Scope ............................................................................................................................ 7

2 Normative references..................................................................................................... 7

3 Terms and definitions .................................................................................................... 8

4 Abbreviations ................................................................................................................ 9

5 Design principles ........................................................................................................... 9

5.1 General ................................................................................................................. 9

5.2 Main objectives ................................................................................................... 10

5.3 Safety principles ................................................................................................. 11

5.3.1 Design basis and design extension conditions .............................................. 11

5.3.2 Functionality and qualification ...................................................................... 12

5.3.3 Accessibility and operator transfer time ........................................................ 12

5.3.4 Control transfer, control prioritisation and security ........................................ 12

5.3.5 Operational considerations ........................................................................... 13

5.4 Human factors engineering principles .................................................................. 14

6 Design process ............................................................................................................ 14

7 Functional design ........................................................................................................ 15

7.1 General ............................................................................................................... 15

7.2 Human factors ..................................................................................................... 15

7.3 Location and access route ................................................................................... 15

7.4 SCR environment ................................................................................................ 16

7.5 Space and configuration ...................................................................................... 16

7.6 Information and control equipment ....................................................................... 17

7.7 Communication systems ...................................................................................... 17

7.8 Other equipment ................................................................................................. 18

7.9 Testing and inspection ........................................................................................ 18

8 System verification and validation ................................................................................ 18

Annex A (informative) Assessment of safe transfer time window ......................................... 20

Bibliography ....................................................................................................................... 21

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SIST EN 60965:2016
IEC 60965:2016 © IEC 2016 – 3 –
INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION
____________
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS – CONTROL ROOMS –
SUPPLEMENTARY CONTROL ROOM FOR REACTOR SHUTDOWN
WITHOUT ACCESS TO THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM
FOREWORD

1) The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) is a worldwide organization for standardization comprising

all national electrotechnical committees (IEC National Committees). The object of IEC is to promote

international co-operation on all questions concerning standardization in the electrical and electronic fields. To

this end and in addition to other activities, IEC publishes International Standards, Technical Specifications,

Technical Reports, Publicly Available Specifications (PAS) and Guides (hereafter referred to as “IEC

Publication(s)”). Their preparation is entrusted to technical committees; any IEC National Committee interested

in the subject dealt with may participate in this preparatory work. International, governmental and non-

governmental organizations liaising with the IEC also participate in this preparation. IEC collaborates closely

with the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) in accordance with conditions determined by

agreement between the two organizations.

2) The formal decisions or agreements of IEC on technical matters express, as nearly as possible, an international

consensus of opinion on the relevant subjects since each technical committee has representation from all

interested IEC National Committees.

3) IEC Publications have the form of recommendations for international use and are accepted by IEC National

Committees in that sense. While all reasonable efforts are made to ensure that the technical content of IEC

Publications is accurate, IEC cannot be held responsible for the way in which they are used or for any

misinterpretation by any end user.

4) In order to promote international uniformity, IEC National Committees undertake to apply IEC Publications

transparently to the maximum extent possible in their national and regional publications. Any divergence

between any IEC Publication and the corresponding national or regional publication shall be clearly indicated in

the latter.

5) IEC itself does not provide any attestation of conformity. Independent certification bodies provide conformity

assessment services and, in some areas, access to IEC marks of conformity. IEC is not responsible for any

services carried out by independent certification bodies.

6) All users should ensure that they have the latest edition of this publication.

7) No liability shall attach to IEC or its directors, employees, servants or agents including individual experts and

members of its technical committees and IEC National Committees for any personal injury, property damage or

other damage of any nature whatsoever, whether direct or indirect, or for costs (including legal fees) and

expenses arising out of the publication, use of, or reliance upon, this IEC Publication or any other IEC

Publications.

8) Attention is drawn to the Normative references cited in this publication. Use of the referenced publications is

indispensable for the correct application of this publication.

9) Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this IEC Publication may be the subject of

patent rights. IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.

International Standard IEC 60965 has been prepared by subcommittee 45A: Instrumentation,

control and electrical systems of nuclear facilities, of IEC technical committee 45: Nuclear

instrumentation.

This third edition cancels and replaces the second edition published in 2009. This edition

constitutes a technical revision.

This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous

edition:

a) requirements associated with regular testing of the supplementary control room (SCR);

b) requirements to assess the time available during which the reactor will be safe but

unattended, in order to move from the main control room (MCR) to the SCR and for the

SCR to become operational;
c) reference to SSR-2/1 which includes the following new requirements:
---------------------- Page: 9 ----------------------
SIST EN 60965:2016
– 4 – IEC 60965:2016 © IEC 2016

1) the SCR should be functionally (as well as physically and electrically) separate from

the MCR,

2) consideration shall be given to the provision of shielding against radioactivity on the

access paths to the SCR;

d) reference to DS431, the revision of NS-G-1.3, including the following new requirements:

1) to implement at least two diverse methods for communication with a set of predefined

locations,

2) to implement features to support monitoring of trends in key plant parameters;

e) requirements for the role, functional capability and robustness of the SCR in design

extension conditions;
The text of this standard is based on the following documents:
FDIS Report on voting
45A/1060/FDIS 45A/1078/RVD

Full information on the voting for the approval of this standard can be found in the report on

voting indicated in the above table.

This publication has been drafted in accordance with the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

The committee has decided that the contents of this publication will remain unchanged until

the stability date indicated on the IEC website under "http://webstore.iec.ch" in the data

related to the specific publication. At this date, the publication will be
• reconfirmed,
• withdrawn,
• replaced by a revised edition, or
• amended.
---------------------- Page: 10 ----------------------
SIST EN 60965:2016
IEC 60965:2016 © IEC 2016 – 5 –
INTRODUCTION
a) Technical background, main issues and organization of the standard

IEC 60965:1989 was developed to provide requirements relevant to the design of NPP

supplementary control points for reactor shutdown without access to the main control

room. The first edition of IEC 60965 has been used extensively within the nuclear industry.

It was however recognized in 2007 that technical developments especially those which

were based on software technology should be incorporated. It was also recognized that

the relationships with the standard for the main control room (i.e. IEC 60964) and the

derivative standards to that standard (i.e. IEC 61227, IEC 61771, IEC 61772, IEC 61839,

and IEC 62241) should be clarified and conditioned. In 2009 the second edition of

IEC 60965 was published.
In June 2013, during the Moscow meeting, WG A8 experts recommended a limited

revision be launched to take into account the lessons learned from TEPCO Fukushima

Daiichi accident and some comments formulated during the circulation of the FDIS of the

published second edition. In the course of development of this revision, the title of the

standard was amended to refer to Supplementary Control ‘Room’ for consistency with

IAEA SSR-2/1.
This IEC standard specifically focuses on the functional design process of the

supplementary control room of an NPP. It is intended that the standard be used by NPP

designers, design authorities, vendors, utilities, and by licensors.

b) Situation of the current standard in the structure of the IEC SC 45A standard series

IEC 60965 is the third level IEC SC 45A document tackling the issue of the design of a

supplementary control room.

IEC 60965 is to be read in association with IEC 60964 for the design of the main control

room (including the derivative standards mentioned above) which is the appropriate

IEC SC 45A document providing guidance on operator controls, verification and validation

of design, application of visual display units, functional analysis and assignment, and

alarm functions and presentation.

For more details on the structure of the IEC SC 45A standard series, see item d) of this

introduction.
c) Recommendations and limitations regarding the application of this Standard

The purpose of this standard is to provide functional design requirements to be used in the

design of the supplementary control room of a nuclear power plant to meet safety
requirements.
This standard is intended for application to a supplementary control room whose

conceptual design is initiated after the publication of this standard. The recommendations

of the standard may be used for refits, upgrades and modifications.

Aspects for which special recommendations have been provided in this Standard, in

accordance with IAEA safety standards, are:

– definition of the MCR and plant design bases for which the supplementary control room

are to be used;
– access by station staff to the supplementary control room in such emergencies;

– assurance for the station staff that the environment in the supplementary control room

is safe when it is to be used;

– provision of information in the supplementary control room on the state of the reactor

critical functions;
– transfer of control and indication functions from the main control room to the
supplementary control room in emergencies;

– independence and separation of the cabling used by the supplementary control room

from that used by the main control room;

– assurance that a safe state has been reached using the supplementary control room;

---------------------- Page: 11 ----------------------
SIST EN 60965:2016
– 6 – IEC 60965:2016 © IEC 2016

– communication facilities between the supplementary control room and to the station

management.

To ensure that the Standard will continue to be relevant in future years, the emphasis has

been placed on issues of principle, rather than specific technologies.

d) Description of the structure of the IEC SC 45A standard series and relationships

with other IEC documents and other bodies documents (IAEA, ISO)

The top-level document of the IEC SC 45A standard series is IEC 61513. It provides

general requirements for I&C systems and equipment that are used to perform functions

important to safety in NPPs. IEC 61513 structures the IEC SC 45A standard series.

IEC 61513 refers directly to other IEC SC 45A standards for general topics related to

categorization of functions and classification of systems, qualification, separation of

systems, defence against common cause failure, software aspects of computer-based

systems, hardware aspects of computer-based systems, and control room design. The

standards referenced directly at this second level should be considered together with

IEC 61513 as a consistent document set.

At a third level, IEC SC 45A standards not directly referenced by IEC 61513 are standards

related to specific equipment, technical methods, or specific activities. Usually these

documents, which make reference to second-level documents for general topics, can be

used on their own.

A fourth level extending the IEC SC 45A standard series corresponds to the Technical

Reports which are not normative.

IEC 61513 has adopted a presentation format similar to the basic safety publication

IEC 61508 with an overall safety life-cycle framework and a system life-cycle framework.

Regarding nuclear safety, it provides the interpretation of the general requirements of

IEC 61508-1, IEC 61508-2 and IEC 61508-4, for the nuclear application sector, regarding

nuclear safety. In this framework IEC 60880 and IEC 62138 correspond to IEC 61508-3 for

the nuclear application sector. IEC 61513 refers to ISO as well as to IAEA GS-R-3,

IAEA GS-G-3.1 and IAEA GS-G-3.5 for topics related to quality assurance (QA).

The IEC SC 45A standards series consistently implements and details the principles and

basic safety aspects provided in the IAEA code on the safety of NPPs and in the IAEA

safety series, in particular the Requirements SSR-2/1, establishing safety requirements

related to the design of Nuclear Power Plants, and the Safety Guide NS-G-1.3 dealing with

instrumentation and control systems important to safety in Nuclear Power Plants. The

terminology and definitions used by SC 45A standards are consistent with those used by

the IAEA.

NOTE It is assumed that for the design of I&C systems in NPPs that implement conventional safety functions

(e.g. to address worker safety, asset protection, chemical hazards, process energy hazards) international or

national standards would be applied, that are based on the requirements of a standard such as IEC 61508.

---------------------- Page: 12 ----------------------
SIST EN 60965:2016
IEC 60965:2016 © IEC 2016 – 7 –
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS – CONTROL ROOMS –
SUPPLEMENTARY CONTROL ROOM FOR REACTOR SHUTDOWN
WITHOUT ACCESS TO THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM
1 Scope

This International Standard establishes requirements for the Supplementary Control Room

provided to enable the operating staff of nuclear power plants to shut down the reactor, where

previously operating, and maintain the plant in a safe shut-down state in the event that control

of the safety functions can no longer be exercised from the Main Control Room, due to

unavailability of the Main Control Room or its facilities. The design has to ensure that the

Supplementary Control Room is protected against the hazards, including any localised

extreme hazards, leading to the unavailability of the Main Control Room.

The standard also establishes requirements for the selection of functions, the design and

organisation of the human-machine interface, and the procedures which shall be used

systematically to verify and validate the functional design of the supplementary control room.

It is assumed that supplementary control room provided for shutdown operations from outside

the main control room would be unattended during normal plant conditions other than for

periodic testing. The requirements reflect the application of human engineering principles as

they apply to the human-machine interface during such periodic testing and during abnormal

plant conditions.

This standard does not cover special emergency response facilities (e.g. a technical support

centre) or facilities provided for radioactive waste handling. Detailed equipment design is also

outside the scope of the standard.

This standard follows the principles of IAEA Specific Safety Requirements SSR-2/1 and IAEA

Safety Guide NS-G-1.3.

The purpose of this standard is to provide functional design requirements to be used in the

design of the supplementary control room of a nuclear power plant to meet safety
requirements.

This standard is intended for application to a supplementary control room whose conceptual

design is initiated after the publication of this standard. If it is desired to apply it to existing

plants or designs, special care must be taken to ensure a consistent design basis. This

relates, for example, to factors such as the consistency between the supplementary control

room and the main control room, the ergonomic approach, the automation level and the

information technology, and the extent of modifications to be implemented in I&C systems.

2 Normative references

The following documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document and

are indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For

undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any
amendments) applies.

IEC 60709, Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control systems important to safety –

Separation
IEC 60964:2009, Nuclear power plants – Control rooms – Design
---------------------- Page: 13 ----------------------
SIST EN 60965:2016
– 8 – IEC 60965:2016 © IEC 2016

IEC 61226, Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control important to safety –

Classification of instrumentation and control functions

IEC 61513, Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control important to safety – General

requirements for systems

IEC 61771, Nuclear power plants – Main control-room – Verification and validation of design

IEC 62646, Nuclear power plants – Control rooms – Computer based procedures
ISO 11064 (all parts), Ergonomic design of control centres

ISO 11064-1, Ergonomic design of control centres – Part 1: Principles for the design of

control centres
ISO 11064-3, Ergonomic design of control centres – Part 3: Control room layout

ISO 11064-6, Ergonomic design of control centres – Part 6: Environmental requirements for

control centres
IAEA SSR-2/1:2012, Safety of nuclear power plants: Design

IAEA NS-G-1.3:2002, Instrumentation and Control Systems Important to Safety in Nuclear

Power Plants (to be replaced by SSG-39)
3 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply. For other terms,

refer to the general terminology defined in IEC 60964, IEC 61513 and in the IAEA NUSS

programme, such as Safety Guide NS-G-1.3 or the safety glossary.
3.1
control room staff

group of plant personnel stationed in the control room, which is responsible for achieving the

plant operational goals by controlling plant through the human-machine interface. Typically,

the control room staff consists of supervisory operators, and operators who actually monitor

plant and plant conditions and manipulate controls, but may also include those staff members

and experts who are authorised to be present in the control room, e.g. during long lasting

event sequences
[SOURCE: IEC 60964:2009, 3.4]
3.2
design extension conditions
postulated accident conditions t
...

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