ETSI TS 187 001 V2.1.5 (2008-10)

Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); NGN SECurity (SEC); Requirements

RTS/TISPAN-07026-NGN-R2

General Information

• Status: Published
• Publication Date: 05-Oct-2008
• Technical Committee: TISPAN 7 - TISPAN Security
• Current Stage: 12 - Completion
• Due Date: 06-Oct-2008
• Completion Date: 06-Oct-2008

Standards Content (Sample)

Technical Specification
Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and
Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN);
NGN SECurity (SEC);
Requirements
2 ETSI TS 187 001 V2.1.5 (2008-10)

Reference
RTS/TISPAN-07026-NGN-R2
Keywords
security, service
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ETSI
3 ETSI TS 187 001 V2.1.5 (2008-10)
Contents
Intellectual Property Rights . 5
Foreword . 5
Introduction . 5
1 Scope . 6
2 References . 6
2.1 Normative references . 7
2.2 Informative references . 7
3 Definitions and abbreviations . 8
3.1 Definitions . 8
3.2 Abbreviations . 8
4 Security Requirements . 9
4.1 Security Policy Requirements . 9
4.2 Authentication, Authorization, Access Control and Accountability Requirements . 10
4.3 Identity and Secure Registration Requirements . 12
4.4 Communications and Data Security Requirements . 12
4.4.1 General Communications and Data Security Requirements . 12
4.4.2 Integrity and Replay Protection Requirements . 13
4.4.3 Confidentiality Requirements . 14
4.5 Privacy Requirements . 14
4.6 Key Management Requirements . 15
4.7 Secure Management Requirements . 15
4.8 NAT/Firewall Interworking Requirements . 15
4.9 Non-Repudiation Requirements . 15
4.10 Availability and DoS protection Requirements . 15
4.11 Assurance Requirements . 16
4.12 Requirements on Strength of Security Mechanisms . 16
4.13 IPTV Security Requirements . 16
4.13.1 Common IPTV Security Requirements . 16
4.13.2 IPTV Service Protection Requirements . 17
4.13.3 IPTV Content Protection Requirements . 17
4.13.4 IMS-based IPTV Security Requirements . 17
4.13.5 Non-IMS-based IPTV Security Requirements. 17
4.13.6 Availability and DoS Protection Requirements . 18
4.14 DRM . 18
4.15 Media Security Requirements . 18
4.15.1 Common Media Security Requirements . 18
5.15.1.1 Regulatory Requirements . 18
5.15.1.2 Non-broadcast media paths . 19
5.15.1.3 NGN Requirements . 19
5.15.1.4 NGCN Requirements . 19
4.15.2 IMS-based Media Security Requirements . 19
4.15.3 Non-IMS-based Media Security Requirements . 20
4.16 Security Requirements to Counter Unsolicited Communications . 20
4.17 Business communication security requirements . 20
4.17.1 General security requirements . 20
4.17.2 Specific security requirements for NGN/NGCN interconnection . 20
4.17.3 Specific security requirements for hosted enterprise services . 20
4.17.4 Specific security requirements for business trunking application . 20
4.17.4.1 Security requirements for (subscription-based) business trunking application . 20
4.17.4.2 Security requirements for (peering-based) business trunking application. 20
4.17.5 Specific security requirements for virtual leased line . 21
4.18 NAT Traversal Security Requirements . 21
4.19 Home Networking Security Requirements . 21
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4 ETSI TS 187 001 V2.1.5 (2008-10)
4.20 H.248 Security Requirements . 22
5 NGN Security Release 2 Requirements Mapping . 22
5.1 Network Access SubSystem (NASS) . 23
5.2 Resource and Admission Control Subsystem (RACS) . 24
5.3 The Core IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) . 25
5.4 The PSTN/ISDN Emulation subsystem (PES) . 28
5.5 Application Server (AS) . 28
Annex A (informative): Bibliography . 30
Annex B (informative): H.248 Security . 31
B.1 Background . 31
B.2 Challenging the assumption . 31
B.3 Possible disadvantages . 32
Annex C (informative): Trust domains in NGN . 33
C.1 Definition of trust for the NGN - analysis . 33
C.2 Requirements for creation of trusted channel . 34
C.2.1 Functional security requirements for trusted channel in the NGN . 34
C.3 Existing NGN capabilities . . 34
History . 35

ETSI
5 ETSI TS 187 001 V2.1.5 (2008-10)
Intellectual Property Rights
IPRs essential or potentially essential to the present document may have been declared to ETSI. The information
pertaining to these essential IPRs, if any, is publicly available for ETSI members and non-members, and can be found
in ETSI SR 000 314: "Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs); Essential, or potentially Essential, IPRs notified to ETSI in
respect of ETSI standards", which is available from the ETSI Secretariat. Latest updates are available on the ETSI Web
server (http://webapp.etsi.org/IPR/home.asp).
Pursuant to the ETSI IPR Policy, no investigation, including IPR searches, has been carried out by ETSI. No guarantee
can be given as to the existence of other IPRs not referenced in ETSI SR 000 314 (or the updates on the ETSI Web
server) which are, or may be, or may become, essential to the present document.
Foreword
This Technical Specification (TS) has been produced by ETSI Technical Committee Telecommunications and Internet
converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN).
Introduction
The TISPAN NGN R1 security is defined by the security requirements in the present document, while the architectural
aspects and stage 2 implementations outline are covered in the Security Architecture for R1 (TS 187 003 [1]).
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6 ETSI TS 187 001 V2.1.5 (2008-10)
1 Scope
The present document defines the security requirements pertaining to TISPAN NGN Release 2. The present document
holds requirements for the various NGN subsystems defined at a stage 1 level. The present document covers security
requirements for both the NGN core network, and the NGN access network(s).
The main scope of the security requirements for the different subsystems are to identify requirement in the following
main areas:
• Security Policies.
• Authentication, Authorization, Access Control and Accountability.
• Identity and Secure Registration.
• Communications and Data Security Requirements (including confidentiality, integrity aspects).
• Privacy.
• Key Management.
• NAT/Firewall Interworking.
• Availability and DoS protection.
• Assurance.
• Strength of Security Mechanisms.
2 References
References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or
non-specific.
• For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
• Non-specific reference may be made only to a complete document or a part thereof and only in the following
cases:
- if it is accepted that it will be possible to use all future changes of the referenced document for the
purposes of the referring document;
- for informative references.
Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at
http://docbox.etsi.org/Reference.
For online referenced documents, information sufficient to identify and locate the source shall be provided. Preferably,
the primary source of the referenced document should be cited, in order to ensure traceability. Furthermore, the
reference should, as far as possible, remain valid for the expected life of the document. The reference shall include the
method of access to the referenced document and the full network address, with the same punctuation and use of upper
case and lower case letters.
NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication ETSI cannot guarantee
their long term validity.
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7 ETSI TS 187 001 V2.1.5 (2008-10)
2.1 Normative references
The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of the present document. For dated
references, only the edition cited applies. For non-specific references, the latest edition of the referenced document
(including any amendments) applies.
[1] ETSI TS 187 003: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for
Advanced Networking (TISPAN); NGN Security; Security Architecture".
[2] ETSI TS 133 203: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile
Telecommunications System (UMTS); 3G security; Access security for IP-based services (3GPP
TS 33.203)".
[3] ETSI TS 133 210: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile
Telecommunications System (UMTS); 3G security; Network Domain Security (NDS); IP network
layer security (3GPP TS 33.210)".
[4] ETSI EG 202 238: "Telecommunications and Internet Protocol Harmonization Over Networks
(TIPHON); Evaluation criteria for cryptographic algorithms".
2.2 Informative references
The following referenced documents are not essential to the use of the present document but they assist the user with
regard to a particular subject area. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including
any amendments) applies.
[i.1] ISO 15408-1: "Information technology - Security techniques - Evaluation criteria for IT security -
Part 1: Introduction and general model".
[i.2] IEEE 802.1X: "Port Based Network Access Control".
[i.3] ISO 15408-2: "Information technology - Security techniques - Evaluation criteria for IT security -
Part 2: Security functional components".
[i.4] IETF RFC 3324: "Short Term Requirements for Network Asserted Identity".
[i.5] IETF RFC 3325: "Private Extensions to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for Asserted Identity
within Trusted Networks".
[i.6] ETSI ES 283 002: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for
Advanced Networking (TISPAN); H.248 Profile for controlling Access and Residential
Gateways".
[i.7] ETSI TS 187 005: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for
Advanced Networking (TISPAN); NGN Lawful Interception; Lawful interception functional
entities, information flow and reference points".
[i.8] ETSI TS 133 310: "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Network domain
security; Authentication framework (NDS/AF) (3GPP TS 33.310)".
[i.9] ETSI TS 133 234: "Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); 3G security;
Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) interworking security (3GPP TS 33.234)".
[i.10] ISO 27000: "Information technology - Security techniques - Information security management
systems - Overview and vocabulary".
[i.11] ETSI TR 187 011: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for
Advanced Networking (TISPAN); NGN Security; Application of ISO-15408-2 requirements to
ETSI standards - guide, method and application with examples".
[i.12] ETSI TR 187 010: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for
Advanced Networking (TISPAN); NGN Security; Report on issues related to security in identity
imanagement and their resolution in the NGN".
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8 ETSI TS 187 001 V2.1.5 (2008-10)
[i.13] ETSI TS 124 229: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile
Telecommunications System (UMTS); Internet Protocol (IP) multimedia call control protocol
based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP); Stage 3
(3GPP TS 24.229)".
3 Definitions and abbreviations
3.1 Definitions
For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions apply:
anonymous communication: anonymous communication session is given when a user receiving a communication
session cannot identify the originating user
trusted channel: means by which an NGN and a remote NGN/NGCN can communicate with necessary confidence to
support the security policies of the NGN (from ISO 15408-1 [i.1])
trusted path: means by which a user and a NGN/NGCN can communicate with necessary confidence to support the
security policies of the NGN/NGCN (from ISO 15408-1 [i.1])
trusted domain: in the context of one or more NGNs interconnected by the NNI as defined in TS 124 229 [i.13] clause
4.4 then trust is achieved by implementing one or more of the security mechanisms defined in TS 187 003 [1]
3.2 Abbreviations
For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply:
rd
3G 3 Generation
rd
3GPP 3 Generation Partnership Project
AA Authentication & Authorization
ACR Anonymous Communications Rejection
AF Application Function
AGW Access Gateway
ALG Application Layer Gateway
AP Authentication Proxy
AS Application Server
CNG Customer Network Gateway
CPE Customer Premises Equipment
CPN Customer Premises Network
CSCF Call Session Control Function
DoS Denial-of-Service
EAP-AKA Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for UMTS Authentication and Key Agreement
HSS Home Subscriber Server
ID IDentity
IKE Internet Key Exchange
IMPU IMS PUblic user ID
IMS IP Multimedia Subsystem
IP Internet Protocol
ISIM IMS Subscriber Identity Module
IT nformation Technology
MAC Message Authentication Code
MD Message Digest
NAF operator controlled Network Application Function
NASS Network Access SubSystem
NAT Network Address Translation
NDS Network Domain Security
NGCN Next Generation Corporate Network
NGN Next Generation Network
NICC Network Interoperability Consultative Committee
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9 ETSI TS 187 001 V2.1.5 (2008-10)
PAI Public Administration International
P-CSCF Proxy - Call Session Control Function
PES PSTN/ISDN Emulation Subsystem
RACS Resource Admission Control Subsystem
RGW Residential Gateway
S-CSCF Serving - Call Session Control Function
SEGF SEcurity Gateway Functions
SIP Session Initiation Protocol
TISPAN Telecommunication and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking
TOE Security Functions
TS Technical Specification
TSF Target of Evaluation
UAS User Agent Server
UE User Equipment
UICC Universal Integrated Circuit Card
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunication System
4 Security Requirements
Security requirements described in clause 4 are identified by a symbolic security requirement identifier (e.g. R-SP-n)
for quick reference and along with some textual description. The security requirements are listed without any implied
preference or priority. It is pointed out that not all security requirements are mutually exclusive, but there is indeed
some unavoidable overlap among them.
High level Objectives
The NGN shall support a secure and trustworthy environment for customers, network operators and service providers to
meet a set of comprehensive and fundamental security requirements.
Given the service requirements, the security objectives are to prevent masquerade, DoS, manipulation of data, fraud and
misuse of the network, abuse of one type of network through interconnection from a less secure environment.
ISIM shall be hosted on a UICC. Use of the ISIM on UICC is the preferred solution for achieving the security
requirements to access the NGN IMS features. This does not preclude existing solutions such as e.g. Digest
Authentication to allow early legacy implementations. The ISIM may reside within the device itself, or be accessed
remotely, via a local interface to the "device holding the UICC".
Security requirements for users, service providers (access, application) may vary. The NGN security architecture shall
not be limited to a single security policy. Each of the security services (authentication, data integrity, replay detection,
confidentiality, etc.) must have the capability to be used independently of the others, as far as possible. The selection of
services should be based on policy.
Security mechanisms needs to provide capabilities to allow for extensibility for new security mechanism and protocols.
Security mechanisms should not introduce new DoS attacks. Some security mechanisms and algorithms require
substantial processing or storage, in which case the security protocols should protect themselves as much as possible
against flooding attacks that overwhelm an endpoint with such processing or storage. Satisfying the requirement for
high availability implies being able to mitigate denial-of-service attacks.
4.1 Security Policy Requirements
A security policy defines the legitimate users of a system and what they are allowed to do. It states what information
must be protected from which threats. In environments with heterogeneous user communities, multiple
vendors' equipment, differing threat models, and uneven deployment of security functionality, assurance that security is
functioning correctly is extremely difficult without enforceable policies.
(R-SP- 1) The TISPAN NGN network shall be logically and physically divided into security domains
allowing for separation of application (e.g. IMS) and transport (e.g. ADSL or UMTS). Also
different operators of similar networks (e.g. IMS) shall be able to operate their own security
policies.
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10 ETSI TS 187 001 V2.1.5 (2008-10)
(R-SP- 2) Security mechanisms and other parameters beyond default security mechanisms shall be
configurable. This shall be static for NNI interface and may be negotiated for UNI interfaces. The
security mechanism negotiation shall have a certain minimum level to be defined by the security
domain; e.g. avoid bidding-down attacks. Users shall be able to reject communications that do not
conform to their minimum security policy.
(R-SP- 3) The security mechanisms shall be partitioned such that the functions of authentication, data
integrity, replay detection, and confidentiality may be implemented and selected independently of
each other, insofar as this makes sense.
(R-SP- 4) The UE shall always offer encryption algorithms for P-CSCF to be used for the session and the
P-CSCF policy shall define whether to use encryption or not.
(R-SP- 5) The UE and the P CSCF shall negotiate the integrity algorithm that shall be used for the session.
(R-SP- 6) The policy of the HN shall be used to decide if an authentication shall take place for the
registration of different IMPUs e.g. belonging to same or different service profiles.
(R-SP- 7) The security gateway functions (SEGF) shall be responsible for enforcing security policies for the
interworking between networks.
NOTE: The actual inter-security domain policy is not standardized and is left to the discretion of the roaming
agreements of the operators.
(R-SP- 8) SEGFs are responsible for security sensitive operations and shall offer capabilities for secure
storage of long-term keys used for IKE authentication.
4.2 Authentication, Authorization, Access Control and
Accountability Requirements
General Access authentication
(R-AA- 1) Access to NGN networks, services, and applications shall be provided for authorized users only.
(R-AA- 2) NGN R1 and R2 IMS authentication shall support early deployment scenarios (with support for
legacy equipments), although it is optional for operators to deploy such scenarios.
(R-AA- 3) In non-early deployment scenarios, IMS authentication shall be independent from access
authentication.
(R-AA- 4) An ISIM shall be used to access any IMS service, however, exceptions may be allowed for
emergency calls and early deployment scenarios.
(R-AA- 5) ISIM based Authentication between the IMS-subscriber and the network shall comply to the
authentication part of Access Security for IP-based services TS 133 203 [2].
(R-AA- 6) ISIM based Re-authentication of an IMS-subscriber shall comply to the authentication part of
Access Security for IP-based services TS 133 203 [2].
(R-AA- 7) It shall be possible to prevent the use of a particular ISIM to access NGN networks and services
and it should be possible to revoke a specific ISIM.
(R-AA- 8) NGN relevant ISIM specific information shall be protected against unauthorized access or
alteration.
(R-AA- 9) User authentication may either be hardware-based (for 3GPP UE: ISIM; i.e. proof by possession of
a physical token) or be software-based (i.e. proof by knowledge of some secret information).
Early Deployments
(R-AA- 10) User Authentication to the NGN IMS using SIP Digest mechanisms shall be supported as an early
deployment scenario.
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11 ETSI TS 187 001 V2.1.5 (2008-10)
(R-AA- 11) Where both Digest and ISIM solutions are deployed by an NGN IMS operator, that operator shall
determine the authentication mechanism (SIP Digest or ISIM-based) on a per-user basis. The
authentication mechanism shall be enforced according to both the subscription information in the
user's service profile and the specific policies of the NGN IMS operator. Where a terminal
supports the ISIM solution and the network operator supports both ISIM and early deployment
solutions, ISIM solution shall be used.
(R-AA- 12) Transmitted passwords shall be sufficiently protected; e.g. by encryption or other techniques.
(R-AA- 13) For the special early deployment scenarios (see note 1), where IMS authentication is linked to
access authentication, it shall be possible to gain access to IMS services after an authentication
procedure. This authentication provides simultaneous access to the access network and IMS
services.
NOTE 1: The two special early deployment scenarios are (also referred to as NASS Bundled authentication):
(A). IMS authentication is linked to access line authentication (no nomadicity).
(B). IMS authentication is linked to access authentication for IP Connectivity
(limited nomadicity can be provided).
NOTE 2: Access authentication may result in IMS services being tied to the access point (line) or to the current IP
Connectivity (device). In the latter case limited nomadicity may be available. No IMS specific
authentication is therefore required from the CPE/Terminal to gain access to IMS services.
(R-AA- 14) The NGN subsystems shall be able to be able to define and enforce policy with respect to validity
of user authorization.
Ut Interface
(R-AA- 15) Mutual authentication shall be supported between the UE and the AS before providing
authorization.
(R-AA- 16) It should also be possible to support an Authentication Proxy based architecture.
NOTE 1: The purpose of the AP is to separate the authentication procedure and the AS specific application logic to
different logical entities.
(R-AA- 17) Mutual authentication shall be supported between the UE and the AP.
(R-AA- 18) The AP shall decide whether a particular subscriber (i.e. the UE), is authorized to access a
particular AS.
(R-AA- 19) If an AP is used, the AS shall only authorize the access request to the requested resource.
NOTE 2: The AS does not need to explicitly authenticate the user.
NASS
(R-AA- 20) Mutual authentication should be supported between the CPE and the NASS during access network
level registration.
(R-AA- 21) The access network shall be able to authenticate and authorize the access subscriber.
(R-AA- 22) Authentication and authorization to the Access Network is controlled by the operator of the Access
Network.
(R-AA- 23) The attributes required for authentication of a user by the access network maybe provided by the
network operator to whom the user has a NGN IMS subscription.
(R-AA- 24) NASS shall support both the use explicit (e.g. PPP or IEEE 802.1x [i.2]) and/or implicit line
authentication (e.g. MAC address authentication or line authentication) of the users/subscribers. In
the case of the implicit access authentication, it shall rely only on an implicit authentication
through physical or logic identity on the layer 2 (L2) transport layer.
(R-AA- 25) In case the CNG is a routing modem and the Customer Premises Network (CPN) is a private IP
realm, authentication shall be initiated from the CNG.
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12 ETSI TS 187 001 V2.1.5 (2008-10)
(R-AA- 26) In case the CNG is a bridge, each UE shall authenticate with the NASS as the IP realm in the CPN
is known to the Access Network.
RACS
R-AA- 27) RACS and AF shall be mutually authenticated prior to resource authorization.
(R-AA- 27A) AF and SPDF in RACS shall be able to mutually identify each other when performing the
authentication.
Other Specific Requirements
(R-AA- 27) A media gateway controller must be able to handle authentication of multiple media gateways,
i.e. to maintain multiple security associations with different media gateways.
(R-AA- 28) Authentication of NGN users and authentication of NGN terminals shall be separate.
(R-AA- 29) Caller id and location information shall be stored according to the Common European regulatory
framework by the EMTEL Service Provider. Caller ID and location information shall be validated
by the EMTEL Service Provider.
4.3 Identity and Secure Registration Requirements
The following requirements aims to mitigate against masquerading, spoofing, and impersonation of NGN terminals,
devices/systems (HW/SW) and users. The requirements aim to provide measures against identity theft,
misuse/authorized use of NGN services/applications.
(R-IR- 1) It shall be possible to implicitly register IMPU(s). The implicitly registered IMPU(s) all belong to
the same Service Profile. All the IMPU(s) being implicitly registered shall be delivered by the
HSS to the S-CSCF and subsequently to the P-CSCF. The S-CSCF shall regard all implicitly
registered IMPU(s) as registered IMPU(s).
(R-IR- 2) An access identity shall be used for access authentication. This identity may or may not be used
for other purposes.
(R-IR- 3) The line ID shall be possible to use for line authentication.
4.4 Communications and Data Security Requirements
Clause 4.4 contains such requirements that address communications and data security. Data, in this context, can mean
either user data (e.g. voice, video, text stream) or management data.
4.4.1 General Communications and Data Security Requirements
General
(R-CD- 1) Confidentiality and integrity of IMS signalling shall be applied in a hop-to-hop fashion.
(UE-to-P-CSCF and among other NEs).
NDS
(R-CD- 2) Network Domain Security (NDS) shall be provided at the network layer and comply to
TS 133 210 [3].
(R-CD- 3) All NDS/IP traffic shall pass through a SEGF (Security Gateway Function) before entering or
leaving the security domain. IMS operators shall operate NDS/IP Za interface between SEGFs
according to TS 133 210 [3].
(R-CD- 4) Security shall be provided within the network domain for the Cx interface.
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13 ETSI TS 187 001 V2.1.5 (2008-10)
Access Security
(R-CD- 5) An ISIM based solution for IMS access security (authentication, confidentiality and integrity
protection) of signalling to and from the user, shall be supported.
(R-CD- 6) Secure link shall be provided between UE and the P-CSCF for protection of the Gm reference
point.
(R-CD- 7) In case access authentication is independent from IMS authentication.
Solutions for access to the NGN core shall provide for secure transfer of signalling to the
NGN core independent of the access technology.
Solutions for access to the NGN core shall provide for secure transfer of signalling to the
NGN core independent of the presence of intermediate IP networks connecting the NGN
access with the NGN core.
Solutions for access to the NGN core shall allow for mutual authentication of end user and
NGN core. It shall be possible for the terminal to authenticate the user.
(R-CD- 8) In the case where IMS authentication is linked to access line authentication the underlying access
technology shall provide protection of NGN signalling and user data.
(R-CD- 9) ISIM specific information shall be updated in a secure manner.
Ut
(R-CD- 10) It shall be possible to protect sensitive data (such as Presence information and notifications) from
attacks (e.g. eavesdropping, tampering, and replay attacks).
RACS
(R-CD- 11) Void.
Other Specific Requirements
(R-CD- 12) All data related to configuring the UE through the e3 reference point shall be protected against loss
of confidentiality and against loss of integrity.
4.4.2 Integrity and Replay Protection Requirements
General
(R-CD- 13) Integrity protection of signalling, control communications and of stored data shall be provided.
(R-CD- 14) It shall be possible to ensure the origin, integrity and freshness of authentication data, particularly
of the cipher key.
Access Security
(R-CD- 15) Integrity protection shall be applied between the UE and the P-CSCF for protecting the SIP
signalling.
NDS
(R-CD- 16) Integrity protection between Network Elements (e.g. between CSCFs, and between CSCFs and the
HSS) shall rely on mechanisms specified by Network Domain Security in TS 133 210 [3].
Ut
(R-CD- 17) Data integrity shall be supported between the UE and the Application Server.
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14 ETSI TS 187 001 V2.1.5 (2008-10)
RACS
(R-CD- 23) RACS shall ensure integrity of all information exchanged over the e4 reference point.
4.4.3 Confidentiality Requirements
General
(R-CD- 18) Confidentiality of communications should be achieved by cryptographic encryption.
Confidentiality of stored data shall be achieved by cryptographic encryption or by access controls.
(R-CD- 19) Confidentiality of signalling and control messages shall be enforced if required by the application
or in environments where the security policy demands confidentiality. The mechanism should
allow a choice in the algorithm to be used.
Access Security
(R-CD- 20) IMS specific confidentiality protection shall be provided for the SIP signalling between UE and
P-CSCF.
NDS
(R-CD- 21) Confidentiality protection between Network Functions (e.g. between CSCFs, or between CSCFs
and the HSS) shall rely on mechanisms specified by Network Domain Security in TS 133 210 [3].
Other Specific Requirements
(R-CD- 22) It shall be possible to protect the confidentiality of user-related data which is stored or processed
by a provider.
4.5 Privacy Requirements
(R-P- 1) It shall be possible to protect the network topology from exposure toward other domains. It shall
also be possible for a security domains to define and implement protection against traffic analysis
for signalling and management protocols.
(R-P- 2) User location and usage patterns shall be kept from unwanted disclosure.
(R-P- 3) It shall be possible to protect the confidentiality of user identity data.
(R-P- 4) Anonymous communication sessions shall be supported in NGN either in a permanent mode or in
a temporary mode communication by call. In this case the originating party identity shall not be
presented to the destination party. The network to which the destination party is connected to is
responsible to handle this service.
(R-P- 5) NGN shall support the specific case where the destination party has an override right
(e.g. emergency communication sessions), and the originating party identity is provided to the
destination party independent whether or not this communication session is anonymous.
(R-P- 6) The Anonymous Communications Rejection (ACR) simulation service shall allow the served user
to reject incoming communication from users or subscribers who have restricted the presentation
of their originating identity according to the OIR simulation service.
(R-P- 7) The NGN shall support mechanisms for the network operator to guarantee the authenticity of a
user identity presented for an incoming call to a user where the call is wholly within that operator's
network (i.e. originating and terminating parties are subscribers to, and resident in, a single NGN).
(R-P- 8) The NGN shall provide mechanisms that allow to present the identity of the session originator, if
this is not restricted by the session originator.
(R-P- 9) The privacy aspect of presence information and the need for authorization before providing
presence information shall be configurable by the user (i.e. presentity).
ETSI
15 ETSI TS 187 001 V2.1.5 (2008-10)
(R-P- 10) A principal of a presentity shall, at any time, be able to control to whom, for how long and what
(all or part of) presence information of the presentity is provided, and a principal of a watcher
shall, at any time, be able to control to whom, for how long and what (all or part of) watcher
information of the watcher is provided.
(R-P- 11) Any services using the presence information shall ensure privacy agreement before releasing
presence information. The presence service does not address deployment specific issues
(e.g. where agreements are stored or how they are negotiated). It only gives requirements for
privacy management.
(R-P- 12) It shall be possible for the sender of the message to request to hide its public ID from the recipient.
(R-P- 13) Users may select the Identity presented when starting a session or sending a message. It shall be
possible to verify this identity and to initiate a session or message in reply.
4.6 Key Management Requirements
(R-KM- 1) Key management and key distribution between SEGFs shall comply to the Network Domain
Security TS 133 210 [3].
(R-KM- 2) The UE and the AS shall be able to resume a previously established secure session.
(R-KM- 3) The key management mechanism must be able to traverse a NAT/NATP device.
4.7 Secure Management Requirements
NOTE: Security Management requirements are for further study.
4.8 NAT/Firewall Interworking Requirements
Firewall is here understood in a generic sense. A firewall could be an application-level gateway (ALG), a proxy, a
packet-filter, a NAT/NATP device or a combination of all of those. A Security Gateway Function is an entity on the
border of the IP security domain and is used to secure native IP based protocols over the Za interfaces.
(R-NF- 1) NGN security protocols shall work with commonly-used firewalls and shall work in environments
with NAT/NATP.
(R-NF- 2) Filters to screen the IP packets to restrict/grant access to specific bearer streams shall be supported.
(R-NF- 3) The SEGFs may include filtering policies and firewall functionality not required in
TS 133 210 [3].
4.9 Non-Repudiation Requirements
NOTE: Non-repudiation requirements are for further study.
4.10 Availability and DoS protection Requirements
(R-AD- 1) Mechanisms shall be provided to mitigate denial-of-service attacks.
(R-AD- 2) Provide access control mechanisms to ensure that authorized users only can access the service.
(R-AD- 3) It shall be possible to prevent intruders from restricting the availability of services by logical
means.
(R-AD- 4) Availability of and accuracy of location information shall be provided for the EMTEL services.
(R-AD- 5) Availability of EMTEL PSAPs shall not be decreased by DoS attacks. EMTEL PSAPs shall be
able to reconnect.
ETSI
16 ETSI TS 187 001 V2.1.5 (2008-10)
4.11 Assurance Requirements
(R-AS- 1) The TISPAN NGN shall provide guidance for evaluating and certifying NGN equipment and
systems.
(R-AS- 2) Security implications of potential misuse of protocols used in NGN shall be documented through a
TVRA. This enables users to assess the security they need before deploying the given protocol.
4.12 Requirements on Strength of Security Mechanisms
The guidelines defined in EG 202 238 [4] shall be followed when defining or selecting cryptographic algorithms in
TISPAN.
4.13 IPTV Security Requirements
4.13.1 Common IPTV Security Requirements
NOTE: When delivering the security information (e.g. the licenses or keys) to the subscribers (especially large
amount of subscribers), the impact to system performance should b
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