ETSI GS NFV-SEC 003 V1.1.1 (2014-12)

Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); NFV Security; Security and Trust Guidance

DGS/NFV-SEC003

General Information

• Status: Published
• Publication Date: 22-Dec-2014
• Technical Committee: NFV SEC - Security
• Current Stage: 12 - Completion
• Due Date: 28-Jan-2015
• Completion Date: 23-Dec-2014

Standards Content (Sample)

GROUP SPECIFICATION
Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV);
NFV Security;
Security and Trust Guidance
Disclaimer
This document has been produced and approved by the Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV) ETSI Industry Specification
Group (ISG) and represents the views of those members who participated in this ISG.
It does not necessarily represent the views of the entire ETSI membership.

2 ETSI GS NFV-SEC 003 V1.1.1 (2014-12)

Reference
DGS/NFV-SEC003
Keywords
NFV, security
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3 ETSI GS NFV-SEC 003 V1.1.1 (2014-12)
Contents
Intellectual Property Rights . 6
Foreword . 6
Modal verbs terminology . 6
1 Scope . 7
2 References . 7
2.1 Normative references . 7
2.2 Informative references . 7
3 Abbreviations . 7
4 Network Function Virtualisation Security. 9
4.1 NFV High-Level Security Goals . 9
4.2 NFV Security Use Case Summaries . 9
4.2.1 Intra-VNFSec: Security within Virtual Network Functions . 9
4.2.1.1 VNFC-Specific Security Use Cases . 10
4.2.1.1.1 VNFC Creation . 10
4.2.1.1.2 VNFC Deletion . 10
4.2.1.1.3 VNFC Configuration and Package Management . 10
4.2.1.1.4 VNFCI Migration . 11
4.2.1.1.5 VNFC Operational State Changes . 11
4.2.1.1.6 VNFC Topology Changes . 11
4.2.1.1.7 VNFC Scale-Up and Scale-Down . 11
4.2.1.1.8 VNFC Scale-In and Scale-Out . 11
4.2.2 Infra-VNFSec: Security between Virtual Network Functions . 12
4.2.3 Extra-VNFSec: Security external to Virtual Network Functions . 12
4.3 NFV External Operational Environment . 13
4.3.1 External Physical Security Guidance . 13
4.3.2 External Hardware Guidance . 13
4.3.3 External Service Guidance . 13
4.3.3.1 DNS. 13
4.3.3.2 IP Addressing, DHCP and Routing . 13
4.3.3.3 Time Services and NTP . 13
4.3.3.4 Geolocation . 13
4.3.3.5 Security Visibility and Testing . 13
4.3.3.6 Certificate Authority . 14
4.3.3.7 Identity and Access Management . 14
4.3.4 External Policies, Processes and Practices Guidance . 14
4.3.4.1 Regulatory Compliance Considerations for NFV . 14
4.3.4.2 Forensic Considerations for NFV . 14
4.3.4.3 Legal/Lawful Intercept Considerations for NFV . 14
4.3.4.4 Considerations for NFV Analytics and Service Level Agreements (SLAs) . 14
4.4 NFV Security Management Lifecycle . 15
4.4.1 NFV Threat Landscape . 15
4.4.1.1 Threat Vectors, Monitoring and Detection . 16
4.4.2 NFV Platform Guidance . 16
4.4.2.1 Platform visibility and validation . 16
4.4.2.1.1 Workload Visibility into Physical and Virtualised Resources . 16
4.4.2.1.2 Introspection . 18
4.4.2.2 Access Visibility for Data and Control Packets in Virtualised Environment . 18
4.4.2.3 Validation of Root of Trust and Chain of Trust . 19
4.4.2.4 Services validation . 19
4.4.3 Certificate, Credential and Key Management within NFV . 19
4.4.3.1 Certificate management . 19
4.4.3.2 Credential Management . 19
4.4.3.2.1 Dynamic Credential Management . 19
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4.4.3.2.2 Role of Identity, keys and certificates . 19
4.4.3.2.3 Credential Injection by hypervisor . 20
4.4.3.3 Key Management . 20
4.4.3.3.1 Key Management and security within cloned images . 20
4.4.3.3.2 Key Management and security within migrated images . 21
4.4.3.3.3 Self-generation of key pairs . 21
4.4.4 Multiparty Administrative domains . 21
4.4.4.1 Rational . 21
4.4.4.2 Administrative domains . 21
4.4.4.3 Infrastructure Domain . 22
4.4.4.4 Tenant Domain . 22
4.4.4.5 Implications . 22
4.4.4.6 Inter-Domain functional blocks and reference points . 23
4.4.4.6.1 Network Service Orchestration . 23
4.4.4.6.2 Infrastructure Orchestration . 23
4.4.4.6.3 VNF-Specific Lifecycle Management . 23
4.4.4.6.4 Generic VNF Lifecycle Management . 23
4.4.4.6.5 Inter-Orchestration (Os-Ma) . 23
4.4.4.6.6 Inter-VNFM (Ve-Vnfm) . 23
4.4.4.7 VNF Package and Image Management . 23
4.4.4.7.1 Integrity checks . 24
4.4.4.7.2 Trust checks . 24
4.4.4.8 VNFC Security Overview . 24
4.4.4.8.1 VNFC security scope . 24
4.4.4.9 VNFC Lifecycle Security - Statement of the problem . 25
4.4.4.10 Security Approach . 26
4.4.5 VNF Instantiation . 27
4.4.5.1 Secured Boot . 27
4.4.5.2 VTPM (Virtual Trusted Platform Module) . 28
4.4.5.3 Attestation . 28
4.4.5.4 Attribution . 28
4.4.5.5 Authenticity . 28
4.4.5.6 Authentication . 28
4.4.5.6.1 User/Tenant Authentication, Authorization and Accounting . 28
4.4.5.7 Authorization . 30
4.4.5.8 Interface Instantiation . 30
4.4.5.9 Levels of assurance . 30
4.4.5.10 Logging, Reporting, Analytics and Metrics . 30
4.4.6 VNF Operation . 31
4.4.6.1 Planned operational lifecycle events . 31
4.4.6.2 VNFC Lifecycle control and authorization . 31
4.4.6.3 Dynamic State Management . 32
4.4.6.3.1 Provision by trusted party - network . 32
4.4.6.3.2 Provision by trusted party - storage . 32
4.4.6.4 Dynamic Integrity Management . 32
4.4.6.4.1 Secured crash and recovery . 32
4.4.6.5 Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) . 32
4.4.7 VNF Retirement . 32
4.4.7.1 License retirement . 33
4.4.7.2 Secured wipe . 33
4.5 NVF Security Technologies . 33
4.5.1 Technologies and Processes . 34
5 Trusted Network Function Virtualisation . 34
5.1 NFV High-Level Trust Goals . 34
5.1.1 Assigning trust . 35
5.1.1.1 Why assign trust? . 35
5.1.1.2 How to assign trust . 35
5.1.2 Evaluating and validating trust . 36
5.1.2.1 Parameters for trust evaluation . 36
5.1.2.2 Methods for trust evaluation . 37
5.1.3 Re-evaluating trust . 37
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5.1.4 Invalidating trust . 38
5.1.5 Re-establishing trust . 39
5.1.5.1 Delegation up the chain of trust . 39
5.1.5.2 Peer-mediated distrust . 39
5.1.6 Delegating trust . 40
5.1.6.1 Directly delegated trust . 41
5.1.6.2 Collaborative trust . 41
5.1.6.3 Transitive trust . 42
5.1.6.4 Reputational trust . 43
5.1.7 Scope of trust . 43
5.1.7.1 Trust manager . 43
5.2 NFV Trust Use Case Summaries . 44
5.2.1 Intra-VNF Trust: Trust within Virtual Network Functions . 44
5.2.2 Inter-VNF Trust: Trust between Virtual Network Functions . 44
5.2.2.1 Managing trust between a VNF instance and its VNFM. 45
5.2.2.1.1 VNF instance's trusting of the VNFM . 45
5.2.2.1.2 VNFM's trusting of the VNF instance . 45
5.2.2.2 Managing trust between VNF instances . 46
5.2.3 Extra-VNF Trust: Trust external to Virtual Network Functions . 47
5.2.3.1 Establishing trust in a VNF Package for deployment . 47
5.2.3.1.1 NFVI domain . 47
5.2.3.1.2 Management and Operations domain . 48
5.2.3.1.3 VNF provider . 49
5.3 Trust between Management and Orchestration entities . 49
5.3.1 Management and Orchestration infrastructure . 50
5.3.2 Implications of long-lived entities . 50
5.4 NFV Trusted Lifecycle Management . 51
5.4.1 Objectives and Policy . 51
5.4.2 Defining a Chain of Trust . 52
5.4.3 Establishing Roots of Trust for VNFs . 52
5.4.3.1 Initial VNFC root of trust establishment . 52
5.4.3.1.1 Multicast . 53
5.4.3.1.2 Injection by hypervisor . 53
5.4.3.1.3 Initial image . 53
5.4.3.1.4 Hypervisor . 53
5.4.3.1.5 VNFC OS and application . 53
5.4.3.1.6 Deployment state . 54
Annex A (informative): Authors & contributors . 55
Annex B (informative): Bibliography . 56
History . 57

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6 ETSI GS NFV-SEC 003 V1.1.1 (2014-12)
Intellectual Property Rights
IPRs essential or potentially essential to the present document may have been declared to ETSI. The information
pertaining to these essential IPRs, if any, is publicly available for ETSI members and non-members, and can be found
in ETSI SR 000 314: "Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs); Essential, or potentially Essential, IPRs notified to ETSI in
respect of ETSI standards", which is available from the ETSI Secretariat. Latest updates are available on the ETSI Web
server (http://ipr.etsi.org).
Pursuant to the ETSI IPR Policy, no investigation, including IPR searches, has been carried out by ETSI. No guarantee
can be given as to the existence of other IPRs not referenced in ETSI SR 000 314 (or the updates on the ETSI Web
server) which are, or may be, or may become, essential to the present document.
Foreword
This Group Specification (GS) has been produced by ETSI Industry Specification Group (ISG) Network Functions
Virtualisation (NFV).
Modal verbs terminology
In the present document "shall", "shall not", "should", "should not", "may", "may not", "need", "need not", "will",
"will not", "can" and "cannot" are to be interpreted as described in clause 3.2 of the ETSI Drafting Rules (Verbal forms
for the expression of provisions).
"must" and "must not" are NOT allowed in ETSI deliverables except when used in direct citation.
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7 ETSI GS NFV-SEC 003 V1.1.1 (2014-12)
1 Scope
The present document has been developed to describe the security and trust guidance that is unique to NFV
development, architecture and operation. Guidance consists of items to consider that may be unique to the environment
or deployment. Supplied guidance does not consist of prescriptive requirements or specific implementation details,
which should be built from the considerations supplied.
Guidance is based on defined use cases, included in the present document, that are derived from the Security Problem
Statement and are unique to NFV. Relevant external guidance will be referenced, where available.
2 References
2.1 Normative references
References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or
non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the
referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at
http://docbox.etsi.org/Reference.
NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee
their long term validity.
The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document.
[1] ETSI GS NFV 001: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); Use Cases".
2.2 Informative references
References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or
non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the
referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee
their long term validity.
The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the
user with regard to a particular subject area.
[i.1] Popek and Goldberg 1974 paper: "Formal Requirements for Virtualizable Third Generation
Architectures".
[i.2] CSA CloudTrust.
[i.3] GS NFV-SWA 001: "Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); Virtual Network Function
Architecture".
3 Abbreviations
For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply:
ABAC Attribute-Based Access Control
API Application Programming Interface
BIOS Basic Input Output System
CA Certificate Authority
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8 ETSI GS NFV-SEC 003 V1.1.1 (2014-12)
CDN Content Distribution Network
CLI Command Line Interface
CPU Central Processing Unit
CPUID CPU Identifier
CSA Cloud Security Alliance
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
DMA Direct Memory Access
DNA DeoxyriboNucleic Acid
DNS Domain Naming Service
DoS Denial of Service
DPI Deep Packet Inspection
DRM Digital Rights Management
EM Element Manager
EMS Element Management System
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
GPS Global Positioning System
GTP-C GPRS Tunnelling Protocol-Control
GTP-U GPRS Tunnelling Protocol-User Data Tunneling
GUI Graphical User Interface
HSM Hardware Security Module
HSS Home Subscriber Server
HVM Hardware Virtual Machine
IAM Identity and Access Management
IMS IP Multimedia Subsystem
IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity
IO Input/Output
IP Intellectual Property
IT Information Technology
LI Lawful Intercept
LUN Logical Unit Number
MAC Media Access Control
MANO Management and Orchestration
MME Mobile Management Entity
NE Network Element
NF Network Function
NFV Network Function Virtualization
NFVI Network Function Virtualization Infrastructure
NFVO Network Function Virtualization Orchestrator
NIC Network Interface Card
NTP Network Time Protocol
OA&M Operations, administration and management
OS Operating System
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
RADIUS RADIUS protocol
RAM Random Access Memory
RBAC Rights-Based Access Management
SDN Software Defined Networking
SIP Session Initialization Protocol
SSAE Statement on Standards for Attestation Engagements
SVA Security Virtual Appliance
SWA Software Architecture
TBOOT Trusted Boot
TOR Top of Rack
TPM Trusted Platform Module
TXT Trusted eXecution Technology
UEFI Unified Extensible Firmware Interface
UUID Unique Universal IDentifier
VA Virtual Appliance
VIM Virtual Infrastructure Manager
VLAN Virtual LAN (Local Access Network)
VM Virtual Machine
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VMM Virtual Machine Monitor
VNF Virtual Network Function
VNFC Virtual Network Function Component
VNFCI Virtual Network Function Component Instance
VNFD Virtual Network Function Descriptor
VNFM Virtual Network Function Manager
VoLTE Voice over LTE
VPC Virtual Private Cloud
vSwitch virtual Switch
VTPM Virtual Trusted Platform Module
4 Network Function Virtualisation Security
4.1 NFV High-Level Security Goals
Security is Embedded in NFV DNA
Security is defined as the state of being protected (secured) as well as those measures applied to
achieve/maintain/validate protection.
The dynamic nature of Network Function Virtualisation demands that security technologies, policies, processes and
practices are embedded in the genetic fabric of NFV.
Additional high-level security goals for NFV include:
• Establish a secured baseline of guidance for NFV operation, while highlighting optional measures that enhance
security to be commensurate with risks to confidentiality, integrity and availability.
• Define areas of consideration where security technologies, practices and processes have different requirements
than non-NFV systems and operations.
• Supply guidance for the operational environment that supports and interfaces with NFV systems and
operations, but avoid redefining any security considerations that are not specific to NFV.
NOTE: NFV security considerations are very similar to hypervisor-based virtualisation security considerations in
their architecture and interfaces. However, security architects and operations managers are instructed to
consider use cases beyond hypervisor-based constructs to include cloud orchestration, virtual appliances
and empower future innovations.
4.2 NFV Security Use Case Summaries
The following use cases describe the need for security within the VNF, between VNFs and secured interfaces and
interchanges external to the VNF. The use cases are summarized for brevity, highlighting important security functions
and considerations unique to NFV.
4.2.1 Intra-VNFSec: Security within Virtual Network Functions
Within the VNF, security measures and processes are required for VNF operations, for contained VNFC operations, and
for secured interface with external assets and services. Specifically, this clause describes the use cases that are unique
within a VNF.
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4.2.1.1 VNFC-Specific Security Use Cases
Sensitive authentication data in workloads
NFV workloads routinely possess sensitive authentication data used for authenticating the workload, its processes and
users. This sensitive authentication data can consist of passwords, private keys, cryptographic certificates, tokens and
other secrets. This data should be protected during all phases of the NFV security and trust lifecycle and should be
considered highly dynamic in nature, with updates likely during instantiation, hibernation/suspension, and VNF
retirement. NFV workloads containing sensitive authentication data reside within and may be described as VMs, VAs,
VNFs and VNFCs. Guidance for this use case should describe the processes, procedures and technologies unique to
NFV that would satisfy the use case, pointing to external best practices where available.
Function and capability authorization control for VNFs
There are many functions and capabilities that will be provided by various parts of a VNF and various different entities
within NFV may request that these functions and capabilities are employed. It is not always appropriate to provide
authorization for an entity to access these, even when the same entity has previously done so. Authorization for use of
these functions and capabilities may be controlled by a number of techniques and across a number of variables,
including identity, trust, joint or delegated decision making and API security.
Guidance for this use case should describe the key technologies for use in the context of authorization control for VNFs,
and how they may be used within an NFV context.
4.2.1.1.1 VNFC Creation
The creation of a VNFC will require updates to networking, credentialing, encryption, licensing, configuration and
other settings unique to the new VNFC that impact security. Creating a VNFC can be accomplished in one of the
following ways:
• The instantiation of a newly-defined VNFC.
• The instantiation of a VNFC with pre-configured state the cloning of an existing VNFC.
Guidance for these use cases should describe update and verification processes and procedures, virtual asset tracking
and audit records.
4.2.1.1.2 VNFC Deletion
The retirement and deletion of a VNFC and its VNFCIs will require updates to networking, credentialing, encryption,
licensing, configuration and other settings unique to VNFC removal that impact security. When requests for secured
wipe and verified destruction are made, the actions taken should be forensically sound. When a VNFC is to be made
unavailable, for re-use or re-creation, deletion of all possible instances (VNFCIs) should be verified across backups and
archives, cloned images and other copies.
Guidance for this use case should describe update and verification processes and procedures, virtual asset tracking and
audit records. Asset management should ensure certificate revocation and updates of IP whitelisting/blacklisting.
4.2.1.1.3 VNFC Configuration and Package Management
The updates to a VNFC and associated VNFCIs include patching, updating, new/modified software packages and
configuration changes. These changes can include:
• Patching of the operating system, drivers and virtual machine components.
• Adding dynamic updates to the configuration (DNS, DHCP, etc.).
• Management of virtual machines and virtual appliances, including security virtual appliances.
• Updates to event-based configuration guidance, such as whitelists and blacklists.
• New versions of application software, software frameworks (e.g. Java) and software components.
Guidance for this use case should describe update and verification processes and procedures.
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4.2.1.1.4 VNFCI Migration
Migrating a VNFCI is desired for maintenance of underlying VNF infrastructure, failover in the event of VNF
infrastructure failure and disaster recovery in the event of a site failure condition. Migrations are often performed as
"live migrations" that should not incur downtime to the operations of the VNFC when correctly functioning.
Migration concerns include memory reuse, feature parity, configuration compatibility and service availability.
4.2.1.1.5 VNFC Operational State Changes
Operational state changes (planned and unplanned/intentional or unintentional) can significantly affect VNFC security.
A partial list of operational state changes includes:
• Hibernation, sleep, resumption, abort, restore, suspension.
• Power-on and power-off (either physical or virtual).
• Instantiation, whether pre-configured or not.
• Patching and maintenance.
• High-availability, recovery and data-in-motion changes during live migration.
• Integrity verification failure, crash and OS compromise.
• Retirement and termination.
Guidance for this use case should describe integrity verification processes and procedures including logging and audit.
4.2.1.1.6 VNFC Topology Changes
Topology changes that affect the security of the VNFC can result in loss of communication, unintended traffic flows,
loss of intended traffic flows and other issues including:
• Network IP address and VLAN updates.
• Service chaining.
• Failover and disaster recovery.
Guidance for this use case should describe awareness of topology changes and resiliency.
4.2.1.1.7 VNFC Scale-Up and Scale-Down
The scale-up and scale-down of a VNFC affect sizing and can alter the memory, storage and processing requirements,
resulting in differences in class of service, monitoring thresholds, performance thresholds and backups. Scale-up and
scale-down are also referred to as vertical scalability.
Guidance for this use case should describe architectural and operational changes associated with increased/decreased
requirements for the VNFC due to scale-up/scale-down.
4.2.1.1.8 VNFC Scale-In and Scale-Out
Scale-in and scale-out of a VNFC affects multiple resources (e.g. services and communications) that spread the VNFC
workload, resulting in differences in class of service, monitoring thresholds, performance thresholds, networking and
backups. Scale-in and scale-out are also referred to as horizontal scalability.
Guidance for this use case should describe architectural and operational changes associated with increased/decreased
requirements for the VNFC due to scale-in/scale-out, as well as dependencies between systems utilized for scalability.
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4.2.2 Infra-VNFSec: Security between Virtual Network Functions
Virtual Network Functions that communicate directly with each other have special security needs, as network-level
security enforcement is often not inherent in the communication path. Characteristics include:
• Secured orchestration for and between VNF domains.
• Flows are often not through firewalls or other network policy enforcement points.
• Virtual Appliances and Security Virtual Appliances need to be configured to be part of the traffic flow.
• Service chaining capabilities need to be enforced, if available.
• Requires strong VNF-VNF security measures and individual VNF resiliency to attack.
4.2.3 Extra-VNFSec: Security external to Virtual Network Functions
The security of VNFs is reliant on the security of the physical infrastructure, environment and external services. The
following use cases identify key issues external to the VNF that directly impact VNF and VNFC security.
Regulatory and jurisdictional impact on NFV deployments
NFV deployments will exist, as current telecommunications services do, in a regulatory and jurisdictional environment.
The virtualisation of network functions leads to new requirements both on the VNFs themselves and on the
management and orchestration components with which they are controlled. Issues include Lawful Intercept, Auditing
and Service Level Agreements, and although there are many similarities to existing practise, the advent of NFV brings
some changes.
In addition, future NFV deployments may increasingly be spread across borders, leading to multiple sets of
requirements being placed on operators. The ability to administer services across borders and to migrate services in
real-time between different jurisdictions presents further challenges.
The trust and security document will identify key legal and regulatory issues and address appropriate processes and
technologies.
Authentication, Authorization and Accounting for NFV
NFV deployments will be complex, with multiple administrative domains within the same deployment, for example:
• NFVI - comprising:
- Network(s)
- Hypervisor
- Compute
- Storage
• SDN
• Service network
• VNFM
• Orchestration
The authentication, authorization and accounting requirements across these domains will be different, some having
regulatory requirements, for instance. In addition, there will be a mix of human and system entities requiring services.
In some deployments, there will be requirement for external parties - such as other operators - to be able to access and
administer parts of the NFV deployment, and this will also include access to authentication, authorization and
accounting services.
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Although each NFV deployment will be different, there will be some common technologies, features and best practices.
The trust and security document will identify and describe these.
4.3 NFV External Operational Environment
These are items of consideration for the external operational environment that are unique to supporting Network
Function Virtualisation. Included are physical securi
...