SIST-TS CEN/TS 16702-2:2015
(Main)Electronic fee collection - Secure monitoring for autonomous toll systems - Part 2: Trusted recorder
Electronic fee collection - Secure monitoring for autonomous toll systems - Part 2: Trusted recorder
This Technical Specification, “Secure Monitoring for autonomous toll systems – Part 2: Trusted recorder” specifies the requirements for the Secure Application Module used in the secure monitoring compliance checking concept. The Technical Specification describes two different configurations of a Secure Application Module (SAM) required for the secure monitoring compliance checking concept:
- Trusted Recorder, for use inside an OBE;
- Verification SAM, for use in other EFC system entities.
The Technical Specification describes
- terms and definitions used to describe the two Secure Application Module configurations;
- operation of the two Secure Application Modules in the secure monitoring compliance checking concept;
- functional requirements for the two Secure Application Modules configurations, including a classification of different security levels;
- the interface, by means of transactions, messages and data elements, between an OBE or Front End and the Trusted Recorder;
- requirements on basic security primitives and key management procedures to support Secure Monitoring using a Trusted Recorder.
This Technical Specification is consistent with the EFC architecture as defined in ISO 17573 and the derived suite of standards and Technical Specifications, especially FprCEN/TS 16702-1 and CEN/TS 16439.
The following is outside the scope of this Technical Specification:
- The life cycle of a Secure Application Module and the way in which this is managed.
- The interface commands needed to get a Secure Application Module in an operational state.
- The interface definition of the Verification SAM.
- Definition of a hardware platform for the implementation of a Secure Application Module.
Elektronische Gebührenerhebung - Sichere Überwachung von autonomen Mautsystemen - Teil 2: Zuverlässige Datenaufzeichnung
Perception du télépéage - Surveillance sécurisée pour systèmes autonomes de péage - Partie 2: Enregistreur fiabilisé
Elektronsko pobiranje pristojbin - Varnostno spremljanje avtonomnih cestninskih sistemov - 2. del: Zaupanja vreden snemalnik
Ta tehnična specifikacija »Varnostno spremljanje avtonomnih cestninskih sistemov - 2. del: Zaupanja vreden snemalnik« določa zahteve za modul varnega dostopa (SAM), uporabljen pri konceptu preverjanja skladnosti varnostnega spremljanja. Ta tehnična specifikacija opisuje dve različni konfiguraciji modula varnega dostopa (SAM), ki sta potrebni za koncept preverjanja skladnosti varnostnega spremljanja:
– zaupanja vreden snemalnik: za uporabo v opremi v vozilu (OBE);
– SAM za preverjanje: za uporabo v drugih entitetah sistema za elektronsko pobiranje pristojbin (EFC).
Ta tehnična specifikacija opisuje:
– izraze in definicije, ki so uporabljeni za opis teh dveh konfiguracij modula varnega dostopa;
– delovanje teh dveh modulov varnega dostopa v konceptu preverjanja skladnosti varnostnega spremljanja;
– funkcionalne zahteve za ti dve konfiguraciji modula varnega dostopa, vključno z razvrstitvijo različnih varnostnih ravni;
– vmesnik, prek transakcij, sporočil in podatkovnih elementov, med opremo v vozilu ali čelnim delom in zaupanja vrednim snemalnikom;
– zahteve glede osnovnih varnostnih primitivov in ključnih postopkov upravljanja kot podpora varnostnemu spremljanju z uporabo zaupanja vrednega snemalnika.
Ta tehnična specifikacija je v skladu z arhitekturo za elektronsko pobiranje pristojbin, kot je določena s standardom ISO 17573 in skupino izpeljanih standardov in tehničnih specifikacij, še posebej FprCEN/TS 16702-1 in CEN/TS 16439.
V tej tehnični specifikaciji ni zajeto naslednje:
– življenjska doba modula varnega dostopa in način, na katerega se to upravlja;
– ukazi vmesnika, ki so potrebni za zagon modula varnega dostopa;
– definicija vmesnika modula varnega dostopa za preverjanje;
– definicija platforme za strojno opremo za izvajanje modula varnega dostopa.
General Information
Relations
Standards Content (Sample)
SLOVENSKI STANDARD
SIST-TS CEN/TS 16702-2:2015
01-september-2015
Elektronsko pobiranje pristojbin - Varnostno spremljanje avtonomnih cestninskih
sistemov - 2. del: Zaupanja vreden snemalnik
Electronic fee collection - Secure monitoring for autonomous toll systems - Part 2:
Trusted recorder
Elektronische Gebührenerhebung - Sichere Überwachung von autonomen
Mautsystemen - Teil 2: Zuverlässige Datenaufzeichnung
Perception du télépéage - Surveillance sécurisée pour systèmes autonomes de péage -
Partie 2: Enregistreur fiabilisé
Ta slovenski standard je istoveten z: CEN/TS 16702-2:2015
ICS:
03.220.20 Cestni transport Road transport
35.240.60 Uporabniške rešitve IT v IT applications in transport
transportu in trgovini and trade
SIST-TS CEN/TS 16702-2:2015 en,fr,de
2003-01.Slovenski inštitut za standardizacijo. Razmnoževanje celote ali delov tega standarda ni dovoljeno.
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SIST-TS CEN/TS 16702-2:2015
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION
CEN/TS 16702-2
SPÉCIFICATION TECHNIQUE
TECHNISCHE SPEZIFIKATION
March 2015
ICS 03.220.20; 35.240.60
English Version
Electronic fee collection - Secure monitoring for autonomous toll
systems - Part 2: Trusted recorder
Perception du télépéage - Surveillance sécurisée pour Elektronische Gebührenerhebung - Sichere Überwachung
systèmes autonomes de péage - Partie 2: Enregistreur von autonomen Mautsystemen - Teil 2: Zuverlässige
fiabilisé Datenaufzeichnung
This Technical Specification (CEN/TS) was approved by CEN on 19 January 2015 for provisional application.
The period of validity of this CEN/TS is limited initially to three years. After two years the members of CEN will be requested to submit their
comments, particularly on the question whether the CEN/TS can be converted into a European Standard.
CEN members are required to announce the existence of this CEN/TS in the same way as for an EN and to make the CEN/TS available
promptly at national level in an appropriate form. It is permissible to keep conflicting national standards in force (in parallel to the CEN/TS)
until the final decision about the possible conversion of the CEN/TS into an EN is reached.
CEN members are the national standards bodies of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and United
Kingdom.
EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR STANDARDIZATION
COMITÉ EUROPÉEN DE NORMALISATION
EUROPÄISCHES KOMITEE FÜR NORMUNG
CEN-CENELEC Management Centre: Avenue Marnix 17, B-1000 Brussels
© 2015 CEN All rights of exploitation in any form and by any means reserved Ref. No. CEN/TS 16702-2:2015 E
worldwide for CEN national Members.
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Contents Page
Foreword .4
Introduction .5
1 Scope .7
2 Normative references .7
3 Terms and definitions .8
4 Symbols and abbreviations . 11
5 SAM concept and scenarios . 12
5.1 General . 12
5.2 The concepts of TR and Verification SAM . 13
5.3 Scenarios for a Trusted Recorder . 14
5.3.1 General . 14
5.3.2 Real-Time Freezing without using a Trusted Time Source . 14
5.3.3 Real-Time Freezing using a Trusted Time Source . 15
5.4 Scenarios for a Verification SAM . 15
5.4.1 General . 15
5.4.2 MAC verification. 16
5.5 General Scenarios . 16
5.5.1 General . 16
5.5.2 Assigning a Toll Domain Counter . 17
5.5.3 Obtaining SAM Information . 17
6 Functional requirements . 18
6.1 General . 18
6.1.1 SAM options . 18
6.1.2 Presentation of requirements . 19
6.2 Basic requirements. 19
6.3 Key management . 20
6.4 Cryptographic functions . 20
6.5 Real-time freezing . 21
6.6 Verification SAM . 21
6.7 Toll Domain Counter . 22
6.8 Trusted time source . 23
6.9 Security protection level . 24
7 Interface requirements . 24
7.1 General . 24
7.2 Calculate MAC for real-time freezing . 24
7.2.1 General . 24
7.2.2 Calculation of MAC . 25
7.2.3 Coding of request . 25
7.2.4 Coding of response . 26
7.3 Calculate digital signature for real-time freezing . 26
7.3.1 General . 26
7.3.2 Calculation of digital signature . 26
7.3.3 Coding of request . 27
7.3.4 Coding of response . 27
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7.4 Get device information . 28
7.4.1 General . 28
7.4.2 Coding of request . 28
7.4.3 Coding of response . 28
7.5 Get toll domain counter information . 28
7.5.1 General . 28
7.5.2 Coding of request . 29
7.5.3 Coding of response . 29
7.6 Get key information . 29
7.6.1 General . 29
7.6.2 Coding of request . 30
7.6.3 Coding of response . 30
7.7 Error handling . 31
Annex A (normative) Data type specification . 32
A.1 General . 32
A.2 Data specifications . 32
Annex B (normative) Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS) proforma . 33
B.1 Guidance for completing the ICS proforma . 33
B.1.1 Purposes and structure . 33
B.1.2 Abbreviations and conventions . 33
B.1.3 Instructions for completing the ICS proforma. 34
B.2 ICS proforma for Trusted Recorder . 35
B.2.1 Identification implementation . 35
B.2.2 Identification of the standard . 35
B.2.3 Global statement of conformance . 35
B.2.4 ICS proforma tables for TR . 36
B.3 ICS proforma for Verification SAM . 39
B.3.1 Identification implementation . 39
B.3.2 Identification of the standard . 39
B.3.3 Global statement of conformance . 39
B.3.4 ICS proforma tables for Verification SAM . 40
Annex C (informative) Trusted time source implementation issues . 43
C.1 General . 43
C.2 Possible implementations of a TTS . 43
C.2.1 TTS based on a real time clock . 43
C.2.2 TTS with the need for external calibration . 43
C.3 TTS power supply . 44
Annex D (informative) Use of this Technical Specification for the EETS . 45
D.1 General . 45
D.2 Overall relationship between European standardization and the EETS . 45
D.3 European standardization work supporting the EETS . 45
D.4 Correspondence between this Technical Specification and the EETS . 46
Bibliography . 47
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Foreword
This document (CEN/TS 16702-2:2015) has been prepared by Technical Committee CEN/TC 278 “Intelligent
transport systems”, the secretariat of which is held by NEN.
This part 2, the trusted recorder is the second part of the standard suite of the secure monitoring for
autonomous toll systems. The overall concept of secure monitoring is defined in part one,
CEN/TS 16702-1:2014.
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent
rights. CEN [and/or CENELEC] shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.
This document has been prepared under a mandate given to CEN by the European Commission and the
European Free Trade Association.
According to the CEN-CENELEC Internal Regulations, the national standards organizations of the following
countries are bound to announce this Technical Specification: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom.
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Introduction
The widespread use of tolling requires provisions for users of vehicles that are roaming through many different
toll domains. Users should be offered a single contract for driving a vehicle through multiple toll domains and
those vehicles require onboard equipment (OBE) that is interoperable with the toll systems in these toll
domains. Thus, there is a commercial and economic justification both in respect of the OBE and the toll
systems for enabling interoperability. In Europe, for example, this need has been officially recognized and
legislation on interoperability has been adopted (see directive 2004/52/EC) and the associated commission
decision.
The Technical Specification “Electronic fee collection – Security framework” (CEN/TS 16439) provides an
overview of general security requirements of the stakeholders and provides a comprehensive threat analysis
for the assets in an interoperable EFC scheme. A number of identified threats may result into less revenue of
the Toll Charger, undercharging and/or not meeting required service levels between the Toll Service Provider
and the Toll Charger. Some of these threats can be eliminated by implementing the security measures
specified in CEN/TS 16439. However, most of the security measures necessary to combat the identified
threats are to be addressed and specified in other standards.
One example of threats that cannot be mitigated by security measures specified in CEN/TS 16439 concerns
the trustworthiness of Toll Declarations in autonomous toll systems. Toll declarations are statements that a
vehicle has been circulating in a particular toll domain within a particular time period. In autonomous toll
systems, the circulation of vehicles is measured by Toll Service Providers, using GNSS-based OBE. Toll
service providers then send Toll Declarations to the Toll Charger, based on which the Toll Charger will charge
the Toll Service Provider. The correctness and completeness of these declarations is obviously of paramount
interest to Toll Chargers, Toll Service Providers and users alike.
The secure monitoring compliance checking concept provides a solution that allows a Toll Charger to check
the trustworthiness of the Toll Declarations from a Toll Service Provider, while respecting the privacy of the
user. This concept is defined in two Technical Specifications. CEN/TS 16702-1:2014 “Secure monitoring for
autonomous toll systems – Part 1: Compliance checking” gives the full description of the secure monitoring
compliance checking concept. The current Technical Specification, CEN/TS 16702-2 “Secure Monitoring for
autonomous toll systems – Part 2: Trusted recorder” defines the Trusted Recorder, a secure element required
for some of the different types of secure monitoring compliance checking defined in CEN/TS 16702-1:2014.
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Figure 1 — Relation between EFC - Security framework and the overall secure monitoring concept
Figure 1 shows the relations between the CEN/TS 16439 EFC Security Framework and EFC Secure
monitoring for autonomous toll systems, i.e. the two parts Compliance Checking and Trusted Recorder. The
threat analysis in the Security Framework motivates the security requirements of an EFC system. The
requirements are implemented and fulfilled by several security measures. One of these measures is Secure
Monitoring, specified in “Secure Monitoring for autonomous toll systems – Part 1: Compliance checking”. The
“Secure Monitoring for autonomous toll systems – Part 2: Trusted Recorder” specifies the cryptographic
services necessary for the secure monitoring compliance checking concept.
Figure 1 indicates also that a Trusted Recorder will most likely be implemented on trusted hardware, e.g. on
Secure Application Module (SAM), inside the OBE or on a general trusted platform of a vehicle. Such a
trusted device could support more functions, which may be required for EFC or other services.
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1 Scope
This Technical Specification defines the requirements for the Secure Application Module (SAM) used in the
secure monitoring compliance checking concept. It specifies two different configurations of a SAM:
— Trusted Recorder, for use inside an OBE;
— Verification SAM, for use in other EFC system entities.
The Technical Specification describes
— terms and definitions used to describe the two Secure Application Module configurations;
— operation of the two Secure Application Modules in the secure monitoring compliance checking concept;
— functional requirements for the two Secure Application Modules configurations, including a classification
of different security levels;
— the interface, by means of transactions, messages and data elements, between an OBE or Front End and
the Trusted Recorder;
— requirements on basic security primitives and key management procedures to support Secure Monitoring
using a Trusted Recorder.
This Technical Specification is consistent with the EFC architecture as defined in ISO 17573 and the derived
suite of standards and Technical Specifications, especially CEN/TS 16702-1:2014 and CEN/TS 16439.
The following is outside the scope of this Technical Specification:
— The life cycle of a Secure Application Module and the way in which this is managed.
— The interface commands needed to get a Secure Application Module in an operational state.
— The interface definition of the Verification SAM.
— Definition of a hardware platform for the implementation of a Secure Application Module.
2 Normative references
The following documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document and are
indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references,
the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
1
CEN/TS 16439:2013 , Electronic fee collection - Security framework
CEN/TS 16702-1:2014, Electronic fee collection - Secure monitoring for autonomous toll systems - Part 1:
Compliance checking
EN ISO 14906:2011, Electronic fee collection - Application interface definition for dedicated short-range
communication (ISO 14906:2011)
1)
CEN/TS 16439:2013 is currently under revision and accepted as a CEN/ISO work item. The next edition will be
assigned the reference CEN ISO/TS 19299.
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ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013, Identification cards — Integrated circuit cards — Part 4: Organization, security and
commands for interchange
ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011, Information technology — Security techniques — Message Authentication Codes
(MACs) — Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher
ISO/IEC 10118-3, Information technology — Security techniques — Hash-functions — Part 3: Dedicated
hash-functions
ISO/IEC 14888-3:2006, Information technology — Security techniques — Digital signatures with appendix —
Part 3: Discrete logarithm based mechanisms
ISO/IEC 18031, Information technology — Security techniques — Random bit generation
ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010, Information technology — Security techniques — Encryption algorithms — Part 3:
Block ciphers
ISO/IEC 19790:2012, Information technology — Security techniques — Security requirements for
cryptographic modules
FIPS PUB 140-2, December 2002, Security requirements for cryptographic modules
Common Criteria Protection Profile BSI-PP-0035, 2007, Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0
3 Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.
3.1
authentication
provision of assurance that a claimed characteristic of an entity is correct
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 27000:2009, 2.5]
3.2
authenticator
data, possibly encrypted, that is used for authentication
Note 1 to entry: In this CEN/TS either a MAC or a signature.
3.3
authenticity
property that an entity is what it claims to be
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 27000:2009, 2.6]
3.4
Back End
computing and communication facilities of an actor (e.g. a Toll Charger or a Toll Service Provider) exchanging
data with a Front or Back End
[SOURCE: CEN ISO/TS 17575-1:2010, 3.4]
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3.5
Big Endian
systems in which the most significant byte of the word is stored in the smallest address given and the least
significant byte is stored in the largest
3.6
confidentiality
property that information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorised individuals, entities, or processes
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 27000:2009, 2.9]
3.7
Front End
parts of the toll system where usage data for an individual user are collected, processed and delivered to the
Back End
Note 1 to entry: The Front End comprises the on-board equipment and an optional proxy.
[SOURCE: CEN ISO/TS 17575-1:2010, 3.13]
3.8
integrity
property that data has not been altered or destroyed in an unauthorized manner
3.9
itinerary
travel diary organized in one or more itinerary records enabling assessment of the correctness of the toll
declaration
3.10
issuer
institution (or its agent) that issues the Trusted Recorder
[SOURCE: adapted from ISO/IEC 7812-1:2006, 3.3]
3.11
Key Verification Code
calculated by encrypting one block of zeroes with the actual symmetric key, then truncated to leftmost three
bytes
[SOURCE: CEN/TS 16439:2013]
3.12
message authentication code
MAC
string of bits which is the output of a MAC algorithm
Note 1 to entry: A MAC is sometimes called a cryptographic check value (see for example ISO 7498-2).
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011, 3.9]
3.13
non-repudiation
ability to prove the occurrence of a claimed event or action and its originating entities, in order to resolve
disputes about the occurrence or non-occurrence of the event or action and about the involvement of entities
in the event
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 27000:2009, 2.27]
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3.14
on-board equipment
OBE
equipment fitted within or on the outside of a vehicle and used for toll purposes
[SOURCE: ISO 17573:2010, 3.9]
3.15
real-time freezing
freezing of each itinerary record as soon as its acquisition has terminated, using a Trusted Recorder
3.16
roadside equipment
equipment located along the road, ether fixed or mobile
3.17
signature
one or more data elements resulting from the signature process
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 14888-1:2008, 3.12]
3.18
Signing Time Lock
pre-configured time interval that shall have elapsed since the last successful request to calculate an
authenticator before a Trusted Recorder calculates another authenticator
3.19
Secure Application Module
SAM
physically, electrically and logically protected module intended to contain algorithm(s), related keys, security
procedures and information to protect an application in such a way that unauthorized access is avoided by
tamper protection features
3.20
secure monitoring compliance checking
concept that allows a Toll Charger to rely on the trustworthiness of toll declarations produced by Toll Service
Providers
3.21
Toll Charger
TC
entity which levies toll for the use of vehicles in a toll domain
[SOURCE: ISO 17573:2010, 3.16]
3.22
toll declaration
statement to declare the usage of a given EFC service to a Toll Charger
3.23
toll domain
area or part of a road network where a toll regime is applied
[SOURCE: ISO 17573:2010, 3.18]
3.24
toll domain ID
unique identifier of a toll domain
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3.25
toll service
service enabling users having only one contract and one set of OBE to use a vehicle in one or more toll
domains
[SOURCE: ISO 17573:2010, 3.22]
3.26
Toll Service Provid
...
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