ISO/IEC 7816-8:2021
(Main)Identification cards — Integrated circuit cards — Part 8: Commands and mechanisms for security operations
Identification cards — Integrated circuit cards — Part 8: Commands and mechanisms for security operations
This document specifies interindustry commands which can be used for security operations. This document also provides informative directives on how to construct security mechanisms with commands defined in ISO/IEC 7816‑4. The choice and conditions of use of cryptographic mechanism in security operations can affect card exportability. The evaluation of the suitability of algorithms and protocols is outside the scope of this document. It does not cover the internal implementation within the card and/or the outside world.
Cartes d'identification — Cartes à circuit intégré — Partie 8: Commandes et mécanismes pour les opérations de sécurité
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Standards Content (Sample)
INTERNATIONAL ISO/IEC
STANDARD 7816-8
Fifth edition
2021-08
Identification cards — Integrated
circuit cards —
Part 8:
Commands and mechanisms for
security operations
Cartes d'identification — Cartes à circuit intégré —
Partie 8: Commandes et mécanismes pour les opérations de sécurité
Reference number
©
ISO/IEC 2021
© ISO/IEC 2021
All rights reserved. Unless otherwise specified, or required in the context of its implementation, no part of this publication may
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Published in Switzerland
ii © ISO/IEC 2021 – All rights reserved
Contents Page
Foreword .iv
Introduction .v
1 Scope .1
2 Normative references .1
3 Terms and definitions .1
4 Abbreviated terms . 2
5 Interindustry commands for security operations .3
5.1 General . 3
5.2 Generate asymmetric key pair command . 3
5.3 Perform security operation command . 7
5.3.1 General. 7
5.3.2 Compute cryptographic checksum operation .10
5.3.3 Compute digital signature operation .10
5.3.4 Hash operation .10
5.3.5 Verify cryptographic checksum operation .11
5.3.6 Verify digital signature operation .11
5.3.7 Verify certificate operation.12
5.3.8 Encipher operation .13
5.3.9 Decipher operation .13
Annex A (informative) Examples of operations related to digital signature .14
Annex B (informative) Examples of certificates interpreted by the card .20
Annex C (informative) Examples of asymmetric key transfer .24
Annex D (informative) Alternatives to achieve the reversible change of security context .27
Annex E (informative) Examples of uses for generate asymmetric key pair command .29
Bibliography .35
© ISO/IEC 2021 – All rights reserved iii
Foreword
ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) and IEC (the International Electrotechnical
Commission) form the specialized system for worldwide standardization. National bodies that are
members of ISO or IEC participate in the development of International Standards through technical
committees established by the respective organization to deal with particular fields of technical
activity. ISO and IEC technical committees collaborate in fields of mutual interest. Other international
organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO and IEC, also take part in the
work.
The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are
described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular, the different approval criteria needed for
the different types of document should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the
editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www .iso .org/ directives or www .iec .ch/ members
_experts/ refdocs).
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject
of patent rights. ISO and IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent
rights. Details of any patent rights identified during the development of the document will be in the
Introduction and/or on the ISO list of patent declarations received (see www .iso .org/ patents) or the IEC
list of patent declarations received (see patents.iec.ch).
Any trade name used in this document is information given for the convenience of users and does not
constitute an endorsement.
For an explanation of the voluntary nature of standards, the meaning of ISO specific terms and
expressions related to conformity assessment, as well as information about ISO's adherence to the
World Trade Organization (WTO) principles in the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) see www .iso .org/
iso/ foreword .html. In the IEC, see www .iec .ch/ understanding -standards.
This document was prepared by Joint Technical Committee ISO/IEC JTC 1, Information technology,
Subcommittee SC 17, Cards and personal identification.
This fifth edition cancels and replaces the fourth edition (ISO/IEC 7816-8:2019), which has been
technically revised.
The main changes compared to the previous edition are as follows:
— in Table A.9, A.10 and A.11, P1-P2 value of mse command has been corrected;
— in Table A.11, P1-P2 value of pso command with hash operation has been corrected.
A list of all parts in the ISO/IEC 7816 series can be found on the ISO and IEC websites.
Any feedback or questions on this document should be directed to the user’s national standards body. A
complete listing of these bodies can be found at www .iso .org/ members .html and www .iec .ch/ national
-committees.
iv © ISO/IEC 2021 – All rights reserved
Introduction
ISO/IEC 7816 is a series of standards specifying integrated circuit cards and the use of such cards
for interchange. These cards are identification cards intended for information exchange negotiated
between the outside world and the integrated circuit in the card. As a result of an information exchange,
the card delivers information (computation result, stored data) and/or modifies its content (data
storage, event memorization).
Five parts are specific to cards with galvanic contacts and three of them specify electrical interfaces:
— ISO/IEC 7816-1 specifies physical characteristics for cards with contacts;
— ISO/IEC 7816-2 specifies dimensions and location of the contacts;
— ISO/IEC 7816-3 specifies electrical interface and transmission protocols for asynchronous cards;
— ISO/IEC 7816-10 specifies electrical interface and answer to reset for synchronous cards;
— ISO/IEC 7816-12 specifies electrical interface and operating procedures for USB cards.
All the other parts are independent from the physical interface technology. They apply to cards accessed
by contacts and/or by radio frequency:
— ISO/IEC 7816-4 specifies organization, security and commands for interchange;
— ISO/IEC 7816-5 specifies registration of application providers;
— ISO/IEC 7816-6 specifies interindustry data elements for interchange;
— ISO/IEC 7816-7 specifies commands for structured card query language;
— ISO/IEC 7816-8 specifies commands for security operations;
— ISO/IEC 7816-9 specifies commands for card management;
— ISO/IEC 7816-11 specifies personal verification through biometric methods;
— ISO/IEC 7816-13 specifies commands for handling the life cycle of applications;
— ISO/IEC 7816-15 specifies cryptographic information application.
ISO/IEC 10536 (all parts) specifies access by close coupling. ISO/IEC 14443 (all parts) and
ISO/IEC 15693 (all parts) specify access by radio frequency. Such cards are also known as contactless
cards.
© ISO/IEC 2021 – All rights reserved v
INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ISO/IEC 7816-8:2021(E)
Identification cards — Integrated circuit cards —
Part 8:
Commands and mechanisms for security operations
1 Scope
This document specifies interindustry commands which can be used for security operations. This
document also provides informative directives on how to construct security mechanisms with
commands defined in ISO/IEC 7816-4.
The choice and conditions of use of cryptographic mechanism in security operations can affect card
exportability. The evaluation of the suitability of algorithms and protocols is outside the scope of this
document. It does not cover the internal implementation within the card and/or the outside world.
2 Normative references
The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content
constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For
undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
ISO/IEC 7816-4, Identification cards — Integrated circuit cards — Part 4: Organization, security and
commands for interchange
3 Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.
ISO and IEC maintain terminology databases for use in standardization at the following addresses:
— ISO Online browsing platform: available at https:// www .iso .org/ obp
— IEC Electropedia: available at https:// www .electropedia .org/
3.1
asymmetric key pair
pair of elements belonging to cryptographic techniques that use two related operations: a public
operation defined by public numbers or by a public key (3.4) and a private operation defined by private
numbers or by a private key
Note 1 to entry: The two operations have the property that, given the public operation, it is computationally
infeasible to derive the private operation.
3.2
certificate
digital signature (3.3) binding a particular person or object and its associated public key (3.4)
Note 1 to entry: The entity issuing the certificate also acts as tag allocation authority with respect to the data
elements in the certificate.
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 7816-4:2020, 3.11]
© ISO/IEC 2021 – All rights reserved 1
3.3
digital signature
data appended to, or cryptographic transformation of, a data string that proves the origin and the
integrity of the data string and protects against forgery, e.g. by the recipient of the data string
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 7816-4:2020, 3.20]
3.4
key
sequence of symbols controlling a cryptographic operation
EXAMPLE Encipherment, decipherment, a private or a public operation in a dynamic authentication,
signature production, signature verification.
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 7816-4:2020, 3.30]
3.5
non-self-descriptive certificate
certificate (3.2) consisting of a concatenation of data elements associated to a header list or extended
header list, describing the structure of the certificate
3.6
self-descriptive certificate
certificate (3.2) consisting of a concatenation of data objects
3.7
secure messaging
SM
set of means for cryptographic protection of (parts of) command-response pairs
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 7816-4:2020, 3.49]
4 Abbreviated terms
BCD binary-coded decimal
BER basic encoding rules of ASN.1 (see ISO/IEC 8825-1)
CA certification authority
CCT control reference template for cryptographic checksum
CRT control reference template
CT control reference template for confidentiality
CVCA country verifying CA
DG3 data group 3
DO BER-TLV data object
DO'…' BER-TLV data object, the tag of which is a hexadecimal value given between single quo-
tation marks
DSA digital signature algorithm
DST control reference template for digital signature
DV document verifier
2 © ISO/IEC 2021 – All rights reserved
ECC elliptic curve cryptography
ECDH elliptic curve Diffie–Hellman key exchange
ECDSA elliptic curve digital signature algorithm
EF elementary file
GQ2 modified Guillou-Quisquater protocol for zero knowledge proof
HT control reference template for hash-code
ICAO international civil aviation organization
ICC integrated circuit card
IS inspection system
KAT control reference template for key agreement
LDS logical data structure
MRTD machine readable travel document
mse manage security environment command
OID object identifier, as defined by ISO/IEC 8825-1
pso perform security operation command
RFU reserved for future use for ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 17
RSA Rivest, Shamir, Adleman
SE security environment
SEID security environment identifier
TLV tag, length, value
5 Interindustry commands for security operations
5.1 General
An ICC compliant with this document may support any of the commands and/or options provided in 5.2
and 5.3.
NOTE In addition to the use of logical channels, there are other alternatives that can be used for switching
the security context. Annex D provides information about this functionality.
5.2 Generate asymmetric key pair command
The generate asymmetric key pair command, which shall be as specified in Table 1, initiates
— the generation and storing of an asymmetric key pair, i.e. a public key and a private key, in the card,
— the generation, storing of an asymmetric key pair and extracting generated public key, or
— the extracting previously generated public key.
© ISO/IEC 2021 – All rights reserved 3
The command may be preceded by a manage security environment command in order to set key
generation related parameters (e.g. algorithm reference). The command may be performed in one or
several steps, possibly using command chaining (see ISO/IEC 7816-4).
Table 1 — generate asymmetric key pair command-response pair
CLA As defined in ISO/IEC 7816-4
INS '46' or '47'
P1 See Table 2
P2 '00' (no information provided) or reference of the private key to be generated coded according
to ISO/IEC 7816-4:2020, Table 102
L field Absent for encoding N = 0, present for encoding N > 0
c c c
Data field Absent, or
Proprietary data if P1-P2 set to '0000', or
One or more CRTs associated to the key generation if P1-P2 different from '0000' (see notes)
A CRT may include an extended header list
L field Absent for encoding N = 0, present for encoding N > 0
e e e
Data field Absent, or
Public key as a sequence of data elements (INS = '46'), or
Public key as a sequence of data objects (INS = '47'), or
Public key as a sequence of data objects according to an extended header list (INS = '47')
SW1-SW2 See ISO/IEC 7816-4:2020, Tables 6 and 7 where relevant, e.g. 6985
NOTE 1 Several CRTs are present when the key pair is generated for several uses. In the command data field, a
CRT possibly has a zero length.
Table 2 — P1 coding
b8 b7 b6 b5 b4 b3 b2 b1 Value
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 No information given
1 — — — — x x x Additional information given
1 — — — — — — x Key generation
1 — — — — — — 0 - Generate asymmetric key pair
1 — — — — — — 1 - Access to an existing public key
1 — — — — — x — Format of returned public key data
1 — — — — — 0 — - Proprietary format
1 — — — — — 1 — - Output format according to extended header list
1 — — — — x — — Output indicator
1 — — — — 0 — — - Public key data in response data field
1 — — — — 1 — — - No response data if Le field absent or proprietary if Le field present
— x x x x — — — 0000, other values are RFU
NOTE 2 The private key can be stored in an internal EF the reference of which is known before issuing the
command or in a DO'7F48' as cardholder private key template.
NOTE 3 The public part can be stored for example in a DO'7F49' as cardholder public key template.
For extracting a previously generated public key (i.e. no generation), the command data field shall be
empty or shall contain a CRT, possibly including an extended header list.
NOTE 4 In those cases when only access to a previously generated public key is requested, P2 is either '00' or
references the private key.
4 © ISO/IEC 2021 – All rights reserved
The response data field shall be
— absent,
— a public key as a sequence of data elements (INS = '46'),
— a public key as a sequence of data objects (INS = '47') from Table 3, or
— a public key as a DO'7F49' (INS = '47') nesting data objects from Table 3.
If the command data field does not indicate any format of public key data, it shall be implicitly known
before issuing the command (e.g. as part of the security environment). When the command data field
indicates an extended header list within a CRT, it covers public key data objects and other requested
data object.
EXAMPLE Annex E provides a set of examples on the use of this command.
If the algorithm is not indicated in the command, then the algorithm is known before issuing the
command. In the public key template, the context-specific class (first byte from '80' to 'BF') is reserved
for public key data objects.
Table 3 — Public key data objects
Tag Value
'7F49' Interindustry template for nesting one set of public key data objects with the following tags
'06' Object identifier of any further information, optional
'80' Algorithm reference as used in control reference data objects for secure messaging, optional
Set of public key data objects for RSA
'81' Modulus (a number denoted as n coded on x bytes)
'82' Public exponent (a number denoted as v, e.g. 65 537)
Set of public key data objects for DSA
'81' First prime (a number denoted as p coded on y bytes)
'82' Second prime (a number denoted as q dividing p-1, e.g. 20 bytes)
'83' Basis (a number denoted as g of order q coded on y bytes)
Public key (a number denoted as y equal to g to the power x mod p where x is the private key coded
'84'
on y bytes)
Set of public key data objects for ECC
'81' Prime (a number denoted as p coded on z bytes)
'82' First coefficient (a number denoted as a coded on z bytes)
'83' Second coefficient (a number denoted as b coded on z bytes)
'84' Generator (a point denoted as PB on the curve, coded on 2z + 1 or 2z or z + 1 bytes)
'85' Order (a prime number denoted as q, order of the generator PB, coded on z bytes)
Public key (a point denoted as PP on the curve, equal to x times PB where x is the private key, coded
'86'
on 2z + 1 or 2z or z + 1 bytes)
'87' Co-factor
Set of public key data objects for GQ2
'81' Modulus (a number denoted as n coded on x bytes)
Number of basic numbers (a number denoted as m coded on 1 byte. If tag '83' is present, then tag
'83' 'A3' shall be absent and the m basic numbers denoted as g, g .g are the first m prime numbers
2 m
2, 3, 5, 7, 11…)
'84' Verification parameter (a number denoted as k coded on 1 byte)
Set of m basic numbers denoted as g, g .g each one coded on 1 byte with tag '80' (If tag 'A3' is
2 m,
'A3'
present, then tag '83' shall be absent)
© ISO/IEC 2021 – All rights reserved 5
Table 3 (continued)
Tag Value
a
Set of public key data objects for RSA Okamoto-Schnorr signature scheme
'81' p the first large prime number
'82' q the second large prime number such that q|(p − 1), with q a divisor of (p − 1)
Zp* the set of integers U modulo p such as 0 < U < p and gcd (U,p) = 1, gcd() being the greatest
'83'
common divisor
'84' Zq* the set of integers U' modulo q such as 0 < U' < q and gcd (U',q) = 1
g the first element of Zp* of order q such as g is a generator of Gq and Gq a cyclic group of prime
'85'
order q
'86' h the second element of Zp* of order q different from g
-r -s
y the public key, an integer denoted as y=g h mod p where (s,r) is the secret key, and s and r are
'87'
two elements of (Zq*), and h of (Zp*)
NOTE In this context, ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 17 reserves any other data object of the context-specific class (first
byte in the range '80' to 'BF').
a
The RSA Okamoto-Schnorr signature scheme, is considered a blind signature process, which is an interactive
procedure between a signer and a recipient. It allows a recipient to obtain a signature of a message of the recip-
[8]
ient's choice without giving the signer any information about the actual message or the resulting signature
[9][10][11]
. DO'73' may be used in the data field for returning a multi-part digital signature response comprised
of concatenation of context-specific data objects defined by the application.
NOTE 5 For other Blind Signature schemes, e.g. Blind RSA signature (with data objects related to RSA), Blind
Schnorr signature (with data objects related to DSA and/or ECDSA), Okamoto-Guillou-Quisquater blind signature
scheme (with data objects related to GQ2), the OID under template '7F49' determines the nature and meaning of
any further or different data objects, i.e. the following indications are possibly denoted by the OID.
— Blind signature type, e.g. RSA, Schnorr, Okamoto-Schnorr, Okamoto-Guillou-Quisquater.
— Cryptographic Hash function.
— Generic description of the token/credential (message) to be signed.
— Attributes generic structure, and/or
— Type of control upon signed message, i.e. partially blind, fully blind or restrictive blind signature (in some
mechanisms, the signer does not totally lose control over the signed message since the signer can include
explicit information in the resulting signature based on some agreement with the recipient. Such blind
signatures are called partially blind signatures. Other mechanisms allow a recipient to receive a blind
signature on a message not known to the signer but the choice of the message is restricted and conforms to
certain rules. Such schemes are called restrictive blind signature mechanisms).
For the coding of the DO stating information about the private part of the key pair, Table 4 applies.
Table 4 — Private key data objects
Tag Value
'7F48' Interindustry template for nesting one set of private key data object with the following tags
'82' Public exponent (optional)
'92' Parameter p
'93' Parameter q
'94' Parameter 1/q mod p
'95' Parameter d mod (p – 1)
'96' Parameter d mod (q – 1)
6 © ISO/IEC 2021 – All rights reserved
Table 4 (continued)
Tag Value
Interindustry template for nesting one set of ECDSA/ECDH private key data object with the
'7F48'
following tags
'92' Private key
'06' Object identifier of related curve (optional)
Curve information (conditional if DO'06' above is not specified)
'93' p is the prime specifying the base field
'94' A 1st coefficient of the equation y^2 = x^3 + A*x + B mod p defining the elliptic curve
'95' B 2nd coefficient of the equation y^2 = x^3 + A*x + B mod p
'96' G = (x,y) base point, i.e. a point in E of prime order, with x and y being its x- and y-coordinates
'97' q prime order of the group generated by G
'98' h cofactor of G in E, i.e. #E[GF(p)]/q
NOTE In this context, ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 17 reserves any other data object of the context-specific class (first
byte in the range '80' to 'BF').
Annex C provides examples of exporting a public key and importing a private key.
5.3 Perform security operation command
5.3.1 General
The perform security operation command, which shall be as specified in Table 5, initiates the
following security operations:
— computations, such as
— computation of a cryptographic checksum,
— computation of a digital signature, or
— computation of a hash-code;
— verifications, such as
— verification of a cryptographic checksum,
— verification of a digital signature, or
— verification of a certificate;
— encipherment; or
— decipherment.
P1 defines output data of the security operation (see Table 6). P2 defines input data to the security
operation (see Table 7). Values of tag of SM data object defined in ISO/IEC 7816-4 are used for P1 and
P2.
P1 and P2 also define operation of this command. It depends on each operation defined in subsequent
subclauses which value is used for P1 and P2. If the security operation requires several commands to
complete, then command chaining may apply (see ISO/IEC 7816-4).
The perform security operation command may be preceded by a manage security environment
command.
© ISO/IEC 2021 – All rights reserved 7
For example, the security object reference as well as the cryptographic mechanism reference shall be
either implicitly known or specified in a CRT in a manage security environment command.
NOTE A security object reference is a reference of a secret key, a reference of a public key, a reference data, a
reference for computing a session key or a reference of a private key. See ISO/IEC 7816-4.
Such a command can be performed only if the security status satisfies the security attributes for the
operation. The successful execution of the command may be subject to successful completion of prior
commands (e.g. verify before the computation of a digital signature).
If present (e.g. implicitly known by the card or because it is part of the command data field), a header
list or an extended header list defines the order and the data items that form the input for the security
operation.
For this command, when a verification related operation is considered, SW1-SW2 set to '6300' or '63CX'
indicates that a verification failed, 'X' ≥ '0' encodes the number of further allowed retries.
Table 5 — perform security operation command-response pair with INS = '2A'
CLA As defined in ISO/IEC 7816-4
INS '2A'
P1 See Table 6
P2 See Table 7
L field Absent for encoding N = 0, present for encoding N > 0
c c c
Data field Absent or value of the data object specified in P2
L field Absent for encoding N = 0, present for encoding N > 0
e e e
Data field Absent or value of the data object specified in P1
SW1-SW2 See ISO/IEC 7816-4:2020, Tables 6 and 7 where relevant, e.g. 6985
Table 6 — P1 coding for output data of the security operation
Value Meaning
a
'00' No output data
'80' Plain value not encoded in BER-TLV
'82' Cryptogram (plain value encoded in BER-TLV DO and including SM DOs)
'84' Cryptogram (plain value encoded in BER-TLV DO, but not including SM DOs)
'86' Padding-content indicator byte followed by cryptogram (plain value not encoded in BER-TLV DO)
'8E' Cryptographic checksum
'90' Hash-code
'9E' Digital signature
NOTE Any other value is reserved for future use by ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 17.
a
P1 = '00' may be used for legacy reasons to indicate that output data is stored in the card and not returned in the
response, i.e. output data is not present in the response data field.
Table 7 — P2 coding for input data to the security operation
Value Meaning
a
'00' No input data
'80' Plain value not encoded in BER-TLV
'82' Cryptogram (plain value encoded in BER-TLV DO and including SM DOs)
'84' Cryptogram (plain value encoded in BER-TLV DO, but not including SM DOs)
'86' Padding-content indicator byte followed by cryptogram (plain value not encoded in BER-TLV DO)
8 © ISO/IEC 2021 – All rights reserved
Table 7 (continued)
'92' Certificate (data not encoded in BER-TLV DO)
'9A' Input data element for the computation of a digital signature
'A0' Input template for the computation of a hash-code (the template is hashed)
'A2' Input template for the verification of a cryptographic checksum (the template is integrated)
'A8' Input template for the verification of a digital signature (the template is signed)
'AC' Input template for the computation of a digital signature (the concatenated value fields are signed)
'AE' Input template for the verification of a certificate (the concatenated value fields are certified)
'BC' Input template for the computation of a digital signature (the template is signed)
'BE' Input template for the verification of a certificate (the template is certified)
NOTE Any other value is reserved for future use by ISO/IEC JTC 1 SC 17.
a
P2 = '00' may be used for legacy reasons to indicate that input data is already stored in the card and there-
fore not present in the command data field.
The pso command with INS = '2B', which shall be as specified in Table 8, allows security operation
commands with extensions. The functions are distinguished by function numbers in P1, defined in
Table 9. Input DOs are conveyed in the command data field.
Optionally, the last DO is an extended header list describing the output.
Table 8 — Perform security operation command-response pair with INS = '2B'
CLA As defined in ISO/IEC 7816-4:2020, 5.4.1
INS '2B'
P1 'XX', function number, to distinguish the different variants of pso (see Table 9)
P2 '00', output DO defined in command data field
L field Present for encoding N > 0
c c
Either input DO(s) (see Table 7) or DO'73', and optionally an extended header list describing the
Data field
output (primitive or constructed) (see Table 6)
L field Absent for encoding N = 0, present for encoding N > 0
e e e
Data field Absent or output either according to the extended header list or DO'73'
SW1-
See ISO/IEC 7816-4:2020, Tables 6 and 7 where relevant, e.g. 6985
SW2
Table 9 — Function numbers for pso command
Value Meaning
'01' Compute cryptographic checksum
'02' Compute digital signature
'03' Hash operation
'04' Verify cryptographic checksum
'05' Verify digital signature
'06' Verify certificate
'07' Encipher
'08' Decipher
NOTE Any other value is RFU.
5.3.2 to 5.3.9 provide further specifications for the case of the even INS code.
© ISO/IEC 2021 – All rights reserved 9
5.3.2 Compute cryptographic checksum operation
The compute cryptographic checksum operation, which shall be as specified in Table 10, initiates the
computation of a cryptographic checksum.
Table 10 — Parameters and data fields for compute cryptographic checksum operation
P1 '8E'
P2 '80'
Command data field Data for which the cryptographic checksum is computed
Response data Cryptographic checksum
field
5.3.3 Compute digital signature operation
The compute digital signature operation, which shall be as specified in Table 11, initiates the
computation of a digital signature. The algorithm may be either a digital signature algorithm or
a combination of a hash algorithm and a digital signature algorithm. Annex A provides examples of
digital signature operations.
For the computation of a digital signature, the data to be signed or integrated in the signing process are
transmitted in the command data field or submitted in a previous command, e.g. pso command with
hash operation. In P2, the digital signature is specified with tag values of SM data object '9A', 'AC' or 'BC'
according to Table 6.
Table 11 — Parameters and data fields for compute digital signature operation
a
P1 '9E'
b
P2 '9A', 'AC' or 'BC'
Command data field Absent (data already in the card), or
If P2 = '9A', data to be signed or integrated in the signature process, or
If P2 = 'AC', data objects, the concatenated value fields of which are signed or integrated
in the signature process, or
If P2 = 'BC', data objects to be signed or integrated in the signature process
Response data field Absent (digital signature stored in the card), or digital signature
a
P1 = '00' may be used for legacy reasons to indicate that output data will be stored in the card and not
returned in the response, i.e. output data is not present in the response data field.
b
P2 = '00' may be used for legacy reasons to indicate that input data is already stored in the card and
therefore not present in the command data field.
5.3.4 Hash operation
The hash operation, which shall be as specified in Table 12, initiates the computation of a hash-code by
performing either
— the complete computation inside the card, or
— a partial computation inside the card.
The HT (i.e. DO'AA' or DO'AB') indicates the algorithm by a cryptographic mechanism reference for
computing a hash-code (see ISO/IEC 7816-4).
The input data shall be presented to the card in successive input blocks (one or more at a time), the
length of which is algorithm dependent. Depending on the hash algorithm, the last input data have a
10 © ISO/IEC 2021 – All rights reserved
length equal or shorter than the block length. The padding mechanism, if appropriate, is part of the
definition of the hash algorithm.
Even if no data are transmitted (i.e. empty command data when P2 = '00' or '80'), P1 shall be set to
'90'. This is applicable, for example, when data is already in the card.
For the resulting hash-code, the following two cases shall be distinguished either
— the card stores the hash-code for a subsequent command; then the L field is not present, or
e
— the card delivers the hash-code in the response; then the L field shall be set to the appropriate
e
length.
Table 12 — Parameters and data fields for hash operation
a
P1 '90'
b
P2 '80' or 'A0'
Command data field If P2 = '80', data to hash, or absent (e.g. for initialization or data already in the card), or
If P2 = 'A0', data objects relevant for hashing (e.g. '90' for intermediate hash-code, '80'
for data to hash)
Response data field Absent (hash-code stored in the card), or hash-code
a
P1 = '00' may be used for legacy reasons to indicate that output data will be stored in the card and not returned in the
response, i.e. output data is not present in the response data field.
b
P2 = '00' may be used for legacy reasons to indicate that input data is already stored in the card and therefore not
present in the command data field.
5.3.5 Verify cryptographic checksum operation
The verify cryptographic checksum operation, which shall be as specified in Table 13, initiates the
verification of a cryptographic checksum.
Table 13 — Parameters and data fields for verify cryptographic checksum operation
P1 '00'
P2 'A2'
Command data field Data objects relevant to the operation (e.g. plain value DO'80' and / or cryptographic
checksum DO'8E')
Response data field Absent
NOTE The value field of DO'80' contains data or data elements covered by the value field of DO'8E' as
cryptographic checksum.
5.3.6 Verify digital signature operation
The verify digital signature operation, which shall be as specified in Table 14, initiates the verification
of a digital signature delivered as a data object in the command data field. Other verification relevant
data are either transmitted in a command chaining process or present in the card. The algorithm may
be either a digital signature algorithm or a combination of a hash algorithm and a digital signature
algorithm. Annex A provides examples of digital signature operations.
The public key as well as the algorithm may be
— implicitly known,
— referenced in a DST (DO'B6') of a manage security environment command, or
© ISO/IEC 2021 – All rights reserved 11
— available as a result from a previous verify certificate operation.
If the algorithm reference in the card declares a signature only algorithm, then the data consists of
a hash-code, or the signature is of message recovery type [see ISO/IEC 9796 (all parts)]. Otherwise,
the hash-code calculation is performed in the card and the algorithm reference additionally contains a
reference to a hash algorithm.
Table 14 — Parameters and data fields for verify digital signature operation
P1 '00'
P2 'A8'
Command data field Data objects relevant to the operation (e.g. either '9A', 'AC' or 'BC', and '9E')
Response data Absent
field
If the command data field contains an empty data object, then the card is expected to know all data
relevant for verification.
5.3.7 Verify certificate operation
The verify certificate operation, which shall be as specified in Table 15, verifies a certificate. For
the verification of a certificate, the digital signature of a certificate to be verified is delivered as a
data object in the command data field. Annex B provides relevant examples of how to implement this
operation, which may help to better understand this subclause.
The public key of the certification authority to be used in the verification process is either implicitly
selected or may be referenced in a DST using the manage security environment command. The
algorithm to apply is implicitly known or may be referenced in a DST. If other data objects are to be
used in the verification process (e.g. hash-code), then these data objects shall be present in the card or
shall be transmitted using the command chaining process.
It is recommended for the public key of the certification authority to be on the card.
The following two cases shall be distinguished:
— if the certificate is self-descriptive (P2 = 'BE'), then the card retrieves a public key identified by its
tag in the (recovered) certificate content;
— if the certificate is not self-descriptive (P2 = 'AE'), then the card retrieves a public key in the
certificate either implicitly or explicitly by using the public key tag in a header list describing the
content of the certificate.
If the retrieved public key is stored in the card, that key may be the default key for the subsequent
operation (e.g. verify digital signature).
Practical implementations recommend that tag '7F21' is not used in the data field, on behalf of the
contained templates/DOs of the card verifiable certificates. The next edition of this document would
possibly deprecate the use of '7F21' in this operation.
Table 15 — Parameters and data fields for verify certificate operation
P1 '00'
P2 '92', 'AE' or 'BE'
12 © ISO/IEC 2021 – All rights reserved
Table 15 (continued)
Command data field Data elements or data objects relevant to the operation.
If P2 = '92', data element to be used in the certificate verification process, (see ISO/
IEC 7816-4:2020, Table 50)
If P2 = 'AE' or 'BE', data objects to be used in the certificate verification process. The
allowed DOs may be those of a Card Verifiable Certificate (see ISO/IEC 7816-4:2020,
Table 50)
Response data field Absent
If a partial message recovery scheme is used and part of the information is already stored in the card,
then the data object for auxiliary data is expected to be sent empty, with the data to be inserted later by
the card.
5.3.8 Encipher operation
The encipher operation, which shall be as specified in Table 16, enciphers data transmitted in the
command data field or data in a card. The usage of this operation may be restricted.
NOTE The operation can be used for generating diversified keys.
Table 16 — Parameters and data fields for Encipher operation
P1 '82', '84' or '86' (cryptogram according to ISO/IEC 7816-4:2020, Table 50)
a
P2 '80'
Command data field Absent (data already in the card) or data to be enciphered
Response data field Enciphered data as mandated by the P1 value
a
P2 = '00' may be used for legacy reasons to indicate that input data is already stored in the card and therefore
not present in the command data field.
5.3.9 Decipher operation
The decipher operation, which shall be as specified in Table 17, deciphers data transmitted in the
command data field. The usage of this operation may be restricted.
Table 17 — Parameters and data fields for Decipher operation
a
P1 '80'
P2 '82', '84' or '86' (cryptogram according to ISO/IEC 7816-4:2020, Table 50)
Command data field Data to be deciphered as mandated by the P2 value
Response data field Absent (deciphered data remains in the card) or deciphered data
a
P1 = '00' may be used for legacy reasons to indicate that output data will be stored in the card and not
returned in the response, i.e. output data is not present in the response data field.
© ISO/IEC 2021 – All rights reserved 13
Annex A
(informative)
Examples of operations related to digital signature
A.1 General
This annex provides examples of how to operate with digital signatures.
A.2 Sequences of commands for managing a security environment
Table A.1 represents a sequence of manage security environment commands to set dst, cct and ct
components of the current SE and finally, to store the current SE under a SEID indicated in P2.
Table A.1 — Setting of security environment components
Command Operation P1-P2 Command data field
mse set dst '41B6' {'84' − L − } {'91 00'}
mse set cct '41B4' {'83' − L − } {'87' − L − }
mse set ct '41B8' {'83' − L − }
mse store (SEID = 1) 'F201' Absent
The set dst operation references the private key to use in the signature computation and specifies
the integration of a random number in the digital signature input. The set cct operation references
a secret key and an initial value to use for the computation of a cryptographic checksum. The set ct
operation references a secret session key to use for confidentiality.
A.3 Sequences of commands for digital signature computation
Table A.2 shows the syntax for producing a digital signature by using a signature scheme with appendix.
The input is a hash-code completed with padding bytes. This example illustrates the calculation of a
digital signature with combined algorithm including a hash operation. In this example, the hash input is
delivered to the card.
Table A.2 — First example of digital signature scheme with appendix
Command Operation P1-P2 Command data field Response data field
mse restore 'F301' Absent Absent
compute digital
pso '9E9A' Hash-code with padding bytes Digital signature
signature
NOTE 1 This example is purely illustrative and its value is limited in terms of implementation as a result of
possible export controls that can apply and indeed for general security reasons (avoidance of repeat signatures is
desirable in some circumstances).
Table A.3 shows the syntax f
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