ETSI GS QKD 016 V1.1.1 (2023-04)

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD); Common Criteria Protection Profile - Pair of Prepare and Measure Quantum Key Distribution Modules

DGS/QKD-016-PP

General Information

• Status: Not Published
• Technical Committee: QKD - Quantum Key Distribution
• Current Stage: 12 - Completion
• Due Date: 02-May-2023
• Completion Date: 18-Apr-2023

Standards Content (Sample)

GROUP SPECIFICATION
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD);
Common Criteria Protection Profile - Pair of Prepare and
Measure Quantum Key Distribution Modules
Disclaimer
The present document has been produced and approved by the Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) ETSI Industry Specification
Group (ISG) and represents the views of those members who participated in this ISG.
It does not necessarily represent the views of the entire ETSI membership.

2 ETSI GS QKD 016 V1.1.1 (2023-04)

Reference
DGS/QKD-016-PP
Keywords
quantum cryptography, quantum key distribution

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3 ETSI GS QKD 016 V1.1.1 (2023-04)
Contents
Intellectual Property Rights . 9
Foreword . 9
Modal verbs terminology . 9
Introduction . 9
1 Scope . 10
2 References . 10
2.1 Normative references . 10
2.2 Informative references . 10
3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations . 11
3.1 Terms . 11
3.2 Symbols . 13
3.3 Abbreviations . 13
4 Application Notes in the PP . 13
5 PP introduction . 13
5.1 PP reference . 13
5.2 PP Overview . 14
5.3 TOE overview . 14
5.3.1 TOE type . 14
5.3.2 TOE definition . 14
5.3.3 TOE users . 17
5.3.4 Method of use . 17
5.3.5 Life-cycle . 18
5.3.5.1 Overview . 18
5.3.5.2 Calibration state . 19
5.3.5.3 QKD state . 20
5.3.5.4 Failure state . 20
5.3.5.5 End of Life state . 20
5.3.5.6 Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware available to the TOE. 20
6 Conformance claims . 20
6.1 CC conformance claims . 20
6.2 Package claim . 21
6.3 PP claim . 21
6.4 Conformance rationale . 21
6.5 Conformance statement . 21
6.6 PP Application Notes . 21
7 Security problem definition . 21
7.1 Assets, TSF data, users, subjects, objects and security attributes . 21
7.1.1 Assets and TSF data . 21
7.1.2 Users and subjects . 22
7.1.3 Objects . 22
7.1.4 Security attributes . 22
7.2 Threats . 23
7.2.1 T.ServAcc Unauthorized access to data and functions in TOE . 23
7.2.2 T.Session Session hijacking or piggybacking . 23
7.2.3 T.QKDEave Eavesdropping on QKD link data . 23
7.2.4 T.QKDMani Manipulation of QKD link data . 23
7.2.5 T.ExplMal Exploitation of TOE malfunction . 23
7.2.6 T.Observe Observation of TSF characteristics . 23
7.3 Organisational security policies . 24
7.3.1 OSP.QKDService Key distribution services of the TOE . 24
7.3.2 OSP.Audit Audit for security operations . 24
7.3.3 OSP.SecEoL Secure End of Life state . 24
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7.4 Assumptions . 24
7.4.1 A.Maint Diligent maintenance . 24
7.4.2 A.SecureOp Operation in a secure area . 24
8 Security objectives . 24
8.1 Security objectives for the TOE . 24
8.1.1 Interpretation of security objectives . 24
8.1.2 O.Identify Identification of users . 24
8.1.3 O.AccCtrl Access control . 25
8.1.4 O.QKD Quantum Key Distribution . 25
8.1.5 O.QKDAuth Authenticated classical channel . 25
8.1.6 O.Audit Audit for cryptographic TSF . 25
8.1.7 O.TST Self-test . 26
8.1.8 O.EMSec Emanation Security . 26
8.1.9 O.Sanitize Secure End of Life state . 26
8.1.10 O.SessionLimit Limitation of user sessions . 26
8.2 Security objectives for the operational environment . 26
8.2.1 OE.Trust Trustworthy users . 26
8.2.2 OE.Audit Review and availability of audit records . 26
8.2.3 OE.SecureOp Secure Operational environment . 27
8.2.4 OE.Personnel Trustworthy personnel . 27
8.3 Security objective rationale . 27
8.3.1 Table of rationale . 27
8.3.2 T.ServAcc . 28
8.3.3 T.Session . 28
8.3.4 T.QKDEave . 28
8.3.5 T.QKDMani . 28
8.3.6 T.ExplMal . 29
8.3.7 T.Observe. 29
8.3.8 OSP.QKDService . 29
8.3.9 OSP.Audit . 29
8.3.10 OSP.SecEoL . 29
8.3.11 A.SecureOp . 29
8.3.12 A.Maint . 29
9 Extended component definition . 30
9.1 Quantum Key Distribution (FCS_QKD) . 30
9.2 Random number generation (FCS_RNG) . 33
9.3 Sanitizing on State Change (FDP_RIP.4) . 34
9.4 Emanation of TSF and user data (FPT_EMS) . 35
9.5 Inter-TSF trusted channel - authenticated classical channel (FTP_ITC.2) . 36
10 Security requirements . 37
10.1 Operations within this PP . 37
10.2 Security functional requirements . 37
10.2.1 User Identification and Management . 37
10.2.2 Access Control . 39
10.2.3 Audit Data . 42
10.2.4 Reaching and preserving secure states . 44
10.2.5 Authenticated classical channel of QKD link . 46
10.2.6 QKD Key Establishment . 47
10.2.7 Management . 49
10.3 Security assurance requirements . 50
10.3.1 Evaluation Assurance Level . 50
10.3.2 Security assurance requirements rationale . 50
10.4 Security requirements rationale . 50
10.4.1 Dependency rationale . 50
10.4.2 Rationale for security objectives . 52
10.4.2.1 Table of rationale . 52
10.4.2.2 O.Identify . 53
10.4.2.3 O.AccCtrl . 53
10.4.2.4 O.QKD . 53
10.4.2.5 O.QKDAuth . 54
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10.4.2.6 O.Audit . 54
10.4.2.7 O.TST . 54
10.4.2.8 O.EMSec . 55
10.4.2.9 O.Sanitize . 55
10.4.2.10 O.SessionLimit . 55
11 Packages . 55
11.1 Trusted User Interfaces with Authentication . 55
11.1.1 Identification . 55
11.1.2 Introduction. 55
11.1.2.1 Overview . 55
11.1.2.2 TOE definition . 55
11.1.2.3 Life-cycle . 56
11.1.2.4 Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware available to the TOE. 56
11.1.3 Security Problem Definition . 56
11.1.3.1 Assets, TSF data, users, subjects, objects and security attributes. 56
11.1.3.1.1 Assets and TSF data . 56
11.1.3.1.2 Users and subjects . 56
11.1.3.1.3 Objects . 57
11.1.3.1.4 Security attributes . 57
11.1.3.2 Threats . 57
11.1.3.2.1 Rationale for defining additional threats . 57
11.1.3.2.2 T.DataCompr Eavesdropping on data on user interfaces . 57
11.1.3.2.3 T.DataMani Generation or manipulation of communication data . 57
11.1.3.2.4 T.Combine Analysing and combining information at different interfaces . 57
11.1.3.2.5 T.Masqu Generation or manipulation of data on user interfaces . 57
11.1.3.2.6 T.Impersonate Impersonation of other users . 57
11.1.3.3 Assumptions . 57
11.1.3.3.1 A.SecComm Secure communication . 57
11.1.4 Security Objectives . 58
11.1.4.1 New objectives for the TOE . 58
11.1.4.1.1 O.TPath Trusted path with user authentication . 58
11.1.4.1.2 O.AuthFail Reaction to failed user authentication . 58
11.1.4.2 Refined objectives for the TOE . 58
11.1.4.2.1 O.EMSec Emanation Security . 58
11.1.4.3 New objectives for the environment . 58
11.1.4.3.1 OE.SecComm Protection of communication channel . 58
11.1.4.3.2 OE.AuthData Secrecy and generation of authentication data . 58
11.1.4.4 Refined objectives for the environment . 59
11.1.4.4.1 Notes . 59
11.1.4.4.2 OE.SecureOp Secure Operational environment . 59
11.1.4.4.3 OE.Personnel Trustworthy personnel . 59
11.1.4.5 Rationale for the refinements . 59
11.1.4.5.1 O.EMSec . 59
11.1.4.5.2 OE.SecureOp . 59
11.1.4.5.3 OE.Personnel . 59
11.1.4.6 Rationale for security objectives . 60
11.1.4.6.1 T.Observe . 60
11.1.4.6.2 T.DataCompr . 60
11.1.4.6.3 T.DataMani . 60
11.1.4.6.4 T.Masqu . 60
11.1.4.6.5 T.Impersonate . 60
11.1.4.6.6 A.SecComm . 60
11.1.5 Security requirements . 61
11.1.5.1 New requirements for the TOE . 61
11.1.5.1.1 Trusted Path to remote users . 61
11.1.5.1.2 User Authentication . 62
11.1.5.2 Refined requirements for the TOE . 63
11.1.5.3 SFR Dependency rationale . 63
11.1.5.4 Rationale for the security requirements. 64
11.1.5.4.1 Table of rationale . 64
11.1.5.4.2 O.EMSec . 64
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11.1.5.4.3 O.TPath. 64
11.1.5.4.4 O.AuthFail . 64
11.2 TOE self-protection . 65
11.2.1 Identification . 65
11.2.2 Introduction. 65
11.2.3 Security Problem Definition . 65
11.2.3.1 Assets, TSF data, users, subjects, objects and security attributes. 65
11.2.3.1.1 Assets and TSF data . 65
11.2.3.1.2 Users and subjects . 65
11.2.3.1.3 Objects . 65
11.2.3.1.4 Security attributes . 65
11.2.3.2 Threats . 66
11.2.3.2.1 T.PhysAttack Physical attacks . 66
11.2.3.3 Assumptions . 66
11.2.3.3.1 A.SecureOp . 66
11.2.4 Security Objectives . 66
11.2.4.1 New objectives for the TOE . 66
11.2.4.1.1 O.PhysProt Physical protection . 66
11.2.4.2 Refined objectives for the TOE . 66
11.2.4.2.1 O.EMSec Emanation Security . 66
11.2.4.3 Refined objectives for the environment . 67
11.2.4.3.1 OE.SecureOp Secure Operational environment . 67
11.2.4.4 Rationale for the refinements . 67
11.2.4.4.1 O.EMSec . 67
11.2.4.4.2 OE.SecureOp . 67
11.2.4.5 Rationale for the security objectives . 67
11.2.4.5.1 T.PhysAttack . 67
11.2.4.5.2 A.SecureOp . 67
11.2.5 Security requirements . 68
11.2.5.1 Introduction . 68
11.2.5.2 New requirements for the TOE . 68
11.2.5.3 Refined requirements for the TOE . 68
11.2.5.4 SFR Dependency Rationale . 69
11.2.5.5 Rationale for the Security Requirements. 69
11.2.5.5.1 Table of rationale . 69
11.2.5.5.2 O.PhysProt . 69
11.2.5.5.3 O.EMSec . 69
11.3 Provisioning and re-personalization after delivery . 69
11.3.1 Identification . 69
11.3.2 Introduction. 69
11.3.2.1 Overview . 69
11.3.2.2 Life-cycle . 70
11.3.3 Security Problem Definition . 70
11.3.3.1 Assets, TSF data, users, subjects, objects and security attributes. 70
11.3.3.1.1 Assets and TSF data . 70
11.3.3.1.2 Users and subjects . 70
11.3.3.1.3 Objects . 71
11.3.3.1.4 Security attributes . 71
11.3.3.2 Threats . 71
11.3.3.2.1 T.Initialize Compromised initialization of TSF data . 71
11.3.3.3 Assumptions . 71
11.3.3.3.1 A.SecureOp . 71
11.3.4 Security Objectives . 72
11.3.4.1 New objectives for the TOE . 72
11.3.4.1.1 O.Personalization Access control to personalization . 72
11.3.4.1.2 O.Pristine Proof of intactness after initial delivery . 72
11.3.4.2 New objectives for the environment . 72
11.3.4.2.1 Note . 72
11.3.4.2.2 OE.Initialize Secure environment for initialization . 72
11.3.4.3 Rationale for the refinements . 72
11.3.4.3.1 A.SecureOp . 72
11.3.4.4 Rationale for security objectives . 73
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11.3.4.4.1 T.Initialize . 73
11.3.4.4.2 A.SecureOp . 73
11.3.5 Security requirements . 73
11.3.5.1 New requirements for the TOE . 73
11.3.5.2 Refined requirements for the TOE . 73
11.3.5.3 SFR Dependency Rationale . 77
11.3.5.4 Rationale for the Security Requirements. 77
11.3.5.4.1 Table of rationale . 77
11.3.5.4.2 O.Personalization. 77
11.3.5.4.3 O.Pristine . 78
11.4 Local Authentication of Users . 78
11.4.1 Identification . 78
11.4.2 Introduction. 78
11.4.2.1 Overview . 78
11.4.2.2 TOE definition . 78
11.4.2.3 Life-cycle . 78
11.4.3 Security Problem Definition . 79
11.4.3.1 Assets, TSF data, users, subjects, objects and security attributes. 79
11.4.3.1.1 Assets and TSF data . 79
11.4.3.1.2 Users and subjects . 79
11.4.3.1.3 Objects . 79
11.4.3.1.4 Security attributes . 79
11.4.3.2 Threats .
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