ETSI TS 133 511 V17.3.1 (2023-02)

5G; Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the next generation Node B (gNodeB) network product class (3GPP TS 33.511 version 17.3.1 Release 17)

RTS/TSGS-0333511vh31

General Information

• Status: Not Published
• Technical Committee: 3GPP SA 3 - Security
• Current Stage: 12 - Citation in the OJ (auto-insert)
• Completion Date: 22-Feb-2023

Standards Content (Sample)

ETSI TS 133 511 V17.3.1 (2023-02)






TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION
5G;
Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the next
generation Node B (gNodeB) network product class
(3GPP TS 33.511 version 17.3.1 Release 17)

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3GPP TS 33.511 version 17.3.1 Release 17 1 ETSI TS 133 511 V17.3.1 (2023-02)

Reference
RTS/TSGS-0333511vh31
Keywords
5G,SECURITY
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ETSI

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3GPP TS 33.511 version 17.3.1 Release 17 2 ETSI TS 133 511 V17.3.1 (2023-02)
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ETSI

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3GPP TS 33.511 version 17.3.1 Release 17 3 ETSI TS 133 511 V17.3.1 (2023-02)
Contents
Intellectual Property Rights . 2
Legal Notice . 2
Modal verbs terminology . 2
Foreword . 5
1 Scope . 6
2 References . 6
3 Definitions of terms and abbreviations. 6
3.1 Terms . 6
3.2 Abbreviations . 6
4 gNodeB-specific security requirements and related test cases . 7
4.1 Introduction . 7
4.2 gNodeB-specific security functional adaptations of requirements and related test cases . 7
4.2.1 Introduction. 7
4.2.2 Security functional requirements on the gNodeB deriving from 3GPP specifications and related test
cases . 7
4.2.2.1 Security functional requirements on the gNodeB deriving from 3GPP specifications – TS 33.501
[2] . 7
4.2.2.1.1 Integrity protection of RRC-signalling . 7
4.2.2.1.2 Integrity protection of user data between the UE and the gNB . 8
4.2.2.1.3 VOID . 8
4.2.2.1.4 RRC integrity check failure . 8
4.2.2.1.5 UP integrity check failure . 9
4.2.2.1.6 Ciphering of RRC-signalling . 10
4.2.2.1.7 Ciphering of user data between the UE and the gNB . 10
4.2.2.1.8 Replay protection of user data between the UE and the gNB . 11
4.2.2.1.9 Replay protection of RRC-signalling . 12
4.2.2.1.10 Ciphering of user data based on the security policy sent by the SMF . 12
4.2.2.1.11 Integrity of user data based on the security policy sent by the SMF . 13
4.2.2.1.12 AS algorithms selection . 14
4.2.2.1.13 Key refresh at the gNB . 15
4.2.2.1.14 Bidding down prevention in Xn-handovers . 16
4.2.2.1.15 AS protection algorithm selection in gNB change . 16
4.2.2.1.16 Control plane data confidentiality protection over N2/Xn interface . 17
4.2.2.1.17 Control plane data integrity protection over N2/Xn interface . 17
4.2.2.1.18 Key update at the gNB on dual connectivity . 18
4.2.2.1.19 UP security activation in Inactive scenario. 19
4.2.3 Technical Baseline . 20
4.2.3.1 Introduction . 20
4.2.3.2 Protecting data and information. 20
4.2.3.2.1 Protecting data and information – general . 20
4.2.3.2.2 Protecting data and information – unauthorized viewing . 20
4.2.3.2.3 Protecting data and information in storage . 20
4.2.3.2.4 Protecting data and information in transfer . 20
4.2.3.2.5 Logging access to personal data . 20
4.2.3.3 Protecting availability and integrity . 20
4.2.3.4 Authentication and authorization . 20
4.2.3.4.1 Authentication attributes. 20
4.2.3.5 Protecting sessions . 21
4.2.3.6 Logging . 21
4.2.4 Operating systems . 21
4.2.5 Web servers . 21
4.2.6 Network devices . 21
4.2.6.1 Protection of data and information . 21
4.2.6.2 Protecting availability and integrity . 21
ETSI

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3GPP TS 33.511 version 17.3.1 Release 17 4 ETSI TS 133 511 V17.3.1 (2023-02)
4.2.6.2.1 Packet filtering. 21
4.2.6.2.2 Interface robustness requirements . 21
4.2.6.2.3 GTP-C Filtering . 21
4.2.6.2.4 GTP-U Filtering. 21
4.2.7 Void . 21
4.3 gNodeB-specific adaptations of hardening requirements and related test cases. . 21
4.3.1 Introduction. 22
4.3.2 Technical Baseline . 22
4.3.3 Operating Systems . 22
4.3.4 Web Servers . 22
4.3.5 Network Devices . 22
4.3.6 Network Functions in service-based architecture . 22
4.4 gNodeB-specific adaptations of basic vulnerability testing requirements and related test cases . 22
Annex A (informative): Change history . 23
History . 24

ETSI

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3GPP TS 33.511 version 17.3.1 Release 17 5 ETSI TS 133 511 V17.3.1 (2023-02)
Foreword
This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).
The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal
TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an
identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows:
Version x.y.z
where:
x the first digit:
1 presented to TSG for information;
2 presented to TSG for approval;
3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control.
y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections,
updates, etc.
z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document.

ETSI

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3GPP TS 33.511 version 17.3.1 Release 17 6 ETSI TS 133 511 V17.3.1 (2023-02)
1 Scope
The present document contains objectives, requirements and test cases that are specific to the gNB network product
class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the
requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the gNB network
product class.
2 References
The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present
document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or
non-specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including
a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same
Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2] 3GPP TS 33.501 (Release 15): "Security architecture and procedures for 5G system".
[3] 3GPP TS 33.117: "Catalogue of general security assurance requirements".
[4] Void
[5] 3GPP TR 33.926: "Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats and critical assets in 3GPP
network product classes".
[6] 3GPP TS 38.331: "NR; Radio Resource Control (RRC) protocol specification".
3 Definitions of terms and abbreviations
3.1 Terms
For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term
defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
3.2 Abbreviations
For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An
abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in
3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
5GC 5G Core Network
AMF Access and Mobility Management Function
gNB NR Node B
NG Next Generation
NG-RAN 5G Radio Access Network
SMF Session Management Function
ETSI

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3GPP TS 33.511 version 17.3.1 Release 17 7 ETSI TS 133 511 V17.3.1 (2023-02)
4 gNodeB-specific security requirements and related
test cases
4.1 Introduction
gNB specific security requirements include both requirements derived from gNB-specific security functional
requirements as well as security requirements derived from threats specific to gNB as described in TR 33.926 [5].
Generic security requirements and test cases common to other network product classes have been captured in TS 33.117
[3] and are not repeated in the present document.
4.2 gNodeB-specific security functional adaptations of
requirements and related test cases
4.2.1 Introduction
Present clause contains gNB-specific security functional adaptations of requirements and related test cases.
4.2.2 Security functional requirements on the gNodeB deriving from 3GPP
specifications and related test cases
4.2.2.1 Security functional requirements on the gNodeB deriving from 3GPP
specifications – TS 33.501 [2]
4.2.2.1.1 Integrity protection of RRC-signalling
Requirement Name: Integrity protection of RRC-signalling
Requirement Reference: TS 33.501 [2], clause 5.3.3
Requirement Description: "The gNB shall support integrity protection of RRC-signalling over the NG RAN air
interface" as specified in TS 33.501 [2], clause 5.3.3.
Threat References: TR 33.926 [5], clause D.2.2.2 – Control plane data integrity protection.
Test Case:
Test Name: TC_CP_DATA_INT_RRC-SIGN_gNB
Purpose: To verify that the RRC-signalling data sent between UE and gNB over the NG RAN air interface are integrity
protected.
Pre-Condition:
- The gNB network product shall be connected in emulated/real network environments. UE may be simulated.
- Tester shall have access to the integrity algorithm and the integrity protection keys.
- The tester can capture the message via the NG RAN air interface, or can capture the message at the UE.
Execution Steps:
1. The NIA0 is disabled at UE and gNB.
2. gNB sends AS SMC message to the UE, and UE responses AS SMP.
3. Check any RRC message sent by gNB after sending AS SMC and before UE enters CM-Idle state is integrity
protected.
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3GPP TS 33.511 version 17.3.1 Release 17 8 ETSI TS 133 511 V17.3.1 (2023-02)
Expected Results:
Any RRC-signalling over the NG RAN air interface is integrity protected after gNB sending AS SMC.
Expected format of evidence:
Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g. Screenshot containing the operational results.
4.2.2.1.2 Integrity protection of user data between the UE and the gNB
Requirement Name: Integrity protection of user data between the UE and the gNB.
Requirement Reference: TS 33.501 [2], clause 5.3.3
Requirement Description: "The gNB shall support integrity protection of user data packets over the NG RAN air
interface" as specified in TS 33.501 [2], clause 5.3.3.
NOTE: This requirement does not apply to the gNB that is used as a secondary node connecting to the EPC.
Threat References: TR 33.926 [5], clause D.2.2.4 – User plane data integrity protection.
Test Case:
Test Name: TC-UP-DATA-INT_gNB
Purpose: To verify that the user data packets are integrity protected over the NG RAN air interface.
Pre-Condition:
- The gNB network product shall be connected in emulated/real network environments. UE may be simulated.
- Tester shall enable the user plane integrity protection and ensure NIA0 is not used.
- Tester shall have knowledge of integrity algorithm and integrity protection keys.
- The tester can capture the message via the NG RAN air interface, or can capture the message at the UE.
Execution Steps:
1. The NIA0 is disabled at UE and gNB.
2. gNB sends RRCConnectionReconfiguration with integrity protection indication "on".
3. Check any User data sent by gNB after sending RRCConnectionReconfiguration and before UE enters CM-Idle
state is Integrity protected.
Expected Results:
Any user plane packets sent between UE and gNB over the NG RAN air interface after gNB sending
RRCConnectionReconfiguration is integrity protected.
Expected format of evidence:
Evidence suitable for the interface e.g. Screenshot containing the operational results.
4.2.2.1.3 VOID
4.2.2.1.4 RRC integrity check failure
Requirement Name: RRC integrity check failure
Requirement Reference: TS 33.501 [2], clause 6.5.1
Requirement Description: "The RRC integrity checks shall be performed both in the ME and the gNB. In case failed
integrity check (i.e. faulty or missing MAC-I) is detected after the start of integrity protection, the concerned message
shall be discarded. This can happen on the gNB side or on the ME side." as specified in TS 33.501 [2], clause 6.5.1.
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3GPP TS 33.511 version 17.3.1 Release 17 9 ETSI TS 133 511 V17.3.1 (2023-02)
Threat References: TR 33.926 [5], clause D.2.2.2, Control plane data integrity protection
Test Case:
Test Name: TC-CP-DATA-RRC-INT-CHECK_gNB
Purpose:
Verify that RRC integrity check failure is handled correctly by the gNB.
Pre-Conditions:
Test environment with a UE. The UE may be simulated. RRC integrity protection is activated at the gNB.
Execution Steps
1a) The UE sends a RRC message to the gNB without MAC-I; or
1b) The UE sends a RRC message to the gNB with a wrong MAC-I.
2b) The gNB verifies the integrity of the RRC message from the UE.
Expected Results:
The RRC message is discarded by the gNB after step 1a) or after step 2b).
Expected format of evidence:
Sample copies of the log files.
4.2.2.1.5 UP integrity check failure
Requirement Name: UP integrity check failure
Requirement Reference: TS 33.501 [2], clause 6.6.4
Requirement Description: "If the gNB or the UE receives a PDCP PDU which fails integrity check with faulty or
missing MAC-I after the start of integrity protection, the PDU shall be discarded." as specified in TS 33.501 [2],
clause 6.6.4.
Threat References: TR 33.926 [5], clause D.2.2.4, User plane data integrity protection
Test Case:
Purpose:
Verify that UP integrity check failure is handled correctly by the gNB.
Pre-Conditions:
Test environment with a UE. The UE may be simulated. UP integrity protection is activated at the gNB.
Execution Steps
1a) The UE sends a PDCP PDU to the gNB without MAC-I; or
1b) The UE sends a PDCP PDU to the gNB with a wrong MAC-I.
2b) The gNB verifies the integrity of the PDCP PDU from the UE.
Expected Results:
The PDCP PDU is discarded by the gNB after step 1a) or after step 2b).
Expected format of evidence:
Evidence suitable for the interface e.g. Screenshot containing the operational results.
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3GPP TS 33.511 version 17.3.1 Release 17 10 ETSI TS 133 511 V17.3.1 (2023-02)
4.2.2.1.6 Ciphering of RRC-signalling
Requirement Name: Ciphering of RRC-signalling
Requirement Reference: TS 33.501 [2], clause 5.3.2
Requirement Description: "The gNB shall support ciphering of RRC-signalling over the NG RAN air interface" as
specified in TS 33.501 [2], clause 5.3.2.
Threat References: TR 33.926 [5], clause D.2.2.1 – Control plane data confidentiality protection.
Test Case:
Test Name: TC-CP-DATA-CIP-RRC-SIGN_gNB
Purpose: To verify that the RRC-signalling data sent between UE and gNB over the NG RAN air interface are
confidentiality protected.
Pre-Condition:
- The gNB network product shall be connected in emulated/real network environments. The UE may be simulated.
- The tester shall have access to the NG RAN air interface or can capture the message at the UE.
Execution Steps:
1. The UE sends a Registraton Request to the AMF.
2. The AMF sends a KgNB and the UE security capability to the gNB.
3. The gNB selects an algorithm and sends AS SMC to the UE.
4. The gNB receive AS SMP from the UE.Expected Results:
Control plane packets sent to the UE after the gNB sends AS SMC is ciphered.
Expected format of evidence:
Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g. Screenshot containing the operational results.
4.2.2.1.7 Ciphering of user data between the UE and the gNB
Requirement Name: Ciphering of user data between the UE and the gNB
Requirement Reference: TS 33.501 [2], clause 5.3.2
Requirement Description: "The gNB shall provide ciphering of user data packets between the UE and the gNB on NG
RAN air interface" as specified in TS 33.501 [2], clause 5.3.2.
Threat References: TR 33.926 [5], clause D.2.2.3 – User plane data confidentiality protection at gNB
Test Case:
Test Name: TC-UP-DATA-CIP_gNB
Purpose: To verify that the user data packets are confidentiality protected over the NG RAN air interface.
Pre-Condition:
- The gNB network product shall be connected in emulated/real network environments. The UE may be simulated.
- The tester shall have access to the NG RAN air interface or can capture the message at the UE.
Execution Steps:
1. The UE sends PDU session establishment Request to the SMF.
2. The SMF sends a UP security policy with UP ciphering required or preferred to the gNB.
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3GPP TS 33.511 version 17.3.1 Release 17 11 ETSI TS 133 511 V17.3.1 (2023-02)
3. The gNB sends RRCConnectionReconfiguration with ciphering protection indication "on".
4. Check any user data sent by the gNB after sending RRCConnectionReconfiguration and before the UE enters into
CM-Idle state.
...