Digital Enhanced Cordless Telecommunications (DECT) - Common Interface (CI) - Part 7: Security features

Update the standard to include new functions defined for NG DECT. Support of the new mechanisms introduced in NG-DECT part 5. Enhancement of security.

Digitalne izboljšane brezvrvične telekomunikacije (DECT) - Skupni vmesnik (CI) - 7. del: Varnostne lastnosti

Posodobitev standarda z vključitvijo novih funkcij, določenih za NG DECT. Podpora novih mehanizmov, uvedenih v 5. delu NG DECT. Izboljšanje varnosti.

General Information

Status
Published
Publication Date
10-May-2012
Technical Committee
Current Stage
6060 - National Implementation/Publication (Adopted Project)
Start Date
08-May-2012
Due Date
13-Jul-2012
Completion Date
11-May-2012

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EN 300 175-7 V2.4.1:2012
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2003-01.Slovenski inštitut za standardizacijo. Razmnoževanje celote ali delov tega standarda ni dovoljeno.Digital Enhanced Cordless Telecommunications (DECT) - Common Interface (CI) - Part 7: Security features33.070.30'(&7Digital Enhanced Cordless Telecommunications (DECT)ICS:Ta slovenski standard je istoveten z:EN 300 175-7 Version 2.4.1SIST EN 300 175-7 V2.4.1:2012en01-junij-2012SIST EN 300 175-7 V2.4.1:2012SLOVENSKI
STANDARD



SIST EN 300 175-7 V2.4.1:2012



ETSI EN 300 175-7 V2.4.1 (2012-04) Digital Enhanced Cordless Telecommunications (DECT); Common Interface (CI); Part 7: Security features
European Standard SIST EN 300 175-7 V2.4.1:2012



ETSI ETSI EN 300 175-7 V2.4.1 (2012-04) 2
Reference REN/DECT-000263 Keywords authentication, DECT, IMT-2000, mobility, radio, security, TDD, TDMA ETSI 650 Route des Lucioles F-06921 Sophia Antipolis Cedex - FRANCE
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Important notice Individual copies of the present document can be downloaded from: http://www.etsi.org The present document may be made available in more than one electronic version or in print. In any case of existing or perceived difference in contents between such versions, the reference version is the Portable Document Format (PDF). In case of dispute, the reference shall be the printing on ETSI printers of the PDF version kept on a specific network drive within ETSI Secretariat. Users of the present document should be aware that the document may be subject to revision or change of status. Information on the current status of this and other ETSI documents is available at http://portal.etsi.org/tb/status/status.asp If you find errors in the present document, please send your comment to one of the following services: http://portal.etsi.org/chaircor/ETSI_support.asp Copyright Notification No part may be reproduced except as authorized by written permission. The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media.
© European Telecommunications Standards Institute 2012. All rights reserved.
DECTTM, PLUGTESTSTM, UMTSTM and the ETSI logo are Trade Marks of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members. 3GPPTM and LTE™ are Trade Marks of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners. GSM® and the GSM logo are Trade Marks registered and owned by the GSM Association. SIST EN 300 175-7 V2.4.1:2012



ETSI ETSI EN 300 175-7 V2.4.1 (2012-04) 3 Contents Intellectual Property Rights . 8 Foreword . 8 Introduction . 9 1 Scope . 13 2 References . 13 2.1 Normative references . 14 2.2 Informative references . 14 3 Definitions and abbreviations . 15 3.1 Definitions . 15 3.2 Abbreviations . 15 4 Security architecture . 17 4.1 Background . 17 4.2 Security services . 17 4.2.1 Authentication of a PT . 17 4.2.2 Authentication of an FT . 17 4.2.3 Mutual authentication . 17 4.2.4 Data confidentiality. 18 4.2.5 User authentication . 18 4.3 Security mechanisms . 18 4.3.1 Authentication of a PT (type 1 procedure) . 18 4.3.2 Authentication of an FT (type 1 procedure) . 20 4.3.3 Mutual authentication . 21 4.3.4 Data confidentiality. 21 4.3.4.1 Derived Cipher Key (DCK) . 21 4.3.4.2 Static Cipher Key (SCK) . 22 4.3.4.3 Default Cipher Key (DefCK) . 22 4.3.5 User authentication . 22 4.3.6 Authentication of a PT (type 2 procedure) . 22 4.3.7 Authentication of a FT (type 2 procedure) . 25 4.4 Cryptographic parameters and keys . 27 4.4.1 Overview . 27 4.4.2 Cryptographic parameters . 27 4.4.2.1 Provisions related to the generation of random numbers . 30 4.4.3 Cryptographic keys . 30 4.4.3.1 Authentication key K . 30 4.4.3.2 Authentication session keys KS and KS' . 31 4.4.3.3 Cipher key CK . 32 4.5 Security processes . 32 4.5.1 Overview . 32 4.5.2 Derivation of authentication key, K . 32 4.5.2.1 K is derived from UAK . 32 4.5.2.2 K is derived from AC . 33 4.5.2.3 K is derived from UAK and UPI . 33 4.5.3 Authentication processes . 33 4.5.3.1 Processes for the derivation of KS and KS' . 33 4.5.3.2 Processes for the derivation of DCK, RES1 and RES2 . 34 4.5.4 Key stream generation . 35 4.6 Combinations of security services . 35 4.6.1 Combinations of security algorithms . 36 4.6.1.1 Limitations related to capering algorithms . 36 5 Algorithms for security processes . 36 5.1 Background . 36 5.1.1 A algorithm . 36 5.1.1.1 A algorithm, DSAA based (A-DSAA) . 37 SIST EN 300 175-7 V2.4.1:2012



ETSI ETSI EN 300 175-7 V2.4.1 (2012-04) 4 5.1.1.2 A algorithm, DSAA2 based (A-DSAA2) . 37 5.1.1.3 A algorithm, proprietary . 38 5.2 Derivation of session authentication key(s) . 38 5.2.1 A11 process . 38 5.2.2 A21 process . 38 5.3 Authentication and cipher key generation processes . 39 5.3.1 A12 process . 39 5.3.2 A22 process . 40 6 Integration of security . 40 6.1 Background . 40 6.2 Association of keys and identities . 41 6.2.1 Authentication key . 41 6.2.1.1 K is derived from UAK . 41 6.2.1.2 K derived from AC. 41 6.2.1.3 K derived from UAK and UPI . 41 6.2.2 Cipher keys . 42 6.3 NWK layer procedures . 42 6.3.1 Background . 42 6.3.2 Authentication exchanges . 43 6.3.3 Authentication procedures . 44 6.3.3.1 Authentication of a PT type 1 procedure . 44 6.3.3.2 Authentication of an FT type 1 procedure . 44 6.3.3.3 Authentication of a PT type 2 procedure . 45 6.3.3.4 Authentication of an FT type 2 procedure . 45 6.3.4 Transfer of Cipher Key, CK. 46 6.3.5 Re-Keying . 46 6.3.6 Encryption with Default Cipher Key . 46 6.4 MAC layer procedures . 46 6.4.1 Background . 46 6.4.2 MAC layer field structure . 46 6.4.3 Data to be encrypted . 48 6.4.4 Encryption process . 48 6.4.5 Initialization and synchronization of the encryption process . 51 6.4.5.1 Construction of CK . 51 6.4.5.2 The Initialization Vector (IV) . 51 6.4.5.3 Generation of two Key Stream segments . 51 6.4.6 Encryption mode control . 52 6.4.6.1 Background . 52 6.4.6.2 MAC layer messages. 52 6.4.6.3 Procedures for switching to encrypt mode . 52 6.4.6.4 Procedures for switching to clear mode . 57 6.4.6.5 Procedures for re-keying . 58 6.4.7 Handover of the encryption process . 59 6.4.7.1 Bearer handover, uninterrupted ciphering . 60 6.4.7.2 Connection handover, uninterrupted ciphering . 60 6.4.7.3 External handover - handover with ciphering . 60 6.4.8 Modifications for half and long slot specifications (2-level modulation) . 61 6.4.8.1 Background . 61 6.4.8.2 MAC layer field structure . 61 6.4.8.3 Data to be encrypted. 61 6.4.8.4 Encryption process . 62 6.4.8.5 Initialization and synchronization of the encryption process . 62 6.4.8.6 Encryption mode control . 62 6.4.8.7 Handover of the encryption process . 62 6.4.9 Modifications for double slot specifications (2-level modulation) . 62 6.4.9.1 Background . 62 6.4.9.2 MAC layer field structure . 63 6.4.9.3 Data to be encrypted. 63 6.4.9.4 Encryption process . 64 6.4.9.5 Initialization and synchronization of the encryption process . 65 6.4.9.6 Encryption mode control . 65 SIST EN 300 175-7 V2.4.1:2012



ETSI ETSI EN 300 175-7 V2.4.1 (2012-04) 5 6.4.9.7 Handover of the encryption process . 65 6.4.10 Modifications for multi-bearer specifications . 65 6.4.11 Modifications for 4-level, 8-level, 16-level and 64-level modulation formats . 66 6.4.11.1 Background . 66 6.4.11.2 MAC layer field structure . 66 6.4.11.3 Data to be encrypted. 66 6.4.11.4 Encryption process . 66 6.4.11.4.1 Encryption process for the A-field and for the unprotected format . 67 6.4.11.4.2 Encryption process for the single subfield protected format . 68 6.4.11.4.3 Encryption process for the multi-subfield protected format . 69 6.4.11.4.4 Encryption process for the constant-size-subfield protected format . 71 6.4.11.4.5 Encryption process for the encoded protected format (MAC service IPX) . 71 6.4.11.5 Initialization and synchronization of the encryption process . 73 6.4.11.6 Encryption mode control . 73 6.4.11.7 Handover of the encryption process . 73 6.5 Security attributes . 73 6.5.1 Background . 73 6.5.2 Authentication protocols . 74 6.5.2.1 Authentication of a PT type 1 procedure . 74 6.5.2.2 Authentication of an FT type 1 procedure . 75 6.5.2.3 Authentication of a PT type 2 procedure . 76 6.5.2.4 Authentication of an FT type 2 procedure . 77 6.5.3 Confidentiality protocols . 78 6.5.4 Access-rights protocols . 80 6.5.5 Key numbering and storage . 80 6.5.5.1 Authentication keys . 80 6.5.5.2 Cipher keys . 81 6.5.6 Key allocation . 82 6.5.6.1 Introduction . 82 6.5.6.2 UAK allocation (DSAA algorithm) . 82 6.5.6.3 UAK allocation (DSAA2 algorithm) . 83 7 Use of security features . 84 7.1 Background . 84 7.2 Key management options . 84 7.2.1 Overview of security parameters relevant for key management . 84 7.2.2 Generation of authentication keys . 85 7.2.3 Initial distribution and installation of keys . 86 7.2.4 Use of keys within the fixed network . 87 7.2.4.1 Use of keys within the fixed network: diagrams for authentication type 1 scenarios . 89 7.2.4.2 Use of keys within the fixed network: diagrams for authentication type 2 scenarios . 92 7.3 Confidentiality service with a Cordless Radio Fixed Part (CRFP). 94 7.3.1 General . 94 7.3.2 CRFP initialization of PT cipher key . 94 Annex A (informative): Security threats analysis . 95 A.1 Introduction . 95 A.2 Threat A - Impersonating a subscriber identity . 96 A.3 Threat B - Illegal use of a handset (PP) . 96 A.4 Threat C - Illegal use of a base station (FP) . 96 A.5 Threat D - Impersonation of a base station (FP) . 97 A.6 Threat E - Illegally obtaining user data and user related signalling information . 97 A.7 Conclusions and comments . 98 Annex B (informative): Security features and operating environments . 100 B.1 Introduction . 100 SIST EN 300 175-7 V2.4.1:2012



ETSI ETSI EN 300 175-7 V2.4.1 (2012-04) 6 B.2 Definitions . 100 B.3 Enrolment options . 100 Annex C (informative): Reasons for not adopting public key techniques . 102 Annex D (informative): Overview of security features . 103 D.1 Introduction . 103 D.2 Authentication of a PT . 103 D.3 Authentication of an FT . 104 D.4 Mutual authentication of a PT and an FT . 104 D.4.1 Direct method . 104 D.4.2 Indirect method 1.
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