ISO 19092:2023
(Main)Financial services — Biometrics — Security framework
Financial services — Biometrics — Security framework
This document specifies the security framework for using biometrics for authentication of customers in financial services, focusing exclusively on retail payments. It introduces the most common types of biometric technologies and addresses issues concerning their application. This document also describes representative architectures for the implementation of biometric authentication and associated minimum control objectives. The following are within the scope of this document: — use of biometrics for the purpose of: — verification of a claimed identity; — identification of an individual; — biometric authentication threats, vulnerabilities and controls; — validation of credentials presented at enrolment to support authentication; — management of biometric information across its life cycle, comprising enrolment, transmission and storage, verification, identification and termination processes; — security requirements for hardware used in conjunction with biometric capture and biometric data processing; — biometric authentication architectures and associated security requirements. The following are not within the scope of this document: — detailed specifications for data collection, feature extraction and comparison of biometric data and the biometric decision-making process; — use of biometric technology for non-financial transaction applications, such as physical or logical system access control.
Services financiers — Biométrie — Cadre de sécurité
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Standards Content (Sample)
INTERNATIONAL ISO
STANDARD 19092
Second edition
2023-03
Financial services — Biometrics —
Security framework
Services financiers — Biométrie — Cadre de sécurité
Reference number
© ISO 2023
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ii
Contents Page
Foreword . vi
Introduction .vii
1 Scope . 1
2 Normative references . 1
3 Terms and definitions . 2
4 Abbreviated terms . 8
5 Biometrics in financial service context . 8
5.1 General . 8
5.2 Generic security considerations . 10
5.3 Personal device vulnerabilities and controls strategy . 10
5.4 Biometric verification versus biometric identification . 10
6 Biometric modalities and core systems .11
6.1 General . 11
6.2 Modalities of biometrics. 11
6.2.1 General . 11
6.2.2 Fingerprint . . 11
6.2.3 Voice biometrics .12
6.2.4 Iris biometrics.12
6.2.5 Face biometrics .12
6.2.6 Signature biometrics . 13
6.2.7 Vein biometrics . 13
6.2.8 Palm print biometrics . 14
6.2.9 Keystroke biometrics . 14
6.3 Biometric system and its supporting systems . 14
6.3.1 Overview . 14
6.3.2 Core systems .15
6.3.3 Core biometric authentication usage scenarios . 16
7 Financial biometric authentication systems — usability considerations .20
7.1 General . 20
7.2 Properties of biometric modalities . 20
7.3 Properties and evaluation of biometric system . 21
7.3.1 Recognition performance . 21
7.3.2 Recognition performance evaluation . 22
7.3.3 Presentation attack detection . 23
7.3.4 Interoperability . 23
8 Financial biometric authentication systems – architectures .24
8.1 Overview . 24
8.2 Conceptual business architecture . 24
8.3 Technical architecture . 25
8.4 Registration architecture .25
8.5 PBP devices and associated biometric authentication architectures . 26
8.5.1 PBP device operators .26
8.5.2 PBP device types .28
8.5.3 Point of biometric presentation (PBP) .28
8.5.4 Biometric authentication architecture .30
9 Financial biometric authentication systems – threats and vulnerabilities .34
9.1 Generic threat considerations.34
9.2 Biometric presentation vulnerabilities . 35
9.2.1 Overview . 35
9.2.2 Synthetic biometric presentation attack vulnerabilities . 35
9.2.3 Improper PBP device calibration vulnerabilities .36
iii
9.2.4 Fault injection .36
9.3 Comparison, decision and storage subsystem vulnerabilities .36
9.3.1 Overview . 36
9.3.2 Improper threshold settings vulnerability . 37
9.3.3 Score and threshold vulnerabilities . 37
9.3.4 Reference refinement vulnerabilities . 37
9.3.5 Self-targeted match search vulnerabilities .38
9.3.6 Other-party targeted match search vulnerabilities .38
9.3.7 Match collision vulnerabilities .38
9.3.8 Authentication result transmission vulnerabilities .38
9.3.9 Biometric storage vulnerabilities .38
10 Financial biometric authentication systems — security requirements .38
10.1 General .38
10.2 Generic security requirements .38
10.2.1 Physical security requirements .38
10.2.2 Logical security requirements .39
10.3 Identity registration .40
10.3.1 Overview .40
10.3.2 Security requirements .40
10.4 Presentation .40
10.4.1 Overview .40
10.4.2 Security requirements .40
10.5 Data storage and handling .40
10.5.1 Overview .40
10.5.2 Reference splitting procedure .40
10.6 Comparison and decision . 42
10.6.1 Overview . 42
10.6.2 Security requirements . 42
10.7 Enrolment . 42
10.7.1 Overview . 42
10.7.2 Security requirements . 42
10.8 Re-enrolment . 43
10.8.1 Overview . 43
10.8.2 Security requirements . 43
10.9 Refinement . 43
10.9.1 Overview . 43
10.9.2 Security requirements . 43
10.10 V erification . . 43
10.10.1 Overview . 43
10.10.2 Security requirements .44
10.11 Identification .44
10.11.1 Overview .44
10.11.2 Security requirements .44
10.12 Termination . 45
10.12.1 Overview . 45
10.12.2 Security requirements . 45
10.13 Suspension and reactivation . 45
10.13.1 Overview . 45
10.13.2 Security requirements . 45
10.14 Archiving .46
10.14.1 Overview .46
10.14.2 Security requirements .46
10.15 Security compliance verification .46
Annex A (informative) Threats and vulnerabilities for biometric environments .47
Annex B (informative) Biometric implementation scenarios .50
Annex C (normative) Biometric security controls checklist .59
iv
Bibliography .64
v
Foreword
ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) is a worldwide federation of national standards
bodies (ISO member bodies). The work of preparing International Standards is normally carried out
through ISO technical committees. Each member body interested in a subject for which a technical
committee has been established has the right to be represented on that committee. International
organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO, also take part in the work.
ISO collaborates closely with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) on all matters of
electrotechnical standardization.
The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are
described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular, the different approval criteria needed for the
different types of ISO documents should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the
editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www.iso.org/directives).
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of
patent rights. ISO shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights. Details of
any patent rights identified during the development of the document will be in the Introduction and/or
on the ISO list of patent declarations received (see www.iso.org/patents).
Any trade name used in this document is information given for the convenience of users and does not
constitute an endorsement.
For an explanation of the voluntary nature of standards, the meaning of ISO specific terms and
expressions related to conformity assessment, as well as information about ISO's adherence to
the World Trade Organization (WTO) principles in the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), see
www.iso.org/iso/foreword.html.
This document was prepared by Technical Committee ISO/TC 68, Financial services, Subcommittee SC 2,
Financial Services, security.
This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition (ISO 19092:2008), which has been technically
revised.
The main changes are as follows:
— technical developments since the first edition reflected;
— newer use cases fitting current use of biometrics in the financial industry and related security
considerations included;
— built on a newer set of ISO standards for biometrics, created by ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 37.
Any feedback or questions on this document should be directed to the user’s national standards body. A
complete listing of these bodies can be found at www.iso.org/members.html.
vi
Introduction
Retail transaction authentication using card- and PIN-based technologies has historically been
central to the protection of retail electronic transactions. However, the advent of new technologies
and the evolution of old technologies has introduced the possibility of using personal biometrics as an
alternative or supplementary method of transaction authentication.
Biometrics as a mechanism for recognizing individuals includes the use of fingerprints and iris and
facial images.
The wide use of a biometric system with the public depends on a number of factors:
— convenience and ease of use;
— level of appropriate security;
— performance;
— non-invasiveness.
This document provides security guidelines for the integration of biometrics into the retail payment
sector using card or other technologies in the financial industry from component to system level and
includes recommendations regarding compliance verification. Nonetheless, the guidelines set out in
this document do not guarantee that a particular implementation will be secure against all threats.
It is the responsibility of the financial institutions deploying such technology, via their security risk
management processes, to ensure adequate controls are in place to mitigate threats in accordance with
institutional policy.
vii
INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ISO 19092:2023(E)
Financial services — Biometrics — Security framework
1 Scope
This document specifies the security framework for using biometrics for authentication of customers
in financial services, focusing exclusively on retail payments. It introduces the most common types of
biometric technologies and addresses issues concerning their application. This document also describes
representative architectures for the implementation of biometric authentication and associated
minimum control objectives.
The following are within the scope of this document:
— use of biometrics for the purpose of:
— verification of a claimed identity;
— identification of an individual;
— biometric authentication threats, vulnerabilities and controls;
— validation of credentials presented at enrolment to support authentication;
— management of biometric information across its life cycle, comprising enrolment, transmission and
storage, verification, identification and termination processes;
— security requirements for hardware used in conjunction with biometric capture and biometric data
processing;
— biometric authentication architectures and associated security requirements.
The following are not within the scope of this document:
— detailed specifications for data collection, feature extraction and comparison of biometric data and
the biometric decision-making process;
— use of biometric technology for non-financial transaction applications, such as physical or logical
system access control.
2 Normative references
The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content
constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For
undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
ISO/IEC 9796 (all parts), Information technology — Security techniques — Digital signature schemes
giving message recovery
ISO/IEC 9797 (all parts), Information technology — Security techniques — Message Authentication Codes
(MACs)
ISO 11568, Financial services — Key management (retail)
ISO 13491-1, Financial services — Secure cryptographic devices (retail) — Part 1: Concepts, requirements
and evaluation methods
ISO 13491-2, Financial services — Secure cryptographic devices (retail) — Part 2: Security compliance
checklists for devices used in financial transactions
ISO/IEC 15408-3, Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — Evaluation criteria for IT
security — Part 3: Security assurance components
ISO/IEC 14888 (all parts), IT Security techniques — Digital signatures with appendix
ISO/IEC 18033 (all parts), Information security — Encryption algorithms
ISO/IEC 19772, Information security — Authenticated encryption
3 Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.
ISO and IEC maintain terminology databases for use in standardization at the following addresses:
— ISO Online browsing platform: available at https:// www .iso .org/ obp
— IEC Electropedia: available at https:// www .electropedia .org/
3.1
biometric authentication
authentication where biometric verification or biometric identification is applied and the identity is
linked to the biometric reference
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 24745:2022, 3.3]
3.2
biometric capture
obtaining and recording of, in a retrievable form, signal(s) of biometric characteristic(s) directly from
individual(s), or from representation(s) of biometric characteristic(s)
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 2382-37:2022, 37.06.03, modified — Notes to entry removed.]
3.3
biometric capture device
device that collects a signal from a biometric characteristic and converts it to a captured biometric
sample
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 2382-37:2022, 37.04.01, modified — Notes to entry removed.]
3.4
biometric data
biometric sample or aggregation of biometric samples at any stage of processing
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 2382-37:2022, 37.03.06, modified — Notes to entry and example removed.]
3.5
biometric enrolment
act of creating and storing a biometric enrolment data record in accordance with an enrolment policy
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 2382-37:2022, 37.05.03, modified — Notes to entry removed.]
3.6
biometric enrolment database
database of biometric enrolment data record(s)
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 2382-37:2022, 37.03.09, modified — Notes to entry removed.]
3.7
biometric feature extraction
process applied to a biometric sample with the intent of isolating and outputting repeatable and
distinctive numbers or labels which can be compared to those extracted from other biometric samples
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 2382-37:2022, 37.05.04, modified — Notes to entry removed.]
3.8
biometric identification
process of searching against a biometric enrolment database to find and return the biometric reference
identifier(s) attributable to a single individual
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 2382-37:2022, 37.08.02, modified — Note to entry removed.]
3.9
biometric information
information conveyed or represented by biometric data
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 24745:2022, 3.9, modified — Note to entry removed.]
3.10
biometric policy
set of rules that indicate the applicability of a biometric reference to some community or class of
application having common security requirements
3.11
biometric presentation
interaction of the biometric capture subject and the biometric capture subsystem to obtain a signal
from a biometric characteristic
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 2382-37:2022, 37.06.07, modified — Note to entry removed.]
3.12
biometric reference
one or more stored biometric samples, biometric templates or biometric models attributed to a
biometric data subject and used as the object of biometric comparison
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 2382-37:2022, 37.03.16, modified — Notes to entry and example removed.]
3.13
biometric reference adaptation
automatic incremental updating of a biometric reference
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 2382-37:2022, 37.05.05, modified — Notes to entry removed.]
3.14
biometric sample
analogue or digital representation of biometric characteristics prior to biometric feature extraction
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 2382-37:2022, 37.03.21, modified — Example removed.]
3.15
biometric system
system for the purpose of the biometric recognition of individuals based on their behavioural and
biological characteristics
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 2382-37:2022, 37.02.03, modified — Notes to entry removed.]
3.16
biometric system-on-card
card-sized device including biometric acquisition, data processing, storage, comparison and decision to
compose a complete biometric verification system
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 24787:2018, 3.8]
3.17
biometric verification
process of confirming a biometric claim through comparison
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 2382-37:2022, 37.08.03, modified — Notes to entry removed.]
3.18
biometrics
automated recognition of individuals based on their biological and behavioural characteristics
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 2382-37:2022, 37.01.03, modified — Notes to entry removed.]
3.19
claimant
individual making a claim that can be authenticated in biometric authentication
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 2382-37:2022, 37.07.10, modified — Note to entry removed and definition revised.]
3.20
comparison
estimation, calculation or measurement of similarity or dissimilarity between biometric probe(s) and
biometric reference(s)
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 2382-37:2022, 37.05.07]
3.21
comparison score
score
numerical value (or set of values) resulting from a comparison
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 2382-37:2022, 37.03.27, modified — Note to entry removed.]
3.22
confidentiality
property that information is not available or disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities or processes
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 27000:2018, 3.10]
3.23
credential
representation of an identity for use in authentication
Note 1 to entry: Customary embodiments of a credential are very diverse. To accommodate this wide range, the
definition adopted is very generic.
Note 2 to entry: A credential is typically made to facilitate data authentication of the identity information
pertaining to the identity it represents. Data authentication is typically used in authorization.
Note 3 to entry: The identity information represented by a credential can, for example, be printed on human-
readable media, or stored within a physical token. Typically, such information can be presented in a manner
designed to reinforce its perceived validity.
EXAMPLE Username, username with a password, PIN, smart card, token, fingerprint, passport.
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 24760-1:2019, 3.3.5, modified — Note 4 to entry changed to examples.]
3.24
decision policy
principles according to which a biometric system provides comparison decisions, inclusive of the
following elements:
— the threshold of biometric comparison;
— the number of attempts for enrolment, verification or identification permitted per transaction;
— the number of biometric references enrolled per claimant;
— the number of distinct biometric samples (e.g. different fingerprints) enrolled per claimant;
— the number of biometric modalities (e.g. fingerprint, voice) in which the claimant is enrolled;
— other internal controls in the comparison process.
Note 1 to entry: Serial, parallel, weighted or fusion decision models in biometric systems utilize more than one
biometric reference in the comparison process for a given user (e.g. using biometric references from multiple
fingerprints).
3.25
encryption
(reversible) transformation of data by an encryption algorithm to produce ciphertext, i.e. to hide the
information content of the data
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 18033-1:2021, 3.11]
3.26
false match rate
FMR
proportion of the completed biometric non-mated comparison trials that result in a false match
Note 1 to entry: The value computed for the FMR will depend on thresholds, other parameters of the comparison
process and the protocol defining the biometric non-mated comparison trials.
Note 2 to entry: Comparisons between:
— identical twins;
— different but related biometric characteristics from the same individual, such as left- and right-hand
topography will need proper consideration (see ISO/IEC 19795-1).
Note 3 to entry: “completed” refers to the computational processes required to make a comparison decision, i.e.
failures to decide are excluded.
Note 4 to entry: “non-mated” refers to cases when the compared biometrics come from different individuals.
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 2382-37:2022, 37.09.09, modified — Note 4 to entry added.]
3.27
false-negative identification rate
FNIR
FNIR (N, R, T)
proportion of a specified set of identification transactions by capture subjects enrolled in the system
for which the subject’s correct reference identifier is not among those returned
Note 1 to entry: The false-negative identification rate can be expressed as a function of N, the number of enrolees,
and of parameters of the identification process where only candidates up to rank R and with a candidate score
greater than threshold T are returned to the candidate list.
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 19795-1:2021, 3.22]
3.28
false non-match rate
FNMR
proportion of the completed biometric matched comparison trials that result in a false non-match
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 2382-37:2022, 37.09.11, modified — Notes to entry removed.]
3.29
false-positive identification rate
FPIR
FPIR (N, T)
proportion of identification transactions by capture subjects not enrolled in the system for which a
reference identifier is returned
Note 1 to entry: The false-positive identification rate can be expressed as a function of N, the number of enrolees,
and of parameters of the identification process where only candidates with a candidate score greater than
threshold T are returned to the candidate list.
Note 2 to entry: For systems that always return a fixed number of candidates without applying a threshold on
scores, FPIR is not a meaningful metric.
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 19795-1:2021, 3.23]
3.30
initial enrolment
(biometric) enrolment that occurs after previous authentication of the subject, such as via a password
Note 1 to entry: See also biometric enrolment (3.5) and re-enrolment (3.38).
3.31
integrated circuit card
card containing integrated circuits and interfaces, especially used for payment or similar
3.32
integrity
property of accuracy and completeness
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 27000:2018, 3.36]
3.33
on-card biometric comparison
comparison and decision-making on an integrated circuit card where the biometric reference is
retained on-card in order to enhance security and privacy
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 24787:2018, 3.12]
3.34
payment token
value linked to and acting as a substitute for a primary account number
3.35
point of biometric presentation
PBP
human interface device to which an account holder presents biometric characteristics, typically
in conjunction with a payment card, for the purposes of carrying out a financial transaction or for
enrolling their credentials for future use in such a transaction
3.36
presentation attack
presentation to the biometric data capture subsystem with the goal of interfering with the operation of
the biometric system
Note 1 to entry: Presentation attack can be implemented through a number of methods, e.g. artefact, mutilations,
replay.
Note 2 to entry: Presentation attacks may have a number of goals, e.g. impersonation or not being recognized.
Note 3 to entry: Biometric systems may not be able to differentiate between biometric presentation attacks with
the goal of interfering with the systems operation and non-conformant presentations.
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 30107-1:2016, 3.5]
3.37
presentation attack detection
automated determination of a presentation attack
Note 1 to entry: Presentation attack detection cannot infer the subject’s intent. In fact, it could be impossible to
derive that difference from the data capture process or acquired sample
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 30107-1:2016, 3.6]
3.38
re-enrolment
process of establishing a new biometric reference replacing existing biometric data for a subject already
enrolled
Note 1 to entry: Re-enrolment requires new captured biometric sample(s).
Note 2 to entry: See also biometric enrolment (3.5) and initial enrolment (3.30).
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 2382-37:2022, 37.05.13, modified — Definition revised and Note 2 to entry added.]
3.39
registration
process before enrolment in which a person is provided an electronic identifier and credential(s) with
which he or she proves his or her identity for enrolment
Note 1 to entry: This is performed in conjunction with enrolment, such that it appears to be a single process.
3.40
secure biometric reader
SBR
secure cryptographic device embodying biometric capture device and associated biometric processing
software
3.41
secure cryptographic device
SCD
device that provides physically and logically protected cryptographic services and storage (e.g. PIN
entry device or hardware security module), and which can be integrated into a larger system, such as
an automated teller machine (ATM) or point of sale (POS) terminal
[SOURCE: ISO 13491-1:2016, 3.28, modified — Definition revised.]
3.42
secure element
significantly tamper-resistant component providing secure storage, secure processing and
confidentiality
3.43
threshold
numerical value (or set of values) at which a decision boundary exists
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 2382-37:2022, 37.03.36]
3.44
token service provider
TSP
entity which translates primary account numbers into payment tokens and vice versa
3.45
trusted domain
TD
secure physical or logical area within a given technology providing confidentiality, integrity or
authentication services to an application
4 Abbreviated terms
API application programming interface
ATM automated teller machine
DSV dynamic signature verification
HSM hardware security module
MAC message authentication code
MPBP mobile device point of biometric presentation
PAN primary account number
POI point of interaction
SCR secure card reader
5 Biometrics in financial service context
5.1 General
To understand the security perspective of this document, it is useful to compare the use of biometrics
in financial transactions with use of a PIN.
Some similarities are as follows:
a) The reference against which the biometric sample is compared is required to be enrolled in advance
for the identity of the associated individual, in an analogous manner to a PIN.
b) Currently, biometrics for authentication is mostly used in verification mode, similar to PINs, and
not in identification mode. That is, the customer presents their biometric characteristic(s), together
with their identity, which is compared 1:1 against an enrolled reference that is looked up based
on the claimed identity. Emerging though, are identification-based solutions where the biometric
characteristic(s) alone is presented to identify the customer (and their payment credentials)
from a “gallery” of customers. Obviously, biometrics is very convenient compared to the potential
difficulty or inconvenience of remembering or entering a PIN.
c) For an enrolled customer, presentation of a biometric characteristic(s) can suffice for the
transaction to be authorized in an analogous manner to a PIN.
d) Rules for accepting or declining a transaction beyond the decision rules on the result of biometric
comparison may be similar or identical to those for PIN.
e) Much of the system infrastructure, except for very specific aspects on biometric processing, is
almost identical.
Some notable differences are as follows:
— Unlike PINs, biometric characteristics such as facial images, voice or fingerprints are not secrets.
Rather, they are public characteristics of the individual which, with adequate safeguards such as
presentation attack detection, are considered sufficiently unique and secure for use in financial
transaction authentication, potentially in place of a PIN.
— PIN security relies on, among other things, the use of secure keypad-based PIN-entry technologies
and methodologies, and on cryptographic protection of PIN values as they traverse financial
authentication systems. Biometric security relies on, among other things, the use of presentation-
attack-resistant technologies, potentially augmented by secure biometric capture technologies, and
on cryptographic protection of biometric data as it traverses financial authentication systems.
— From a convenience perspective, PIN authentication relies on user memory. Biometric authentication
does not.
— Compromised PINs can be replaced in order to reinstate trusted transaction usage; biometric
characteristics cannot be changed upon compromise; biometric solutions rely on reliable
presentation attack detection.
— While both PIN and biometric authentication processes have non-zero error rates, the added
complexity and variability in biometric capture, processing and comparison means biometric
solutions are potentially more vulnerable to accuracy and reliability dependencies.
— There are users for whom a particular biometric will not work or is not feasible. Examples include
manual labourers with worn fingerprints or people wearing face masks.
— The capture of biometric characteristics may be more susceptible to environmental conditions (e.g.
lighting, noise) than the capture of PINs
— Biometric capture under optimum
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