ETSI TS 102 224 V12.0.0 (2018-09)

Smart Cards; Security mechanisms for UICC based Applications - Functional requirements (Release 12)

RTS/SCP-R0282v1200

General Information

• Status: Published
• Publication Date: 18-Sep-2018
• Technical Committee: SET REQ - SET-REQ
• Current Stage: 12 - Completion
• Due Date: 19-Sep-2018
• Completion Date: 19-Sep-2018

Standards Content (Sample)

ETSI TS 102 224 V12.0.0 (2018-09)






TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION
Smart Cards;
Security mechanisms for UICC based Applications
Functional requirements
(Release 12)

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Release 12 2 ETSI TS 102 224 V12.0.0 (2018-09)



Reference
RTS/SCP-R0282v1200
Keywords
security, smart card
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Release 12 3 ETSI TS 102 224 V12.0.0 (2018-09)
Contents
Intellectual Property Rights . 5
Foreword . 5
Modal verbs terminology . 5
1 Scope . 6
2 References . 6
2.1 Normative references . 6
2.2 Informative references . 7
3 Definitions and abbreviations . 7
3.1 Definitions . 7
3.2 Abbreviations . 8
4 Introduction . 8
5 Security requirements . 9
5.1 Introduction . 9
5.2 Authentication . 10
5.2.1 Definition . 10
5.2.2 Purpose . 10
5.2.3 Functional requirements . 10
5.3 Message integrity . 10
5.3.1 Definition . 10
5.3.2 Purpose . 10
5.3.3 Functional requirements . 11
5.4 Replay detection and sequence integrity . 11
5.4.1 Definition . 11
5.4.2 Purpose . 11
5.4.3 Functional requirements . 11
5.5 Proof of receipt and proof of execution . 11
5.5.1 Definition . 11
5.5.2 Purpose . 11
5.5.3 Functional requirements . 12
5.6 Message confidentiality . 12
5.6.1 Definition . 12
5.6.2 Purpose . 12
5.6.3 Functional requirements . 12
5.7 Security management . 12
5.8 User Notification . 12
5.8.1 Definition . 12
5.8.2 Purpose . 13
5.8.3 Functional requirements . 13
6 Normal procedures . 13
6.1 Security mechanisms . 13
6.1.1 Introduction. 13
6.1.2 Authentication mechanisms . 13
6.1.3 Message integrity mechanisms . 13
6.1.4 Replay detection and sequence integrity mechanisms . 13
6.1.5 Proof of receipt mechanisms . 14
6.1.6 Message confidentiality mechanisms . 14
6.2 Security mechanisms and recommended combinations . 14
6.2.1 Non-cryptographic mechanisms . 14
6.2.2 Cryptographic mechanisms . 14
6.2.3 Recommended combinations of cryptographic mechanisms . 15
7 Exceptional procedures . 15
7.1 Authentication or integrity failure . 15
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Release 12 4 ETSI TS 102 224 V12.0.0 (2018-09)
7.2 Sequence and replay detection failure . 16
7.3 Proof of receipt failure . 16
8 Interfacing to the Transport Layer . 16
9 Remote Application Management over IP . 16
9.1 Introduction . 16
9.2 Transport requirement . 16
9.3 Functions requirements . 16
9.4 Security requirements . 17
9.5 Backward compatibility requirements . 17
Annex A (informative): Change history . 18
History . 19

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Release 12 5 ETSI TS 102 224 V12.0.0 (2018-09)
Intellectual Property Rights
Essential patents
IPRs essential or potentially essential to normative deliverables may have been declared to ETSI. The information
pertaining to these essential IPRs, if any, is publicly available for ETSI members and non-members, and can be found
in ETSI SR 000 314: "Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs); Essential, or potentially Essential, IPRs notified to ETSI in
respect of ETSI standards", which is available from the ETSI Secretariat. Latest updates are available on the ETSI Web
server (https://ipr.etsi.org/).
Pursuant to the ETSI IPR Policy, no investigation, including IPR searches, has been carried out by ETSI. No guarantee
can be given as to the existence of other IPRs not referenced in ETSI SR 000 314 (or the updates on the ETSI Web
server) which are, or may be, or may become, essential to the present document.
Trademarks
The present document may include trademarks and/or tradenames which are asserted and/or registered by their owners.
ETSI claims no ownership of these except for any which are indicated as being the property of ETSI, and conveys no
right to use or reproduce any trademark and/or tradename. Mention of those trademarks in the present document does
not constitute an endorsement by ETSI of products, services or organizations associated with those trademarks.
Foreword
This Technical Specification (TS) has been produced by ETSI Technical Committee Smart Card Platform (SCP).
It is based on work originally done in the 3GPP in TSG-terminals WG3 and ETSI SMG.
The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within TC SCP and may change following formal
TC SCP approval. If TC SCP modifies the contents of the present document, it will then be republished by ETSI with
an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows:
Version x.y.z
where:
x: the first digit:
0 early working draft;
1 presented to TC SCP for information;
2 presented to TC SCP for approval;
3 or greater indicates TC SCP approved document under change control.
y: the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections,
updates, etc.
z: the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document.
Modal verbs terminology
In the present document "shall", "shall not", "should", "should not", "may", "need not", "will", "will not", "can" and
"cannot" are to be interpreted as described in clause 3.2 of the ETSI Drafting Rules (Verbal forms for the expression of
provisions).
"must" and "must not" are NOT allowed in ETSI deliverables except when used in direct citation.
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Release 12 6 ETSI TS 102 224 V12.0.0 (2018-09)
1 Scope
The present document provides standardized security mechanisms in conjunction with the Card Application Toolkit for
the interface between a Network Entity and a UICC.
The security mechanisms which are specified are independent of applications.
The present document describes the functional requirements of the security mechanisms with the implementation detail
of these mechanisms being described in ETSI TS 102 225 [2].
Within the scope of the present document, the UICC refers here to an ICC which support at least one application in
order to access a cellular network.
The ICC is considered as a platform, which is based on ETSI TS 102 221 [5].
2 References
2.1 Normative references
References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or
non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the
referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at
https://docbox.etsi.org/Reference/.
• In the case of a reference to a TC SCP document, a non specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version
of that document in the same Release as the present document.
NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee
their long term validity.
The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document.
[1] ETSI TR 121 905: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile
Telecommunications System (UMTS); Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications (3GPP TR 21.905)".
[2] ETSI TS 102 225: "Smart Cards; Secured packet structure for UICC based applications".
[3] ETSI TS 131 111: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile
Telecommunications System (UMTS); Universal Subscriber Identity Module Application Toolkit
(USAT) (3GPP TS 31.111)".
[4] Void.
[5] ETSI TS 102 221: "Smart cards; UICC-Terminal interface; Physical and logical characteristics".
[6] ETSI TS 102 223: "Smart cards; Card Application Toolkit (CAT)".
[7] ETSI TS 102 127: "Smart cards; Transport protocol for CAT applications; Stage 2".
[8] ETSI TS 102 483: "Smart cards; UICC-Terminal interface; Internet Protocol connectivity between
UICC and terminal".
[9] ETSI TS 102 412: "Smart Card; Smart Card Platform Requirements Stage 1".
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2.2 Informative references
References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or
non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the
referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
• In the case of a reference to a TC SCP document, a non specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version
of that document in the same Release as the present document.
NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee
their long term validity.
[i.1] ETSI ETR 330: "Security Techniques Advisory Group (STAG); A guide to legislative and
regulatory environment".
3 Definitions and abbreviations
3.1 Definitions
For the purpose of the present document, the following terms and definitions apply:
application layer: layer above the transport layer on which the application messages are exchanged between the
sending and receiving applications
application message: package of commands or data sent from the sending application to the receiving application, or
vice versa, independently of the transport mechanism
NOTE: An application message is transformed with respect to a chosen transport layer and chosen level of
security into one or more secured packets.
counter: mechanism or data field used for keeping track of a message sequence
NOTE: This could be realized as a sequence oriented or time stamp derived value maintaining a level of
synchronization.
cryptographic checksum: string of bits derived from some secret information, (e.g. a secret key), part or all of the
application message, and possible further information (e.g. part of the security header)
NOTE: The secret key is known to the sending entity and to the receiving entity. The Cryptographic checksum is
often referred to as Message Authentication Code (MAC).
digital signature: string of bits derived from some secret information (e.g. a secret key) the complete application
message, and possible further information (e.g. part of the security header)
NOTE: The secret information is known only to the sending entity. Although the authenticity of the digital
signature can be proved by the receiving entity, the receiving entity is not able to reproduce the digital
signature without knowledge of the secret information owned by the sending entity.
receiving application: entity to which the application message is destined
receiving entity: entity where the secured packet is received (e.g. SMS-SC, UICC, USSD entry point, or dedicated
toolkit server) and where the security mechanisms are utilized
NOTE: The receiving entity processes the secured packets.
redundancy check: string of bits derived from the application message and possible further information for the purpose
of detecting accidental changes to the message, without the use of any secret information
secured packet: information flow on top of which the level of required security has been applied
NOTE: An application message is transformed with respect to a chosen Transport Layer and chosen level of
security into one or more secured packets.
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security header: that part of the secured packet which consists of all security information
EXAMPLE: Counter, key identification, indication of security level, checksum or digital signature.
sender identification: simple verification of the identity of the sending entity by the receiving entity comparing the
sender identity with an a priori stored identity of the sender at the receiving entity
sending application: entity generating an application message to be sent
sending entity: entity from which the secured packet originates (e.g. SMS-SC, UICC, USSD entry point, or dedicated
toolkit server) and where the security mechanisms are invoked
NOTE: The sending entity generates the secured packets to be sent.
status code: indication that a message has been received (correctly or incorrectly, indicating reason for failure)
transport layer: layer responsible for transporting secured packets through the network
NOTE: The transport layer implements one or more transport mechanisms, (e.g. SMS or USSD).
unsecured acknowledgement: status code included in a response message
3.2 Abbreviations
For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in ETSI TR 121 905 [1] and the following apply:
CAT Card Application Toolkit
CAT_TP Card Application Toolkit Transport Protocol
4 Introduction
The Card Application Toolkit (CAT) as described in ETSI TS 102 223 [6] is a set of applications and related procedures
that may be used during a card session. It allows operators to create specific applications resident on the UICC. There
exists a need to secure Card Application Toolkit (CAT) related communication over the network, (e.g. SMS, USSD,
and future transport mechanisms) with the level of security chosen by the network operator or the application provider.
It is assumed in the present document that the sending and receiving entities are in a secure environment.
The appropriate security mechanisms are described in the present document.
The security mechanisms cover the following security requirements:
- unilateral authentication from network to UICC;
- unilateral authentication from UICC to network;
- message integrity;
- replay detection;
- proof of receipt;
- message confidentiality.
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Sending Sending Transport Receiving Receiving
Application Entity Mech. Entity Application
Information flow
(e.g. UICC
(e.g. a bank) (e.g. SMS-SC) (e.g. USSD, SMS) (e.g. UICC)
resident
application)
(e.g. UICC (e.g. UICC) (e.g. SMS-SC) (e.g. a bank
resident resident
application) application)

Figure 1: System overview
5 Security requirements
5.1 Introduction
The application message is transferred from the sending application to the receiving application in one or more secured
packets via a sending entity and a receiving entity, or group of receiving entities. The receiving entity is then
responsible for reconstructing the application message from the received secured packets for presentation to the target
receiving application. It is possible that there are several receiving entities and applications.
The sending application shall indicate to the sending entity the security mechanisms to be applied to the application
message. This shall be indicated in the secured packet. The receiving entity shall indicate to the receiving application
the security mechanisms applied to the secured packet, in a secure manner. The interface between the sending
application and the sending entity, and the interface between the receiving entity and receiving application are not
defined.
The security requirements to satisfy when transferring application messages from the sending entity to the receiving
entity that have been considered are:
- authentication;
- message integrity;
- replay detection and sequence integrity;
- proof of receipt and proof of execution;
- message confidentiality;
- indication of the security mechanisms used.
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Mechanisms to satisfy the above requirements will be governed by the following assumptions:
- in general, security is provided for each secured packet transmitted (an application message may be broken
into several secured packets, each of which shall have identical security mechanisms applied to it);
- there should be the ability to turn mechanisms on and off on a per application message basis, with an
indication of the status transmitted with the message;
- security related information used should be independent of that used with existing network keys;
- third party applications may have access to the sending entity, however this is considered to be an internal
network security issue and therefore outside of the scope of the present document.
5.2 Authentication
5.2.1 Definition
Authentication is the verification of an entity's claimed identity by another entity. A first level of authentication is
"unilateral authentication" which provides the receiver with proof of the sender's identity. A higher level is "mutual
authentication", where both entities are provided with proof of each other's identity.
For mutual authentication purposes the sending and/or receiving entities have to generate and exchange dedicated
authentication messages. Due to the unidirectional nature of current transport mechanisms mutual authentication is not
considered in the present document.
5.2.2 Purpose
The purpose of authentication is to protect sending and receiving Entities and applications against unauthorized use.
Authentication assures that only authorized parties can perform actions at the UICC, and it prevents unauthorized
parties from having access to entities on the network side (or even behind it) via a Card Application Toolkit (CAT)
feature.
5.2.3 Functional requirements
For the purposes of sender identification and unilateral authentication the sending entity shall be uniquely defined and
addressed.
Unilateral authentication can be achieved by the use of a cryptographic checksum or digital signature attached to the
message. The distinguishing identifications of the receiving and sending entities should be linked to them for the entire
life time of these entities. (If for some reason, the identity of any of the entities is changed, then all other entities
involved in the authentication procedure shall be informed of the new identity.)
5.3 Message integrity
5.3.1 Definition
Message Integrity detects that no corruption, accidental or intentional, of the content of the message has occurred.
5.3.2 Purpose
The purpose of this mechanism is to detect any corruption of the application message or the whole secured packet.
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5.3.3 Functional requirements
The integrity of the application message or whole secured packet may be achieved as follows:
- by adding a Redundancy Check in the security header to protect against accidental corruption (the redundancy
check mechanism on its own only protects against accidental corruption. In conjunction with encryption it can
be used to provide message integrity);
- by adding a cryptographic checksum in the security header. In certain circumstances the authentication of the
sending entity is achieved implicitly by the verification of the cryptographic checksum;
- by calculating and verifying a digital signature on the application message to be transferred. In this case the
authentication of the sending entity is achieved implicitly by the verification of the digital signature.
5.4 Replay detection and sequence integrity
5.4.1 Definition
Replay detection is a mechanism which provides the receiving entity with a means of recognizing that it has received
the same secured packet(s) previously.
Sequence integrity is a mechanism which ensures that no changes, accidental or intentional, have occurred to the
intended sequence of secured packets.
5.4.2 Purpose
Replay detection protects the receiving entity against replay attack and secured packet duplication.
Sequence integrity protects the receiving entity against message suppression a
...