ISO/IEC 10021-4:1997/Cor 2:2000
(Corrigendum)Information technology — Message Handling Systems (MHS): Message transfer system: Abstract service definition and procedures — Technical Corrigendum 2
Information technology — Message Handling Systems (MHS): Message transfer system: Abstract service definition and procedures — Technical Corrigendum 2
Technologies de l'information — Systèmes de messagerie (MHS): Système de transfert de messages: Définition et procédures du service abstrait — Rectificatif technique 2
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INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ISO/IEC 10021-4:1997
TECHNICAL CORRIGENDUM 2
TECHNICAL CORRIGENDUM 3
Published 2000-05-01
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION � МЕЖДУНАРОДНАЯОРГАНИЗАЦИЯПОСТАНДАРТИЗАЦИИ � ORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE DE NORMALISATION
INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION � МЕЖДУНАРОДНАЯ ЭЛЕКТРОТЕХНИЧЕСКАЯ КОМИССИЯ � COMMISSION ÉLECTROTECHNIQUE INTERNATIONALE
Information technology — Message Handling Systems (MHS):
Message transfer system: Abstract service definition and
procedures
TECHNICAL CORRIGENDUM 2
TECHNICAL CORRIGENDUM 3
Technologies de l'information — Systèmes de messagerie (MHS): Système de transfert de messages: Définition et
procédures du service abstrait
RECTIFICATIF TECHNIQUE 2
RECTIFICATIF TECHNIQUE 3
Technical Corrigenda 2 and 3 to International Standard ISO/IEC 10021-4:1997 were prepared byJoint Technical
Committee ISO/IEC JTC 1, Information technology, Subcommittee SC 6, Telecommunications and information
exchange between systems.
ICS 35.240.20 Ref. No. ISO/IEC 10021-4:1997/Cor.2:2000(E)
ISO/IEC 10021-4:1997/Cor.3:2000(E)
© ISO/IEC 2000 – All rights reserved
Printed in Switzerland
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ISO/IEC 10021-4:1997/Cor.2:2000 (E) & Cor.3:2000 (E)
INTERNATIONAL STANDARD
ISO/IEC 10021-4 : 1997/Cor.2 (1997) E & Cor.3 (1998) E
ITU-T Rec. X.411 (1997)/Cor.2 (1997E) & Cor.3 (1998E)
ITU-T RECOMMENDATION
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY – MESSAGE HANDLING SYSTEMS (MHS) –
MESSAGE TRANSFER SYSTEM: ABSTRACT SERVICE DEFINITION
AND PROCEDURES
TECHNICAL CORRIGENDUM 2 AND CORRIGENDUM 3
1 Subclause 8.1.1.1.1.2
In 8.1.1.1.1.2 fifth paragraph "If strong-authentication . ", append "or certificate-selector".
In 8.1.1.1.1.2 final paragraph first sentence append "and, optionally, additional certificates which provide a
certification-path for the initiator’s certificate". Insert after the second sentence "If the initiator is an MTS-user,
the initiator-certificate shall contain the OR-address of the initiator in the x400Address component in its
subject alternative name field (see 12.3.2.1 of ITU-T Rec. X.509 | ISO/IEC 9594-8), unless the security-policy
provides an alternative binding of the certificate to the MTS-user. If the initiator is the MTS, the
initiator-certificate shall contain the MTA-name of the initiator in an mta-name (see A.5.1 of ITU-T Rec.
X.402 | ISO/IEC 10021-2) in the otherName component in its subject alternative name field, unless the
security-policy provides an alternative binding of the certificate to the initiating MTA.". In the final sentence,
delete "via the Change-credentials abstract-operation, or" and append "and, where the initiator has more than
one certificate, a certificate-selector may be supplied to identify the certificate using any certificate selection
criteria specified for certificate match (see 12.7.2 of ITU-T Rec. X.509 | ISO/IEC 9594-8)".
2 Subclause 8.1.1.1.2.2
In 8.1.1.1.2.2 fifth paragraph "If strong-authentication .", append to the first sentence "and, optionally, a
responder-certificate or certificate-selector".
In 8.1.1.1.2.2 append the following paragraph:
The responder-certificate is a certificate of the responder of the association, generated by a trusted source
(e.g. a certification-authority) and, optionally, additional certificates which provide a certification-path for the
responder’s certificate. It may be supplied by the responder of the association, if the responder-bind-token is
an asymmetric-token. If the responder is an MTS-user, the responder-certificate shall contain the
OR-address of the responder in the x400Address component in its subject alternative name field (see 12.3.2.1
of ITU-T Rec. X.509 | ISO/IEC 9594-8), unless the security-policy provides an alternative binding of the
certificate to the MTS-user. If the responder is the MTS, the responder-certificate shall contain the
MTA-name of the responder in an mta-name (see A.5.1 of ITU-T Rec. X.402 | ISO/IEC 10021-2) in the
otherName component in its subject alternative name field, unless the security-policy provides an alternative
binding of the certificate to the responding MTA. The responder-certificate may be used to convey a verified
copy of the public-asymmetric-encryption-key (subject-public-key) of the responder of the association. The
responder's public-asymmetric-encryption-key may be used by the initiator to validate the responder-bind-
token. If the initiator is known to have, or have access to, the responder's certificate (e.g. via the Directory), the
responder-certificate may be omitted and, where the responder has more than one certificate, a
certificate-selector may be supplied to identify the certificate using any certificate selection criteria specified
for certificate match (see 12.7.2 of ITU-T Rec. X.509 | ISO/IEC 9594-8).
ITU-T Rec. X.411 (1997)/Cor.2 (1997E) & Cor.3 (1998E) 1
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ISO/IEC 10021-4:1997/Cor.2:2000 (E) & Cor.3:2000 (E)
3 Subclause 8.2.1.1.1.26
In 8.2.1.1.1.26 penultimate paragraph replace "the message-token provides for non-repudiation-of-origin of the
message content" by "the message-token may provide non-repudiation-of-origin of the message content
subject to availability of an appropriate Public Key infrastructure".
4 Subclause 8.2.1.1.1.28
In 8.2.1.1.1.28 third paragraph after "to provide for non-repudiation-of-origin of the message content" insert
"subject to availability of an appropriate Public Key infrastructure".
5 Subclause 8.2.1.1.2.4
In 8.2.1.1.2.4 penultimate paragraph after "An asymmetric proof-of-submission may also provide for Non
Repudiation of Submission" insert "subject to availability of an appropriate Public Key infrastructure".
6 Subclause 8.3.1.1.2.2
In 8.3.1.1.2.2 penultimate paragraph after "An asymmetric proof-of-delivery may also provide for Non
Repudiation of Delivery" insert "subject to availability of an appropriate Public Key infrastructure".
7 Subclause 8.4.1.2
In 8.4.1.2 insert "simple-authentication" before each occurrence of "credentials" in the first paragraph.
8 Subclause 8.4.1.2.1.1
Delete the third paragraph of 8.4.1.2.1.1.
9 Subclause 8.4.1.2.1.2
Delete "(i.e. simple or strong)" from the second paragraph of 8.4.1.2.1.2.
10 Subclause 8.5.8
In 8.5.8 replace the bullet on "recipient-name" by:
recipient-name: either the OR-address-and-or-directory-name of the intended-recipient of the
token; or, for strong authentication in an MTA-bind, the MTA-name and optionally the global-
domain-identifier of the peer MTA (i.e. the recipient of the bind-token); or, for strong authentication
in an MTS-bind, the MTA-name and optionally the global-domain-identifier of the MTA where the
token is generated by the MTS-user, or the OR-address-and-optional-directory-name of the
MTS-user where the token is generated by the MTS; or, for strong authentication in an MS-bind, the
OR-address-and-optional-directory-name of the MS-user (whether the token is generated by the MS
or by the MS-user);
11 Figure 2
In Figure 2 (Part 1 of 29), before "-- Object Identifiers" insert:
-- IPM Information Objects
IPMPerRecipientEnvelopeExtensions
----
FROM IPMSInformationObjects { joint-iso-itu-t mhs(6) ipms(1) modules(0)
information-objects(2) version-1997(1) }
2 ITU-T Rec. X.411 (1997)/Cor.2 (1997E) & Cor.3 (1998E)
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ISO/IEC 10021-4:1997/Cor.2:2000 (E) & Cor.3:2000 (E)
In Figure 2 (Part 4 of 29), replace the productions for InitiatorCredentials and
ResponderCredentials by:
InitiatorCredentials ::= Credentials
ResponderCredentials ::= Credentials
Credentials ::= CHOICE {
simple Password,
strong [0] StrongCredentials,
... ,
protected [1] ProtectedPassword }
In Figure 2 (Part 4 of 29), replace the production for StrongCredentials by:
StrongCredentials ::= SET {
bind-token [0] Token,
certificate [1] Certificates OPTIONAL,
... ,
certificate-selector [2] CertificateAssertion OPTIONAL }
In Figure 2 (Part 9 of 29), replace the production for ChangeCredentialsArgument by:
ChangeCredentialsArgument ::= SET {
old-credentials [0] Credentials (WITH COMPONENTS { simple }),
new-credentials [1] Credentials (WITH COMPONENTS { simple }) }
In Figure 2 (Part 10 of 29), delete the production for Credentials.
In Figure 2 (Part 11 of 29), in the production for PerRecipientMessageSubmissionExtensions, insert
the line "IPMPerRecipientEnvelopeExtensions |" before "PrivateExtensions,".
In Figure 2 (Part 13 of 29), in the production for MessageDeliveryExtensions, insert the line
"IPMPerRecipientEnvelopeExtensions |" before "PrivateExtensions,".
12 Subclause 12.1.1.1.1.2
In 12.1.1.1.1.2 fourth paragraph "If strong-authentication .", append "or certificate-selector".
In 12.1.1.1.1.2 final paragraph first sentence append "and, optionally, additional certificates which provide a
certification-path for the initiator’s certificate". Insert after the second sentence "The initiator-certificate shall
contain the MTA-name of the initiator in an mta-name (see A.5.1 of ITU-T Rec. X.402 | ISO/IEC 10021-2) in
the otherName component in its subject alternative name field (see 12.3.2.1 of ITU-T Rec. X.509 |
ISO/IEC 9594-8), unless the security-policy provides an alternative binding of the certificate to the initiating
MTA.". In the final sentence append "and, where the initiator has more than one certificate, a
certificate-selector may be supplied to identify the certificate using any certificate selection criteria specified
for certificate match (see 12.7.2 of ITU-T Rec. X.509 | ISO/IEC 9594-8)".
13 Subclause 12.1.1.1.2.2
In 12.1.1.1.2.2 fourth paragraph "If strong-authentication .", append to the first sentence "and, optionally, a
responder-certificate or certificate-selector".
In 12.1.1.1.2.2 append the following paragraph:
The responder-certificate is a certificate of the responder of the association, generated by a trusted source
(e.g. a certification-authority) and, optionally, additional certificates which provide a certification-path for the
responder’s certificate. It may be supplied by the responder of the association, if the responder-bind-token is
an asymmetric-token. The responder-certificate shall contain the MTA-name of the responder in an
mta-name (see A.5.1 of ITU-T Rec. X.402 | ISO/IEC 10021-2) in the otherName component in its subject
alternative name field (see 12.3.2.1 of ITU-T Rec. X.509 | ISO/IEC 9594-8), unless the security-policy provides
an alternative binding of the certificate to the responding MTA. The responder-certificate may be used to
convey a verified copy of the public-asymmetric-encryption-key (subject-public-key) of the responder of the
association. The responder's public-asymmetric-encryption-key may be used by the initiator to validate the
responder-bind-token. If the initiator is known to have, or have access to, the responder's certificate (e.g. via
ITU-T Rec. X.411 (1997)/Cor.2 (1997E) & Cor.3 (1998E) 3
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ISO/IEC 10021-4:1997/Cor.2:2000 (E) & Cor.3:2000 (E)
the Directory), the responder-certificate may be omitted and, where the responder has more than one
certificate, a certificate-selector may be supplied to identify the certificate using any certificate selection
criteria specified for certificate match (see 12.7.2 of ITU-T Rec. X.509 | ISO/IEC 9594-8).
14 Figure 4
In Figure 4 (Part 1 of 7), before "-- Object Identifiers" insert:
-- IPM Information Objects
IPMPerRecipientEnvelopeExtensions
----
FROM IPMSInformationObjects { joint-iso-itu-t mhs(6) ipms(1) modules(0)
information-objects(2) version-1997(1) }
In Figure 4 (Part 3 of 7), in the production for PerRecipientMessageTransferExtensions, insert the line
"IPMPerRecipientEnvelopeExtensions |" before "PrivateExtensions,".
15 Figure 7
Replace Figure 7 by:
- , , , - -
IN FROM PROBE IN DEFERRED DELIVERY PROBE PROBE DELIVER TEST
M
FRONT END
E
S
IN FROM
S
PROBE-OUT ROUTING AND CONVERSION DECISION
A
MESSAGE-OUT
G
MESSAGE
E
REDIRECTION
DELIVERY
C
O
SPLITTER
N
T
R
D
O
CONVERSION
L
I
P S
DISTRIBUTION LIST EXPANSION
R
P
O
C
A DOUBLE ENVELOPER
E
D T
U
DOUBLE ENVELOPE EXTRACTOR
C
R
E
H
ERROR PROCESSING
E
R
OUT TO REPORT MODULE
TISO8860-99
OUT TO PROBE-OUT, MESSAGE-OUT, MESSAGE DELIVERY, PROBE-DELIVER-TEST
4 ITU-T Rec. X.411 (1997)/Cor.2 (1997E) & Cor.3 (1998E)
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ISO/IEC 10021-4:1997/Cor.2:2000 (E) & Cor.3:2000 (E)
16 Figure 8
Replace Figure 8 by:
Error
1
Front End
3
2
Routing and
Redirection
Conversion
Decision
Error
4 10
Dispatcher
Error Processing
5
Splitter
Error
6
Conversion
Error
7
DL Expansion
Error
To Submit
8
Double Enveloper
Error
9
Double Envelope Extractor
To Report Module
12 11
Report Exit
Exit
TISO8870-99
NOTE – Numbers in this figure refer to the numbered steps in the control procedures logic (see 14.3.1.4).
17 Subclause 14.3.1.4
In 14.3.1.4 insert new steps 8) and 9), and renumber subsequent steps accordingly:
8) The Double-enveloper procedure is called if the routing instruction requires the message to be
embedded within an inner-envelope content-type.
In the case of a successful return the procedure terminates, as the MTA has no further processing to perform on
the original message.
In the case of an unsuccessful return, processing continues at step 10 (Error-handler).
9) The Double-envelope-extractor procedure is called if the routing instruction is to extract the inner
envelope from the content.
Upon successful return of an extracted message or probe, processing of the extracted message or probe resumes
at step 1. Upon successful return of an extracted report, processing of the extracted report continues as specified
in 14.4.1. In addition in each case, processing of the report instructions on the original message continues at
step 11.
Upon an unsuccessful return, processing continues at step 10 (Error-handler).
ITU-T Rec. X.411 (1997)/Cor.2 (1997E) & Cor.3 (1998E) 5
MAIN MODULE
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ISO/IEC 10021-4:1997/Cor.2:2000 (E) & Cor.3:2000 (E)
18 Subclause 14.3.4.4
In 14.3.4.4 renumber steps 6) and 7) as 7) and 8), and insert new step 6):
6) If the recipient OR-name identifies a double-envelope-extractor at this MTA and the content-type of the
message is inner-envelope, then the procedure returns a routing instruction to extract the inner envelope from
the content. The procedure then terminates.
Insert a new second paragraph in the former step 7) now renumbered 8):
If the security-policy specifies that a double envelope is required for the identified next hop and the
content-type of the message is not inner-envelope, then the procedure returns a routing instruction to embed
the current message within the content of a new message using the procedure specified in 14.3.13. The
procedure then terminates.
19 Subclause 14.3.12.4
In 14.3.12.4 bullet 4) b), append to the second sentence ", and terminal-type set to the value g3-facsimile".
Insert a new bullet 4) c):
c) telex-delivery: Values of country-name, administration-domain-name, and optionally
private-domain-name are configured. The OR-address is constructed from the configured
components and a network-address obtained from the values of the telexNumber and
countryCode components of the telexNumber Directory attribute, a terminal-identifier
obtained from the value of the answerback component of the telexNumber Directory attribute,
and terminal-type set to the value telex. This is considered to satisfy the telex-delivery
method.
Insert new subclauses 14.3.13 and 14.3.14, as follows:
14.3.13 Double-enveloper Procedure
This procedure takes a message, probe or report, and places the entire object in the content of a new message
which is addressed to a remote double-envelope-extractor, and submitted as a new message which has an inner-
envelope content-type.
14.3.13.1 Arguments
1) A message, probe or report which is to be wrapped in an outer-envelope.
2) The OR-name of the remote double-envelope-extra
...
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