IEC TR 62351-10:2012
(Main)Power systems management and associated information exchange - Data and communications security - Part 10: Security architecture guidelines
Power systems management and associated information exchange - Data and communications security - Part 10: Security architecture guidelines
IEC/TR 62351-10:2012(E) targets the description of security architecture guidelines for power systems based on essential security controls, i.e. on security-related components and functions and their interaction. Furthermore, the relation and mapping of these security controls to the general system architecture of power systems is provided as a guideline to support system integrators to securely deploy power generation, transmission, and distribution systems applying available standards.
General Information
Standards Content (Sample)
IEC/TR 62351-10 ®
Edition 1.0 2012-10
TECHNICAL
REPORT
colour
inside
Power systems management and associated information exchange – Data and
communications security –
Part 10: Security architecture guidelines
IEC/TR 62351-10:2012(E)
All rights reserved. Unless otherwise specified, no part of this publication may be reproduced or utilized in any form
or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and microfilm, without permission in writing from
either IEC or IEC's member National Committee in the country of the requester.
If you have any questions about IEC copyright or have an enquiry about obtaining additional rights to this publication,
please contact the address below or your local IEC member National Committee for further information.
IEC Central Office Tel.: +41 22 919 02 11
3, rue de Varembé Fax: +41 22 919 03 00
CH-1211 Geneva 20 info@iec.ch
Switzerland www.iec.ch
About the IEC
The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) is the leading global organization that prepares and publishes
International Standards for all electrical, electronic and related technologies.
About IEC publications
The technical content of IEC publications is kept under constant review by the IEC. Please make sure that you have the
latest edition, a corrigenda or an amendment might have been published.
Useful links:
IEC publications search - www.iec.ch/searchpub Electropedia - www.electropedia.org
The advanced search enables you to find IEC publications The world's leading online dictionary of electronic and
by a variety of criteria (reference number, text, technical electrical terms containing more than 30 000 terms and
committee,…). definitions in English and French, with equivalent terms in
It also gives information on projects, replaced and additional languages. Also known as the International
withdrawn publications. Electrotechnical Vocabulary (IEV) on-line.
IEC Just Published - webstore.iec.ch/justpublished Customer Service Centre - webstore.iec.ch/csc
Stay up to date on all new IEC publications. Just Published If you wish to give us your feedback on this publication
details all new publications released. Available on-line and or need further assistance, please contact the
also once a month by email. Customer Service Centre: csc@iec.ch.
IEC/TR 62351-10 ®
Edition 1.0 2012-10
TECHNICAL
REPORT
colour
inside
Power systems management and associated information exchange – Data and
communications security –
Part 10: Security architecture guidelines
INTERNATIONAL
ELECTROTECHNICAL
COMMISSION
PRICE CODE
X
ICS 33.200 ISBN 978-2-83220-419-1
– 2 – TR 62351-10 © IEC:2012(E)
CONTENTS
FOREWORD . 4
INTRODUCTION . 6
1 Scope . 7
2 Normative references . 7
3 Terms, definitions and abbreviations . 7
3.1 Terms and definitions . 7
3.2 Abbreviations . 7
4 Power systems – specifics and related standardization. 8
4.1 Overview . 8
4.2 Security specifics . 9
4.3 Relevant regulation and standardization activities . 11
4.4 Reference architecture for TC 57 . 15
5 Security architecture in power systems . 18
5.1 General . 18
5.2 Security domains and their mapping to power system domains . 19
5.3 System interface categories and their mapping to power systems . 21
5.4 Security controls . 26
5.4.1 General . 26
5.4.2 Domain mapping of security controls . 28
5.4.3 Determination of necessary security controls . 30
5.4.4 Network-based security controls . 31
6 Mapping security controls to the TC 57 architecture . 34
6.1 General . 34
6.2 Security domains within a generic power system architecture . 34
6.3 Application of security controls to a generic power system architecture . 35
6.4 Application of security controls to specific power system scenarios . 38
6.4.1 General . 38
6.4.2 Substation automation . 39
6.4.3 Control center – substation communication. 41
6.4.4 Advanced metering . 42
6.5 Identified gaps . 44
Annex A (informative) Further related material . 45
Bibliography . 47
Figure 1 – Power systems – Management of two infrastructures (see Figure 11 of [40]) . 9
Figure 2 – Comparison office / power system security requirements . 10
Figure 3 – Graphical representation of scope and completeness of selected standards
(enhanced version of Figure 1 in 4.1 of [4]) . 15
Figure 4 – TC 57 reference architecture (see [29]) . 16
Figure 5 – Application of TC 57 standards to a power system (see [29], enhanced
according to IEC/TR 61850-1) . 17
Figure 6 – Mapping of information security domains to power system domains . 20
Figure 7 – Mapping of IEC TC 57 communication standards to IEC 62351 parts . 23
Figure 8 – Mapping of IEC 62351 protocol related parts to the IEC 61850 stack . 25
Figure 9 – Security controls overview. 27
TR 62351-10 © IEC:2012(E) – 3 –
Figure 10 – Generic system security assessment approach covering design and
implementation . 30
Figure 11 – Secure design, development, and operation process . 31
Figure 12 – Generic power systems architecture . 35
Figure 13 – Power systems architecture with security controls . 36
Figure 14 – Example substation automation deployment with security controls . 39
Figure 15 – Example control center substation communication with security controls . 41
Figure 16 – Example advanced metering infrastructure deployment with security
controls . 43
Table 1 – IEC 62351 parts . 11
Table 2 – Security domains (see also [35]) . 19
Table 3 – Mapping of logical interface categories to TC 57 reference architecture . 22
Table 4 – Security controls applicable to the different security domains . 28
Table 5 – General security standards applicable to network security . 33
Table 6 – Example security approaches to power system communication protocols . 38
Table A.1 – NERC CIP overview . 45
Table A.2 – The SABSA matrix for security architecture development . 46
– 4 – TR 62351-10 © IEC:2012(E)
INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION
____________
POWER SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT
AND ASSOCIATED INFORMATION EXCHANGE –
DATA AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY –
Part 10: Security architecture guidelines
FOREWORD
1) The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) is a worldwide organization for standardization comprising
all national electrotechnical committees (IEC National Committees). The object of IEC is to promote
international co-operation on all questions concerning standardization in the electrical and electronic fields. To
this end and in addition to other activities, IEC publishes International Standards, Technical Specifications,
Technical Reports, Publicly Available Specifications (PAS) and Guides (hereafter referred to as “IEC
Publication(s)”). Their preparation is entrusted to technical committees; any IEC National Committee interested
in the subject dealt with may participate in this preparatory work. International, governmental and non-
governmental organizations liaising with the IEC also participate in this preparation. IEC collaborates closely
with the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) in accordance with conditions determined by
agreement between the two organizations.
2) The formal decisions or agreements of IEC on technical matters express, as nearly as possible, an international
consensus of opinion on the relevant subjects since each technical committee has representation from all
interested IEC National Committees.
3) IEC Publications have the form of recommendations for international use and are accepted by IEC National
Committees in that sense. While all reasonable efforts are made to ensure that the technical content of IEC
Publications is accurate, IEC cannot be held responsible for the way in which they are used or for any
misinterpretation by any end user.
4) In order to promote international uniformity, IEC National Committees undertake to apply IEC Publications
transparently to the maximum extent possible in their national and regional publications. Any divergence
between any IEC Publication and the corresponding national or regional publication shall be clearly indicated in
the latter.
5) IEC itself does not provide any attestation of conformity. Independent certification bodies provide conformity
assessment services and, in some areas, access to IEC marks of conformity. IEC is not responsible for any
services carried out by independent certification bodies.
6) All users should ensure that they have the latest edition of this publication.
7) No liability shall attach to IEC or its directors, employees, servants or agents including individual experts and
members of its technical committees and IEC National Committees for any personal injury, property damage or
other damage of any nature whatsoever, whether direct or indirect, or for costs (including legal fees) and
expenses arising out of the publication, use of, or reliance upon, this IEC Publication or any other IEC
Publications.
8) Attention is drawn to the Normative references cited in this publication. Use of the referenced publications is
indispensable for the correct application of this publication.
9) Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this IEC Publication may be the subject of
patent rights. IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.
The main task of IEC technical committees is to prepare International Standards. However, a
technical committee may propose the publication of a technical report when it has collected
data of a different kind from that which is normally published as an International Standard, for
example "state of the art".
IEC 62351-10, which is a technical report, has been prepared by IEC technical committee 57:
Power systems management and associated information exchange.
The text of this technical report is based on the following documents:
Enquiry draft Report on voting
57/1234/DTR 57/1265/RVC
TR 62351-10 © IEC:2012(E) – 5 –
Full information on the voting for the approval of this technical report can be found in the
report on voting indicated in the above table.
This publication has been drafted in accordance with the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.
A list of all parts in the IEC 62351 series, published under the general title Power systems
management and associated information exchange – Data and communications security, can
be found on the IEC website.
The committee has decided that the contents of this publication will remain unchanged until
the stability date indicated on the IEC web site under "http://webstore.iec.ch" in the data
related to the specific publication. At this date, the publication will be
• reconfirmed,
• withdrawn,
• replaced by a revised edition, or
• amended.
A bilingual version of this publication may be issued at a later date.
IMPORTANT – The 'colour inside' logo on the cover page of this publication indicates
that it contains colours which are considered to be useful for the correct
understanding of its contents. Users should therefore print this document using a
colour printer.
– 6 – TR 62351-10 © IEC:2012(E)
INTRODUCTION
Cyber security becomes more and more a basic necessity in power control systems as
standard IT and other forms of modern communication technology are being increasingly used
for control and supervision of these systems. The application of IT communication technology
demands the consideration of already existing vulnerabilities, which can be exploited by
potential attackers, as recent intentional and unintentional cyber incidents on SCADA and
other industrial control systems have shown. The increasing number of control system cyber
incidents world-wide with medium to high impact underlines the importance of appropriate
security measures (see [11] ).
The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) Technical Committee (TC) 57 (Power
Systems Management and Associated Information Exchange) is responsible for developing
international standards for power system data communications protocols. Standards
developed within TC 57 comprise for instance IEC 60870-5, IEC 61850, and IEC 62351 just to
state a few. Especially the latter addresses technical security controls within power systems.
A security architecture as targeted here does not only comprise technical means like the
application of dedicated security entities, security protocols or security options in
communication protocols to secure power system entities or the communication network. It
also describes operational guidelines considering the available technical base as well as the
personnel controlling the power systems. Moreover, interactions with existing (security)
infrastructures also affect overall system security.
In this Technical Report hands-on guidelines are proposed for the implementation of security
mechanisms based on deployment examples, rather than a lecture or reference book for
security in general. Therefore, available resources of information related to security of power
systems or more general to security in Smart Grid are utilized and will be referenced as much
as possible, without repeating their content here. Thus this Technical Report addresses both,
the power system engineer and the traditional IT security engineer.
The examples used throughout this Technical Report are intended to better explain the
influences of and the interactions with security. They are used as descriptive examples
without the claim to be complete.
Clause 4 of this Technical Report specifies the specifics of the power systems industry,
comprising differences in the security requirements compared to office systems as well as an
overview about related standardization. It also introduces the TC 57 reference architecture as
one base for the security architecture discussion.
Clause 5 establishes a general approach to a security architecture by using security domains
and dedicated security controls within these domains and maps this approach to the power
system domain based on examples use cases. Clause 5 also addresses the mapping of the
NIST identified interface categories with the TC 57 architecture interfaces.
Clause 6 maps security controls with the IEC TC 57 power system architecture based on
example scenarios. It starts with an overview scenario of power systems and digs into
dedicated sub-scenarios like a substation deployment, the communication between a
substation and a control centre and so on.
______________
References in square brackets refer to the Bibliography.
TR 62351-10 © IEC:2012(E) – 7 –
POWER SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT
AND ASSOCIATED INFORMATION EXCHANGE –
DATA AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY –
Part 10: Security architecture guidelines
1 Scope
This part of IEC 62351, which is a Technical Report, targets the description of security
architecture guidelines for power systems based on essential security controls, i.e. on
security-related components and functions and their interaction. Furthermore, the relation and
mapping of these security controls to the general system architecture of power systems is
provided as a guideline to support system integrators to securely deploy power generation,
transmission, and distribution systems applying available standards.
2 Normative references
The following documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document and
are indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For
undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any
amendments) applies.
IEC/TS 62351-2, Power systems management and associated information exchange – Data
and communications security – Part 2: Glossary of terms
3 Terms, definitions and abbreviations
3.1 Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in IEC/TS 62351-2, as well
as the following apply.
3.1.1
de-militarized zone
DMZ
LAN segment / zone used to tier application/UI/file access between two other zones/segments
3.1.2
reliability
ability of a system to perform a required function under stated conditions for a specified
period of time
3.1.3
security controls
technical or procedural security counter measures to avoid, counteract or minimize security
risks
3.2 Abbreviations
For the purposes of this document, the following abbreviations apply.
ACL access control lists
– 8 – TR 62351-10 © IEC:2012(E)
BDEW Bundesverband Für Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft
BES bulk energy system
CA certification authority that issues digital certificates
CSWG cyber security working group
DHS department of homeland security
DMZ de-militarized zone
DoS denial of service
DTLS datagram transport layer security
DTR draft technical report
HMAC hashed message authentication codes
HTTPS secure hypertext transfer protocol
HSM hardware security module
IDS intrusion detection system
IP internet protocol
IPS intrusion prevention system
LAN local area network (it is the Ethernet IP network inside a security domain)
LDAP lightweight directory access protocol
NTP network time protocol
NERC North American Electric Reliability Corporation
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NWIP new work item proposal
OS operating system
OTP one time password authentication
RBAC remote based access control
RDP remote desktop protocol
PKI public key infrastructure
SGIP Smart Grid interoperability panel
SNMP simple network management protocol
TCP transmission control protocol
TPM trusted platform module
TLS transport layer security
TR technical report
TS technical specification
URL uniform request locator
WIP work in progress
WLAN wireless local area network
4 Power systems – specifics and related standardization
4.1 Overview
Power generation, transmission, and distribution systems are characterized by the existence
of two infrastructures in parallel, the electrical grid (1 in Figure 1), carrying the energy and the
information infrastructure (2 in Figure 1) used to automate and control the electrical grid.
Especially the information infrastructure is becoming more and more a critical part of power
system operations as it is responsible not only for retrieving information from field equipment
TR 62351-10 © IEC:2012(E) – 9 –
but most importantly for submitting control commands. A dependable management of these
two infrastructures is crucial and strongly relies on the information infrastructure as
automation continues to replace manual operations. Hence, the reliability of the power system
strongly depends on the reliability of the information infrastructure. Therefore the information
infrastructure shall be managed to the level of reliability needed to provide the required
stability of the power system infrastructure to prevent any type of outage.
Operators,
engineers,
Central
and other
generating Step-Up
2. Information Infrastructure users
plan
transformer
Distribution
Distribution Transmission
Control center
Gas substation
substation substation
Diesel
turbine
engine
Distribution
Micro-
substation
turbine
Data concentrator
Commercial
Fuel
Diesel
engine cell
Photo
voltaics
Cogeneration
Batteries Wind
Industrial
Commercial
Residential
IEC 1946/12
Figure 1 – Power systems – Management of two infrastructures (see Figure 11 of [40])
The present, rather centralized approach for power generation is evolving to a decentralized
power generation involving existing power plants, power plants producing renewable energy
(like wind parks) down to residences having their own micro power plants (e.g. solar cells).
Moreover, electro mobility as potential energy storage will become more important and needs
to be integrated into the current power system landscape. This increases the already high
complexity of power systems even more. Furthermore, there is also the trend to interconnect
the formerly closed and proprietary architectures with office environments and enterprise
systems to allow new functionalities and increase cost effectiveness. The reverse side is that
this may also lead to new vulnerabilities, which turn cyber security into a priority and a
permanent challenge.
As the information infrastructure is the backbone of power system control, it needs
appropriate protection to ensure the operation of power systems and support the required
system reliability. Information security is the base for protecting the information infrastructure
against intentional and unintentional cyber incidents but needs to take the power system
specifics into account. These specifics are depicted in 4.2. Security as a major topic has been
recognized by standardization bodies as outlined in 4.3, which does not provide a complete
list of standards but lists the most important ones for the application domain. 4.4 focuses on
the architecture of the IEC TC 57 spanning power systems management and associated
information exchange.
4.2 Security specifics
The operational environment of the power systems information infrastructure differs from
office environments or telecommunication environments in several aspects. Specific cyber
security problems have been identified for instance in the NIST document set NIST IR 7628
(see [17], [18], and [19]). Volume 3 of NIST IR 7628 (see [19]) provides a list of evident and
specific cyber security problems. These documents explain the enumerated operational,
system, and device issues more specifically. Technical issues related to the definition of
appropriate security measures have also been discussed as part of IEC/TS 62351-5 (see [43]).
– 10 – TR 62351-10 © IEC:2012(E)
The following list provides some examples for specifics in power systems out of the
referenced documents and also provides additional examples (not a complete list):
– computer-constrained resources precluding many IT technologies;
– communication between components is often asymmetric and message oriented (like
multicast);
– strict timing requirements (down to milliseconds);
– long lifetime or operation time of components (in the range of 10 to 30 years);
– based on the long operation time of the components, there are strong requirements for
interoperability with legacy systems and for migration concepts;
– interoperability with legacy systems influences the maintainability of power systems and
makes systems more complex, especially if maintenance and operation security is desired;
– limitations of connectivity of systems or system components to a central (control) network;
– higher availability and less latency requirements leading e.g. to missing or limited patch
windows within customer facilities complicate the security patch process. Often customers
do not or only reluctantly accept updates in their environment;
– interconnection of independent entities (producers / generators, other transport /
distribution network operators and services);
– field devices may be installed in physically unprotected areas. Direct access to
components by maintenance personnel is costly and often impractical as devices may be
installed in widely distributed areas.
Figure 2 summarizes the differences for basic security services and practices between office
networks and power system networks. The classifications low, medium, and high are
comparable with the NISIR 7628 volume 1 (see [17]) impact levels.
Energy Control
Office IT
Systems
Anti-virus / mobile code Uncommon / hard to deploy Common / widely used
Component Lifetime 10-30 years 3-5 years
Outsourcing Rarely used Common
Application of patches Use case specific Regular / scheduled
Real time requirement Critical due to safety Delays accepted
Security testing / audit Rarely (operational networks) Scheduled and mandated
Physical Security Very much varying High
Security Awareness Increasing High
Confidentiality (Data) Low – Medium High
Integrity (Data) High Medium
Availability / Reliability 24 x 365 x … Medium, delays accepted
Non-Repudiation High Medium
IEC 1947/12
Figure 2 – Comparison office / power system security requirements
As seen, security objectives in power systems are focused on authentication and integrity
protection rather than on confidentiality (which is typically the main objective in office and
telecommunication environments). This is especially true for energy automation control and
protection communication. Nevertheless, with the increased introduction of the advanced
metering infrastructure (AMI) and the increasing demand for energy automation down to
residential level, confidentiality is required to protect the user’s privacy.
While the influences of the information infrastructure to the electrical infrastructure are
obvious, there is also a feedback of the electrical infrastructure to the information
TR 62351-10 © IEC:2012(E) – 11 –
infrastructure. Information about states and events or engineering data in the electrical
infrastructure can be used to derive relevant input for security controls in the information
infrastructure. One example is the utilization of field device configuration data for the
compilation of rules for intrusion detection/prevention systems (IDS/IPS) or firewall systems.
4.3 Relevant regulation and standardization activities
In this subclause 4.3 an overview of important domain specific regulation and standardization
activities relating to security in Smart Grid systems is provided. This list is not complete and
merely states the main standards considered in this report. For a survey on proposed
standardization activities related to Smart Grid in general the IEC and NIST activities defining
standardization roadmaps are referred to (the respective documents are referenced in the
following list).
ISO/IEC
– ISO/IEC 27001 (see [5]), Information technology – Security techniques – Information
security management systems – Requirements, specifies a set of information security
management requirements designed to be used for certification purposes.
– ISO/IEC 27002 (see [6]), Information technology – Security techniques – Code of practice
for information security management, establishes guidelines und general principles for
initiating, implementing, maintaining, and improving information security management in
an organization.
– IEC 62351 (all parts, see [25]) is being standardized by the IEC TC 57 WG 15 and defines
data and communications security for power systems management and associated
information exchange. It comprises security definitions for communication protocols,
network and system management as well as role-based access control. IEC 62351 is
extensible, thus allowing further parts to be added if necessary. The newest part will target
the management of security credentials.
Table 1 provides an overview of the different parts and their standardization status
regarding Edition 1. There is currently work going on to provide an Edition 2 of selected
parts to address comments received from public reviews such as from the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) or the Smart Grid Information Security Working Group
(SGIS) as well as recent advances in cryptography.
Table 1 – IEC 62351 parts
IEC 62351 Definition of security services for Standardization status
Part 1 Introduction and overview TS
Part 2 Glossary of terms TS
TS, edition 2 is currently under review
Part 3 Profiles including TCP/IP
targeting an IS
Part 4 Profiles including MMS TS
Part 5 Security for IEC 60870-5 and derivatives TS, work on edition 2 is almost finished
TS, will be updated in edition 2 to align with
Part 6 Security for IEC 61850 profiles
IEC TR 61850-90-5
Network and system management (NSM) data
Part 7 TS
object models
Role-based access control for power systems
Part 8 TS
management
Part 9 Key management WIP
Part 10 Security architecture guidelines TR (this document)
Part 11 Security for XML Files NWIP
An overview of the different parts of IEC 62351 is provided either in IEC/TS 62351-1 (see
[40]) or in a TC 57 WG 15 White Paper (see [37]). These documents also provide an
overview of security services necessary to protect against certain threats from a more
– 12 – TR 62351-10 © IEC:2012(E)
general point of view and their mapping to the power domain by using IEC 62351 defined
security technology.
– IEC 62443 (see [26]) is being standardized by IEC TC 65 and will reflect the publications
of ISA 99, i.e. ISA 99 documents will be submitted to the IEC voting process. Hence, parts
of IEC 62443 are likely to be similar, if not identical, to ISA 99. The IEC version is
currently likely to contain one more standard (IEC 62443-2-4) which is not developed by
ISA.
– The IEC Smart Grid strategic group (SG3) has issued the Smart Grid standardization
roadmap report (SMB/4175/R see [22]) which encompasses requirements, status and
recommendations of standards relevant for the Smart Grid. Security is covered in detail in
a separate section of [22]. An overall security architecture capturing the complexity of the
Smart Grid is requested. Besides this, the following recommendations pertaining to open
items and necessary enhancements are listed:
• a specification of a dedicated set of security controls (e.g. perimeter security and
access control);
• a defined compartmentalization of Smart Grid applications (domains) based on clear
network segmentation and functional zones;
• a specification comprising identity establishment (based on trust levels) and identity
management;
• necessity to consider security of the legacy components within standardization;
• the harmonization with IEC 62443 [26] to achieve common industrial security
standards;
• a recommendation to review, adapt and enhance existing standards in order to support
general and ubiquitous security across wired and wireless connections.
– ISO/IEC 15408 (see [23]) describes common criteria to specify functional security
requirements as well as assurance requirements for components, devices, or systems.
ISO/IEC 15408 is being mentioned here, as there are currently attempts to provide
protection profiles and associated technical guidelines for smart meter gateways in certain
countries (Germany).
IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers)
– IEEE 1686-2007 (see [30]) is the Standard for substation intelligent electronic devices
(IEDs) cyber security capabilities. The standard defines functions and features that shall
be provided in substation intelligent electronic devices to accommodate critical
infrastructure protection programs. It addresses security in terms of access, operation,
configuration, firmware revision, and data retrieval from IEDs. Encryption for the secure
transmission of data, both within and external to the substation is not part of this standard.
– IEEE P2030 (see [31]) provides a Guide for Smart Grid interoperability of energy
technology and information technology operation with the electric power system (EPS),
end-use applications, and loads. The document is intended to provide guidelines for power
system architectures, communication and information technology architectures related to
Smart Grid targeting the interoperability of involved components.
ISA (International Society of Automation)
– ISA-99 (see [32]) defines a framework addressing Security for industrial automation and
control systems. It covers the processes for establishing an industrial automation and
control systems security program based on risk analysis, establishing awareness and
counter measures, and monitoring cyber security management systems. It describes
several categories of security technologies and also the types of products available in
those categories along with preliminary recommendations and guidance for using those
security technologies. The standard consists of several sub-parts, which are in different
state of completion.
CIGRE (International Council on Large Electric Systems)
– The guideline Security for information systems and intranets in electric power systems
presents the work of Joint Working Group D2/B3/C2-01 and focuses on the importance of
TR 62351-10 © IEC:2012(E) – 13 –
handling information security within an electric utility, dealing with various threats and
vulnerabilities, the evolution of power utility information systems from isolated to fully
integrated systems, the concept of using security domains for dealing with information
security within an electric utility, and the use of ISO/IEC 17799 [39]).
– WG D2.22 “Treatment of information security for electric power utilities”: Three reports
Risk assessment of information and communication systems (see [34]), Security
frameworks for electric power utilities (see [35]), and Security technologies guideline (see
[36]) provide practical guidelines and experiences for determining security risks in power
systems and the development of frameworks including control system security domains.
This is done by elaborating the specific security requirements of these types of domains,
and also by giving a view of interrelated domains and high-level frameworks that are
necessary to manage corporate risks. Domain-specific cyber security controls are being
defined and guidance is provided on how these controls can be applied to electric utility
networks.
– WG D2.31 “Security architecture principles for digital systems in electric power utilities
(EPUs)”: The new working group advances the results of D2.22 by identifying and
developing security architecture principles for digital systems in EPUs. Topics to be
addressed are defence in depth and graded approaches (zoning principles) in EPUs,
Smart Grid relevant security architecture principles, developments of security architecture
for digital systems addressing newly discovered threat scenarios as well as business
demands and the support of technical control structures of the IT security architecture.
– JWG B5/D2.46 “Application and management of cyber security measures for Protection
and Control systems” aims at identifying threats to protection and control systems to map
them with existing to evaluate their effectiveness in providing a defence against the
identified threats. Also targeted are practical organizational and technical guidelines for
implementing cyber security in protection and control systems that minimizes these
differences.
NERC (North American Electric Reliability Corporation)
– NERC’s mission is to ensure the reliability of the bulk power system in North America. To
achieve that, NERC develops and enforces reliability standards and monitors users,
owners, and operators for preparedness. NERC is a self-regulatory organization, subject
to oversight by the US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and governmental
authorities in Canada. NERC has established the Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)
Cyber Security Standards CIP–002 through CIP–011 which are defined to provide a
foundation of sound security practices across the bulk power system. These standards are
not designed to protect the system from specific and imminent threats. They apply to
operators of Bulk Electric Systems (see also [13]). The profiles originate in 2006. NERC-
CIP provides a consistent framework for security control perimeters and access
management with incident reporting and recovery for critical cyber assets and cover
functional as well as non-functional requirements. Clause A.1 provides an overview of the
different parts of NERC-CIP.
– The draft standard CIP-011 may not lead to new cyber security requirements, but it
provides a new organization of the existing requirements in the current CIP standards and
eliminates the non-routable protocol exception. The classification of Bulk Electric Systems
(BES) into the three categories low, medium, and high impact BES cyber systems, and the
mapping of these to security controls are new.
IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force)
– The IETF published RFC 6272, Internet protocols for the Smart Grid (see [38]), which
contains an overview of security considerations and a fairly thorough list of potentially
applicable security technology defined by the IETF. Several IETF standards are applicable
in Smart Grid environments. These are enumerated in 5.4.4.
National activities
– The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is a US federal technology
institute that develops and promotes measurement, standards, and technology. In 2009,
NIST formed the Smart Grid interoperability panel (SGIP) as a public-private cooperation
with over 600 members that develops frameworks and roadmaps, not standards. SGIP’s
– 14 – TR 62351-10 © IEC:2012(E)
security related work is carried out in the cyber security working group (CSWG). The
following subset of NIST documents directly applies to security in Smart Grid
environments:
• NIST special publication 800-39, Managing information security risk: organization,
mission, and information system view (see [9]) provides guidance for an integrated,
organization-wide program for managing information security risk to organizational
operations (i.e. mission, functions, image, and reputation), organizational assets,
individuals, other organizations).
• NIST special publication 800-53, Recommended security controls for federal
information systems (see [20]) provides guidelines for selecting and specifying
technical and organizational security controls and connected processes for information
systems supporting the executive agencies of the federal government to meet the
requirements of FIPS 200 (“Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information
and Information Systems”). It provides an extensive catalogue of security controls and
maps these in a dedicated appendix to industrial control systems.
• NIST special publication 800-82, Guide to industrial control systems (ICS) security(see
[21]) provides guidance on how to secure Industrial Control Systems (ICS), including
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Distributed Control
Systems (DCS), and other control system configurations such as Programmable Logic
Controllers (PLC). It uses NIST SP 800-53 (see [20]) as a basis and provides specific
guidance on the application of the security controls in NIST SP 800-53. This
publication is an update to the second public draft, which was released in 2007.
• NIST special publication 1108R2, NIST framework and roadmap for Smart Grid
interoperability standards (see [16]), describes a high-level conceptual reference
model for the Smart Grid. It lists 75 existing standards that are applicable or likely to
be applicable to the on-going development of the Smart Grid. The document also
identifies 15 high-priority gaps and potential harmonization issues for which new or
revised standards and requirements are needed.
• NIST IR 7628 (see [17], [18], and [19]) originates from the CSWG and targets the
development of a comprehensive set of cyber security requirements building on NIST
SP 1108 (see [16]), also stated above. The document consists of three subdocuments
targeting strategy (see [17]), security architecture (see [18]), and requirements, and
supportive analyses and references (see [19]).
– The US Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Catalog of control systems security –
recommendations for standards developers (see [33]) presents a compilation of practices
that various industry bodies have recommended to increase the security of control
systems from both physical and cyber-attacks. The recommendations in this catalogue are
grouped into 18 families, or categories, that have similar emphasis. It is a collection of
recommendations to be considered when reviewing and developing cyber security
standards for control systems. The recommendations in this catalogue are intended to be
...
IEC/TR 62351-10 ®
Edition 1.0 2012-10
TECHNICAL
REPORT
colour
inside
Power systems management and associated information exchange – Data and
communications security –
Part 10: Security architecture guidelines
IEC/TR 62351-10:2012(E)
All rights reserved. Unless otherwise specified, no part of this publication may be reproduced or utilized in any form
or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and microfilm, without permission in writing from
either IEC or IEC's member National Committee in the country of the requester.
If you have any questions about IEC copyright or have an enquiry about obtaining additional rights to this publication,
please contact the address below or your local IEC member National Committee for further information.
IEC Central Office Tel.: +41 22 919 02 11
3, rue de Varembé Fax: +41 22 919 03 00
CH-1211 Geneva 20 info@iec.ch
Switzerland www.iec.ch
About the IEC
The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) is the leading global organization that prepares and publishes
International Standards for all electrical, electronic and related technologies.
About IEC publications
The technical content of IEC publications is kept under constant review by the IEC. Please make sure that you have the
latest edition, a corrigenda or an amendment might have been published.
Useful links:
IEC publications search - www.iec.ch/searchpub Electropedia - www.electropedia.org
The advanced search enables you to find IEC publications The world's leading online dictionary of electronic and
by a variety of criteria (reference number, text, technical electrical terms containing more than 30 000 terms and
committee,…). definitions in English and French, with equivalent terms in
It also gives information on projects, replaced and additional languages. Also known as the International
withdrawn publications. Electrotechnical Vocabulary (IEV) on-line.
IEC Just Published - webstore.iec.ch/justpublished Customer Service Centre - webstore.iec.ch/csc
Stay up to date on all new IEC publications. Just Published If you wish to give us your feedback on this publication
details all new publications released. Available on-line and or need further assistance, please contact the
also once a month by email. Customer Service Centre: csc@iec.ch.
IEC/TR 62351-10 ®
Edition 1.0 2012-10
TECHNICAL
REPORT
colour
inside
Power systems management and associated information exchange – Data and
communications security –
Part 10: Security architecture guidelines
INTERNATIONAL
ELECTROTECHNICAL
COMMISSION
PRICE CODE
X
ICS 33.200 ISBN 978-2-83220-419-1
– 2 – TR 62351-10 © IEC:2012(E)
CONTENTS
FOREWORD . 4
INTRODUCTION . 6
1 Scope . 7
2 Normative references . 7
3 Terms, definitions and abbreviations . 7
3.1 Terms and definitions . 7
3.2 Abbreviations . 7
4 Power systems – specifics and related standardization. 8
4.1 Overview . 8
4.2 Security specifics . 9
4.3 Relevant regulation and standardization activities . 11
4.4 Reference architecture for TC 57 . 15
5 Security architecture in power systems . 18
5.1 General . 18
5.2 Security domains and their mapping to power system domains . 19
5.3 System interface categories and their mapping to power systems . 21
5.4 Security controls . 26
5.4.1 General . 26
5.4.2 Domain mapping of security controls . 28
5.4.3 Determination of necessary security controls . 30
5.4.4 Network-based security controls . 31
6 Mapping security controls to the TC 57 architecture . 34
6.1 General . 34
6.2 Security domains within a generic power system architecture . 34
6.3 Application of security controls to a generic power system architecture . 35
6.4 Application of security controls to specific power system scenarios . 38
6.4.1 General . 38
6.4.2 Substation automation . 39
6.4.3 Control center – substation communication. 41
6.4.4 Advanced metering . 42
6.5 Identified gaps . 44
Annex A (informative) Further related material . 45
Bibliography . 47
Figure 1 – Power systems – Management of two infrastructures (see Figure 11 of [40]) . 9
Figure 2 – Comparison office / power system security requirements . 10
Figure 3 – Graphical representation of scope and completeness of selected standards
(enhanced version of Figure 1 in 4.1 of [4]) . 15
Figure 4 – TC 57 reference architecture (see [29]) . 16
Figure 5 – Application of TC 57 standards to a power system (see [29], enhanced
according to IEC/TR 61850-1) . 17
Figure 6 – Mapping of information security domains to power system domains . 20
Figure 7 – Mapping of IEC TC 57 communication standards to IEC 62351 parts . 23
Figure 8 – Mapping of IEC 62351 protocol related parts to the IEC 61850 stack . 25
Figure 9 – Security controls overview. 27
TR 62351-10 © IEC:2012(E) – 3 –
Figure 10 – Generic system security assessment approach covering design and
implementation . 30
Figure 11 – Secure design, development, and operation process . 31
Figure 12 – Generic power systems architecture . 35
Figure 13 – Power systems architecture with security controls . 36
Figure 14 – Example substation automation deployment with security controls . 39
Figure 15 – Example control center substation communication with security controls . 41
Figure 16 – Example advanced metering infrastructure deployment with security
controls . 43
Table 1 – IEC 62351 parts . 11
Table 2 – Security domains (see also [35]) . 19
Table 3 – Mapping of logical interface categories to TC 57 reference architecture . 22
Table 4 – Security controls applicable to the different security domains . 28
Table 5 – General security standards applicable to network security . 33
Table 6 – Example security approaches to power system communication protocols . 38
Table A.1 – NERC CIP overview . 45
Table A.2 – The SABSA matrix for security architecture development . 46
– 4 – TR 62351-10 © IEC:2012(E)
INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION
____________
POWER SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT
AND ASSOCIATED INFORMATION EXCHANGE –
DATA AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY –
Part 10: Security architecture guidelines
FOREWORD
1) The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) is a worldwide organization for standardization comprising
all national electrotechnical committees (IEC National Committees). The object of IEC is to promote
international co-operation on all questions concerning standardization in the electrical and electronic fields. To
this end and in addition to other activities, IEC publishes International Standards, Technical Specifications,
Technical Reports, Publicly Available Specifications (PAS) and Guides (hereafter referred to as “IEC
Publication(s)”). Their preparation is entrusted to technical committees; any IEC National Committee interested
in the subject dealt with may participate in this preparatory work. International, governmental and non-
governmental organizations liaising with the IEC also participate in this preparation. IEC collaborates closely
with the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) in accordance with conditions determined by
agreement between the two organizations.
2) The formal decisions or agreements of IEC on technical matters express, as nearly as possible, an international
consensus of opinion on the relevant subjects since each technical committee has representation from all
interested IEC National Committees.
3) IEC Publications have the form of recommendations for international use and are accepted by IEC National
Committees in that sense. While all reasonable efforts are made to ensure that the technical content of IEC
Publications is accurate, IEC cannot be held responsible for the way in which they are used or for any
misinterpretation by any end user.
4) In order to promote international uniformity, IEC National Committees undertake to apply IEC Publications
transparently to the maximum extent possible in their national and regional publications. Any divergence
between any IEC Publication and the corresponding national or regional publication shall be clearly indicated in
the latter.
5) IEC itself does not provide any attestation of conformity. Independent certification bodies provide conformity
assessment services and, in some areas, access to IEC marks of conformity. IEC is not responsible for any
services carried out by independent certification bodies.
6) All users should ensure that they have the latest edition of this publication.
7) No liability shall attach to IEC or its directors, employees, servants or agents including individual experts and
members of its technical committees and IEC National Committees for any personal injury, property damage or
other damage of any nature whatsoever, whether direct or indirect, or for costs (including legal fees) and
expenses arising out of the publication, use of, or reliance upon, this IEC Publication or any other IEC
Publications.
8) Attention is drawn to the Normative references cited in this publication. Use of the referenced publications is
indispensable for the correct application of this publication.
9) Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this IEC Publication may be the subject of
patent rights. IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.
The main task of IEC technical committees is to prepare International Standards. However, a
technical committee may propose the publication of a technical report when it has collected
data of a different kind from that which is normally published as an International Standard, for
example "state of the art".
IEC 62351-10, which is a technical report, has been prepared by IEC technical committee 57:
Power systems management and associated information exchange.
The text of this technical report is based on the following documents:
Enquiry draft Report on voting
57/1234/DTR 57/1265/RVC
TR 62351-10 © IEC:2012(E) – 5 –
Full information on the voting for the approval of this technical report can be found in the
report on voting indicated in the above table.
This publication has been drafted in accordance with the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.
A list of all parts in the IEC 62351 series, published under the general title Power systems
management and associated information exchange – Data and communications security, can
be found on the IEC website.
The committee has decided that the contents of this publication will remain unchanged until
the stability date indicated on the IEC web site under "http://webstore.iec.ch" in the data
related to the specific publication. At this date, the publication will be
• reconfirmed,
• withdrawn,
• replaced by a revised edition, or
• amended.
A bilingual version of this publication may be issued at a later date.
IMPORTANT – The 'colour inside' logo on the cover page of this publication indicates
that it contains colours which are considered to be useful for the correct
understanding of its contents. Users should therefore print this document using a
colour printer.
– 6 – TR 62351-10 © IEC:2012(E)
INTRODUCTION
Cyber security becomes more and more a basic necessity in power control systems as
standard IT and other forms of modern communication technology are being increasingly used
for control and supervision of these systems. The application of IT communication technology
demands the consideration of already existing vulnerabilities, which can be exploited by
potential attackers, as recent intentional and unintentional cyber incidents on SCADA and
other industrial control systems have shown. The increasing number of control system cyber
incidents world-wide with medium to high impact underlines the importance of appropriate
security measures (see [11] ).
The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) Technical Committee (TC) 57 (Power
Systems Management and Associated Information Exchange) is responsible for developing
international standards for power system data communications protocols. Standards
developed within TC 57 comprise for instance IEC 60870-5, IEC 61850, and IEC 62351 just to
state a few. Especially the latter addresses technical security controls within power systems.
A security architecture as targeted here does not only comprise technical means like the
application of dedicated security entities, security protocols or security options in
communication protocols to secure power system entities or the communication network. It
also describes operational guidelines considering the available technical base as well as the
personnel controlling the power systems. Moreover, interactions with existing (security)
infrastructures also affect overall system security.
In this Technical Report hands-on guidelines are proposed for the implementation of security
mechanisms based on deployment examples, rather than a lecture or reference book for
security in general. Therefore, available resources of information related to security of power
systems or more general to security in Smart Grid are utilized and will be referenced as much
as possible, without repeating their content here. Thus this Technical Report addresses both,
the power system engineer and the traditional IT security engineer.
The examples used throughout this Technical Report are intended to better explain the
influences of and the interactions with security. They are used as descriptive examples
without the claim to be complete.
Clause 4 of this Technical Report specifies the specifics of the power systems industry,
comprising differences in the security requirements compared to office systems as well as an
overview about related standardization. It also introduces the TC 57 reference architecture as
one base for the security architecture discussion.
Clause 5 establishes a general approach to a security architecture by using security domains
and dedicated security controls within these domains and maps this approach to the power
system domain based on examples use cases. Clause 5 also addresses the mapping of the
NIST identified interface categories with the TC 57 architecture interfaces.
Clause 6 maps security controls with the IEC TC 57 power system architecture based on
example scenarios. It starts with an overview scenario of power systems and digs into
dedicated sub-scenarios like a substation deployment, the communication between a
substation and a control centre and so on.
______________
References in square brackets refer to the Bibliography.
TR 62351-10 © IEC:2012(E) – 7 –
POWER SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT
AND ASSOCIATED INFORMATION EXCHANGE –
DATA AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY –
Part 10: Security architecture guidelines
1 Scope
This part of IEC 62351, which is a Technical Report, targets the description of security
architecture guidelines for power systems based on essential security controls, i.e. on
security-related components and functions and their interaction. Furthermore, the relation and
mapping of these security controls to the general system architecture of power systems is
provided as a guideline to support system integrators to securely deploy power generation,
transmission, and distribution systems applying available standards.
2 Normative references
The following documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document and
are indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For
undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any
amendments) applies.
IEC/TS 62351-2, Power systems management and associated information exchange – Data
and communications security – Part 2: Glossary of terms
3 Terms, definitions and abbreviations
3.1 Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in IEC/TS 62351-2, as well
as the following apply.
3.1.1
de-militarized zone
DMZ
LAN segment / zone used to tier application/UI/file access between two other zones/segments
3.1.2
reliability
ability of a system to perform a required function under stated conditions for a specified
period of time
3.1.3
security controls
technical or procedural security counter measures to avoid, counteract or minimize security
risks
3.2 Abbreviations
For the purposes of this document, the following abbreviations apply.
ACL access control lists
– 8 – TR 62351-10 © IEC:2012(E)
BDEW Bundesverband Für Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft
BES bulk energy system
CA certification authority that issues digital certificates
CSWG cyber security working group
DHS department of homeland security
DMZ de-militarized zone
DoS denial of service
DTLS datagram transport layer security
DTR draft technical report
HMAC hashed message authentication codes
HTTPS secure hypertext transfer protocol
HSM hardware security module
IDS intrusion detection system
IP internet protocol
IPS intrusion prevention system
LAN local area network (it is the Ethernet IP network inside a security domain)
LDAP lightweight directory access protocol
NTP network time protocol
NERC North American Electric Reliability Corporation
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NWIP new work item proposal
OS operating system
OTP one time password authentication
RBAC remote based access control
RDP remote desktop protocol
PKI public key infrastructure
SGIP Smart Grid interoperability panel
SNMP simple network management protocol
TCP transmission control protocol
TPM trusted platform module
TLS transport layer security
TR technical report
TS technical specification
URL uniform request locator
WIP work in progress
WLAN wireless local area network
4 Power systems – specifics and related standardization
4.1 Overview
Power generation, transmission, and distribution systems are characterized by the existence
of two infrastructures in parallel, the electrical grid (1 in Figure 1), carrying the energy and the
information infrastructure (2 in Figure 1) used to automate and control the electrical grid.
Especially the information infrastructure is becoming more and more a critical part of power
system operations as it is responsible not only for retrieving information from field equipment
TR 62351-10 © IEC:2012(E) – 9 –
but most importantly for submitting control commands. A dependable management of these
two infrastructures is crucial and strongly relies on the information infrastructure as
automation continues to replace manual operations. Hence, the reliability of the power system
strongly depends on the reliability of the information infrastructure. Therefore the information
infrastructure shall be managed to the level of reliability needed to provide the required
stability of the power system infrastructure to prevent any type of outage.
Operators,
engineers,
Central
and other
generating Step-Up
2. Information Infrastructure users
plan
transformer
Distribution
Distribution Transmission
Control center
Gas substation
substation substation
Diesel
turbine
engine
Distribution
Micro-
substation
turbine
Data concentrator
Commercial
Fuel
Diesel
engine cell
Photo
voltaics
Cogeneration
Batteries Wind
Industrial
Commercial
Residential
IEC 1946/12
Figure 1 – Power systems – Management of two infrastructures (see Figure 11 of [40])
The present, rather centralized approach for power generation is evolving to a decentralized
power generation involving existing power plants, power plants producing renewable energy
(like wind parks) down to residences having their own micro power plants (e.g. solar cells).
Moreover, electro mobility as potential energy storage will become more important and needs
to be integrated into the current power system landscape. This increases the already high
complexity of power systems even more. Furthermore, there is also the trend to interconnect
the formerly closed and proprietary architectures with office environments and enterprise
systems to allow new functionalities and increase cost effectiveness. The reverse side is that
this may also lead to new vulnerabilities, which turn cyber security into a priority and a
permanent challenge.
As the information infrastructure is the backbone of power system control, it needs
appropriate protection to ensure the operation of power systems and support the required
system reliability. Information security is the base for protecting the information infrastructure
against intentional and unintentional cyber incidents but needs to take the power system
specifics into account. These specifics are depicted in 4.2. Security as a major topic has been
recognized by standardization bodies as outlined in 4.3, which does not provide a complete
list of standards but lists the most important ones for the application domain. 4.4 focuses on
the architecture of the IEC TC 57 spanning power systems management and associated
information exchange.
4.2 Security specifics
The operational environment of the power systems information infrastructure differs from
office environments or telecommunication environments in several aspects. Specific cyber
security problems have been identified for instance in the NIST document set NIST IR 7628
(see [17], [18], and [19]). Volume 3 of NIST IR 7628 (see [19]) provides a list of evident and
specific cyber security problems. These documents explain the enumerated operational,
system, and device issues more specifically. Technical issues related to the definition of
appropriate security measures have also been discussed as part of IEC/TS 62351-5 (see [43]).
– 10 – TR 62351-10 © IEC:2012(E)
The following list provides some examples for specifics in power systems out of the
referenced documents and also provides additional examples (not a complete list):
– computer-constrained resources precluding many IT technologies;
– communication between components is often asymmetric and message oriented (like
multicast);
– strict timing requirements (down to milliseconds);
– long lifetime or operation time of components (in the range of 10 to 30 years);
– based on the long operation time of the components, there are strong requirements for
interoperability with legacy systems and for migration concepts;
– interoperability with legacy systems influences the maintainability of power systems and
makes systems more complex, especially if maintenance and operation security is desired;
– limitations of connectivity of systems or system components to a central (control) network;
– higher availability and less latency requirements leading e.g. to missing or limited patch
windows within customer facilities complicate the security patch process. Often customers
do not or only reluctantly accept updates in their environment;
– interconnection of independent entities (producers / generators, other transport /
distribution network operators and services);
– field devices may be installed in physically unprotected areas. Direct access to
components by maintenance personnel is costly and often impractical as devices may be
installed in widely distributed areas.
Figure 2 summarizes the differences for basic security services and practices between office
networks and power system networks. The classifications low, medium, and high are
comparable with the NISIR 7628 volume 1 (see [17]) impact levels.
Energy Control
Office IT
Systems
Anti-virus / mobile code Uncommon / hard to deploy Common / widely used
Component Lifetime 10-30 years 3-5 years
Outsourcing Rarely used Common
Application of patches Use case specific Regular / scheduled
Real time requirement Critical due to safety Delays accepted
Security testing / audit Rarely (operational networks) Scheduled and mandated
Physical Security Very much varying High
Security Awareness Increasing High
Confidentiality (Data) Low – Medium High
Integrity (Data) High Medium
Availability / Reliability 24 x 365 x … Medium, delays accepted
Non-Repudiation High Medium
IEC 1947/12
Figure 2 – Comparison office / power system security requirements
As seen, security objectives in power systems are focused on authentication and integrity
protection rather than on confidentiality (which is typically the main objective in office and
telecommunication environments). This is especially true for energy automation control and
protection communication. Nevertheless, with the increased introduction of the advanced
metering infrastructure (AMI) and the increasing demand for energy automation down to
residential level, confidentiality is required to protect the user’s privacy.
While the influences of the information infrastructure to the electrical infrastructure are
obvious, there is also a feedback of the electrical infrastructure to the information
TR 62351-10 © IEC:2012(E) – 11 –
infrastructure. Information about states and events or engineering data in the electrical
infrastructure can be used to derive relevant input for security controls in the information
infrastructure. One example is the utilization of field device configuration data for the
compilation of rules for intrusion detection/prevention systems (IDS/IPS) or firewall systems.
4.3 Relevant regulation and standardization activities
In this subclause 4.3 an overview of important domain specific regulation and standardization
activities relating to security in Smart Grid systems is provided. This list is not complete and
merely states the main standards considered in this report. For a survey on proposed
standardization activities related to Smart Grid in general the IEC and NIST activities defining
standardization roadmaps are referred to (the respective documents are referenced in the
following list).
ISO/IEC
– ISO/IEC 27001 (see [5]), Information technology – Security techniques – Information
security management systems – Requirements, specifies a set of information security
management requirements designed to be used for certification purposes.
– ISO/IEC 27002 (see [6]), Information technology – Security techniques – Code of practice
for information security management, establishes guidelines und general principles for
initiating, implementing, maintaining, and improving information security management in
an organization.
– IEC 62351 (all parts, see [25]) is being standardized by the IEC TC 57 WG 15 and defines
data and communications security for power systems management and associated
information exchange. It comprises security definitions for communication protocols,
network and system management as well as role-based access control. IEC 62351 is
extensible, thus allowing further parts to be added if necessary. The newest part will target
the management of security credentials.
Table 1 provides an overview of the different parts and their standardization status
regarding Edition 1. There is currently work going on to provide an Edition 2 of selected
parts to address comments received from public reviews such as from the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) or the Smart Grid Information Security Working Group
(SGIS) as well as recent advances in cryptography.
Table 1 – IEC 62351 parts
IEC 62351 Definition of security services for Standardization status
Part 1 Introduction and overview TS
Part 2 Glossary of terms TS
TS, edition 2 is currently under review
Part 3 Profiles including TCP/IP
targeting an IS
Part 4 Profiles including MMS TS
Part 5 Security for IEC 60870-5 and derivatives TS, work on edition 2 is almost finished
TS, will be updated in edition 2 to align with
Part 6 Security for IEC 61850 profiles
IEC TR 61850-90-5
Network and system management (NSM) data
Part 7 TS
object models
Role-based access control for power systems
Part 8 TS
management
Part 9 Key management WIP
Part 10 Security architecture guidelines TR (this document)
Part 11 Security for XML Files NWIP
An overview of the different parts of IEC 62351 is provided either in IEC/TS 62351-1 (see
[40]) or in a TC 57 WG 15 White Paper (see [37]). These documents also provide an
overview of security services necessary to protect against certain threats from a more
– 12 – TR 62351-10 © IEC:2012(E)
general point of view and their mapping to the power domain by using IEC 62351 defined
security technology.
– IEC 62443 (see [26]) is being standardized by IEC TC 65 and will reflect the publications
of ISA 99, i.e. ISA 99 documents will be submitted to the IEC voting process. Hence, parts
of IEC 62443 are likely to be similar, if not identical, to ISA 99. The IEC version is
currently likely to contain one more standard (IEC 62443-2-4) which is not developed by
ISA.
– The IEC Smart Grid strategic group (SG3) has issued the Smart Grid standardization
roadmap report (SMB/4175/R see [22]) which encompasses requirements, status and
recommendations of standards relevant for the Smart Grid. Security is covered in detail in
a separate section of [22]. An overall security architecture capturing the complexity of the
Smart Grid is requested. Besides this, the following recommendations pertaining to open
items and necessary enhancements are listed:
• a specification of a dedicated set of security controls (e.g. perimeter security and
access control);
• a defined compartmentalization of Smart Grid applications (domains) based on clear
network segmentation and functional zones;
• a specification comprising identity establishment (based on trust levels) and identity
management;
• necessity to consider security of the legacy components within standardization;
• the harmonization with IEC 62443 [26] to achieve common industrial security
standards;
• a recommendation to review, adapt and enhance existing standards in order to support
general and ubiquitous security across wired and wireless connections.
– ISO/IEC 15408 (see [23]) describes common criteria to specify functional security
requirements as well as assurance requirements for components, devices, or systems.
ISO/IEC 15408 is being mentioned here, as there are currently attempts to provide
protection profiles and associated technical guidelines for smart meter gateways in certain
countries (Germany).
IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers)
– IEEE 1686-2007 (see [30]) is the Standard for substation intelligent electronic devices
(IEDs) cyber security capabilities. The standard defines functions and features that shall
be provided in substation intelligent electronic devices to accommodate critical
infrastructure protection programs. It addresses security in terms of access, operation,
configuration, firmware revision, and data retrieval from IEDs. Encryption for the secure
transmission of data, both within and external to the substation is not part of this standard.
– IEEE P2030 (see [31]) provides a Guide for Smart Grid interoperability of energy
technology and information technology operation with the electric power system (EPS),
end-use applications, and loads. The document is intended to provide guidelines for power
system architectures, communication and information technology architectures related to
Smart Grid targeting the interoperability of involved components.
ISA (International Society of Automation)
– ISA-99 (see [32]) defines a framework addressing Security for industrial automation and
control systems. It covers the processes for establishing an industrial automation and
control systems security program based on risk analysis, establishing awareness and
counter measures, and monitoring cyber security management systems. It describes
several categories of security technologies and also the types of products available in
those categories along with preliminary recommendations and guidance for using those
security technologies. The standard consists of several sub-parts, which are in different
state of completion.
CIGRE (International Council on Large Electric Systems)
– The guideline Security for information systems and intranets in electric power systems
presents the work of Joint Working Group D2/B3/C2-01 and focuses on the importance of
TR 62351-10 © IEC:2012(E) – 13 –
handling information security within an electric utility, dealing with various threats and
vulnerabilities, the evolution of power utility information systems from isolated to fully
integrated systems, the concept of using security domains for dealing with information
security within an electric utility, and the use of ISO/IEC 17799 [39]).
– WG D2.22 “Treatment of information security for electric power utilities”: Three reports
Risk assessment of information and communication systems (see [34]), Security
frameworks for electric power utilities (see [35]), and Security technologies guideline (see
[36]) provide practical guidelines and experiences for determining security risks in power
systems and the development of frameworks including control system security domains.
This is done by elaborating the specific security requirements of these types of domains,
and also by giving a view of interrelated domains and high-level frameworks that are
necessary to manage corporate risks. Domain-specific cyber security controls are being
defined and guidance is provided on how these controls can be applied to electric utility
networks.
– WG D2.31 “Security architecture principles for digital systems in electric power utilities
(EPUs)”: The new working group advances the results of D2.22 by identifying and
developing security architecture principles for digital systems in EPUs. Topics to be
addressed are defence in depth and graded approaches (zoning principles) in EPUs,
Smart Grid relevant security architecture principles, developments of security architecture
for digital systems addressing newly discovered threat scenarios as well as business
demands and the support of technical control structures of the IT security architecture.
– JWG B5/D2.46 “Application and management of cyber security measures for Protection
and Control systems” aims at identifying threats to protection and control systems to map
them with existing to evaluate their effectiveness in providing a defence against the
identified threats. Also targeted are practical organizational and technical guidelines for
implementing cyber security in protection and control systems that minimizes these
differences.
NERC (North American Electric Reliability Corporation)
– NERC’s mission is to ensure the reliability of the bulk power system in North America. To
achieve that, NERC develops and enforces reliability standards and monitors users,
owners, and operators for preparedness. NERC is a self-regulatory organization, subject
to oversight by the US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and governmental
authorities in Canada. NERC has established the Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)
Cyber Security Standards CIP–002 through CIP–011 which are defined to provide a
foundation of sound security practices across the bulk power system. These standards are
not designed to protect the system from specific and imminent threats. They apply to
operators of Bulk Electric Systems (see also [13]). The profiles originate in 2006. NERC-
CIP provides a consistent framework for security control perimeters and access
management with incident reporting and recovery for critical cyber assets and cover
functional as well as non-functional requirements. Clause A.1 provides an overview of the
different parts of NERC-CIP.
– The draft standard CIP-011 may not lead to new cyber security requirements, but it
provides a new organization of the existing requirements in the current CIP standards and
eliminates the non-routable protocol exception. The classification of Bulk Electric Systems
(BES) into the three categories low, medium, and high impact BES cyber systems, and the
mapping of these to security controls are new.
IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force)
– The IETF published RFC 6272, Internet protocols for the Smart Grid (see [38]), which
contains an overview of security considerations and a fairly thorough list of potentially
applicable security technology defined by the IETF. Several IETF standards are applicable
in Smart Grid environments. These are enumerated in 5.4.4.
National activities
– The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is a US federal technology
institute that develops and promotes measurement, standards, and technology. In 2009,
NIST formed the Smart Grid interoperability panel (SGIP) as a public-private cooperation
with over 600 members that develops frameworks and roadmaps, not standards. SGIP’s
– 14 – TR 62351-10 © IEC:2012(E)
security related work is carried out in the cyber security working group (CSWG). The
following subset of NIST documents directly applies to security in Smart Grid
environments:
• NIST special publication 800-39, Managing information security risk: organization,
mission, and information system view (see [9]) provides guidance for an integrated,
organization-wide program for managing information security risk to organizational
operations (i.e. mission, functions, image, and reputation), organizational assets,
individuals, other organizations).
• NIST special publication 800-53, Recommended security controls for federal
information systems (see [20]) provides guidelines for selecting and specifying
technical and organizational security controls and connected processes for information
systems supporting the executive agencies of the federal government to meet the
requirements of FIPS 200 (“Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information
and Information Systems”). It provides an extensive catalogue of security controls and
maps these in a dedicated appendix to industrial control systems.
• NIST special publication 800-82, Guide to industrial control systems (ICS) security(see
[21]) provides guidance on how to secure Industrial Control Systems (ICS), including
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Distributed Control
Systems (DCS), and other control system configurations such as Programmable Logic
Controllers (PLC). It uses NIST SP 800-53 (see [20]) as a basis and provides specific
guidance on the application of the security controls in NIST SP 800-53. This
publication is an update to the second public draft, which was released in 2007.
• NIST special publication 1108R2, NIST framework and roadmap for Smart Grid
interoperability standards (see [16]), describes a high-level conceptual reference
model for the Smart Grid. It lists 75 existing standards that are applicable or likely to
be applicable to the on-going development of the Smart Grid. The document also
identifies 15 high-priority gaps and potential harmonization issues for which new or
revised standards and requirements are needed.
• NIST IR 7628 (see [17], [18], and [19]) originates from the CSWG and targets the
development of a comprehensive set of cyber security requirements building on NIST
SP 1108 (see [16]), also stated above. The document consists of three subdocuments
targeting strategy (see [17]), security architecture (see [18]), and requirements, and
supportive analyses and references (see [19]).
– The US Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Catalog of control systems security –
recommendations for standards developers (see [33]) presents a compilation of practices
that various industry bodies have recommended to increase the security of control
systems from both physical and cyber-attacks. The recommendations in this catalogue are
grouped into 18 families, or categories, that have similar emphasis. It is a collection of
recommendations to be considered when reviewing and developing cyber security
standards for control systems. The recommendations in this catalogue are intended to be
...
Questions, Comments and Discussion
Ask us and Technical Secretary will try to provide an answer. You can facilitate discussion about the standard in here.
Loading comments...