ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:2013/Amd 1:2015
(Amendment)Information technology - Telecommunications and information exchange between systems - Local and metropolitan area networks - Part 1AE: Media access control (MAC) security - Amendment 1: Galois Counter Mode- - Advanced Encryption Standard-256 (GCM-AES-256) Cipher Suite
Information technology - Telecommunications and information exchange between systems - Local and metropolitan area networks - Part 1AE: Media access control (MAC) security - Amendment 1: Galois Counter Mode- - Advanced Encryption Standard-256 (GCM-AES-256) Cipher Suite
Technologies de l'information — Télécommunications et échange d'information entre systèmes — Réseaux locaux et métropolitains — Partie 1AE: Sécurité du contrôle d'accès aux supports (MAC) — Amendement 1: .
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ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:2013/Amd 1:2015 is a standard published by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). Its full title is "Information technology - Telecommunications and information exchange between systems - Local and metropolitan area networks - Part 1AE: Media access control (MAC) security - Amendment 1: Galois Counter Mode- - Advanced Encryption Standard-256 (GCM-AES-256) Cipher Suite". This standard covers: Information technology - Telecommunications and information exchange between systems - Local and metropolitan area networks - Part 1AE: Media access control (MAC) security - Amendment 1: Galois Counter Mode- - Advanced Encryption Standard-256 (GCM-AES-256) Cipher Suite
Information technology - Telecommunications and information exchange between systems - Local and metropolitan area networks - Part 1AE: Media access control (MAC) security - Amendment 1: Galois Counter Mode- - Advanced Encryption Standard-256 (GCM-AES-256) Cipher Suite
ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:2013/Amd 1:2015 is classified under the following ICS (International Classification for Standards) categories: 35.110 - Networking. The ICS classification helps identify the subject area and facilitates finding related standards.
ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:2013/Amd 1:2015 has the following relationships with other standards: It is inter standard links to ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:2013, ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:2020. Understanding these relationships helps ensure you are using the most current and applicable version of the standard.
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Standards Content (Sample)
INTERNATIONAL ISO/IEC/
STANDARD IEEE
8802-1AE
First edition
2013-12-01
AMENDMENT 1
2015-05-01
Information technology —
Telecommunications and information
exchange between systems — Local and
metropolitan area networks —
Part 1AE:
Media access control (MAC) security
AMENDMENT 1: Galois Counter Model —
Advanced Encryption Standard-256 (GCM-
AES-256) Cipher Suite
Technologies de l'information — Télécommunications et échange
d'information entre systèmes — Réseaux locaux et métropolitains —
Partie 1AE: Sécurité du contrôle d'accès aux supports (MAC)
AMENDEMENT 1
Reference number
ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:2013/Amd.1:2015(E)
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IEEE 2015
ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:2013/Amd.1:2015(E)
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ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:2013/Amd.1:2015(E)
Foreword
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Amendment 1 to ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-11 was prepared by the LAN/MAN Standards Committee of the IEEE
Computer Society (as IEEE Std 802.11ae-2012). It was adopted by Joint Technical Committee
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© IEEE 2015 – All rights reserved iii
ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:2013/Amd.1:2015(E)
(blank page)
iv © IEEE 2015 – All rights reserved
IEEE Standard for
Local and metropolitan area networks—
Media Access Control (MAC) Security
Amendment 1: Galois Counter Mode—
Advanced Encryption Standard—
256 (GCM-AES-256) Cipher Suite
IEEE Computer Society
Sponsored by the
LAN/MAN Standards Committee
IEEE
IEEE Std 802.1AEbn™‐2011
3 Park Avenue
(Amendment to
New York, NY 10016-5997
IEEE Std 802.1AE™-2006)
USA
14 October 2011
™
IEEE Std 802.1AEbn -2011
(Amendment to
IEEE Std 802.1AE™-2006)
IEEE Standard for
Local and metropolitan area networks—
Media Access Control (MAC) Security
Amendment 1: Galois Counter Mode—
Advanced Encryption Standard—
256 (GCM-AES-256) Cipher Suite
Sponsor
LAN/MAN Standards Committee
of the
IEEE Computer Society
Approved 10 September 2011
IEEE-SA Standards Board
Abstract: This amendment specifies the GCM-AES-256 Cipher Suite as an option in addition to the
existing mandatory to implement Default Cipher Suite, GCM-AES-128.
Keywords: authenticity, authorized port, confidentiality, data origin integrity, IEEE 802.1AEbn,
LANs, local area networks, MAC Bridges, MAC security, MAC Service, MANs, metropolitan area
networks, port based network access control, secure association, security, transparent bridging
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
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PDF: ISBN 978-0-7381-6735-0 STD97152
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Introduction
This introduction is not part of IEEE Std 802.1AEbn-2011, IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks—
Media Access Control (MAC) Security—Amendment 1: Galois Counter Mode—Advanced Encryption Standard—
256 (GCM-AES-256) Cipher Suite.
The first edition of IEEE Std 802.1AE was published in 2006. This first amendment to that standard adds the
option of using the GCM-AES-256 Cipher Suite.
Relationship between IEEE Std 802.1AE and other IEEE Std 802 standards
IEEE Std 802.1X-2010 specifies Port-based Network Access Control, and provides a means of
authenticating and authorizing devices attached to a LAN, and includes the MACsec Key Agreement
protocol (MKA) necessary to make use of IEEE 802.1AE.
This standard is not intended for use with IEEE Std 802.11 Wireless LAN Medium Access Control. An
amendment to that standard, IEEE Std 802.11i-2004, also makes use of IEEE Std 802.1X, thus facilitating
the use of a common authentication and authorization framework for LAN media to which this standard
applies and for Wireless LANs.
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Patents
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Participants
At the time this standard was submitted to the IEEE-SA for approval, the IEEE P802.1 Working Group had
the following membership:
Tony Jeffree, Chair
Paul Congdon, Vice Chair
Mick Seaman, Editor and Chair, Security Task Group
Eric Gray
Zehavit Alon Eric Multanen
Yafan An Yingjie Gu David Olsen
Ting Ao Craig Gunther Donald Pannell
Peter Ashwood-Smith Michael Johas Teener Glenn Parsons
Christian Boiger Stephen Haddock Mark Pearson
Paul Bottorff Hitoshi Hayakawa Joseph Pelissier
Rudolf Brandner Hal Keen Rene Raeber
Srikanth Keesara
Craig Carlson Karen T. Randall
Rodney Cummings Yongbum Kim Josef Roese
Claudio Desanti Philippe Klein Dan Romascanu
Zhemin Ding Oliver Kleineberg Jessy Rouyer
Donald Eastlake, III Michael Krause Ali Sajassi
Janos Farkas Lin Li Panagiotis Saltsidis
Donald Fedyk Jeff Lynch Rakesh Sharma
Norman Finn Ben Mack-Crane Kevin Stanton
David Martin Robert Sultan
Ilango Ganga
Geoffrey Garner John Messenger PatriciaThaler
Anoop Ghanwani John Morris Chait Tumuluri
Mark Gravel Maarten Vissers
The following members of the individual balloting committee voted on this standard. Balloters may have
voted for approval, disapproval, or abstention.
Thomas Alexander Atsushi Ito Robert Robinson
Butch Anton Raj Jain Benjamin Rolfe
Junghoon Jee Jessy Rouyer
Nancy Bravin
Herbert Ruck
William Byrd Tony Jeffree
Randall Safier
Radhakrishna Canchi Michael Johas Teener
Joseph Salowey
Keith Chow Shinkyo Kaku
Raymond Savarda
Charles Cook Piotr Karocki
Bartien Sayogo
Claudio DeSanti Stuart J. Kerry
Mick Seaman
Wael Diab Lior Khermosh
Shusaku Shimada
Patrick Diamond Yongbum Kim
Kapil Sood
Thomas Dineen Geoff Ladwig
Thomas Starai
Sourav Dutta Paul Lambert
Walter Struppler
Donald Fedyk William Lumpkins
Joseph Tardo
Yukihiro Fujimoto Greg Luri
Michael Johas Teener
Devon Gayle Elvis Maculuba
Patricia Thaler
Gregory Gillooly Edward McCall
Mark-Rene Uchida
Evan Gilman Michael McInnis
Dmitri Varsanofiev
Ron Greenthaler Gary Michel
Prabodh Varshney
Randall Groves Michael S. Newman
John Vergis
C. Guy Satoshi Obara
Hung-Yu Wei
John Hawkins Glenn Parsons
Brian Weis
David Hunter Karen T. Randall
Ludwig Winkel
Paul Isaacs Maximilian Riegel
Oren Yuen
vi Copyright © 2011 IEEE. All rights reserved.
When the IEEE-SA Standards Board approved this standard on 10 September 2011, it had the following
membership:
Richard H. Hulett, Chair
John Kulick, Vice Chair
Robert M. Grow, Past Chair
Judith Gorman, Secretary
Masayuki Ariyoshi
Gary Robinson
Jim Hughes
William Bartley
Joseph L. Koepfinger* Jon Walter Rosdahl
Ted Burse
Sam Sciacca
David J. Law
Clint Chaplin
Thomas Lee Mike Seavey
Wael Diab
Hung Ling Curtis Siller
Jean-Philippe Faure
Oleg Logvinov Phil Winston
Alexander Gelman
Ted Olsen Howard L. Wolfman
Paul Houzé
Don Wright
*Member Emeritus
Also included are the following nonvoting IEEE-SA Standards Board liaisons:
Satish Aggarwal, NRC Representative
Richard DeBlasio, DOE Representative
Michael Janezic, NIST Representative
Catherine Berger
IEEE Project Editor
Patricia Gerdon
IEEE Standards Program Manager, Technical Program Development
Contents
1. Overview. 2
1.1 Introduction. 2
1.2 Scope. 2
2. Normative references. 3
6. Secure provision of the MAC Service . 4
6.1 MACsec connectivity . 4
7. Principles of secure network operation. 5
8. MAC Security Protocol (MACsec). 6
9. Encoding of MACsec protocol data units. 7
9.8 Transmit SA status. 7
10. Principle of MAC Security Entity (SecY) operation . 8
11. MAC Security in Systems. 9
11.7 MACsec in Provider Bridged Networks. 9
14. Cipher Suites. 10
14.1 Cipher Suite use . 10
14.4 Cipher Suite conformance . 10
14.5 Default Cipher Suite (GCM-AES-128) . 11
14.6 GCM-AES-256 . 11
Annex B (informative) Bibliography. 13
Annex C (informative) MACsec Test Vectors. 14
C.1 Integrity protection (54-octet frame) . 15
C.2 Integrity protection (60-octet frame) . 18
C.3 Integrity protection (65-octet frame) . 21
C.4 Integrity protection (79-octet frame) . 24
C.5 Confidentiality protection (54-octet frame). 27
C.6 Confidentiality protection (60-octet frame). 30
C.7 Confidentiality protection (61-octet frame). 33
C.8 Confidentiality protection (75-octet frame). 36
Figures
Figure 11-14 Provider network with priority selection and aggregation. 9
Figure 14-1 Cipher Suite Protect and Validate operations . 10
x Copyright © 2011 IEEE. All rights reserved.
Tables
Table 14-1 MACsec Cipher Suites. 10
Table C-1 Unprotected frame (example) . 15
Table C-2 Integrity protected frame (example) . 15
Table C-3 GCM-AES-128 Key and calculated ICV (example) . 16
Table C-4 GCM-AES-256 Key and calculated ICV (example) . 17
Table C-5 Unprotected frame (example) . 18
Table C-6 Integrity protected frame (example) . 18
Table C-7 GCM-AES-128 Key and calculated ICV (example) . 19
Table C-8 GCM-AES-256 Key and calculated ICV (example) . 20
Table C-9 Unprotected frame (example) . 21
Table C-10 Integrity protected frame (example) . 21
Table C-11 GCM-AES-128 Key and calculated ICV (example) . 22
Table C-12 GCM-AES-256 Key and calculated ICV (example) . 23
Table C-13 Unprotected frame (example) . 24
Table C-14 Integrity protected frame (example) . 24
Table C-15 GCM-AES-128 Key and calculated ICV (example) . 25
Table C-16 GCM-AES-256 Key and calculated ICV (example) . 26
Table C-17 Unprotected frame (example) . 27
Table C-18 Confidentiality protected frame (example). 27
Table C-19 GCM-AES-128 Key, Secure Data, and ICV (example) . 28
Table C-20 GCM-AES-256 Key, Secure Data, and ICV (example) . 29
Table C-21 Unprotected frame (example) . 30
Table C-22 Confidentiality protected frame (example). 30
Table C-23 GCM-AES-128 Key, Secure Data, and ICV (example) . 31
Table C-24 GCM-AES-256 Key, Secure Data, and ICV (example) . 32
Table C-25 Unprotected frame (example) . 33
Table C-26 Confidentiality protected frame (example). 33
Table C-27 GCM-AES-128 Key, Secure Data, and ICV (example) . 34
Table C-28 GCM-AES-256 Key, Secure Data, and ICV (example) . 35
Table C-29 Unprotected frame (example) . 36
Table C-30 Confidentiality protected frame (example). 36
Table C-31 GCM-AES-128 Key, Secure Data, and ICV (example) . 37
Table C-32 GCM-AES-256 Key, Secure Data, and ICV (example) . 38
ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:2013/Amd.1:2015(E)
IEEE Standard for
Local and metropolitan area networks—
Media Access Control (MAC) Security
Amendment 1: Galois Counter Mode—
Advanced Encryption Standard—
256 (GCM-AES-256) Cipher Suite
IMPORTANT NOTICE: This standard is not intended to ensure safety, security, health, or environmental
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NOTE—The editing instructions contained in this amendment define how to merge the material contained therein into
the existing base standard and its amendments to form the comprehensive standard.
The editing instructions are shown in bold italic. Four editing instructions are used: change, delete, insert,
and replace. Change is used to make corrections in existing text or tables. The editing instruction specifies
the location of the change and describes what is being changed by using strikethrough (to remove old
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incorporated into the base standard.
ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:2013/Amd.1:2015(E)
IEEE Std 802.1AEbn-2011 AMENDMENT 1: GALOIS COUNTER MODE—ADVANCED
1. Overview
1.1 Introduction
Change the fourth paragraph as follows:
To deliver these benefits, MACsec has to be used in conjunction with appropriate policies for higher-level
protocol operation in networked systems, an authentication and authorization framework, and network
management. IEEE Std 802.1X P802.1af™ [B2] provides authentication and cryptographic key
distribution.
1.2 Scope
Change bullet i) as follows:
i) Specifies the interface/exchanges between a SecY and its associated and collocated MAC Security
Key Agreement Entity (KaY, IEEE Std 802.1X P802.1af [B2]) that provides and updates
cryptographic keys.
Change bullet o) as follows:
o) Specify how the relationships between MACsec protocol peers are discovered and authenticated, as
supported by key management or key distribution protocols, but makes use of IEEE Std 802.1X
P802.1af Key Agreement for MAC security to achieve these functions.
2 Copyright © 2011 IEEE. All rights reserved.
ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:2013/Amd.1:2015(E)
ENCRYPTION STANDARD—256 (GCM-AES-256) CIPHER SUITE IEEE Std 802.1AEbn-2011
2. Normative references
Insert the following references at the appropriate point:
TM
IEEE Std 802.1X -2010, IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Port-based Network
Access Control.
TM
IEEE Std 802.1Q , IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Virtual Bridged Local Area
Networks.
NIST SP 800-38D, Nov 2007, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter
Mode (GCM) and GMAC.
Delete the following reference and the accompanying footnote:
Galois Counter Mode of Operation (GCM), David A. McGrew, John Viega.
Delete the following references:
IEEE Std 802.1Q-2005, IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Virtual Bridged Local
Area Networks.
IEEE Std 802.1X-2004, IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Port Based Network
Access Control.
TM
IEEE Std 802.1ad -2005, IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Virtual Bridged
Local Area Networks—Amendment 4: Provider Bridges.
This document is available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-800-38D.pdf
ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:2013/Amd.1:2015(E)
IEEE Std 802.1AEbn-2011 AMENDMENT 1: GALOIS COUNTER MODE—ADVANCED
6. Secure provision of the MAC Service
6.1 MACsec connectivity
Change the first paragraph as follows:
The connectivity provided (6.2) between the MAC Internal Sublayer Service (ISS) access points of stations
connected to a single LAN composes an insecure association between communicating stations. Key
agreement protocols as defined in IEEE P802.1af IEEE Std 802.1X establish and maintain a secure
Connectivity Association (CA), which is a fully (i.e., symmetric and transitive) connected subset of the ISS
service access points. Each instance of MACsec operates within a single CA.
4 Copyright © 2011 IEEE. All rights reserved.
ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:2013/Amd.1:2015(E)
ENCRYPTION STANDARD—256 (GCM-AES-256) CIPHER SUITE IEEE Std 802.1AEbn-2011
7. Principles of secure network operation
Change bullet d) as follows:
d) MACsec Key Agreement Entities (IEEE P802.1afIEEE Std 802.1X)
7.1.2 Use of the secure MAC Service by bridges
Change NOTE 1 as follows:
NOTE 1—Using an SC identifier that includes a port number component would appear to be unnecessary in the case of
a simple system that comprises a single LAN station, with a uniquely allocated 48-bit MAC address, and a single SecY.
However, some systems require support for more SecYs than they have uniquely allocated addresses, either because they
make use of technologies that support virtual MACs, or because their interface stacks include the possibility of including
multiple SecYs at different sublayers. Provider bridges (IEEE Std 802.1ad-2005IEEE Std 802.1Q) provide examples of
the latter.
7.3.1 Client policies
Change NOTE 1 as follows:
NOTE 1—To facilitate policy selection by clients of the secure MAC Service, IEEE P802.1af IEEE Std 802.1X specifies
authorized permissions, including those required by MAC Bridges (IEEE Std 802.1D) and VLAN-aware Bridges (IEEE
Std 802.1Q) to support the secure MAC Service in Bridged and Virtually Bridged Local Area Networks.
7.3.2 Use of the secure MAC Service by bridges
Change NOTE 1 as follows:
NOTE 1—The apparent exception to this configuration restriction, which does not permit the creation of security
associations to create “secure tunnels” through selected bridges in a Bridged Local Area Network, is the use of a
Provider Bridged Network as specified in IEEE Std 802.1ad-2005IEEE Std 802.1Q. However, a Provider Bridged
Network appears to Customer Bridges as a single LAN providing full connectivity independent of the operation of
Customer Bridge protocols.
Change NOTE 2 as follows:
NOTE 2—Use of this address ensures that the physical topology as perceived by spanning tree protocols aligns with that
provided by MAC Security. In Provider Bridged Networks, the Provider Bridge Group Address is used. An exception to
the alignment rule occurs with certain types of interface that are supported by Provider Bridge Networks, where a
provider operated C-VLAN (see IEEE Std 802.1ad-2005IEEE Std 802.1Q) aware component provides the customer
interface.
Change bullet d) as follows:
d) Configuration of the VLAN Translation Table (IEEE Std 802.1ad-2005 only)
Change NOTE 3 as follows:
NOTE 3—A Bridge Port is one of the bridge’s points of attachment to an instance of the MAC Internal Sublayer Service
(ISS), and is used by the MAC Relay Entity and associated Higher-Layer Entities as specified in IEEE Std 802.1D, and
IEEE Std 802.1Q, and IEEE Std 802.1ad.
ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:2013/Amd.1:2015(E)
IEEE Std 802.1AEbn-2011 AMENDMENT 1: GALOIS COUNTER MODE—ADVANCED
8. MAC Security Protocol (MACsec)
8.1.3 Interoperability requirements
Change the third paragraph as follows:
Where the underlying MAC Service used by MACsec is supported by a Provider Bridged Network
(IEEE Std 802.1adIEEE Std 802.1Q), communicating SecYs can be attached to different media operating
(locally) at different transmission rates. Interoperability between, for example, 10 Gb/s and 1 Gb/s, and
between 1 Gb/s and 100 Mb/s requires interoperability across the speed range. The design of MACsec
facilitates interoperability from 1 Mb/s to 100 Gb/s without modification or negotiation of protocol formats
and parameters. Operation at higher transmission rates depends on the capabilities of the Cipher Suite. The
mandatory default Cipher Suite has been selected (Clause 14) in part because of its ability to perform across
this range.
6 Copyright © 2011 IEEE. All rights reserved.
ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:2013/Amd.1:2015(E)
ENCRYPTION STANDARD—256 (GCM-AES-256) CIPHER SUITE IEEE Std 802.1AEbn-2011
9. Encoding of MACsec protocol data units
9.8 Transmit SA status
Change the NOTE, as follows:
NOTE—As specified in this clause, the The IV used by the dDefault Cipher Suite (GCM-AES-128) (14.5) and the
GCM-AES-256 Cipher Suite (14.6) comprises the SCI (even if the SCI is not transmitted in the SecTAG) and the PN.
Subject to proper unique MAC Address allocation procedures, the SCI is a globally unique identifier for a SecY. To
satisfy the IV uniqueness requirements of CTR mode of operation, a fresh key is used before PN values are reused.
ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:2013/Amd.1:2015(E)
IEEE Std 802.1AEbn-2011 AMENDMENT 1: GALOIS COUNTER MODE—ADVANCED
10. Principle of MAC Security Entity (SecY) operation
10.7.22 Transmit SA status
Insert a further bullet e) directly after the existing bullet d), as follows:
e) nextPN (10.6, 10.6.5)
8 Copyright © 2011 IEEE. All rights reserved.
ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:2013/Amd.1:2015(E)
ENCRYPTION STANDARD—256 (GCM-AES-256) CIPHER SUITE IEEE Std 802.1AEbn-2011
11. MAC Security in Systems
11.7 MACsec in Provider Bridged Networks
Change the first paragraph as follows:
Provider Bridges are specified in the IEEE Std 802.1ad amendment to IEEE Std 802.1Q. Provider Bridges
(IEEE Std 802.1Q) enable service providers to use VLANs to offer the equivalent of separate LANs to
different users. Data for each of the virtual LANs is segregated within the provider’s network by using a
Service VLAN TAG (S-TAG) that is distinguished, by EtherType, from the Customer VLAN-TAGs (C-
TAGs) used within each customer’s network. See Figure 11-12.
Change the NOTE as follows:
NOTE—Figure 11-12 is based on Figure 15-1 of IEEE Std 802.1ad-2005IEEE Std 802.1Q.
Change the paragraph describing Figure 11-14 as follows:
Figure 11-14 shows the addition of the service access priority selection function described in 6.9 of IEEE
Std 802.1adIEEE Std 802.1Q to the interface stack of Figure 11-13, together with the use of Link
Aggregation to support attachment to the provider’s network with two LANs.
Replace Figure 11-14 with the following figure, which changes the prior reference to IEEE
Std 802.1ad Clause 6.9 to a reference to IEEE Std 802.1Q Clause 6.9:
Higher Layer
Entities
LLC
MAC Relay
Entity
(EISS)
802.1Q Clause 6.7
(VLAN tagging)
(ISS) (ISS)
802.1Q Clause 8.5.1
(Bridge Port connectivity)
(Secure ISS) (ISS)
MAC Security across provider’s network
MACsec (SecY & KaY)
(Secure ISS)
802.1Q Clause 6.9
(Priority S-tagging)
(Secure ISS)
Link Aggregation
(Insecure ISS) (Secure ISS) (Insecure ISS)
(Secure ISS)
MAC Security to provider’s network
MACsec (SecY & KaY) MACsec (SecY & KaY)
LAN MAC LAN MAC
Figure 11-14—Provider network with priority selection and aggregation
ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:2013/Amd.1:2015(E)
IEEE Std 802.1AEbn-2011 AMENDMENT 1: GALOIS COUNTER MODE—ADVANCED
14. Cipher Suites
14.1 Cipher Suite use
Change footnote 2 in Figure 14-1 as follows:
SAK SAK
SCI SCI
3 4
PN PN PN
Destination Address Destination Address Destination Address
Source Address PROTECT Source Address VALIDATE Source Address
5 6
SecTAG SecTAG SecTAG
7 8 7
User Data Secure Data User Data
ICV VALID
The SAK to be used on receipt of the frame is identified by the SCI and the AN.
The SCI is extracted from the SCI field of the SecTAG if present. A value conveyed by key agreement (point-to-point only) is used otherwise.
In the GCM-AES-128 and GCM-AES-256 Cipher Suites (14.5, 14.6), the SCI is always included in the IV parameter whether included in the SecTAG or
not (and thus always contributes to the ICV). However the Cipher Suite parameter A includes the SCI if and only if the SCI is included in the SecTAG .
The PN is conveyed in the SecTAG
The validated PN can be used for replay protection.
All the transmitted octets of the SecTAG are protected, including the optional SCI field if present
The validated received SecTAG contains bits of the TCI, and optionally the SCI, these can be used for service multiplexing (11.7).
The length, in octets, of the User Data is conveyed by the User Data parameter, and is protected by Cipher Suite operation.
The length, in octets, of the Secure Data is conveyed by the MACsec frame, unless it is short, when it is conveyed by the SL parameter in the SecTAG TCI
Figure 14-1—Cipher Suite Protect and Validate operations
14.4 Cipher Suite conformance
Change Table 14-1 as follows:
Table 14-1—MACsec Cipher Suites
Services
provided
Cipher Suite #
Cipher Suite Name Mandatory/Optional
Identifier
00-80-02-00-01-00-00-01
GCM-AES-128 Yes Yes Mandatory 14.5
00-80-C2-00-01-00-00-01
00-80-C2-00-01-00-00-02 GCM-AES-256 Yes Yes Optional 14.6
Delete the NOTE after the table as follows:
NOTE—Currently, Table 14-1 does not include any optional Cipher Suites.
10 Copyright © 2011 IEEE. All rights reserved.
Integrity without
confidentiality
Integrity and
confidentiality
Defining Clause
ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:2013/Amd.1:2015(E)
ENCRYPTION STANDARD—256 (GCM-AES-256) CIPHER SUITE IEEE Std 802.1AEbn-2011
Insert the following NOTE after the paragraph beginning “Table 14-1 assigns a Cipher Suite
reference number for use in protocol identification within a MACsec context”:
NOTE—In IEEE Std 802.1AE-2006 (the first edition of this standard) the Cipher Suite Identifier for GCM-AES-128
was incorrectly shown as 00-80-02-00-01-00-00-01 in Table 14-1. Prior to the inclusion of GCM-AES-256, GCM-AES-
128 was the only conformant Cipher Suite. IEEE Std 802.1X uses a reserved encoding for the Default Cipher Suite
rather than the Cipher Suite Identifier to identify GCM-AES-128.
Change 14.5 as follows:
14.5 Default Cipher Suite (GCM-AES-128)
The Default Cipher Suite uses the Galois/Counter Mode of Ooperation with the AES-128 symmetric block
cipher, as specified in this clause by reference to the terms K, IV, A, P, C, T used in section 2.1 of the GCM
specification (GCM) as submitted to NIST NIST SP 800-38D.
K is the 128 bit SAK. The 64 most significan
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