ETSI TS 103 457 V1.1.1 (2018-10)

CYBER; Trusted Cross-Domain Interface: Interface to offload sensitive functions to a trusted domain

DTS/CYBER-0019

General Information

• Status: Published
• Publication Date: 23-Oct-2018
• Technical Committee: CYBER - Cyber Security
• Current Stage: 12 - Completion
• Due Date: 19-Nov-2018
• Completion Date: 24-Oct-2018

Standards Content (Sample)

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION
CYBER;
Trusted Cross-Domain Interface:
Interface to offload sensitive functions to a trusted domain

2 ETSI TS 103 457 V1.1.1 (2018-10)

Reference
DTS/CYBER-0019
Keywords
cybersecurity, interface
ETSI
650 Route des Lucioles
F-06921 Sophia Antipolis Cedex - FRANCE

Tel.: [phone]  Fax: [phone]

Siret N° 348 623 562 00017 - NAF 742 C
Association à but non lucratif enregistrée à la
Sous-Préfecture de Grasse (06) N° 7803/88

Important notice
The present document can be downloaded from:
http://www.etsi.org/standards-search
The present document may be made available in electronic versions and/or in print. The content of any electronic and/or
print versions of the present document shall not be modified without the prior written authorization of ETSI. In case of any
existing or perceived difference in contents between such versions and/or in print, the only prevailing document is the
print of the Portable Document Format (PDF) version kept on a specific network drive within ETSI Secretariat.
Users of the present document should be aware that the document may be subject to revision or change of status.
Information on the current status of this and other ETSI documents is available at
https://portal.etsi.org/TB/ETSIDeliverableStatus.aspx
If you find errors in the present document, please send your comment to one of the following services:
https://portal.etsi.org/People/CommiteeSupportStaff.aspx
Copyright Notification
No part may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying
and microfilm except as authorized by written permission of ETSI.
The content of the PDF version shall not be modified without the written authorization of ETSI.
The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media.

© ETSI 2018.
All rights reserved.
TM TM TM
DECT , PLUGTESTS , UMTS and the ETSI logo are trademarks of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members.
TM TM
3GPP and LTE are trademarks of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and
of the 3GPP Organizational Partners.
oneM2M logo is protected for the benefit of its Members. ®
GSM and the GSM logo are trademarks registered and owned by the GSM Association.
ETSI
3 ETSI TS 103 457 V1.1.1 (2018-10)
Contents
Intellectual Property Rights . 5
Foreword . 5
Modal verbs terminology . 5
Introduction . 5
1 Scope . 7
2 References . 7
2.1 Normative references . 7
2.2 Informative references . 7
3 Definition of terms and abbreviations . 7
3.1 Terms . 7
3.2 Abbreviations . 8
4 General . 8
4.1 TCDI functional requirements . 8
4.2 TCDI life cycle . 9
4.2.1 Life cycle Diagram . 9
4.2.2 Connection between LTD and MTD . 9
4.2.3 Session . 10
4.2.4 Keep the trusted connection between the LTD and the MTD . 10
4.2.5 Releasing and erasing . 11
5 Interface Elementary Functions . 12
5.1 General provisions . 12
5.2 Connection and session management . 12
5.2.1 General . 12
5.2.2 TD_OpenConnection . 13
5.2.3 TD_CloseConnection. 13
5.2.4 TD_CreateSession . 13
5.2.5 TD_CloseSession . 14
5.2.6 TD_TrustRenewal . 14
5.3 Data and value management . 15
5.3.1 TD_CreateObject . 15
5.3.2 TD_GetObjectValue . 15
5.3.3 TD_PutObjectValue. 16
5.4 Transferring cryptographic functionality . 16
5.4.1 Entropy request . 16
5.4.1.1 General . 16
5.4.1.2 TD_GetRandom . 17
5.4.2 Encryption keys request . 17
5.4.2.1 General . 17
5.4.2.2 TD_GenerateEncryptionKey . 17
5.4.3 Trusted timestamping . 18
5.4.3.1 General . 18
5.4.3.2 TD_GetTrustedTimestamping . 18
5.4.4 Secure archive . 18
5.4.4.1 General . 18
5.4.4.2 TD_CreateArchive . 19
5.4.4.3 TD_Archive . 19
5.4.4.4 TD_CloseArchive . 20
5.4.5 Secure storage . 20
5.4.5.1 General . 20
5.4.5.2 TD_CreateStorage . 20
5.4.5.3 TD_DeleteStorage . 21
5.4.5.4 TD_StoreData . 21
5.4.5.5 TD_GetStorageValue . 22
ETSI
4 ETSI TS 103 457 V1.1.1 (2018-10)
5.6 Search capabilities . 22
5.6.1 Container search . 22
5.6.1.1 General . 22
5.6.1.2 TD_GetStorage . 23
5.6.1.3 TD_Search . 23
6 Encoding . 24
6.1 Message identifiers . 24
6.2 Type (TTLV) codes . 25
6.3 Tag (TTLV) codes . 25
6.4 Status Codes . 26
Annex A (informative): Use Cases . 28
A.1 Entropy request scenario . 28
A.1.1 Description . 28
A.1.2 Example . 28
A.2 Encrypted Virtual Machine use case (including LTD execution environment check) . 29
A.2.1 Description . 29
A.2.2 Example . 30
A.2.2.1 Introduction. 30
A.2.2.2 Successful case . 30
A.2.2.3 Failure case . 30
A.3 Secure archive use case . 30
A.3.1 Description . 30
A.3.2 Example . 31
A.4 Secure query use case . 32
A.4.1 Description . 32
A.4.2 Example . 33
A.5 Secure Storage use case . 33
A.5.1 Description . 33
A.5.2 Example . 34
A.6 Authentication use case . 35
A.6.1 Description . 35
A.6.2 Example . 35
A.7 Lawful intercept use case . 36
A.7.1 Description . 36
A.7.2 Example . 36
A.8 NFV sec use case . 37
A.8.1 Description . 37
A.8.2 Example . 38
Annex B (informative): Guidelines . 39
B.1 Implementation guidelines . 39
B.1.1 Global architecture . 39
B.1.2 Connection management . 39
B.1.3 Predefined Container-id and Object-id . 39
B.2 Good practice . 39
B.3 TTLV encoding examples . 40
B.3.1 GetRandom. 40
B.3.2 StoreData . 40
Annex C (informative): Bibliography . 41
History . 42

ETSI
5 ETSI TS 103 457 V1.1.1 (2018-10)
Intellectual Property Rights
Essential patents
IPRs essential or potentially essential to normative deliverables may have been declared to ETSI. The information
pertaining to these essential IPRs, if any, is publicly available for ETSI members and non-members, and can be found
in ETSI SR 000 314: "Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs); Essential, or potentially Essential, IPRs notified to ETSI in
respect of ETSI standards", which is available from the ETSI Secretariat. Latest updates are available on the ETSI Web
server (https://ipr.etsi.org/).
Pursuant to the ETSI IPR Policy, no investigation, including IPR searches, has been carried out by ETSI. No guarantee
can be given as to the existence of other IPRs not referenced in ETSI SR 000 314 (or the updates on the ETSI Web
server) which are, or may be, or may become, essential to the present document.
Trademarks
The present document may include trademarks and/or tradenames which are asserted and/or registered by their owners.
ETSI claims no ownership of these except for any which are indicated as being the property of ETSI, and conveys no
right to use or reproduce any trademark and/or tradename. Mention of those trademarks in the present document does
not constitute an endorsement by ETSI of products, services or organizations associated with those trademarks.
Foreword
This Technical Specification (TS) has been produced by ETSI Technical Committee Cyber Security (CYBER).
Modal verbs terminology
In the present document "shall", "shall not", "should", "should not", "may", "need not", "will", "will not", "can" and
"cannot" are to be interpreted as described in clause 3.2 of the ETSI Drafting Rules (Verbal forms for the expression of
provisions).
"must" and "must not" are NOT allowed in ETSI deliverables except when used in direct citation.
Introduction
Deploying hosted sensitive functions in modern virtualized IT infrastructure is still a concern and a major issue.
The main threats are malicious administrators operating the IT infrastructure including: network, storage and host
platform facilities and virtualization management. These threats and related issues are thoroughly discussed in ETSI
TR 103 308 [i.1].
ETSI specification group NFV SEC is in charge of defining a secured standard architecture. Proprietary solutions
providing trusted security for virtualized environments have started emerging.
These new envisioned architectures add security components at the hosting platform level and into centralized services
in charge of security management. The key concept is Hardware Root of Trust to get strong guarantees on the integrity
of the deployed elements. These architectures offer secured managed infrastructures that enable deployment, live
migration of encrypted VMs.
In addition to these works, the present document proposes a new interoperable interface that should help building
sensitive services with trust.
This interface applies in the setting where two trust domains (see ETSI GS NFV-SEC 013 [i.4] for details) are defined:
• The More Trusted Domain (MTD) contains resources (network, storage, processing) where sensitive functions
can be offloaded.
ETSI
6 ETSI TS 103 457 V1.1.1 (2018-10)
• The Less Trusted Domain (LTD) contains resources that can be managed without the risk of compromising
sensitive information, since these functionalities are offloaded to the MTD.
This Trusted Cross-Domain interface includes a set of basic functions called by the LTD entity but performed securely
within the MTD. This set of basic functions enables the LTD entity to build more complex services.

ETSI
7 ETSI TS 103 457 V1.1.1 (2018-10)
1 Scope
The present document specifies a high-level service-oriented interface, as an application layer with a set of mandatory
functions, to access secured services provided by, and executed in a More Trusted Domain. The transport layer is out of
scope and left to the architecture implementation.
This interface is not considered as a replacement of the already existing technologies (such as PKCS#11, KMIP, etc.)
but rather operating on top of these.
2 References
2.1 Normative references
References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or
non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the
referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at
https://docbox.etsi.org/Reference.
NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee
their long-term validity.
Not applicable.
2.2 Informative references
References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or
non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the
referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee
their long-term validity.
The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the
user with regard to a particular subject area.
[i.1] ETSI TR 103 308: "CYBER; Security baseline regarding LI and RD for NFV and related
platforms".
[i.2] ETSI GR NFV-SEC 011: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); Security; Report on NFV LI
Architecture".
[i.3] Wikipedia definition of Type-Length-Value.
[i.4] ETSI GS NFV-SEC 013: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV) Release 3; Security ; Security
Management and Monitoring specification".
3 Definition of terms and abbreviations
3.1 Terms
For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply:
domain: set of domain services
ETSI
8 ETSI TS 103 457 V1.1.1 (2018-10)
trusted cross domain interface: domain service with a set of dedicated domain interface functions for communication
between domain services of different domains (inter-domain communication)
trusted cross domain interface function: function of a domain interface which is implemented by a domain service of
another domain in order to realize inter-domain communication
trusted cross domain object: data generated by a domain service
trusted cross domain service: service with a set of dedicated domain service functions for communication with other
domain services of the same domain (intra-domain communication)
trusted cross domain service function: function of a domain service which is implemented by the same or another
domain service in order to realize intra-domain communication
trusted cross secured domain interface: domain interface offering access to secured domain services
3.2 Abbreviations
For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply:
AC Access Control
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CN Common Name
FW FireWall
HSM Hardware Security Module
IT Information Technology
KMIP Key Management Interoperability Protocol
LI Lawful Interception
LTD Less Trusted Domain
MF Mediation Function
MTD More Trusted Domain
NFV Network Function Virtualization
PNRG Pseudorandom Number Generator
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
SEC Security
TCDI Trusted Cross-Domain Interface
TCF Triggering Control Function
TCO Trusted COntext
TLS Transport Layer Security
TPM Trusted Platform Module
TTLV Tag-Type-Length-Value encoding
VM Virtual Machine
VMM Virtual Machine Manager
vPOI virtual Point Of Interception
4 General
4.1 TCDI functional requirements
TCDI provides services to the application layer. MTD implements, exposes and delivers the required services.
TCDI provides the following high-level services:
• Key Management: TCDI allows symmetric and asymmetric keys to be requested and received.
• Cryptographic operations: TCDI allows basic cryptographic operation to be performed in the MTD.
EXAMPLE: Random number generator.
ETSI
9 ETSI TS 103 457 V1.1.1 (2018-10)
• File/Database/Storage access: TCDI provides services to append, push and store sensitive data in containers
such as files or database.
TCDI shall allow the use of sensitive objects in several functions without regeneration and compromise.
TCDI shall allow the sharing of MTD domain objects by LTD entities.
A LTD entity shall provide attestations on demand to the MTD, and the MTD shall verify those attestations to ensure
the trust relation between the domains.
TCDI shall allow cascading the execution of domain service functions of the LTD on domain objects of the MTD
within a single session.
4.2 TCDI life cycle
4.2.1 Life cycle Diagram
The interface allows a LTD entity to establish a trusted connection to a server in the MTD to execute sensitive
operations and compose results within a TCO guaranteed by the MTD server (illustrated in figure 1). Only one
connection per LTD entity shall be accepted.

Figure 1: Interface Life Cycle
4.2.2 Connection between LTD and MTD
The use of TCDI is initiated by one LTD with the establishment of a connection to one MTD service. The MTD may
close the connection after some period of inactivity (see Good Practice section for recommendations).
The MTD shall support two modes of operation depending on the LTD trust level:
• Trusted mode enables the MTD to verify that the LTD is running in an authorized environment (see Good
Practice section for recommendations).
• Untrusted hardware mode enables the use of TCDI when the LTD does not have access to a TPM.
The MTD shall have a database of authorized RSA key pairs and the LTD shall be able to sign data as a TPM would.
ETSI
10 ETSI TS 103 457 V1.1.1 (2018-10)
MTD is responsible for granting the appropriate level of services available to a LTD connection depending on the trust
level and the requested LTD-Role. MTD shall deny connections if the requested LTD-Role does not match the trust
level.
MTD shall accept only one connection per LTD, and simultaneous connections from multiple LTD. New connections to
the MTD shall get rejected if the supported limit of simultaneous connections is reached.
4.2.3 Session
A session describes a set of transactions between the LTD and MTD for which an ephemeral TCO is created to secure
all the sensitive data generated or managed, either simple objects or containers.
The MTD generates and associates a unique identifier to sensitive data and guarantees their unicity:
• Session-Id to each session.
• Object-Id to each object.
• Container-Id to each container.
Session creation within an existing session returns an error.

Figure 2: Session based calls to sensitive functions
4.2.4 Keep the trusted connection between the LTD and the MTD
Depending on the deployment scenario, the MTD may have different requirements for the acceptable interval between
re-attestations. The MTD may take different actions depending on the attestation state of the LTD.
EXAMPLE: The MTD can give access to certain resources only when certain pre-conditions are met by an
LTD attestation.
The LTD manages its connection's lifetime by renewing the trust connection.
Upon expired connection, the MTD terminates the current session with the LTD entity.
If the MTD ends a session and connection because of expired connection's lifetime, the LTD shall set up a new
connection and a new session to re-start the delegation of sensitive functions.
ETSI
11 ETSI TS 103 457 V1.1.1 (2018-10)

Figure 3: Attestation Check Success

Figure 4: Attestation Check Failure
4.2.5 Releasing and erasing
When a LTD entity has finished offloading SFs or decides to request the erasing of the trusted context, the LTD entity
may close the current session.
The MTD shall securely erase the trusted context of the session upon closure initiated by the LTD entity or when the
connection's lifetime expires.
ETSI
12 ETSI TS 103 457 V1.1.1 (2018-10)
5 Interface Elementary Functions
5.1 General provisions
Elementary functions are achieved using simple communication command/response pattern where the MTD executes
and returns response on the solicitation of the LTD entity.
Responses have the form of an optional result data value or a reference Object-id to that value and a status error code of
the operation.
Every function runs inside a TCO initiated by a session.
Each function waits a synchronous response; therefore, functions shall be called sequentially.
Results may be void in the response message in case of error.
Protocol messages are composed of a one-byte message identifier, followed by a sequence of TTLV encoded
parameters.
As described in [i.3], variable length typed element of information is binary encoded into 4 concatenated parts:
• Tag, 1 byte, used as a symbolic type for the element.
• Type, 2 bytes, used as the practical type of encoding.
• Length, 4 bytes.
• Value, variable sized information.
Several literal types, such as integer, Unicode or binary string, or symbolic constant are used for simple information.
Some composed types such as DBKeyValue pairs are used for more structured information.
The complete list of Message identifiers is defined in clause 6.1. The list of Tags and Types for TTLV is defined in
clauses 6.2 and 6.3.
For each message command and response defined in clauses 5.2 to 5.6, message parameters are defined in tables. In the
column "status" the abbreviations have the following meaning:
M: Mandatory.
The parameter shall be present.
R: Recommended.
The parameter should be present.
O: Optional.
The parameter may be present.
C: Conditional.
The parameter shall be present when the defined conditions are met.
The description of and common provisions for message parameters are defined in clauses 6.3 and 6.4.
5.2 Connection and session management
5.2.1 General
The MTD is responsible of storing a configuration of database type for LTD entities based on their LTD-Role. A
Container-Id reference to the configuration of the MTD is returned at connection opening. The configuration shall be
read-only.
ETSI
13 ETSI TS 103 457 V1.1.1 (2018-10)
5.2.2 TD_OpenConnection
TD_OpenConnection opens a connection between the LTD and the MTD.
TD_OpenConnection (LTD-Id, LTD-Role, CN, Nonce, DATA)
Returns a Container-Id and status code.
Table 1: TD_OpenConnection command
Command parameter Status Description and Requirements
LTD-Id M Identifier of the requesting entity.
LTD-Role M Role of the requesting entity.
CN M The certificate common name CN associated to a RSA TPM-Key used by LTD.
MTD shall verify that the LTD is running on an authorized hardware. The MTD shall
have a database of authorized TPM RSA key pairs.
Nonce M Nonce value computed upon connection by the MTD.
DATA M See clause 6.3.
MTD shall verify the signature to trust the LTD and accept the connection.

Table 2: TD_OpenConnection response
Command parameter Status Description and Requirements
Container-Id M Configuration container for the MTD.
Status code M It shall be one of these values:
• TDSC_SUCCESS
• TDSC_UNKNOWN_ROLE
• TDSC_TRUST_REFUSED
• TDSC_GENERAL_FAILURE
5.2.3 TD_CloseConnection
TD_CloseConnection closes the connection between the LTD and the MTD.
TD_CloseConnection ()
Returns a status code.
Table 3: TD_CloseConnection command
Command parameter Status Description and Requirements
none - -
Table 4: TD_CloseConnection response
Command parameter Status Description and Requirements
Status code M It shall be one of these values:
• TDSC_SUCCESS
• TDSC_GENERAL_FAILURE
5.2.4 TD_CreateSession
TD_CreateSession creates a session between the LTD and the MTD.
TD_CreateSession ()
Returns Session-Id and a status code.
ETSI
14 ETSI TS 103 457 V1.1.1 (2018-10)
Table 5: TD_CreateSession command
Command parameter Status Description and Requirements
none - -
Table 6: TD_CreateSession response
Command parameter Status Description and Requirements
Session-Id C See clause 6.3.
The MTD shall return a Session-Id when the command is
successful.
Status code M It shall be one of these values:
• TDSC_SUCCESS
• TDSC_SESSION_ID_ALREADY_OPENED
• TDSC_TOO_MANY_EXISTING_SESSIONS
• TDSC_TRUST_EXPIRED
• TDSC_GENERAL_FAILURE
5.2.5 TD_CloseSession
TD_CloseSession closes a session between the LTD and the MTD.
TD_CloseSession (Session-Id)
Returns a status code.
Table 7: TD_CloseSession command
Command parameter Status Description and Requirements
Session-Id M See clause 6.3
Table 8: TD_CloseSession response
Command parameter Status Description and Requirements
Status code M It shall be one of these values:
• TDSC_SUCCESS
• TDSC_UNKNOWN_SESSION_ID
• TDSC_ON_GOING_PROCESSES
TDSC_GENERAL_FAILURE
5.2.6 TD_TrustRenewal
TD_TrustRenewal is used to verify that the LTD entity execution context has not been modified. The MTD shall have a
database of authorized RSA Public keys indexed by CN reference measurements indexed to LTD-Role. The
provisioning of this CN is out of scope, and it is assumed that it is trustworthy.
It is used to regain trust form MTD after some time.
TD_TrustRenewal (Session-Id, CN, Nonce, DATA)
Returns a status code.
The MTD shall verify the attestation to accept continuing delivering services. In case of failed verification, the MTD
shall disconnect from the LTD.
ETSI
15 ETSI TS 103 457 V1.1.1 (2018-10)
Table 9: TD_TrustRenewal command
Command parameter Status Description and Requirements
Session-Id M See clause 6.3
CN M See clause 6.3
The MTD shall use CN to decrypt DATA
Nonce M Nonce value computed upon connection by the MTD
DATA M See clause 6.3
MTD shall verify the signature to accept to trust the LTD entity and
the connection
Table 10: TD_TrustRenewal response
Command parameter Status Description and Requirements
Status code M It shall be one of these values:
• TDSC_SUCCESS
• TDSC_UNKNOWN_SESSION_ID
• TDSC_ATTESTATION_FAILED
• TDSC_TRUST_EXPIRED
• TDSC_GENERAL_FAILURE
5.3 Data and value management
5.3.1 TD_CreateObject
TD_CreateObject returns the Object-Id that has been created.
TD_CreateObject (Session-Id)
Returns the Object-Id and a status code.
Table 11: TD_CreateObject command
Command parameter Status Description and Requirements
Session-Id M See clause 6.3
Table 12: TD_CreateObject response
Command parameter Status Description and Requirements
Object-Id M See clause 6.3
Status code M It shall be one of these values:
• TDSC_SUCCESS
• TDSC_UNKNOWN_SESSION_ID
• TDSC_TRUST_EXPIRED
• TDSC_OBJECT_CREATION_FAILED
• TDSC_GENERAL_FAILURE
5.3.2 TD_GetObjectValue
TD_GetObjectValue returns the value associated with an Object-Id.
TD_GetObjectValue (Session-Id, Object-Id)
Returns the object content/value referenced by Object-Id and a status code.
ETSI
16 ETSI TS 103 457 V1.1.1 (2018-10)
Table 13: TD_GetObjectValue command
Command parameter Status Description and Requirements
Session-Id M See clause 6.3
Object-Id M See clause 6.3
Table 14: TD_GetObjectValue response
Command parameter Status Description and Requirements
DATA C Value corresponding to the Object-Id if TDSC_SUCCESS
Status code M It shall be one of these values:
• TDSC_SUCCESS
• TDSC_UNKNOWN_SESSION_ID
• TDSC_UNKNOWN_OBJECT_ID
• TDSC_TRUST_EXPIRED
• TDSC_GENERAL_FAILURE
5.3.3 TD_PutObjectValue
TD_PutObjectValue modifies the value of the object referenced by Object-id in the MTD.
TD_PutObjectValue (Session-Id, Object-Id, DATA)
Returns a status code.
Table 15: TD_PutObjectValue command
Command parameter Status Description and Requirements
Session-Id M See clause 6.3
Object-Id M See clause 6.3
DATA M See clause 6.3
Table 16: TD_PutObjectValue response
Command parameter Status Description and Requirements
Status code M It shall be one of these values:
• TDSC_SUCCESS
• TDSC_UNKNOWN_SESSION_ID
• TDSC_UNKNOWN_OBJECT_ID
• TDSC_TRUST_EXPIRED
• TDSC_GENERAL_FAILURE
5.4 Transferring cryptographic functionality
5.4.1 Entropy request
5.4.1.1 General
Accessing a trusted source of entropy and random number generation is fundamental in cryptographic environment.
This interface delivers access to the MTD considered as a trusted and quality random source provider.
EXAMPLE: In cloud or NFV context, it enables the virtual machines to start with initialized RNG, avoiding
collisions, or it is used to establish TLS tunnels.
ETSI
17 ETSI TS 103 457 V1.1.1 (2018-10)
5.4.1.2 TD_GetRandom
TD_GetRandom allows the LTD to request a random number to the MTD.
TD_GetRandom (Session-Id, SizeInBytes)
Returns an Object-Id and a status code.
Table 17: TD_GetRandom command
Command parameter Status Description and Requirements
Session-Id M See clause 6.3
SizeInBytes M See clause 6.3
Table 18: TD_GetRandom response
Command parameter Status Description and Requirements
Object-Id C The MTD shall return an Object-Id when the command is successful.
The random content is a byte string stored in the MTD and addressable
by the returned Object-Id.
Status code M It shall be one of these values:
• TDSC_SUCCESS
• TDSC_UNKNOWN_SESSION_ID
• TDSC_TRUST_EXPIRED
• TDSC_GENERAL_FAILURE
5.4.2 Encryption keys request
5.4.2.1 General
A MTD provides long term key management and storage.
EXAMPLE: Some providers encrypt their VNF, and keys are dynamically delivered by a server in the MTD.
Thus, a VNF can be copied but not run without accessing the encryption key.
5.4.2.2 TD_GenerateEncryptionKey
TD_GenerateEncryptionKey requests the MTD to generate a key which will be used by the LTD.
TD_GenerateEncryptionKey (Session-Id, Key_Type)
Returns an Object-Id and a status code.
Table 19: TD_GenerateEncryptionKey command
Command parameter Status Description and Requirements
Session-Id M See clause 6.3
Key_Type M See clause 6.3
ETSI
18 ETSI TS 103 457 V1.1.1 (2018-10)
Table 20: TD_GenerateEncryptionKey response
Command parameter Status Description and Requirements
Object-Id C The MTD shall return an Object-Id when the command is
successful.
Status code M It shall be one of these values:
• TDSC_SUCCESS
• TDSC_UNKNOWN_SESSION_ID
• TDSC_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE
• TDSC_KEY_SIZE_NOT_SUPPORTED
• TDSC_TRUST_EXPIRED
• TDSC_GENERAL_FAILURE
5.4.3 Trusted timestamping
5.4.3.1 General
Trusted time stamping enables all amenities to share the same trusted source of time.
5.4.3.2 TD_GetTrustedTimestamping
TD_GetTrustedTimestamping requests the MTD to timestamp some data.
TD_GetTrustedTimestamping (Session-Id, DATA)
Returns an Object-Id and a status code.
Table 21: TD_GetTrustedTimestamping command
Command parameter Status Description and Requirements
Session-Id M See clause 6.3
DATA M See clause 6.3
Table 22: TD_GetTrustedTimestamping response
Command parameter Status Description and Requirements
Object-Id C The MTD shall return the Object-Id associated with the trusted
timestamping when the command is successful.
Status code M It shall be one of these values:
• TDSC_SUCCESS
• TDSC_UNKNOWN_SESSION_ID
• TDSC_TRUST_EXPIRED
• TDSC_GENERAL_FAILURE
5.4.4 Secure archive
5.4.4.1 General
This interface enables data to be archived in the MTD. This is a write only service. Predefined Container-Id in the MTD
can be used as global containers across LTD. The MTD Container shall be identified by its Resource-Id.
EXAMPLE: In Cloud or NFV context, log files can be stored by default in the MTD.
ETSI
19 ETSI TS 103 457 V1.1.1 (2018-10)
5.4.4.2 TD_CreateArchive
TD_CreateArchive creates a container for archival purpose.
TD_CreateArchive shall only create a PERMANENT container. This container shall be preserved beyond the end of the
session (TD_CloseSession). TD_CreateArchive is a write only function. The LTD shall not be able to destroy this
archive. The LTD delegates the responsibility and the life cycle of the container to the MTD.
TD_CreateArchive (Session-Id, Container-Type)
Returns a Container-Id and a status code.
Table 23: TD_CreateArchive command
Command parameter Status Description and Requirements
Session-Id M See clause 6.3
Container-Type M See clause 6.3
Container-Type shall be PERMANENT_FILE or
PERMANENT_DATABASE
Table 24: TD_CreateArchive response
Command parameter Status Description and Requirements
Container-Id C The MTD shall return a Container-Id when the command is
successful.
Status code M It shall be one of these values:
• TDSC_SUCCESS
• TDSC_UNKNOWN_SESSION_ID
• TDSC_STORAGE_FULL
• TDSC_CONTAINER_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED
• TDSC_TRUST_EXPIRED
• TDSC_GENERAL_FAILURE
5.4.4.3 TD_Archive
TD_Archive writes data to the Container-Id. TD_Archive is a write-only function. TD_CreateArchive shall be executed
prior to call this func
...