ETSI GS NFV-SEC 025 V1.1.1 (2026-04)

Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV) ; Security; Secure End-to-End VNF and NS management specification

DGS/NFV-SEC025

General Information

• Status: Not Published
• Technical Committee: NFV SEC - Security
• Current Stage: 12 - Completion
• Due Date: 30-May-2026
• Completion Date: 29-Apr-2026

Standards Content (Sample)

GROUP SPECIFICATION
Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV);
Security;
Secure End-to-End VNF and NS management specification
Disclaimer
The present document has been produced and approved by the Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV) ETSI Industry
Specification Group (ISG) and represents the views of those members who participated in this ISG.
It does not necessarily represent the views of the entire ETSI membership.

2 ETSI GS NFV-SEC 025 V1.1.1 (2026-04)

Reference
DGS/NFV-SEC025
Keywords
access control, cybersecurity, NFV, NFVI, security,
trust
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3 ETSI GS NFV-SEC 025 V1.1.1 (2026-04)
Contents
Intellectual Property Rights . 5
Foreword . 5
Modal verbs terminology . 5
Executive summary . 5
1 Scope . 6
2 References . 6
2.1 Normative references . 6
2.2 Informative references . 7
3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations . 8
3.1 Terms . 8
3.2 Symbols . 8
3.3 Abbreviations . 8
4 Threat analysis for VNF/NS during their lifecycle . 10
4.1 Introduction . 10
4.2 Assets . 10
4.2.1 NS Assets . 10
4.2.2 VNF Assets . 11
4.3 Threat agents . 12
4.4 Threats . 14
4.4.1 Introduction. 14
4.4.2 VNF/NS on-boarding . 15
4.4.3 VNF in sta ntiatio n . 17
4.4.4 VNF configuration . 19
4.4.5 VNF during run-time . 20
4.4.6 VNF termination . 24
4.4.7 Generic Threats . 25
5 VNF/NS On-boarding . 25
5.1 Security requirements and capabilities in VNFD . 25
5.1.1 NFVI Security capabilities . 25
5.1.2 Affinity and anti-affinity rules . 26
5.1.3 Secure computing policies for containers in VNFD . 27
5.2 Security requirements and capabilities in NSD . 27
5.2.1 Affinity and anti-affinity rules . 27
5.3 Protection of VNF/NS packages and catalogues . 28
5.3.1 Mitigations map . 28
5.3.2 Requirements . 28
5.3.2.1 VNF Package . 28
5.3.2.2 NS Package . 30
5.3.2.3 VNF/NS Catalogues . 31
5.4 API Protection . 32
5.4.1 Mitigations map . 32
5.4.2 Requirements . 32
5.4.2.1 Introduction . 32
5.4.2.2 Os-Ma-Nfvo . 32
5.4.2.3 Registration . 33
5.4.2.4 API authorization server . 33
6 VNF Instantiation . 35
6.1 Mitigations map . 35
6.2 Protection of VNF images . 37
6.2.1 Description . 37
6.2.2 VNF images repository protection requirements . 38
6.2.3 Workload protection in VM or container requirements . 40
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4 ETSI GS NFV-SEC 025 V1.1.1 (2026-04)
6.3 Generation of VNF/VNFC instance Identity document . 40
6.3.1 Description . 40
6.3.2 Identifier generation and registration of attestation policies . 42
6.3.2.1 Identifier generation . 42
6.3.2.2 Registration of attestation policies . 43
6.3.3 Attestation of VNFI/VNFCI . 43
6.3.4 Generation of VNFI/VNFCI key-pair . 43
6.3.5 Generation of VNFI/VNFCI identity document . 43
6.3.6 Requirements . 44
6.3.6.1 Requirements for attestation. 44
6.3.6.2 Requirements for VNFI/VNFCI key pair generation . 44
6.3.6.3 Requirements for VNFI/VNFCI identity document generation . 44
6.4 Remote Attestation of NFVI . 46
6.5 Memory Allocation . 46
7 VNF Configuration . 47
7.1 Injection of key-pair . 47
7.2 Configuration of sensitive parameters . 48
8 VNF during run-time . 49
8.1 Remote attestation during run-time . 49
8.2 Protection of VNF instance data . 49
8.3 Scalability of VNF instances pinned by hardware . 50
8.4 Mobility of VNF instances pinned by hardware . 51
9 VNF termination . 51
9.1 Memory clean-up . 51
Annex (informative): Change history . 53
History . 54

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5 ETSI GS NFV-SEC 025 V1.1.1 (2026-04)
Intellectual Property Rights
Essential patents
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Foreword
This Group Specification (GS) has been produced by ETSI Industry Specification Group (ISG) Network Functions
Virtualisation (NFV).
Modal verbs terminology
In the present document "shall", "shall not", "should", "should not", "may", "need not", "will", "will not", "can" and
"cannot" are to be interpreted as described in clause 3.2 of the ETSI Drafting Rules (Verbal forms for the expression of
provisions).
"must" and "must not" are NOT allowed in ETSI deliverables except when used in direct citation.
Executive summary
The present document defines detailed security requirements and capabilities to enable secure end-to-end management
of Virtualized Network Functions (VNFs) and Network Services (NS). It includes provisions for attestation of the NFV
system, secure configuration, mobility and scalability of VNFs, considering multi-tenant environments, and supports
both VM and container-based architectures to ensure robust security throughout the NFV lifecycle.

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6 ETSI GS NFV-SEC 025 V1.1.1 (2026-04)
1 Scope
The present document defines the capabilities to enable a secure End-to-End management of VNF and NS, starting
from the VNF/NS on-boarding, instantiation and configuration, mobility scalability during the run time and termination
of VNF/NS.
For this aim, the present document includes in particular:
• Detail security requirements and capabilities that are candidates for the enhancement of the NSD and VNFD.
• Definition of the attestation for the entire NFV system (including the multi-tenant case) and the VNF use of
attestation to assess the security level and capability of the NFVI platform and NFV-MANO.
• Mobility and scalability of VNFs that are pinned by hardware (e.g. HMEE, HSM).
• The secure configuration of VNFs, including the key pair injection.
• Memory allocation for sensitive VNFs.
Both VM and OS container architectures will be considered.
2 References
2.1 Normative references
References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or
non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the
referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found in the
ETSI docbox.
NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee
their long-term validity.
The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document.
[1] ETSI GS NFV-IFA 005: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV) Release 4; Management and
Orchestration; Or-Vi reference point - Interface and Information Model Specification".
[2] ETSI GS NFV-IFA 006: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV) Release 4; Management and
Orchestration; Vi-Vnfm reference point - Interface and Information Model Specification".
[3] ETSI GS NFV-IFA 007: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV) Release 4; Management and
Orchestration; Or-Vnfm reference point - Interface and Information Model Specification".
[4] ETSI GS NFV-IFA 008: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV) Release 4; Management and
Orchestration; Ve-Vnfm reference point - Interface and Information Model Specification".
[5] ETSI GS NFV-IFA 013: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV) Release 4; Management and
Orchestration; Os-Ma-Nfvo reference point - Interface and Information Model Specification".
[6] ETSI GS NFV-IFA 010: " Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV) Release 4; Management and
Orchestration; Functional requirements specification".
[7] ETSI GS NFV-SOL 013: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV) Release 4; Protocols and Data
Models; Specification of common aspects for RESTful NFV MANO APIs".
[8] IETF RFC 6749: "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework".
[9] ETSI GS NFV-SEC 022: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV) Release 4; Security; Access
Token Specification for API Access".
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7 ETSI GS NFV-SEC 025 V1.1.1 (2026-04)
[10] ETSI GS NFV-SEC 023: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV) Release 5; Security; Container
Security Specification".
[11] OASIS KMIP SPEC: "Key Management Interoperability Protocol Specification Version 2.1".
[12] ETSI GS NFV-SEC 020: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); Security; Identity
Management and Security Specification".
[13] ETSI GS NFV-SEC 024: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV) Security; Security
Management Specification".
[14] OASIS PKCS #11 SPEC: "Cryptographic Token Interface Base Specification" Version 3.1.
[15] IETF RFC 3986: "Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax".
[16] ISO/IEC 27001:2022: "Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — Information
security management systems — Requirements".
[17] NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: "Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and
Organizations".
[18] IETF RFC 5280: "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation
List (CRL) Profile".
[19] IETF RFC 9711 "The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)".
[20] ETSI GS NFV-SEC 026: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV) Release 5; Security; Isolation
and trust domain specification".
2.2 Informative references
References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or
non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the
referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee
their long-term validity.
The following referenced documents may be useful in implementing an ETSI deliverable or add to the reader's
understanding, but are not required for conformance to the present document.
[i.1] ETSI TS 102 165-1: "Cyber Security (CYBER); Methods and protocols; Part 1: Method and pro
forma for Threat, Vulnerability, Risk Analysis (TVRA)".
[i.2] ETSI GS NFV-SEC 006: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); Security Guide; Report on
Security Aspects and Regulatory Concerns".
[i.3] "ENISA Threat Landscape for 5G Networks: Threat assessment for the fifth generation of mobile
telecommunications networks (5G)", November 2019.
[i.4] NIST SP 800-125: "Guide to Security for Full Virtualization Technologies", January 2011.
[i.5] NIST SP 800-125A Rev1: "Security Recommendations for Server-based Hypervisor Platforms",
June 2018.
[i.6] NIST SP 800-125B: "Secure Virtual Network Configuration for Virtual Machine (VM)
Protection", March 2016.
[i.7] Fraunhofer AISEC report: "Threat analysis of container-as-a-service for network function
virtualization", November 2017.
[i.8] 5G Americas: "The Evolution of Security in 5G: A "slice" of Mobile Threats", July 2019.
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8 ETSI GS NFV-SEC 025 V1.1.1 (2026-04)
[i.9] ETSI NFV FVI Platform Capability Registry.
[i.10] ETSI GS NFV-IFA 011: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV) Release 4; Management and
Orchestration; VNF Descriptor and Packaging Specification".
[i.11] ETSI GS NFV-IFA 014: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV) Release 4; Management and
Orchestration; Network Service Templates Specification".
[i.12] ETSI GR NFV-EVE 018: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV) Release 5; Evolution and
Ecosystem; Report on Multi-tenancy in NFV".
[i.13] ENISA: "NFV Security in 5G: Challenges and Best Practices" 2022.
[i.14] ETSI GS NFV-SEC 021: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV) Release 4; Security; VNF
Package Security Specification".
[i.15] ETSI GS NFV-SOL 004: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV) Release 4; Protocols and Data
Models; VNF Package and PNFD Archive specification".
[i.16] ETSI GS NFV-SOL 007: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV) Release 4; Protocols and Data
Models; Network Service Descriptor File Structure Specification".
ETSI GR NFV-IFA 039: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV) Release 5; Architectural
[i.17]
Framework; Report on Service Based Architecture (SBA) design".
[i.18] SPIFFE: Universal identity control plane for distributed systems; CNCF Incubating Project.
[i.19] SPIRE: About SPIRE; CNCF Incubating Project.
[i.20] ETSI TS 133 310: "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; 5G; Network
Domain Security (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF) (3GPP TS 33.310 version 18.5.0
Release 18)".
[i.21] ETSI GR NFV-SEC 018: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); Security; Report on NFV
Remote Attestation Architecture".
[i.22] NIST FIPS 140-2 Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 2001.
3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations
3.1 Terms
For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply:
API authorization server: logical function that implements the authorization server functionality as defined in IETF
RFC 6749 [8] as a standalone physical server or logical entity
3.2 Symbols
Void.
3.3 Abbreviations
For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply:
AMF Access and Mobility Function
API Access Point Identifier
CA Certification Authority
CIR Container Image Registry
CIS Container Infrastructure Services
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9 ETSI GS NFV-SEC 025 V1.1.1 (2026-04)
CISM Container Infrastructure Service Management
CPU Central Processing Unit
CSP Certification Service Provider
DF Deployment Flavour
DPU Data Processing Unit
DRTM Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement
EM Element Manager
GPU General Purpose Processor
HBRT Hardware Based Root of Trust
HMEE Hardware Mediated Execution Enclave
HRoT Hardware Root of Trust
HSM Hardware Security Module
ID Identity Document
IoT Internet of Things
JSON JavaScript Object Notation
KMIP Key Management Interoperability Protocol
LCM Life Cycle Management
LoA Level of Assurance
MCIOP Managed Container Infrastructure Object Package
MNO Mobile Network Operator
NEF Network Element Function
NFVI Network Function Virtualisation Infrastructure
NFVO Network Functions Virtualisation Orchestrator
NIC Network Interface Card
NRF Network Repository Function
NS Network Service
NTP Network Time Protocol
NUMA Non Uniform Memory Access
OAM Operations, Administration, and Maintenance
OSS Operations Support Systems
PCF Policy Control Function
PKCS Public Key Cryptographic Standard
PoP Point of Preference
PTP Precision Time Protocol
PVID Primary Verifiable Identity Document
RA Registration Authority
RBAC Role Based Access Control
RoT Root of Trust
SLA Service-Level Agreement
SM Security Manager
SUE System Under Evaluation
TLS Transport Layer Security
TPM Trusted Platform Module
TVRA Threat Vulnerability and Risk Analysis
UDM Unified Data Management
UDR User Data Repository
UDSF Unstructure Data Storage Function
UE User Equipment
URI Uniform Resource Identifier
VBS Virtual Block Storage
VID Verifiable Identity Document
VIM Virtualised Infrastructure Management
VL Virtual Link
VM Virtual Machine
VNF Virtualised Network Function
VNFC Virtualised Network Function Component
VNFCI Virtual Network Function Component Instance
VNFD Virtualised Network Function Descriptor
VNFI Virtual Network Function Infrastructure
VNFM Virtualised Network Function Manager
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4 Threat analysis for VNF/NS during their lifecycle
4.1 Introduction
Before analysing the way to protect the NS and the VNF during their lifecycle, it is important to identify the threats
affecting the NS and the VNF.
For this identification of threats, it is essential first to know the critical assets of NS and VNF (clause 4.2), consisting of
anything that has value for an organization (for business or to fulfil legal obligations) and needs to be protected, and
secondly to identify the threat agents (clause 4.3), the entities that can adversely act on the asset.
During the lifecycle of the VNF or NS, the list of assets evolves, including, during the on-boarding, the information
contained in the VNF package and adding later some identifiers, cryptographic keys and runtime environment when it is
instantiated, and then adding the data, monitoring data, generated during the run-time.
The associated threats for each of the lifecycle steps are identified in clause 4.4.
This threat analysis uses the TVRA method described in ETSI TS 102 165-1 [i.1] and the format found in the annex A
of ETSI GS NFV-SEC 006 [i.2].
4.2 Assets
4.2.1 NS Assets
At the NS level, the network topology, describing constituents of the NS, their communication links, their affinity or
anti-affinity rules is an important asset. For example, the use of an out-of-date version of a VNF that is part of the NS,
and including a security threat in its software, could have an impact on the NS security; protection of the identification
of the constituents of the NS is needed.
In the same way, the affinity/anti-affinity rules may be used to group the sensitive VNFs together to run in an
NFVI-PoP protected with a high level of protection. These rules also need to be protected.
The priority description defines the priority in case of congestion on the underlying physical links and is used to resolve
conflicts in case of resource shortage. This priority information needs to be protected to ensure that resources for critical
communications are not pre-empted during resource allocation.
Monitoring data, such as metrics, measurements and events, is also information that shall be protected.
And the LCM scripts associated with some events are also some assets to be protected as they have an impact on the
orchestration of the NS when an event is raised. Modification in the scripts may have an impact on, e.g. the NS service
continuity.
The service provider may have legal obligations to fulfil e.g. provide a network service on a slice with a service level
agreed with his customer. The SLA is an asset that the service provider needs to protect (e.g. bandwidth, latency,
availability).
The NS Assets mapping depicted in figure 4.2.1-1 lists the identified assets at the NS level.
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Figure 4.2.1-1: NS Assets map
4.2.2 VNF Assets
At the VNF level, the VNF Package contains some assets to be protected, e.g. some descriptors, the software, the
manifest files and non-MANO artefacts files, the LCM scripts associated to some events.
After instantiation of the VNF there are some sensitive parameters that shall be protected, e.g. cryptographic keys, VNF
instance identity, security policies, data associated to the VNF for the license management and enforcement (e.g.
Service Provider Id).
Some data related to the service-based architecture are also some sensitive data, e.g. the VNF registration information,
access policies and access token used to control access to the API of the VNF.
After instantiation, the VNF instance with the guest OS, libs, the virtual links, the VNFC instance included in the VNF
instance, the security and configuration parameters need to be protected.
The VNF data used for the attestation process, such as the VNF integrity measurement and integrity golden
measurement that are used by the attestation server to check the integrity of the VNF software, are also assets.
Some VNFs use as input a time clock reference, timestamping or location information that need to be trustable
information (e.g. digital signing and certificate verification, license enforcement, timestamping of events, lawful
Interception). Any manipulation of time reference invalidates signing processes, certificate validation and exposes
organizations to compliance problems, legal challenges and compromise the security of the NFV system. Time
reference, timestamping information and location are assets for the VNF.
During the run-time of the VNF, the sensitive application data generated by the application stored in the permanent
storage or in transit, the lawful interception data, the VNF monitoring information (e.g. metrics, measurements, events)
and the VNF instance states are also important assets that shall be protected.
Examples of such sensitive application data are:
• Subscriber data managed by UDM and UDR Network Functions
• Policy data managed by PCF and UDR Network Functions
• Exposure function data managed by NEF and UDR Network Functions
• Application data, such as those managed by NEF and UDR Network Functions
• UE Context managed by AMF and UDSF Network Functions
The VNF Assets mapping depicted in figure 4.2.2-1 lists the identified assets at the VNF level.
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Figure 4.2.2-1: VNF Assets map
4.3 Threat agents
A list of threat agents for the 5G network landscape is given in clause 6 of the ENISA Threat landscape for 5G
networks [i.3]. These threat agents apply also for the NFV environment. The threat agents groups in this report are the
following:
• Cyber criminals
• Insider including employees (own, third parties)
• Hostile state actors
• Hacktivists
• Cyber warriors
• Cyber-terrorists
• Corporations
• Script Kiddies
• Inadvertent attacker
The means by which these threat agents attack the system have evolved, and they may use powerful Cyber Threat
Intelligence based on Artificial Intelligence to attack the NFV system. The threat agent may have legitimate access to
the network that could facilitate the attack.
The 5G infrastructure that will be used by various applications with a critical and vital impact on society, will
concentrate the efforts of the cyber-criminals and cyber-terrorists.
The 5G has a great importance to the sovereignty of the nation-states and then will be the target of attacks sponsored by
states, and in particular in a situation of cyber war. A hostile state actor may even instrument the attack at the physical
layer, influencing 5G component manufacturers to introduce backdoors into their designs.
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Table 4.3-1 lists the threat agents and, for each, describes the target, motivation and capabilities of the threat agent. The
table also gives a link to the associated threats described in clause 4.4.
Table 4.3-1: Threat agents list
Threat agents
Item Threat-Agent Description (Target/motivation/capabilities) Associated
name Threats
Threat- Cyber criminals Target: Industries, government, operators, organizations, individuals.
Agent.1
The 5G networks will connect various industries and governments that
are the target of the cyber criminals. Attacks towards the Network
virtualization system of operator to enter the various target is a
possible channel to reach their goal. The cyber criminals have
legitimate access to the network that could ease their attack.

Capabilities: The cyber criminals may use a very powerful system
(e.g. using artificial intelligence).

Threat- Insider, including Target: Industries, organizations, operators.
Agent.2 employees (own or
rd
parties)
3 The insider may be paid by another organization to mount some
attacks using their knowledge and their access to the system. The
rd
number of insiders may be important due to the number of 3 parties
involved in the 5G system (VNF providers, Infrastructure
manufacturers, component designers, etc.).

Capabilities: The threat agent uses his knowledge of the system and
his legitimate access to the system.

Threat- Hostile state actor Target: other country for economic or political reasons, Industries.
Agent.3
The motivation of the nation-states' agents is mostly espionage
against other countries. The nation-state may influence third parties
involved in the network system (e.g. component designers) to
instrument their products for this espionage.

Capabilities of the hostile state actor are significant and may use a
very powerful system (e.g. using artificial intelligence).
Threat- Hacktivists Target: Industries, organizations, operators.
Threats:
Agent.4
The motivation of hacktivists is to draw attention to their cause that
are in general protestation against political or geopolitical decisions
affecting national or international matters. They are active in
disclosing some confidential information involving their target.

Capabilities are in general relatively low as they belong to
associations that are not motivated by the monetization in their
attacks. But they are able to gain a legitimate access to the network
which could ease the attack.
Threat- Cyber warriors Target: Other country for geopolitical reasons.
Agent.5
The cyber wars is the new way the states is using to maintain their
dominance, independence and sovereignty. The soldiers will use the
5G networks for their missions, increasing the attractiveness of this
technology as a target of attacks and positioning the 5G network as a
high critical infrastructure to protect. The cyber warriors have both the
defender and offender roles.
Capabilities of the nation state are significant and may use very
powerful system (e.g. using artificial intelligence).
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Threat agents
Item Threat-Agent Description (Target/motivation/capabilities) Associated
name Threats
Threat- Cyber terrorists Target: individuals, industry.
Agent.6
The 5G infrastructure is used by a vast amount of applications with a
critical and vital impact on the society. For example in the
autonomous driving, an attack on the system could be setup remotely
to cause accidents with vital impact on individuals. An attack also on
energy supplier infrastructure may cause also large damage at the
national level.
Capabilities of the terrorist organizations may be important.

Threat- Corporation Target: other corporation (industries, operators, etc.).
Agent.7
The main motivation of such threat agent is economical and the
competiveness, tracking new services deployed by competitors and a
potential use of patents.
Capabilities could be important but balanced with the benefit derived.
The Threat agent use his high knowledge of the system to mount the
attack.
Threat- Script Kiddies Target: operators, application providers.
Agent.8
The main motivation of this threat agents is gaining a free access to
resources (e.g. gaming). The attack is set-up on the devices that the
threat agent owned at home (IoT devices, mobile phone, etc.).

Capabilities are low but the threat agent has a legitimate access to the
network and can mount the attack on his personal device at home.
Threat- Inadvertent Target: any exposed system element.
Agent 9 attacker
Devoid of motivation, but takes an action that somehow damages a
part of the system (e.g. switches off a power source or damages a
cable).
Threat- Physical external This agent may be natural, such as flooding or any other threat of
Agent 10 event physical "force majeure" including geological/extreme
weather/exceptional physical natural events or may be other presence
of other high risks industries in the physical vicinity of the NFV system
(e.g. Oil or Gas).
Target: any exposed system element.

Capability of creating damages to all or a part of the system without
any intention of doing so.
4.4 Threats
4.4.1 Introduction
The complexity and the extension of attack surface of a virtualized environment increase the difficulty to list, in an
exhaustive manner, the security threats to which the NS/VNF assets are exposed during the lifecycle of NS/VNF. For
this activity of threat analysis, some reports have been used to help the identification of the largest number of these
threats:
• ENISA Threat Landscape [i.3]
• NIST SP 800-125 [i.4]
• NIST SP 800-125Ar1 [i.5]
• NIST SP 800-125B [i.6]
• Fraunhofer AISEC report [i.7]
ETSI
15 ETSI GS NFV-SEC 025 V1.1.1 (2026-04)
• 5G Americas [i.8]
Only threats concerning the VNF and NS in an NFV environment have been listed. They have been sorted with the
lifecycle steps concerned by the threat:
• VNF/NS on-boarding
• VNF instantiation
• VNF configuration
• VNF during run-time
• VNF termination
The threats are listed in tables, where the threat is named and described, the corresponding threat agents are listed and
the assets concerned by the threat are identified. Then the last column of the tables gives a link in the document to the
possible requirements to mitigate the threat.
4.4.2 VNF/NS on-boarding
Table 4.4.2-1 lists the threats on VNF/NS assets during the on-boarding of VNF/NS. For further details, see clause 5 of
the present document.
Table 4.4.2-1: Threats during VNF/NS on-boarding
Threat
Item Description of threat Threat Agent Assets Mitigation
concerned Requirements
On- A threat agent gains access to the Os-ma-nfvo Cyber VNF application Verify the
boarding interface and on-boards a malicious VNF in criminals, data, VNF operation of the
-Threat 1 NFV-MANO. This VNF could be used to attack the insiders, cyber sensitive
VNF in a
other VNF or NFVI and/or gain access to sensitive warriors, cyber parameters, sandboxed,
data. terrorists, VNF lawful firewalled lab
hostile state interception before allowing
actors, data, some the operation of
hacktivists, VNF Instance the VNF.
corporations, assets
script kiddies
On- A threat agent gains access to the Os-ma-nfvo Cyber Some VNF Vendor and
boarding interface and uploads a malicious VNF as a new criminals, instance assets Operator
-Threat 2 version of a VNF constituent of a legitimate NS. This insiders, cyber including Signed VNF
VNF is used to attack the other VNF in the same warriors, cyber guestOS, libs, package.
namespace/security domain and/or gain access to terrorists VNF application
sensitive data. data, VNF
sensitive
parameters
On- A threat agent acting as an operator gains access to Cyber VNF application Isolation and
boarding the Os-ma-nfvo and on-boards a malicious NS criminals, data, VNF roles (RBAC)
-Threat 3 containing malicious VNFs that will attack the network insi
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