ETSI TR 103 460 V2.1.1 (2020-10)

Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Security; Pre-standardization study on Misbehavior Detection; Release 2

DTR/ITS-00539

General Information

• Status: Not Published
• Technical Committee: ITS WG5 - Security
• Current Stage: 12 - Completion
• Due Date: 09-Oct-2020
• Completion Date: 12-Oct-2020

Standards Content (Sample)

ETSI TR 103 460 V2.1.1 (2020-10)






TECHNICAL REPORT
Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS);
Security;
Pre-standardization study on Misbehaviour Detection;
Release 2

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Release 2 2 ETSI TR 103 460 V2.1.1 (2020-10)



Reference
DTR/ITS-00539
Keywords
ITS, security

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Release 2 3 ETSI TR 103 460 V2.1.1 (2020-10)
Contents
Intellectual Property Rights . 4
Foreword . 4
Modal verbs terminology . 4
1 Scope . 5
2 References . 5
2.1 Normative references . 5
2.2 Informative references . 5
3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations . 9
3.1 Terms . 9
3.2 Symbols . 9
3.3 Abbreviations . 9
4 Background . 10
4.1 General . 10
4.2 European C-ITS trust system and revocation of trust . 11
4.3 Misbehaviour detection, analysis and response in the US Connected Vehicle project. 12
4.3.1 Context of SCMS design and harmonization US-EU-Australia task-group . 12
4.3.2 Functional architecture of CCMS . 12
5 State-of-the-art . 14
5.1 Detection approaches . 14
5.1.1 General . 14
5.1.2 False beacon information detection . 14
5.1.3 False warning detection . 16
5.1.4 Node trust evaluation . 16
5.1.5 Feasibility assessment . 17
5.2 Reporting approaches . 17
5.2.1 General . 17
5.2.2 Unicast MR to the misbehaviour authority . 18
5.2.3 Broadcast MR to neighbours: pros, cons and alternatives . 18
6 MD and MR - use cases and scenarios . 19
6.1 Use case 1: Plausibility checks on access layer measurements on periodic broadcast messages (CAMs) . 19
6.2 Use case 2: Plausibility checks on periodic broadcast messages (CAMs) . 20
6.3 Use case 3: Security level local checks on received C-ITS messages . 21
6.4 Use case 4: Misbehaviour detection on the DENM messages signalling a traffic event . 22
7 Misbehaviour detection and reporting architecture . 23
7.1 General . 23
7.2 Misbehaviour report message format . 25
8 Misbehaviour detection standard recommendations . 27
Annex A: Potential misbehaviour detection mechanisms for "Cooperative Awareness
Messages" (CAMs). 29
Annex B: Example of an ASN.1 MR specification . 31
Annex C: Misbehaviour detection with " Collective Perception Messages" (CPMs) . 33
C.1 General . 33
C.2 Overview on collective perception messages . 33
C.3 Attack model for misbehaving CPMs . 33
C.4 Misbehaviour detection with CPM . 34
C.5 An initial list of open issues . 34
History . 35

ETSI

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Release 2 4 ETSI TR 103 460 V2.1.1 (2020-10)
Intellectual Property Rights
Essential patents
IPRs essential or potentially essential to normative deliverables may have been declared to ETSI. The information
pertaining to these essential IPRs, if any, is publicly available for ETSI members and non-members, and can be found
in ETSI SR 000 314: "Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs); Essential, or potentially Essential, IPRs notified to ETSI in
respect of ETSI standards", which is available from the ETSI Secretariat. Latest updates are available on the ETSI Web
server (https://ipr.etsi.org/).
Pursuant to the ETSI IPR Policy, no investigation, including IPR searches, has been carried out by ETSI. No guarantee
can be given as to the existence of other IPRs not referenced in ETSI SR 000 314 (or the updates on the ETSI Web
server) which are, or may be, or may become, essential to the present document.
Trademarks
The present document may include trademarks and/or tradenames which are asserted and/or registered by their owners.
ETSI claims no ownership of these except for any which are indicated as being the property of ETSI, and conveys no
right to use or reproduce any trademark and/or tradename. Mention of those trademarks in the present document does
not constitute an endorsement by ETSI of products, services or organizations associated with those trademarks.
Foreword
This Technical Report (TR) has been produced by ETSI Technical Committee Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS).
Modal verbs terminology
In the present document "should", "should not", "may", "need not", "will", "will not", "can" and "cannot" are to be
interpreted as described in clause 3.2 of the ETSI Drafting Rules (Verbal forms for the expression of provisions).
"must" and "must not" are NOT allowed in ETSI deliverables except when used in direct citation.
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Release 2 5 ETSI TR 103 460 V2.1.1 (2020-10)
1 Scope
The present document provides an overview of the relevant misbehaviour detection mechanisms suitable for C-ITS and
provides comments on performance and applicability of different misbehaviour detection mechanisms. The present
document provides also hints on potential minimum requirements for the security architecture and misbehaviour
detection distribution mechanisms, i.e. misbehaviour reporting.
2 References
2.1 Normative references
Normative references are not applicable in the present document.
2.2 Informative references
References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or
non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the
referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee
their long term validity.
The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the
user with regard to a particular subject area.
[i.1] ETSI TS 101 539-1: "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); V2X Applications; Part 1: Road Hazard
Signalling (RHS) application requirements specification".
[i.2] ETSI TS 101 539-2: "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); V2X Applications; Part 2: Intersection
Collision Risk Warning (ICRW) application requirements specification".
[i.3] ETSI TS 101 539-3: "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); V2X Applications; Part 3: Longitudinal
Collision Risk Warning (LCRW) application requirements specification".
[i.4] ETSI TS 102 637-1: "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Vehicular Communications; Basic Set
of Applications; Part 1: Functional Requirements".
[i.5] ETSI EN 302 637-2: "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Vehicular Communications; Basic Set
of Applications; Part 2: Specification of Cooperative Awareness Basic Service".
[i.6] ETSI TS 102 894-2: "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Users and applications requirements;
Part 2: Applications and facilities layer common data dictionary".
[i.7] ETSI TS 102 940: "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Security; ITS communications security
architecture and security management".
[i.8] ETSI TS 103 096-2: "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Testing; Conformance test
specifications for ITS Security; Part 2: Test Suite Structure and Test Purposes (TSS & TP)".
[i.9] ETSI TS 103 097: "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Security; Security header and certificate
formats".
[i.10] ETSI TR 103 562: "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Vehicular Communications; Basic Set of
Applications; Analysis of the Collective Perception Service (CPS); Release 2".
[i.11] ETSI TR 102 893: "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Security; Threat, Vulnerability and Risk
Analysis (TVRA)".
[i.12] Recommendation ITU-T X.696 (08/2014): "Information Technology-Specification of Octet
Encoding Rules (OER)".
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[i.13] European Commission: "Certificate Policy for Deployment and Operation of European
Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems (C-ITS), Release 1", June 2017.
NOTE: Available at https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/c-its_certificate_policy_release_1.pdf.
[i.14] European Commission: "Security Policy & Governance Framework for Deployment and
Operation of European Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems (C-ITS)".
NOTE: Available at https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/c-its_security_policy_release_1.pdf.
[i.15] C-ITS Platform WG5: "Security & Certification Final Report Annex II Revocation of trust in
Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems (C-ITS)".
NOTE: Available at https://ec.europa.eu/transport/themes/its/c-its_en.
[i.16] EU-US ITS Task Force - Standard harmonization Task Group 6: "Cooperative-ITS Security Policy
Framework".
NOTE: Available at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/harmonized-security-policies-cooperative-
intelligent-transport-systems-create-international.
[i.17] US-DOT, CVRIA: "Connected Vehicle Reference Implementation Architecture".
[i.18] US-DOT, ARC-IT: "The National ITS Reference architecture - Cooperative ITS Credentials
Management System".
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[i.19] FHWA-JPO-16-312: "Security Management Operational Concept - Tampa (THEA)".
NOTE: Available at https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/30827.
[i.20] 2016-31059 National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), Department of
Transportation (DOT): "Federal Motor Vehicle Safety - V2V communications, Notice of Proposed
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[i.21] V. Mahieu, G. Baldini: "Harmonization Task Group 6 Cooperative ITS Security Policy", ITS
World Congress 2015.
[i.22] T. Leinmüller, R. K. Schmidt and A. Held: "Cooperative position verification - defending against
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[i.23] K. Zaidi, M. B. Milojevic, V. Rakocevic, A. Nallanathan and M. Rajarajan: "Host-based intrusion
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[i.26] R. W. van der Heijden, A. Al-Momani, F. Kargl and O. M. F. Abu-Sharkh: "Enhanced position
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NOTE: Available at https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01779985.
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[i.29] J. P. Hubaux, S. Capkun and J. Luo: "The security and privacy of smart vehicles", IEEE Security
Privacy, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 49-55, May 2004.
[i.30] Moreno Ambrosin, Lily L Yang, Xiruo Liu, Manoj R Sastry, Ignacio J Alvarez: "Design of a
Misbehavior Detection System for Objects Based Shared Perception V2X Applications", to appear
in 2019 IEEE Intelligent Transportation Systems Conference (ITSC19), October 27-30, 2019.
[i.31] Joseph Kamel, Ines Jemaa, Arnaud Kaiser, Loic Cantat, Pascal Urien: "Misbehavior Detection in
C-ITS: A comparative approach of local detection mechanisms", Vehicular Networking
Conference (VNC), Dec 2019, Los Angeles, California, United States.
[i.32] C. Allig, T. Leinmuller, P. Mittal and G. Wanielik: "Trustworthiness Estimation of Entities within
Collective Perception", IEEE Vehicular Networking Conference (VNC), Dec 2019.
[i.33] J. Kamel, I. B. Jemaa, A. Kaiser and P. Urien: "Misbehavior Reporting Protocol for C-ITS", IEEE
Vehicular Networking Conference (VNC), Taipei, Taiwan, Dec. 2018.
[i.34] N. Bimeyer, C. Stresing and K. M. Bayarou: "Intrusion detection in vanets through verification of
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[i.35] C. Chen, X. Wang, W. Han and B. Zang: "A robust detection of the Sybil attack in urban vanets",
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[i.36] Y. Hao, J. Tang, and Y. Cheng: "Cooperative sybil attack detection for position based applications
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[i.37] S. Park, B. Aslam, D. Turgut, and C. C. Zou: "Defense against Sybil attack in vehicular ad hoc
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[i.38] M. Raya, P. Papadimitratos, V. D. Gligor and J. P. Hubaux: "On datacentric trust establishment in
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[i.39] Z. Cao, J. Kong, U. Lee, M. Gerla and Z. Chen: "Proof-of-relevance: Filtering false data via
authentic consensus in vehicle ad-hoc networks", IEEE INFOCOM Workshops 2008, April 2008,
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[i.40] M. Sun, M. Li and R. Gerdes: "A data trust framework for VANETs enabling false data detection
and secure vehicle tracking", IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS),
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NOTE: Available at https://doi.org/10.1109/CNS.2017.8228654.
[i.41] S. So, P. Sharma and J. Petit: "Integrating plausibility checks and machine learning for
misbehavior detection in vanet", 2018 17th IEEE International Conference on Machine Learning
and Applications (ICMLA), pp. 564-571, 2018.
[i.42] J. Kamel, I. B. Jemaa, A. Kaiser, P. Cincilla and P. Urien: "CaTch: A Confidence Range Tolerant
Misbehavior Detection Approach", IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference,
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[i.43] M. Raya, P. Papadimitratos, I. Aad, D. Jungels and J. P. Hubaux: "Eviction of misbehaving and
faulty nodes in vehicular networks", IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 25,
no. 8, pp. 1557- 1568, Oct 2007.
[i.44] Rens W. van der Heijden, Stefan Dietzel, Tim Leinmüller, Frank Kargl: "Survey on Misbehavior
Detection in Cooperative Intelligent Transportation Systems", IEEE Communications Surveys &
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[i.45] Q. Xu, R. Zheng, W. Saad and Z. Han: "Device fingerprinting in wireless networks: Challenges
and opportunities", IEEE Communications Surveys Tutorials, Volume: 18, Issue: 1, First quarter
2016.
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[i.46] T. Zhou, R. R. Choudhury, P. Ning and K. Chakrabarty: "Privacy preserving detection of sybil
attacks in vehicular ad hoc networks", Fourth Annual International Conference on Mobile and
Ubiquitous Systems: Networking Services (MobiQuitous), Aug 2007, pp. 1-8.
[i.47] T. H.-J. Kim, A. Studer, R. Dubey, X. Zhang, A. Perrig, F. Bai, B. Bellur and A. Iyer: "Vanet alert
endorsement using multi-source filters", Conference MOBICOM - Proceedings of the Seventh
ACM International Workshop on VehiculArInterNETworking, ser. VANET '10. New York, NY,
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[i.48] H.-C. Hsiao, A. Studer, R. Dubey, E. Shi and A. Perrig: "Efficient and secure threshold-based
event validation for vanets", Proceedings of the Fourth ACM Conference on Wireless Network
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[i.49] X. Zhuo, J. Hao, D. Liu and Y. Dai: "Removal of misbehaving insiders in anonymous vanets",
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Wireless and Mobile Systems, ser. MSWiM '09. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2009, pp. 106-115.
[i.50] R. K. Schmidt, T. Leinmüller, E. Schoch, A. Held and G. Schaefer: "Vehicle behavior analysis to
enhance security in vanets", TU Ilmenau, Proceedings of 4th Workshop on Vehicle to Vehicle
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[i.51] B. Xiao, B. Yu and C. Gao: "Detection and localization of sybil nodes in vanets", Proceedings of
the 2006 Workshop on Dependability Issues in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks and Sensor Networks,
ser. DIWANS '06. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2006, pp. 1-8.
[i.52] I. J. Byung Kwan Lee, EunHee Jeong: "A DTSA (Detection Technique against a Sybil Attack)
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and ITS Applications, vol. 7, pp. 1-10, 2013.
[i.53] A. Jøsang: "A logic for uncertain probabilities", International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness
and Knowledge-Based Systems, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 279-311, Jun. 2001.
[i.54] P. K. Singh, M. K. Dash, P. Mittal, S. K. Nandi and S. Nandi: "Misbehavior detection in c-its
using deep learning approach", Intelligent Systems Design and Applications, A. Abraham,
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[i.55] P. K. Singh, S. Gupta, R. Vashistha, S. K. Nandi and S. Nandi: "Machine learning based approach
to detect position falsification attack in vanets", Security and Privacy, S. Nandi, D. Jinwala,
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[i.61] N. Bissmeyer: "Misbehavior Detection and Attacker Identification in Vehicular Ad hoc
Networks", Technische Universität Darmstadt, Dissertation, November 2014.
[i.62] Joseph Kamel: "Misbehavior Detection for Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems (C-ITS)",
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3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations
3.1 Terms
For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply:
ego vehicle: vehicle embedding the ITS-S being considered
reported ITS station: ITS station that is subject to creation of an MR
reporting ITS station: ITS station sending an MR
3.2 Symbols
Void.
3.3 Abbreviations
For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in ETSI TS 102 940 [i.7] and the following apply:
AoA Angle of Arrival
ART Acceptance Range Threshold
AT Authorization Ticket
CAM Co-operative Awareness Message
C-ITS Cooperative Intelligent Transport System
CCMS Cooperative-ITS Credential Management System
CoE Certainty of Event
CP Collective Perception
CPM Collective Perception Message
CRL Certificate Revocation List
DENM Decentralized Environment Notification Message
DTSA Detection Technique against a Sybil Attack
eART enhanced Acceptance Range Threshold
EWMA Exponentially Weighted Moving Average
ID IDentity
ITS Intelligent Transport System
ITS-S ITS Station
K-NN K-Nearest Neighbours
LEAVE Local Eviction of Attackers by Voting Evaluators
LSTM Long Short-Term Memory
MA Misbehaviour Authority
MB MisBehaviour
MBR MisBehaviour Reporting
MD MisBehaviour Detection
MDM Minimum Distance Moved
MLP Multi-Layer Perceptron
MPP Map-Proofed Position
MR Misbehaviour Report
OBU On-Board Unit
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Release 2 10 ETSI TR 103 460 V2.1.1 (2020-10)
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PRP Permanent Revocation Protocol
P2DAP Privacy-Preserving Detection of Abuses of Pseudonyms
RSSI Received Signal Strength Indicator
RSU Road Side Unit
SAW Sudden Appearance Warning
SLEP Suicide-based Local Eviction Protocol
SVM Support Vector Machine
T-VNets Trust architecture for Vehicular Networks
VEBAS Vehicle Behaviour Analysis and Evaluation Scheme
VeReMi Vehicular Reference Misbehavior Dataset
4 Background
4.1 General
The main purpose of a "Public Key Infrastructure" (PKI) in a C-ITS trust system, also referred to as "Cooperative-ITS
Credential Management System" (CCMS), is to provide a certificate management system that supports secure
distribution, use and revocation of certificates to ITS stations (ITS-Ss). Revocation of trust credentials may be needed,
under different situations, e.g. for the following reasons:
• The CCMS detects a malicious ITS station and decides to evict it from the network.
• During the ITS-S life-cycle management, the certificates issued to an ITS station will be revoked at the "ITS-S
end of life", e.g. the ITS station is decommissioned or the ITS station failed and thus is replaced by a spare
part.
Misbehaviour detection and reporting is a main issue in a CCMS and has not been specified in details in the first
pre-deployment phases due to the following reasons:
• Algorithms for misbehaviour detection applicable in an ad-hoc network (i.e. local detection on vehicles and
roadside stations) as well as in a PKI are not sufficiently defined and seem to be not trivial. Denigration of
benign ITS stations cannot be circumvented (risk of false positive).
• Misbehaviour detection requires a network connec
...