ISO 17776:2016
(Main)Petroleum and natural gas industries — Offshore production installations — Major accident hazard management during the design of new installations
Petroleum and natural gas industries — Offshore production installations — Major accident hazard management during the design of new installations
ISO 17776:2016 describes processes for managing major accident (MA) hazards during the design of offshore oil and gas production installations. It provides requirements and guidance on the development of strategies both to prevent the occurrence of MAs and to limit the possible consequences. It also contains some requirements and guidance on managing MA hazards in operation. ISO 17776:2016 is applicable to the design of - fixed offshore structures, and - floating systems for production, storage and offloading for the petroleum and natural gas industries. The scope includes all credible MA hazards with the potential to have a material effect on people, the environment and assets. This document is intended for the larger projects undertaken to develop new offshore installations. However, the principles are also applicable to small or simple projects or design changes to existing facilities and can also be relevant to onshore production facilities. Mobile offshore units as defined in this document are excluded, although many of the principles can be used as guidance. The design of subsea facilities are also excluded, though the effects of mobile and subsea facilities are considered if they can lead to major accidents that affect an offshore installation. This document does not cover the construction, commissioning, abandonment or security risks associated with offshore installations. The decision to apply the requirements and guidance of this document, in full or in part, is intended to be based on an assessment of the likelihood and possible consequences of MA hazards.
Industries du pétrole et du gaz naturel — Installations des plates-formes en mer — Lignes directrices relatives aux outils et techniques pour l'identification et l'évaluation des risques
General Information
Relations
Standards Content (Sample)
INTERNATIONAL ISO
STANDARD 17776
Second edition
2016-12-15
Petroleum and natural gas
industries — Offshore production
installations — Major accident hazard
management during the design of new
installations
Industries du pétrole et du gaz naturel — Installations des plates-
formes en mer — Lignes directrices relatives aux outils et techniques
pour l’identification et l’évaluation des risques
Reference number
©
ISO 2016
© ISO 2016, Published in Switzerland
All rights reserved. Unless otherwise specified, no part of this publication may be reproduced or utilized otherwise in any form
or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, or posting on the internet or an intranet, without prior
written permission. Permission can be requested from either ISO at the address below or ISO’s member body in the country of
the requester.
ISO copyright office
Ch. de Blandonnet 8 • CP 401
CH-1214 Vernier, Geneva, Switzerland
Tel. +41 22 749 01 11
Fax +41 22 749 09 47
copyright@iso.org
www.iso.org
ii © ISO 2016 – All rights reserved
Contents Page
Foreword .v
Introduction .vi
1 Scope . 1
2 Normative references . 1
3 Terms, definitions and abbreviated terms . 1
3.1 Terms and definitions . 1
3.2 Abbreviated terms . 4
4 Major accident hazard management overview . 5
4.1 General . 5
4.2 Project management commitment . 5
4.3 Project management accountability . 6
4.4 Project plan to manage major accident hazards . 6
4.5 Objectives of major accident hazard management . 6
4.6 Selection of hazard evaluation and risk assessment methods . 7
4.7 Good engineering practice . 7
4.8 Documentation . 8
4.8.1 General. 8
4.8.2 Register of major accident hazards . 9
4.9 Actions management . 9
4.10 Management of change . 9
5 Management of major accident hazards in design .10
5.1 Overview of MA hazard management .10
5.2 Key concepts .11
5.2.1 Understanding the MA hazards .11
5.2.2 Inherently safer design (ISD) .12
5.2.3 Design strategies for managing MA hazards.13
5.2.4 Barriers .13
5.2.5 Performance standards .14
5.2.6 Communication with technical and operational teams.15
6 Screening and concept selection process .15
6.1 General .15
6.2 Objectives.16
6.3 Functional requirements .17
6.3.1 Screening .17
6.3.2 Hazard identification.17
6.3.3 Major accident hazards evaluation .17
6.3.4 ISD and barriers.18
6.3.5 Performance standards .18
6.3.6 Sufficiency of measures .18
6.3.7 Documentation .18
7 Concept definition and optimization.19
7.1 General .19
7.2 Objectives.20
7.3 Functional requirements .20
7.3.1 Hazard identification.20
7.3.2 Major accident hazard evaluation .20
7.3.3 Risk assessment . .20
7.3.4 Inherently safer design (ISD) .20
7.3.5 Barriers .21
7.3.6 Performance standards .21
7.3.7 Sufficiency of measures .21
7.3.8 Documentation .22
8 Detailed design and construction phase .22
8.1 General .22
8.2 Objectives.23
8.3 Functional requirements .23
8.3.1 Overview .23
8.3.2 Hazard identification.24
8.3.3 Major accident hazards evaluation .24
8.3.4 Risk assessment . .24
8.3.5 Inherently safer design (ISD) .24
8.3.6 Barriers .24
8.3.7 Performance standards .25
8.3.8 Sufficiency of measures .25
8.3.9 Register of major accident hazards .25
8.3.10 Documentation .25
8.3.11 Procurement of equipment .26
8.3.12 Construction, completion and commissioning .26
8.3.13 Transfer to operation .26
8.3.14 Actions management .26
9 Major accident hazard management in operation .27
9.1 General .27
9.2 Objectives.27
9.3 Functional requirements .28
9.3.1 Barrier management .28
9.3.2 Revalidation .28
9.3.3 Safety-critical tasks .28
9.3.4 Temporary changes .29
9.3.5 Non-availability of barrier performance .29
9.3.6 Management of change (MOC) . .29
Annex A (informative) Example of a framework for risk-related decision support.31
Annex B (informative) Plan to manage major accident hazards .32
Annex C (informative) Major accident hazard management identification and evaluation tools .41
Annex D (informative) Strategy for managing major accident hazards .71
Annex E (informative) Barrier system performance standards .77
Annex F (informative) HAZID guidewords .80
Bibliography .94
iv © ISO 2016 – All rights reserved
Foreword
ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) is a worldwide federation of national standards
bodies (ISO member bodies). The work of preparing International Standards is normally carried out
through ISO technical committees. Each member body interested in a subject for which a technical
committee has been established has the right to be represented on that committee. International
organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO, also take part in the work.
ISO collaborates closely with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) on all matters of
electrotechnical standardization.
The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are
described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular, the different approval criteria needed for the
different types of ISO documents should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the
editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www.iso.org/directives).
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of
patent rights. ISO shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights. Details of
any patent rights identified during the development of the document will be in the Introduction and/or
on the ISO list of patent declarations received (see www.iso.org/patents).
Any trade name used in this document is information given for the convenience of users and does not
constitute an endorsement.
For an explanation on the meaning of ISO specific terms and expressions related to conformity assessment,
as well as information about ISO’s adherence to the World Trade Organization (WTO) principles in the
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) see the following URL: www.iso.org/iso/foreword.html.
The committee responsible for this document is ISO/TC 67, Materials, equipment and offshore structures
for petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries, Subcommittee SC 6, Processing equipment and
systems.
This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition (ISO 17776:2000), which has been technically
revised and the title changed from Petroleum and natural gas industries — Offshore production
installations — Guidelines on tools and techniques for hazard identification and risk assessment to the
present title.
Introduction
The purpose of this document is to establish requirements and provide guidance for the effective
management of major accident (MA) hazards during the design of new offshore installations for the
petroleum and natural gas industries.
The management of MA hazards involves the application of engineering expertise and knowledge to
provide the measures needed to meet the objectives set by the organizations involved in the project
development. A range of tools for evaluating and assessing the likelihood and consequences of MAs
is needed to help select the measures to be implemented, and to judge when sufficient measures have
been provided.
This process is built on the underlying integrity provided by the application of internationally
recognized codes and standards.
This document covers the following main elements:
— establishing general requirements for identifying MA hazards and their causes;
— assessing MA hazards to understand their likelihood and possible consequences;
— developing suitable strategies for managing MA hazards;
— progressively improving the understanding of MA hazards and their consequences to guide design
decisions during the development phases of the installation;
— providing the measures needed to manage all credible MAs;
— maintaining the measures throughout the life of the installation.
The technical content of this document is arranged as follows:
a) objectives: the goals to be achieved;
b) functional requirements: specifying requirements considered necessary to meet the stated
objectives;
c) annexes: guidelines in support of the functional requirements.
This document should be read in conjunction with ISO 13702 and ISO 15544.
vi © ISO 2016 – All rights reserved
INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ISO 17776:2016(E)
Petroleum and natural gas industries — Offshore
production installations — Major accident hazard
management during the design of new installations
1 Scope
This document describes processes for managing major accident (MA) hazards during the design of
offshore oil and gas production installations. It provides requirements and guidance on the development
of strategies both to prevent the occurrence of MAs and to limit the possible consequences. It also
contains some requirements and guidance on managing MA hazards in operation.
This document is applicable to the design of
— fixed offshore structures, and
— floating systems for production, storage and offloading
for the petroleum and natural gas industries.
The scope includes all credible MA hazards with the potential to have a material effect on people, the
environment and assets.
This document is intended for the larger projects undertaken to develop new offshore installations.
However, the principles are also applicable to small or simple projects or design changes to existing
facilities and can also be relevant to onshore production facilities.
Mobile offshore units as defined in this document are excluded, although many of the principles can
be used as guidance. The design of subsea facilities are also excluded, though the effects of mobile and
subsea facilities are considered if they can lead to major accidents that affect an offshore installation.
This document does not cover the construction, commissioning, abandonment or security risks
associated with offshore installations.
The decision to apply the requirements and guidance of this document, in full or in part, is intended to
be based on an assessment of the likelihood and possible consequences of MA hazards.
2 Normative references
The following documents are referred to in text in such a way that some or all of their content
constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For
undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
ISO 31000, Risk management — Principles and guidelines
3 Terms, definitions and abbreviated terms
3.1 Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this document, the following terms, definitions and abbreviated terms apply.
ISO and IEC maintain terminological databases for use in standardization at the following addresses:
— IEC Electropedia: available at http://www.electropedia.org/
— ISO Online browsing platform: available at http://www.iso.org/obp
3.1.1
barrier
functional grouping of safeguards or controls selected to prevent a major accident or limit the
consequences
Note 1 to entry: Barriers can be subdivided into hardware barriers or human barriers and are supported by
management system elements.
Note 2 to entry: Adapted from IOGP Report No. 415.
3.1.2
emergency response
action taken by personnel on or off an installation to limit the consequences of a major accident or
initiate and execute abandonment
[SOURCE: ISO 15544:2000, 2.1.8]
3.1.3
environment
surroundings in which an organization operates, including air, water, land, natural resources, flora,
fauna, humans and their interrelationships
Note 1 to entry: Surroundings can extend from within an organization to the local, regional and global system.
Note 2 to entry: Surroundings can be described in terms of biodiversity, ecosystems, climate or other
characteristics.
[SOURCE: ISO 14001:2015, 3.2.1]
3.1.4
ergonomics
scientific discipline concerned with study of human factors and understanding of interactions among
human and other elements of a system
Note 1 to entry: Adapted from ISO 6385:2004.
3.1.5
escape route
route from an area of an installation leading to a muster area, temporary refuge (TR), embarkation
area, or means of escape to the sea
[SOURCE: ISO 15544:2000, 2.1.15]
3.1.6
evacuation
planned method of leaving the installation in an emergency
[SOURCE: ISO 15544:2000, 2.1.17]
3.1.7
harm
injury or damage to the health of people, or damage to property or the environment
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC Guide 51:2014, 3.1]
3.1.8
hazard
potential source of harm
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC Guide 51:2014, 3.2]
2 © ISO 2016 – All rights reserved
3.1.9
hazardous event
event that can cause harm
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC Guide 51:2014, 3.3]
3.1.10
individual risk
risk to which an individual is exposed during a defined period of time
3.1.11
inherently safer design
design which eliminates or reduces major accidents through measures that are permanent and
inseparable from the design
3.1.12
major accident
MA
hazardous event that results in
— multiple fatalities or severe injuries; or
— extensive damage to structure, installation or plant; or
— large-scale impact on the environment (e.g. persistent and severe environmental damage that
can lead to loss of commercial or recreational use, loss of natural resources over a wide area or
severe environmental damage that will require extensive measures to restore beneficial uses of the
environment)
Note 1 to entry: In this document, a major accident is the realization of a major accident hazard.
Note 2 to entry: This definition is intended to incorporate terms such as “major accident” as defined by UK HSE.
3.1.13
major hazard
hazard with the potential, if realized, to result in a major accident
3.1.14
mobile offshore unit
mobile platform, including drilling ships, equipped for drilling for subsea hydrocarbon deposits and
mobile platforms for purposes other than production and storage of hydrocarbon deposits
Note 1 to entry: Includes mobile offshore drilling units, drill ships, accommodation units, construction and pipe-
lay units, well servicing and well stimulation vessels.
3.1.15
muster area
designated area to which personnel report when required to do so in an emergency
[SOURCE: ISO 15544:2000, 2.1.29]
3.1.16
performance standard
measureable statement, expressed in qualitative or quantitative terms, of the performance required of a
system, item of equipment, person or procedure, and that is relied upon as a basis for managing a hazard
Note 1 to entry: Hardware performance standards address the functionality, reliability, survivability and
interdependency of barriers under emergency conditions.
[SOURCE: IOGP Report No. 415]
3.1.17
risk
combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm
Note 1 to entry: A more general definition of risk is given in ISO Guide 73:2009 and is “effect of uncertainty” where:
— an effect is a deviation from the expected, and
— uncertainty is a state of having limited knowledge where it is impossible to exactly describe the existing
state and future outcomes.
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC Guide 51:2014, 3.9, modified, Note 1 to entry has been replaced with another note.]
3.1.18
risk criteria
terms of reference against which the significance of risk is evaluated
Note 1 to entry: Risk criteria are based on organizational objectives, and external and internal context.
Note 2 to entry: Risk criteria can be derived from standards, laws, policies and other requirements.
[SOURCE: ISO Guide 73:2009, 3.3.1.3]
3.1.19
risk tolerance
organization’s readiness to bear the risk after risk treatment in order to achieve its objectives
Note 1 to entry: Risk tolerance can be influenced by legal or regulatory requirements.
Note 2 to entry: Qualitative or quantitative criteria can be used to help the organization decide if a risk is tolerable
[SOURCE: ISO Guide 73:2009, 3.7.1.3, modified – Note 2 to entry has been added.]
3.1.20
temporary refuge
TR
place provided where personnel can take refuge for a predetermined period while investigations,
emergency response and evacuation preparations are undertaken
[SOURCE: ISO 15544:2000, 2.1.37, modified, Note 1 to entry has been omitted.]
3.2 Abbreviated terms
CFD computational fluid dynamics
EER escape, evacuation and rescue
ESD emergency shutdown
FMECA failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis
HAZID hazard identification study
HAZOP hazard and operability study
IOGP International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (previously: OGP)
ISD inherently safer design
JHA job hazard analysis
MA major accident
MOC management of change
4 © ISO 2016 – All rights reserved
P&ID piping and instrument diagram
PFD probability of failure on demand
QRA quantitative risk analysis
TR temporary refuge
4 Major accident hazard management overview
4.1 General
The process to manage MA hazards shall align with the principles and framework set out in ISO 31000
and shall
— establish the context prior to starting or executing any of the elements of the process,
— update the context throughout the process, and
— apply a thorough process for communicating, consulting, monitoring and review.
In developing the context for managing MA hazards, “lessons learned” from other organizations,
accident reports and general safety bulletins made available for public review shall be taken into account
where these identify additional hazards, additional measures, or highlight deficiencies in the current
measures for the management of MA hazards on offshore installations. This is part of an improvement
effort which requires users to seek opportunities for improving their designs on a continual basis.
A process to manage MA hazards shall be applied throughout all stages of a project. Designs shall
be regularly reviewed during their development and changed as necessary to achieve the strategies
developed to meet the objectives and risk criteria.
Modifications to an existing installation shall be conducted under an appropriate management of
change (MOC) process. To assess how any modification can change the likelihood or consequences of an
MA, a good understanding is needed of the existing MA hazards and any new MA hazards introduced
by the change. It is also necessary to understand the effectiveness of the current strategies to manage
the existing MA hazards, in order to avoid compromising design measures already implemented to
reduce risk.
If strategies for managing the MA hazards are not available, the requirements and guidance provided
in this document shall be used to identify the existing MA hazards and develop suitable strategies to
manage them.
The outcome of this process is the measures necessary to manage each MA hazard for the life cycle of the
installation. In order to determine the most effective range of design measures, a systematic analysis,
using a range of tools and techniques, shall be used to evaluate the likelihood and consequences of each
identified MA hazard.
An integral part of decision-making is a framework which allows judgement of when the risks to
human beings, the environment and assets are reduced to a tolerable level. Effective decision-making
requires a transparent process which promotes dialogue and engagement with stakeholders to assist in
identifying where improvements can be made in managing MA hazards. An example of a framework to
support decision making is given in Annex A.
4.2 Project management commitment
Project managers shall establish a broad view of the context of the proposed project and the associated
risks to people, the structure, installation or plant and the environment over the lifetime of installation
and beyond.
To ensure effective implementation of the process of managing all credible MA hazards, the project
management shall:
— establish the context for the project, such as key development parameters and expectations of
stakeholders;
— highlight the importance of managing MA hazards within the overall project objectives, and include
stakeholders in the development of the objectives;
— establish and communicate objectives for managing MA hazards and risk to those involved, both
internally and externally (in some jurisdictions these objectives can be written into legislation);
— define the decision-making process related to managing MA hazards, including who is authorized to
make decisions and the criteria to be used;
— develop the organization of the project team, with clear roles and responsibilities for managing MA
hazards, including the lead discipline engineers;
— make available to the project team competent and sufficient engineering resources to deliver the
MA hazard management objectives (including safety and other technical disciplines);
— provide sufficient time and resources for managing MA hazards, particularly taking account of the
iterative nature of the process;
— implement the measures which result from the process to manage all credible MA hazards;
— define how the process for managing all credible MA hazards and the outcomes will be documented.
4.3 Project management accountability
The project management shall be accountable for the effective implementation of the process
for managing MA hazards across all contributors to the work, including design contractors,
equipment/system suppliers and service providers. The project management shall endeavour to ensure
that any such contracted organizations understand the requirements and are competent to conduct the
specified tasks.
The person in the project organization accountable for safety engineering shall be capable of specifying
and commissioning work necessary for evaluating MA hazards and performing risk assessments.
Where appropriate, that work can be supported by external consultants. The project management shall
develop the terms of reference for the work, and shall decide how the results are to be used to manage
any MA hazards.
4.4 Project plan to manage major accident hazards
The process to manage potential MA hazards for each of the design development stages shall be set out
in a plan. This shall define the project-specific objectives needed to manage all credible MA hazards and
the criteria to judge their tolerability. The plan shall set out the key activities and when they shall be
conducted in order to allow timely implementation of suitable MA hazard management measures.
The plan to manage MA hazards shall be developed at the earliest reasonable opportunity, updated for
the start of each new phase in the project development and as required to accommodate new events
and information. Further details can be found in Annex B.
4.5 Objectives of major accident hazard management
Many competent organizations define objectives, standards and criteria for managing MA hazards. In
addition, some regulatory authorities also define minimum standards for specific types of incidents,
and these can include criteria for tolerable risk.
6 © ISO 2016 – All rights reserved
Irrespective of whether such objectives, standards and criteria have been defined by regulation or
the owner, the project management team, with the support of the person accountable for the safety
engineering and other disciplines’ engineers, shall define the specific objectives and criteria for MA
hazard management which are applicable to the project or installation.
Suitable objectives, and any criteria that are needed to support them, shall address the following:
— eliminating or avoiding MA hazards where it is reasonable to do so;
— designing for maximum credible life of the installation without the need for extensive inspection,
testing or maintenance activities;
— reducing the likelihood of MAs by providing facilities that can meet the full operational envelope,
including foreseeable upset conditions and the potential for human error;
— reducing the likelihood of MAs by providing the functionality to safely allow all foreseeable
operational, inspection, testing and maintenance activities;
— preventing escalation so that small incidents or problems do not lead to MAs;
— limiting the extent and duration of any MAs that do occur;
— providing protection for people on board while emergency response is undertaken and, if necessary,
evacuation is completed.
4.6 Selection of hazard evaluation and risk assessment methods
The person accountable for safety engineering shall be responsible for selection of the approach and
the appropriate methods for MA hazard evaluation and risk assessment. The methods chosen shall be
dependent upon factors such as the size and complexity of the installation, the credible MA hazards,
the severity of the MA consequences, the degree of uncertainty, the level of risk, the number of people
exposed to the risk and the proximity of environmentally sensitive areas.
The approach to MA hazard evaluation and risk assessment can vary depending upon the scale of the
installation and the life cycle phase when the analysis is undertaken. For example:
— For simple installations, such as wellhead platforms and other small platforms with limited process
facilities, checklists based upon previous risk assessments of similar installations and operations
can allow a consistent approach to MA hazard management which relies on conformance with
applicable codes and standards.
— For new installations which are a repeat of earlier designs, the evaluations undertaken for the
original design can be used providing they meet current objectives, standards and criteria, new
knowledge and technology and they adequately cover any significant differences which affect the
management of MA hazards (e.g. environment, fluid composition, shut-in pressure). In some cases,
the earlier hazard management work may be deemed sufficient or may need only limited new work.
— Complex installations, such as production platforms with processing facilities and accommodation,
shall always use a structured approach for MA hazard management to ensure that no MA hazards
are overlooked. Within a structured approach there may be areas of the installation where previous
relevant MA hazard management work can be used to limit the amount of new work needed.
— For installations in the early design phase, evaluations will necessarily be less detailed than those
undertaken during later design phases.
4.7 Good engineering practice
An integral part of MA hazard management is the application of recognized and accepted good
engineering practice by the project team, primary contractors, sub-contractors and suppliers. Although
these may not specifically be defined in codes and standards, it is the generic term for recognized
risk management practices and measures that are used by competent organizations to manage
well-understood MA hazards arising from their activities. It involves a combination of competence,
implementation of standards (both internal and external) for managing MA hazards, learning from
past experience (own and others) and generally acting in a way which reduces risks.
Guidance for risk-related decision-making is available in Reference [64]. This document illustrates the
relative importance of good practice, engineering risk assessment or a more precautionary approach in
making risk-related decisions. The precautionary approach is applied when available engineering and
scientific evidence about the MA is insufficient, inconclusive or uncertain. This will mean that more
conservative assumptions are applied and make it more likely that a safety measure is implemented.
4.8 Documentation
4.8.1 General
The process for managing MA hazards within a project shall be documented, in order to provide a clear
record of activities that have been undertaken to
— develop the strategies for managing MA hazards and how they reduce risk, and
— demonstrate that the MA hazard management objectives and risk-tolerability criteria have been
achieved, with an audit trail to the appropriate supporting documentation.
To achieve this, documentation shall:
a) identify all credible MA hazards and evaluate the potential consequences of any relevant MAs;
b) document the design strategies for managing MA hazards and the reasoning used to develop them;
c) document key decisions made during the development of design strategies for managing MA
hazards;
d) describe the approach taken to risk assessment, and how uncertainties, including the potential for
human error, have been taken into account;
e) report the risk assessed, and when necessary calculated, for the design detailing the contributions
from each identified MA hazard;
f) identify the range of barriers implemented (including ISD measures) and why they are considered
sufficient;
g) define design and operations performance standards for each of the barriers (including ISD
measures);
h) demonstrate that the emergency response arrangements are appropriate;
i) describe how engagement and input from operational and technical staff has been managed;
j) describe why the design is considered suitable for operation;
k) describe the role of operating procedures and practices in maintaining MA hazard management
and risk provisions.
Reports which define the purpose, scope, methodology used and the outcome of each activity shall be
included or referenced. This includes all formal studies for identification and evaluation of MA hazards
and related MAs.
The documentation shall be subject to formal review by the project management team to provide
assurance that objectives have been achieved. External acceptance can also be required by local
legislation.
8 © ISO 2016 – All rights reserved
The documentation is intended primarily for the information of the technical and operational teams
who will be operating and modifying the installation. In some jurisdictions, a “Safety Case” or Major
Hazards Report that includes this type of documentation is a legal requirement.
The project management team shall ensure that an effective system records and tracks MA hazard
management activities, and that the records are available for reference by the project and in the
operational phase.
4.8.2 Register of major accident hazards
A register of MA hazards shall be prepared to summarize the following:
— all the MA hazards identified;
— the identified initiating mechanisms (i.e. failure modes or causes);
— the potential consequences of all credible MAs, including the escalation potential;
— the primary design measures for inherently safer design;
— the hardware barriers provided for MAs;
— the primary design measures for protection of escape routes, the temporary refuge, muster
locations, evacuation facilities and the associated structural supports;
— the barrier performance standards and safety-critical tasks necessary to maintain them;
— requirements to verify barrier performance standards;
— reference to supporting evaluation/study reports.
4.9 Actions management
A defined management process is required to ensure effective close-out for actions arising from the
various formal design review and study activities. Actions shall be defined, recorded in a clear and
actionable manner, and closed out or rejected in a systematic way.
The process shall include as a minimum:
— raising, vetting and recording of actio
...
Questions, Comments and Discussion
Ask us and Technical Secretary will try to provide an answer. You can facilitate discussion about the standard in here.
Loading comments...