ETSI TR 133 926 V15.2.0 (2019-10)

LTE; Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats and critical assets in 3GPP network product classes (3GPP TR 33.926 version 15.2.0 Release 15)

RTR/TSGS-0333926vf20

General Information

• Status: Published
• Publication Date: 08-Oct-2019
• Technical Committee: 3GPP SA 3 - Security
• Current Stage: 12 - Completion
• Completion Date: 09-Oct-2019

Standards Content (Sample)

TECHNICAL REPORT
LTE;
Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats and
critical assets in 3GPP network product classes
(3GPP TR 33.926 version 15.2.0 Release 15)

3GPP TR 33.926 version 15.2.0 Release 15 1 ETSI TR 133 926 V15.2.0 (2019-10)

Reference
RTR/TSGS-0333926vf20
Keywords
LTE,SECURITY
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3GPP TR 33.926 version 15.2.0 Release 15 2 ETSI TR 133 926 V15.2.0 (2019-10)
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Contents
Intellectual Property Rights . 2
Legal Notice . 2
Modal verbs terminology . 2
Foreword . 6
1 Scope . 7
2 References . 7
3 Definitions and abbreviations . 7
3.1 Definitions . 7
3.2 Abbreviations . 7
4 Generic Network Product (GNP) class description . 8
4.1 Overview . 8
4.2 Minimum set of functions defining the GNP class . 9
4.3 Generic network product model . 9
4.3.1 Generic network product model overview . 9
4.3.2 Functions defined by 3GPP . 9
4.3.3 Other functions . 9
4.3.4 Operating System (OS) . 9
4.3.5 Hardware . 9
4.3.6 Interfaces. 10
4.4 Scope of the present document . 10
4.4.1 Introduction. 10
4.4.2 Scope regarding GNP functions defined by 3GPP . 11
4.4.3 Scope regarding other functions . 11
4.4.4 Scope regarding Operating System (OS) . 11
4.4.5 Scope regarding hardware . 11
4.4.6 Scope regarding interfaces . 11
5 Generic Assets and Threats . 11
5.1 Introduction . 11
5.2 Generic critical assets . 11
5.3 Generic threats . 12
5.3.0 Generic threats format . 12
5.3.1 Introduction. 12
5.3.2 Threats relating to 3GPP-defined interfaces . 13
5.3.3 Spoofing identity . 13
5.3.3.1 Default Accounts . 13
5.3.3.2 Weak Password Policies . 13
5.3.3.3 Password peek . 14
5.3.3.4 Direct Root Access . 14
5.3.3.5 IP Spoofing . 14
5.3.3.6 Malware . 14
5.3.3.7 Eavesdropping . 14
5.3.4 Tampering . 15
5.3.4.1 Software Tampering . 15
5.3.4.2 Ownership File Misuse . 15
5.3.4.3 External Device Boot . 15
5.3.4.4 Log Tampering . 15
5.3.4.5 OAM Traffic Tampering . 15
5.3.4.6 File Write Permissions Abuse . 16
5.3.4.7 User Session Tampering . 16
5.3.5 Repudiation . 16
5.3.5.1 Lack of User Activity Trace . 16
5.3.6 Information disclosure . 16
5.3.6.1 Poor key generation. 16
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5.3.6.2 Poor key management . 17
5.3.6.3 Weak cryptographic algorithms . 17
5.3.6.4 Insecure Data Storage . 17
5.3.6.5 System Fingerprinting . 17
5.3.6.6 Malware . 17
5.3.6.7 Personal Identification Information Violation. 18
5.3.6.8 Insecure Default Configuration . 18
5.3.6.9 File/Directory Read Permissions Misuse . 18
5.3.6.10 Insecure Network Services . 18
5.3.6.11 Unnecessary Services . 18
5.3.6.12 Log Disclosure . 19
5.3.6.13 Unnecessary Applications . 19
5.3.6.14 Eavesdropping . 19
5.3.6.15 Security threat caused by lack of GNP traffic isolation . 19
5.3.7 Denial of service . 20
5.3.7.1 Compromised/Misbehaving User Equipments . 20
5.3.7.2 Implementation Flaw . 20
5.3.7.3 Insecure Network Services . 20
5.3.7.4 Human Error . 20
5.3.8 Elevation of privilege. 21
5.3.8.1 Misuse by authorized users . 21
5.3.8.2 Over-Privileged Processes/Services . 21
5.3.8.3 Folder Write Permission Abuse . 21
5.3.8.4 Root-Owned File Write Permission Abuse . 21
5.3.8.5 High-Privileged Files . 21
5.3.8.6 Insecure Network Services . 22
5.3.8.7 Elevation of Privilege via Unnecessary Network Services . 22
Annex A:  Aspects specific to the network product class MME . 23
A.1 Network product class description for the MME . 23
A.1.1 Introduction . 23
A.1.2 Minimum set of functions defining the MME network product class . 23
A.2 Assets and threats specific to the MME . 23
A.2.1 Critical assets . 23
A.2.2 Threats related to AKA procedures . 24
A.2.2.1 Access to 2G . 24
A.2.2.2 Resynchronization . 24
A.2.2.3 Failed Integrity check of Attach message . 24
A.2.2.4 Forwarding EPS authentication data to SGSN . 24
A.2.2.5 Forwarding unused EPS authentication data between different security domains . 24
A.2.3 Threats related to security mode command procedure . 25
A.2.3.1 Bidding Down . 25
A.2.3.2 NAS integrity selection and use . 25
A.2.3.3 NAS NULL integrity protection . 25
A.2.3.4 NAS confidentiality protection . 25
A.2.4 Threats related to security in Intra-RAT mobility . 25
A.2.4.1 Bidding down on X2-Handover . 25
A.2.4.2 NAS integrity protection algorithm selection in MME change . 26
A.2.5 Threats related to security in Inter-RAT mobility . 26
A.2.5.1 2G SIM access via idle mode mobility . 26
A.2.5.2 2G SIM access via handover. 26
A.2.5. 3 2G SIM access via SRVCC . 26
A.2.6 Threats related to release of non-emergency bearer . 26
Annex B:  Aspects specific to the network product class PGW . 28
B.1 Network product class description for the PGW . 28
B.1.1 Introduction . 28
B.1.2 Minimum set of functions defining the PGW network product class . 28
B.2 Assets and threats specific to the PGW . 28
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B.2.1 Critical assets . 28
B.2.2 Threats related to IP Address Allocation . 29
B.2.2.1 IP Address Reallocation Continuously. 29
B.2.3 Packet Forwarding . 29
B.2.3.1 Sending unauthorized packets to other UEs . 29
B.2.4 Emergency PDN Connection . 29
B.2.4.1 Inactive Emergency PDN Connection Release . 29
B.2.5 Threats related to charging relevant data . 29
B.2.5.1 Failure to assign unique TEID or Charging ID for a session . 29
Annex C:  Aspects specific to the network product class eNB . 30
C.1 Network product class description for the eNB . 30
C.1.1 Introduction. 30
C.1.2 Minimum set of functions defining the eNB network product class . 30
C.2 Assets and threats specific to the eNB . 30
C.2.1 Critical assets . 30
C.2.2 Threats related to Control plane and User plane . 31
C.2.2.1 Control plane data confidentiality protection . 31
C.2.2.2 Control plane data integrity protection . 31
C.2.2.3 User plane data ciphering and deciphering at eNB . 31
C.2.2.4 User plane data integrity protection . 31
Annex D: Change history . 32
History . 33

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Foreword
rd
This Technical Report has been produced by the 3 Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).
The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal
TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an
identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows:
Version x.y.z
where:
x the first digit:
1 presented to TSG for information;
2 presented to TSG for approval;
3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control.
Y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc.
z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document.
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1 Scope
The present document captures the network product class descriptions, threats and critical assets that have been
identified in the course of the work on 3GPP security assurance specifications. The main body of the present document
contains generic aspects that are believed to apply to more than one network product class, while Annexes cover the
aspects specific to one network product class.
2 References
The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present
document.
- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or
non-specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including
a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in the same
Release as the present document.
[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
[2] 3GPP TR 33.916: "Security Assurance Methodology for 3GPP network products classes".
[3] 3GPP TS 23.401: "General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) enhancements for Evolved Universal
Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) access".
[4] 3GPP TR 33.821: "Rationale and track of security decisions in Long Term Evolution (LTE)
RAN/3GPP System Architecture Evolution (SAE)".
[5] 3GPP TS 33.116: "Security Assurance Specification for MME network product class".
[6] 3GPP TS 33.250: "Security assurance specification for the PGW network product class".
3 Definitions and abbreviations
3.1 Definitions
For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following
apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP
TR 21.905 [1].
GNP Class (Generic Network Product Class): generic network product class is a class of network products that all
implement a common set of 3GPP-defined functionalities for that particular network product
3.2 Abbreviations
For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply.
An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any,
in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].
GNP Generic Network Product
SCAS Security Assurance Specification
SECAM Security Assurance Methodology
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4 Generic Network Product (GNP) class description
4.1 Overview
A 3GPP generic network product class defines a set of functions that are implemented on that product, which includes,
but not limited to minimum set of common 3GPP functions for that product covered in 3GPP specifications, other
functions not covered by 3GPP specifications, as well as interfaces to access that product. A generic network product
also includes hardware, software, and OS components that the product is implemented on. The current document
describes the threats and the critical assets in the course of developing 3GPP security assurance specifications for a
particular network product class.
Applicability of the GNP security assurance specification to products: Assume a telecom equipment vendor wants
to sell a product to an operator, and the latter is interested in following the Security Assurance Methodology as
described in TR 33.916[2], then, before evaluation according to TR 33.916[2] in a testing laboratory can start, it first
needs to be determined which security assurance specifications written by 3GPP apply to the given product.
Each 3GPP Network Product, is basically a device composed of hardware (e.g. chip, processors, RAM, network cards),
software (e.g. operating system, drivers, applications, services, protocols), and interfaces (e.g. console interfaces and
O&M interfaces) that allow the 3GPP network product to be managed and configured locally and/or remotely A GNP is
a 3GPP network product.
GNP Security Assurance Specification (GNP SCAS): The GNP SCAS provides a description of the security
requirements (which are including test cases) pertaining to that generic network product class.
Need for a GNP network product model: This minimum set of functions listed in clause 4.2 is exclusively meant as a
membership criterion for the GNP Class. It is not meant to restrict the functionality of a GNP, or the scope of the
present document in any way. On the contrary, it is clear that GNPs will contain many more functions than those from
the minimum set listed in clause 4.2, and the GNP will contain requirements relating to functions not contained in this
minimum set. Some of these functions, beyond the minimum set, can be found from various 3GPP specifications, but
by far not all these functions. This implies that there is a need to describe the functions that cannot be found from 3GPP
specifications in some other way before the GNP can be written so that the GNP can make reference to this description.
This description is the GNP model, cf. clause 4.3.
EXAMPLE 1: 3GPP specifications do not describe a local management interface, but the GNP will have to take it
into account, so a local management interface needs to be part of an GNP model.
EXAMPLE 2: The GNP sometimes says e.g.: "Authentication events on the local management interface shall be
logged." This implies the presence of a logging function. The logging function is not part of the
defining minimum set of functions from clause 4.2. If a product implements this minimum set, but
no logging function, then this just means that the product is a GNP, but will fail the evaluation
against the GNP SCAS.
The GNP model is further used in clauses 5 and 6 in various ways, e.g. the critical assets can point to parts of the GNP
model, threats and requirements can refer to interfaces shown in the GNP model, etc.
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4.2 Minimum set of functions defining the GNP class
According to TR 33.916 [2], a network product class is a class of products that all implement a common set of 3GPP-
defined functionalities. This common set is defined to be the list of functions contained in pertinent 3GPP
specifications, such as clause 4.3 of 3GPP TS 23.401 [3], Release 8 [3].
NOTE: The reason why the definition of the common set of functions refers to a particular Release 8 version of
TS 23.401 [3], contrary to what is customary in 3GPP when referencing other 3GPP specifications, is that
a Security Assurance Specification is to avoid having a moving target when defining a network product
class. Nevertheless, the set of functions in clause 4.3.1 of 3GPP TS 23.401, Release 8 [3] is expected to
be stable, as only FASMO corrections are allowed to Release 8. Furthermore, this set is believed to be
minimal, i.e. implemented by all network products, which may not be true for the corresponding set of
functions from later releases of TS 23.401 [3]. For the description of these functions compliance with TS
23.401 Release 8 [3] later version is allowed as, obviously, a generic network product should still remain
a member of the GNP class when it implements a FASMO correction to Release 8.

4.3 Generic network product model
4.3.1 Generic network product model overview
Figure 4.3-1 depicts the components of a generic network product model at a high level.
These components are further described in the following subclauses.

Figure 4.3-1: GNP model
4.3.2 Functions defined by 3GPP
A GNP will, in many cases, implement 3GPP-defined functions from various releases of pertinent 3GPP specifications.
Vendors are, to a large extent, free to select the features implemented in their GNPs. E.g. a GNP could lack support for
relay nodes, as introduced in Release 10, but implement all other features defined up to and including Release 10.
4.3.3 Other functions
A GNP will also contain functionality not or not fully covered in 3GPP specifications.
Examples include, but are not limited to, local or remote management functions.
4.3.4 Operating System (OS)
The present document assumes that the GNP is implemented on dedicated hardware that requires an operating system to
run.
4.3.5 Hardware
The present document assumes that the GNP is implemented on dedicated hardware. Aspects of virtualization and cloud
are not taken into account in the present version.
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NOTE: Aspects of virtualization and cloud are FFS in future releases of the GNP SCAS. They deserve separate
study for finding out how to define the boundaries between the GNP class and the hosting environment
(e.g. shared HW and Virtual Machine) and which security assumptions to make on this environment.
4.3.6 Interfaces
There are two types of logical interfaces defined for the GNP:
- remote logical interfaces; and
- local logical interfaces.
A remote logical interface is an interface which can be used to communicate with the GNP from another network
node.
The entire protocol stack implementing the communication is considered to be part of the remote logical interface.
Remote Logical Interfaces also include the remote access interfaces to the GNP for its maintenance through e.g. an
Element Management System (EMS).
A local logical interface is an interface that can be used only via physical connection to the GNP. That is, the
connection requires physical access to the GNP.
The entire protocol stack is considered to be part of the local logical interface. The entire protocol stack and the physical
parts of the interface can be used by local connections.
Local Logical Interfaces also include the local hardware interfaces and the Local Maintenance Terminal interface
(LMT) of the GNP used for its maintenance through a console.
This means that for both, local and remote logical interfaces, the GNP model does not only cover the application layer
protocol, for which a GNP function terminates the interface (e.g. S5), but also the protocols (e.g. SCTP, IP, Ethernet,
USB) in the protocol stack below the application layer protocol.
There are some major differences between local and remote interfaces from security perspective. For example attaching
to a local interface may cause execution of complex internal procedures in the GNP like loading USB device drivers,
enumeration of attached devices, mounting file systems etc.
A GNP hosts the following interfaces:
Remote logical interfaces:
- Service interfaces that are defined in pertinent 3GPP specifications
- Service interfaces that are not defined by 3GPP
- Remote OAM interface
- EMS (Element Management System) interface
Local logical interfaces:
- OAM local console
- LMT (Local Maintenance Terminal) interface
- GNP local hardware interfaces
NOTE: There is some overlap between the present clause 4.3.6 and clauses 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 in as far as a GNP
function (e.g. S5) is part of the termination point for a logical interface.
4.4 Scope of the present document
4.4.1 Introduction
The present subclause refers to the GNP model in clause 4.3.
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4.4.2 Scope regarding GNP functions defined by 3GPP
The set of GNP functions actually implemented in an GNP is to be described in the annex of the present document. But
the GNP SCAS needs to explicitly address all GNP functions that, if present in an GNP network product, need to be
evaluated and hence covered by requirements in the GNP SCAS. Furthermore, it is to be avoided that a particular
version of an GNP SCAS becomes a moving target. This leads to the following requirement:
NOTE: Although the present document intends to cover the security problems and security requirements for all
NP functions described in the versions of 3GPP specifications, what other NP, in additional to the MME,
to be covered is at the discretion of the working group.
4.4.3 Scope regarding other functions
At least the following functions not defined by 3GPP are in scope of the GNP SCAS:
- Remote management functions
- Local management functions
4.4.4 Scope regarding Operating System (OS)
The GNP SCAS does not attempt a full evaluation of the correct internal functioning of the OS. However, interfaces
(I.e. the restriction on open ports and unnecessary services running in the system) and modifications (e.g. verification of
the correct applied patch level, hardening, etc.) of the OS are in scope.
4.4.5 Scope regarding hardware
The GNP SCAS does not attempt a full evaluation of the correct internal functioning of the hardware platform.
However, interfaces that are implemented in hardware (e.g. USB port) and modifications of the hardware are in scope.
4.4.6 Scope regarding interfaces
The interfaces listed in clause 4.3.6 are all in scope of the present document.
5 Generic Assets and Threats
5.1 Introduction
The present subclause contains assets and threats that are believed to apply to more than one network product.
5.2 Generic critical assets
The critical assets of GNP to be protected are:
- User account data and credentials (e.g. passwords);
- Log data;
- Configuration data, e.g. GNP's IP address, ports, VPN ID, Management Objects (e.g. user group, command
group) etc.
- Operating System (OS), i.e. the files that make up the OS and its processes (code and data);
- GNP Application;
- Sufficient processing capacity: that processing powers are not consumed close to limits;
- Hardware, e.g. mainframe, board, power supply unit etc.
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- The interfaces of GNP to be protected and which are within SECAM scope: for example
- Console interface, for local access: local interface on MME
- OAM interface, for remote access: interface between MME and OAM system
NOTE 1: The detailed interfaces of the GNP are described in clause 4, Generic Network Product Class Description
of the present document.
- GNP Software: binary code or executable code
NOTE 2: GNP files may be any file owned by a user (root user as well as non root uses), including User account
data and credentials, Log data, configuration data, OS files, GNP applications or GNP Software.
5.3 Generic threats
5.3.0 Generic threats format
Threats are described using the following format:
- Threat Name:
- Threat Category:
- Threat Description:
- Threatened Asset:
5.3.1 Introduction
Threat analysis is an important step in the SCAS methodology in order to justify a proposed requirement and ensuring
that no relevant requirements have been forgotten.
In particular, to ensure this latter point, the threat analysis needs to be free of gaps and overlapping, and it needs to be
ensured that all relevant threats are covered by a requirement.
To resolve the overlapping, it is suggested to first look at the action used to exploit the threat is considered. For example
if passwords are stored locally in the GNP (e.g. in a database or file system) in an insecure way (e.g. clear text, unsalted
hashes), an attacker can retrieve these passwords (e.g. can retrieve the file containing them and can retrieved them by
means of brute forcing if an unsalted hashes is used) and later use them. So the threat related to this scenario is
Information Disclosure.
To achieve this goal, the identified threats are grouped into the seven categories, one covering threats relating to 3GPP-
defined interfaces and the other six ones corresponding to the categories proposed by STRIDE
[http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee823878(v=cs.20).aspx] and reported below:
- Spoofing identity. An example of identity spoofing is illegally accessing and then using another user's
authentication information, such as username and password.
- Tampering with data. Data tampering involves the malicious modification of data. Examples include
unauthorized changes made to persistent data, such as that held in a database, and the alteration of data as it
flows between two computers over an open network, such as the Internet.
- Repudiation. Repudiation threats are associated with users who deny performing an action without other parties
having any way to prove otherwise. For example, a user performs an illegal operation in a system that lacks the
ability to trace the prohibited operations. Non-repudiation refers to the ability of a system to counter repudiation
threats. For example, a user who purchases an item might have to sign for the item upon receipt. The vendor can
then use the signed receipt as evidence that the user did receive the package.
- Information disclosure. Information disclosure threats involve the exposure of information to individuals who
are not supposed to have access to it. For example, the ability of users to read a file that they were not granted
access to, or the ability of an intruder to read data in transit between two computers.
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- Denial of service. Denial of service (DoS) attacks deny service to valid users-for example, by making a Web
server temporarily unavailable or unusable. You need to protect against certain types of DoS threats simply to
improve system availability and reliability.
- Elevation of privilege. In this type of threat, an unprivileged user gains privileged access and thereby has
sufficient access to compromise or destroy the entire system. Elevation of privilege threats include those
situations i
...