ETSI TS 133 512 V17.3.0 (2022-05)

5G; 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS); Access and Mobility management Function (AMF) (3GPP TS 33.512 version 17.3.0 Release 17)

RTS/TSGS-0333512vh30

General Information

• Status: Not Published
• Technical Committee: 3GPP SA 3 - Security
• Current Stage: 12 - Completion
• Completion Date: 11-May-2022

Standards Content (Sample)

ETSI TS 133 512 V17.3.0 (2022-05)






TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION
5G;
5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS);
Access and Mobility management Function (AMF)
(3GPP TS 33.512 version 17.3.0 Release 17)

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3GPP TS 33.512 version 17.3.0 Release 17 1 ETSI TS 133 512 V17.3.0 (2022-05)

Reference
RTS/TSGS-0333512vh30
Keywords
5G,SECURITY
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ETSI

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3GPP TS 33.512 version 17.3.0 Release 17 2 ETSI TS 133 512 V17.3.0 (2022-05)
Intellectual Property Rights
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Legal Notice
This Technical Specification (TS) has been produced by ETSI 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).
The present document may refer to technical specifications or reports using their 3GPP identities. These shall be
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Modal verbs terminology
In the present document "shall", "shall not", "should", "should not", "may", "need not", "will", "will not", "can" and
"cannot" are to be interpreted as described in clause 3.2 of the ETSI Drafting Rules (Verbal forms for the expression of
provisions).
"must" and "must not" are NOT allowed in ETSI deliverables except when used in direct citation.
ETSI

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3GPP TS 33.512 version 17.3.0 Release 17 3 ETSI TS 133 512 V17.3.0 (2022-05)
Contents
Intellectual Property Rights . 2
Legal Notice . 2
Modal verbs terminology . 2
Foreword . 5
1 Scope . 7
2 References . 7
3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations . 7
3.1 Terms . 7
3.2 Symbols . 7
3.3 Abbreviations . 8
4 AMF-specific security requirements and related test cases. 8
4.1 Introduction . 8
4.2 AMF-specific adaptations of security functional requirements and related test cases. . 8
4.2.1 Introduction. 8
4.2.2 Security functional requirements on the AMF deriving from 3GPP specifications and related test
cases . 8
4.2.2.0 General . 8
4.2.2.1 Authentication and key agreement procedure . 8
4.2.2.1.1 Synchronization failure handling . 8
4.2.2.1.2 RES* verification failure handling . 10
4.2.2.1.3 NAS based redirection from 5GS to EPS . 12
4.2.2.2 Void. 13
4.2.2.3 Security mode command procedure . 13
4.2.2.3.1 Replay protection of NAS signalling messages . 13
4.2.2.3.2 NAS NULL integrity protection . 13
4.2.2.3.3 NAS integrity algorithm selection and use . 14
4.2.2.4 Security in intra-RAT mobility . 15
4.2.2.4.1 Bidding down prevention in Xn-handover . 15
4.2.2.4.2 NAS protection algorithm selection in AMF change . 16
4.2.2.5 5G-GUTI allocation . 17
4.2.2.5.1 5G-GUTI allocation . 17
4.2.2.6 Security in registration procedure . 18
4.2.2.6.1 Invalid or unacceptable UE security capabilities handling . 18
4.2.2.7 RRCRestablishment in Control Plane CIoT 5GS Optimization . 19
4.2.2.8 Security in PDU session establishment procedure . 20
4.2.2.8.1 Validation of S-NSSAIs in PDU session establishment request. 20
4.2.2.9 Network Slice Specific Authentication and Authorization . 21
4.2.2.9.1 NSSAA revocation . 21
4.2.3 Technical Baseline . 22
4.2.3.1 Introduction . 22
4.2.3.2 Protecting data and information. 22
4.2.3.2.1 Protecting data and information – general . 22
4.2.3.2.2 Protecting data and information – unauthorized viewing . 22
4.2.3.2.3 Protecting data and information in storage . 22
4.2.3.2.4 Protecting data and information in transfer . 22
4.2.3.2.5 Logging access to personal data . 22
4.2.3.3 Protecting availability and integrity . 22
4.2.3.4 Authentication and authorization . 22
4.2.3.5 Protecting sessions . 22
4.2.3.6 Logging . 22
4.2.4 Operating Systems . 22
4.2.5 Web Servers . 22
4.2.6 Network Devices . 23
4.3 AMF-specific adaptations of hardening requirements and related test cases . 23
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3GPP TS 33.512 version 17.3.0 Release 17 4 ETSI TS 133 512 V17.3.0 (2022-05)
4.3.1 Introduction. 23
4.3.2 Technical baseline. 23
4.3.3 Operating systems . 23
4.3.4 Web servers . 23
4.3.5 Network devices . 23
4.3.6 Network functions in service-based architecture . 23
4.4 AMF-specific adaptations of basic vulnerability testing requirements and related test cases . 23
Annex A (informative): Change history . 24
History . 25

ETSI

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3GPP TS 33.512 version 17.3.0 Release 17 5 ETSI TS 133 512 V17.3.0 (2022-05)
Foreword
This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).
The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal
TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an
identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows:
Version x.y.z
where:
x the first digit:
1 presented to TSG for information;
2 presented to TSG for approval;
3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control.
y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections,
updates, etc.
z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document.
In the present document, modal verbs have the following meanings:
shall indicates a mandatory requirement to do something
shall not indicates an interdiction (prohibition) to do something
The constructions "shall" and "shall not" are confined to the context of normative provisions, and do not appear in
Technical Reports.
The constructions "must" and "must not" are not used as substitutes for "shall" and "shall not". Their use is avoided
insofar as possible, and they are not used in a normative context except in a direct citation from an external, referenced,
non-3GPP document, or so as to maintain continuity of style when extending or modifying the provisions of such a
referenced document.
should indicates a recommendation to do something
should not indicates a recommendation not to do something
may indicates permission to do something
need not indicates permission not to do something
The construction "may not" is ambiguous and is not used in normative elements. The unambiguous constructions
"might not" or "shall not" are used instead, depending upon the meaning intended.
can indicates that something is possible
cannot indicates that something is impossible
The constructions "can" and "cannot" are not substitutes for "may" and "need not".
will indicates that something is certain or expected to happen as a result of action taken by an agency
the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document
will not indicates that something is certain or expected not to happen as a result of action taken by an
agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document
might indicates a likelihood that something will happen as a result of action taken by some agency the
behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document
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3GPP TS 33.512 version 17.3.0 Release 17 6 ETSI TS 133 512 V17.3.0 (2022-05)
might not indicates a likelihood that something will not happen as a result of action taken by some agency
the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document
In addition:
is (or any other verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact
is not (or any other negative verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact
The constructions "is" and "is not" do not indicate requirements.

ETSI

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3GPP TS 33.512 version 17.3.0 Release 17 7 ETSI TS 133 512 V17.3.0 (2022-05)
1 Scope
The present document contains objectives, requirements and test cases that are specific to the AMF network product
class. It refers to the Catalogue of General Security Assurance Requirements and formulates specific adaptions of the
requirements and test cases given there, as well as specifying requirements and test cases unique to the AMF network
product class.
2 References
The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present
document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or
non-specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including
a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same
Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2] 3GPP TS 33.501 (Release 15): "Security architecture and procedures for 5G system".
[3] 3GPP TS 33.117: "Catalogue of general security assurance requirements".
[4] 3GPP TS 23.003: "Numbering, addressing and identification".
[5] 3GPP TS 24.501: "Non-Access-Stratum (NAS) protocol for 5G System (5GS); Stage 3".
[6] 3GPP TR 33.926: "Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats and critical assets in 3GPP
network product classes".
[7] 3GPP TS 33.501: "Security architecture and procedures for 5G system".
[8] 3GPP TS 23.501: "System Architecture for the 5G System".
[9] 3GPP TS 38.413: "NG-RAN; NG Application Protocol (NGAP)".
3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations
3.1 Terms
For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term
defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].

3.2 Symbols
Void.
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3GPP TS 33.512 version 17.3.0 Release 17 8 ETSI TS 133 512 V17.3.0 (2022-05)
3.3 Abbreviations
For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An
abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in
3GPP TR 21.905 [1].

4 AMF-specific security requirements and related test
cases
4.1 Introduction
AMF specific security requirements include both requirements derived from AMF-specific security functional
requirements in relevant specifications as well as security requirements introduced in the present document derived
from the threats specific to AMF as described in TR 33.926 [6].
4.2 AMF-specific adaptations of security functional
requirements and related test cases.
4.2.1 Introduction
The present clause describes the security functional requirements and the corresponding test cases for AMF network
product class. The proposed security requirements are classified in two groups:
- Security functional requirements derived from TS 33.501 [2] and detailed in clause 4.2.2.
- General security functional requirements which include requirements not already addressed in TS 33.501 [2] but
whose support is also important to ensure that AMF conforms to a common security baseline detailed in
clause 4.2.3.
4.2.2 Security functional requirements on the AMF deriving from 3GPP
specifications and related test cases
4.2.2.0 General
The general approach in TS 33.117 [3] clause 4.2.2.1 and all the requirements and test cases in TS 33.117 [3] clause
4.2.2.2 related to SBA/SBI aspect apply to the AMF network product class.
4.2.2.1 Authentication and key agreement procedure
4.2.2.1.1 Synchronization failure handling
Requirement Name: Synchronization failure handling
Requirement Reference: TS 33.501 [7], clause 6.1.3.3.2
Requirement Description: "Upon receiving an authentication failure message with synchronisation failure (AUTS) from
the UE, the SEAF sends an Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message with a "synchronisation failure
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3GPP TS 33.512 version 17.3.0 Release 17 9 ETSI TS 133 512 V17.3.0 (2022-05)
indication" to the AUSF and the AUSF sends an Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Request message to the UDM/ARPF,
together with the following parameters:
- RAND sent to the UE in the preceding Authentication Request, and
- AUTS received by the SEAF in the response from the UE to that request, as described in clause 6.1.3.2.0 and
6.1.3.3.1.
An SEAF will not react to unsolicited "synchronisation failure indication" messages from the UE.
The SEAF does not send new authentication requests to the UE before having received the response to its
Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message with a "synchronisation failure indication" from the AUSF (or
before it is timed out). "

as specified in TS 33.501[7], clause 6.1.3.3.2.
Threat References: TR 33.926 [6], clause K.2.2.1, Resynchronization
Test Case:
Test Name: TC_SYNC_FAIL_SEAF_AMF
Purpose:
Verify that synchronization failure is correctly handled by the SEAF/AMF.
Pre-Conditions:
- Test environment with UE and AUSF. The UE and the AUSF may be simulated.
- AMF network product is connected in emulated/real network environment.
Execution Steps
Test A:
1) The UE sends an authentication failure message to the SEAF/AMF with synchronisation failure (AUTS).
2) The SEAF/AMF sends a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message with a "synchronisation
failure indication" to the AUSF.
3) The AUSF sends a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message to the SEAF/AMF immediately
after receiving the request from the SEAF/AMF, to make sure the SEAF/AMF will receive the response before
timeout.

Test B:
1) The UE sends an authentication failure message to the SEAF/AMF with synchronisation failure (AUTS).
2) The SEAF/AMF sends a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message with a "synchronisation
failure indication" to the AUSF.
3) The AUSF does not send a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message to the SEAF/AMF before
timeout.
Expected Results:
Before receiving Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message from the AUSF and before the timer for
receiving Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message runs out,
For Test B, the SEAF/AMF does not send any new authentication request to the UE.
For Test A, the SEAF/AMF may initiate new authentication towards the UE.
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Expected format of evidence:
Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g., Screenshot containing the operational results.
4.2.2.1.2 RES* verification failure handling
Requirement Name: RES* verification failure handling
Requirement Reference: TS 33.501 [7], clause 6.1.3.2.2
Requirement Description:
"The SEAF shall proceed with step 10 in Figure 6.1.3.2-1 and after receiving the
Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message from the AUSF in step 12 in Figure 6.1.3.2-1, proceed as
described below:
- If the AUSF has indicated in the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message to the SEAF that the
verification of the RES* was not successful in the AUSF, or
- if the verification of the RES* was not successful in the SEAF,
then the SEAF shall either reject the authentication by sending an Authentication Reject to the UE if the SUCI was used
by the UE in the initial NAS message or the SEAF/AMF shall initiate an Identification procedure with the UE if the 5G-
GUTI was used by the UE in the initial NAS message to retrieve the SUCI and an additional authentication attempt may
be initiated.
Also, if the SEAF does not receive any Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message from the AUSF as
expected, then the SEAF shall either reject the authentication to the UE or initiate an Identification procedure with the
UE."
As specified in TS 33.501 [7], clause 6.1.3.2.2.
Threat References: TR 33.926 [6], clause K.2.2.3, RES* verification failure
Test Case:
Test Name: TC_RES*_VERIFICATION_FAILURE
Purpose:
1) Verify that the SEAF/AMF correctly handles RES* verification failure detected in the SEAF/AMF or/and in the
AUSF, when the SUCI is included in the initial NAS message.
2) Verify that the SEAF/AMF correctly handles RES* verification failure detected in the SEAF/AMF or/and in the
AUSF, when the 5G-GUTI is included in the initial NAS message.
Procedure and execution steps:
Pre-Conditions:
Test environment with UE and AUSF. The UE and the AUSF may be simulated.
Execution Steps
A. Test Case 1
1) The UE sends RR with SUCI to the SEAF/AMF under test, to trigger the SEAF/AMF under test to initiate
the authentication, i.e. to send Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request to the AUSF.
2) The AUSF, after receiving the request from the SEAF/AMF under test, responds with a
Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message with an authentication vector to the SEAF/AMF
under test.
3) The UE, after receiving the Authentication Request message from the SEAF/AMF under test, returns an
incorrect RES* to the SEAF/AMF under test in the NAS Authentication Response message, which will
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3GPP TS 33.512 version 17.3.0 Release 17 11 ETSI TS 133 512 V17.3.0 (2022-05)
trigger the AMF to compute HRES*, compare HRES* with HXRES* and send an authentication request to
the AUSF. The tester captures the value of RES* in the request.
4) The AUSF returns to the AMF under test the indication of RES* verification failure.

B. Test Case 2
1) The UE sends RR with a 5G-GUTI to the SEAF/AMF under test, to trigger the SEAF/AMF under test to
initiate the authentication, i.e. to send Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request to the AUSF.
2) The AUSF, after receiving the request from the SEAF/AMF under test, responds with a
Nausf_UEAuthenticatio
...