ISO/IEC 30107-1:2016

Information technology — Biometric presentation attack detection — Part 1: Framework

Abstract: In recent years, there has been an increase in the availability and interest in using biometric sensors for authenticating users, but the potential for attacks on a system through the biometric sensor has limited the use of biometrics in applications which are unsupervised by an agent of the system owner, such as remote authentication over untrusted networks. Biometric data can be easily obtained directly from a person, online, or through existing databases and then used to create spoofs (or fakes) to mount an attack. The presentation of a biometric spoof (e.g. a facial image or video of a person on a tablet or a fake silicone or gelatin fingerprint) to a biometric sensor can be detected by methods broadly referred to as presentation attack detection, PAD. The purpose of ISO/IEC 30107-1 is to provide a foundation for PAD through defining terms and establishing a framework through which presentation attack events can be specified and detected so that they can be categorized, detailed and communicated for subsequent decision making and performance assessment activities. This foundation is intended to not only introduce and frame the topics of presentation attacks and PAD but also to benefit other standards projects. This standard does not advocate a specific standard PAD method. The scope is limited to describing attacks that take place at the sensor during the presentation and collection of biometric characteristics. There are two other parts of ISO/IEC 30107, under the general title Information Technology - Biometric presentation attack detection: - Part 2:Data Formats - Part 3: Testing and reporting. Keywords: Liveness, liveness detection, biometric liveness detection, spoof detection, biometric spoof, biometric spoof detection, fake, fake biometric, fake biometrics, arefact, artefact detection. .

Technologies de l'information — Détection d'attaque de présentation en biométrie — Partie 1: Structure

General Information

• Status: Withdrawn
• Publication Date: 13-Jan-2016
• ICS: 35.040 - Information coding
• ICS: 35.240.15 - Identification cards. Chip cards. Biometrics
• Technical Committee: ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 37 - Biometrics
• Drafting Committee: ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 37 - Biometrics
• Current Stage: 9599 - Withdrawal of International Standard
• Completion Date: 10-Aug-2023

Relations

• Revised: ISO/IEC 30107-1:2023 - Information technology — Biometric presentation attack detection — Part 1: Framework
• Effective Date: 06-Jun-2022

Standards Content (Sample)

INTERNATIONAL ISO/IEC
STANDARD 30107-1
First edition
2016-01-15
Information technology — Biometric
presentation attack detection —
Part 1:
Framework
Technologies de l’information — Détection d’attaque de présentation
en biométrie —
Partie 1: Structure
Reference number
ISO/IEC 30107-1:2016(E)
©
ISO/IEC 2016

---------------------- Page: 1 ----------------------
ISO/IEC 30107-1:2016(E)

COPYRIGHT PROTECTED DOCUMENT
© ISO/IEC 2016, Published in Switzerland
All rights reserved. Unless otherwise specified, no part of this publication may be reproduced or utilized otherwise in any form
or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, or posting on the internet or an intranet, without prior
written permission. Permission can be requested from either ISO at the address below or ISO’s member body in the country of
the requester.
ISO copyright office
Ch. de Blandonnet 8 • CP 401
CH-1214 Vernier, Geneva, Switzerland
Tel. [phone]
Fax [phone]
[e-mail]
www.iso.org
ii © ISO/IEC 2016 – All rights reserved

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ISO/IEC 30107-1:2016(E)

Contents Page
Foreword .iv
Introduction .v
1 Scope . 1
2 Normative references . 1
3 Terms and definitions . 1
4 Symbols and abbreviated terms . 2
5 Characterisation of presentation attacks . 3
5.1 General . 3
5.2 Presentation attack instruments . 4
6 Framework for presentation attack detection methods . 5
6.1 Types of presentation attack detection . 5
6.2 The role of challenge-response . 5
6.2.1 Challenge-response related to liveness . 6
6.2.2 Liveness not related to challenge-response . 6
6.2.3 Challenge-response not related to biometrics . 6
6.3 Presentation attack detection process . 6
6.4 Presentation attack detection within biometric system architecture . 7
6.4.1 Overview in terms of the generalized biometric framework . 7
6.4.2 PAD processing considerations relative to the other biometric subsystems. 8
6.4.3 PAD location implications regarding data interchange . 9
7 Obstacles to biometric imposter presentation attacks in a biometric system .9
Bibliography .11
© ISO/IEC 2016 – All rights reserved iii

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ISO/IEC 30107-1:2016(E)

Foreword
ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) and IEC (the International Electrotechnical
Commission) form the specialized system for worldwide standardization. National bodies that are
members of ISO or IEC participate in the development of International Standards through technical
committees established by the respective organization to deal with particular fields of technical
activity. ISO and IEC technical committees collaborate in fields of mutual interest. Other international
organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO and IEC, also take part in the
work. In the field of information technology, ISO and IEC have established a joint technical committee,
ISO/IEC JTC 1.
The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are
described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular the different approval criteria needed for
the different types of document should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the
editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www.iso.org/directives).
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject
of patent rights. ISO and IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent
rights. Details of any patent rights identified during the development of the document will be in the
Introduction and/or on the ISO list of patent declarations received (see www.iso.org/patents).
Any trade name used in this document is information given for the convenience of users and does not
constitute an endorsement.
For an explanation on the meaning of ISO specific terms and expressions related to conformity
assessment, as well as information about ISO’s adherence to the WTO principles in the Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT) see the following URL: Foreword - Supplementary information
ISO/IEC 30107-1 was prepared by Technical Committee ISO/TC JTC1, Information technology,
Subcommittee SC 37, Biometrics.
ISO/IEC 30107 consists of the following parts, under the general title Information technology —
Biometric presentation attack detection:
— Part 1: Framework
— Part 2: Data formats
— Part 3: Testing and reporting
iv © ISO/IEC 2016 – All rights reserved

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ISO/IEC 30107-1:2016(E)

Introduction
Biometric technologies are used to recognize individuals based on biological and behavioural
characteristics and, consequently, are often used as a component in security systems. A biometric
technology assisted security system may attempt to recognize persons who are known as either friends
or foes, or may attempt to recognize persons who are unknown to the system as either.
Since the beginning of these technologies, the possibility of subversion of recognition by determined
adversaries has been widely acknowledged, as has the need for countermeasures to detect and defeat
subversive recognition attempts, or presentation attacks. Subversion of the intended function of a
biometric technology can take place at any point within a security system and by any actor, whether
a system insider or an external adversary. This International Standard (ISO/IEC 30107) will be
limited in scope, however, focusing on techniques for the automated detection of presentation attacks
undertaken by biometric capture subjects at the point of presentation and collection of the relevant
biometric characteristics. We will call these automated techniques “Presentation Attack Detection”
(PAD) methods.
The potential for subversion of biometric systems at the point of data collection by determined
individuals acting as biometric capture subjects has limited the use of biometrics in applications
which are unsupervised by an agent of the system owner, such as remote collections over untrusted
networks. Guidelines on e-authentication, for example, do not recommend the use of biometrics as an
authentication factor for this reason. In unattended applications, such as remote authentication over
open networks, automated presentation attack detection methods could be applied to mitigate the
risks of attack. Standards, best practices and independently evaluated techniques could improve the
security of all systems employing biometrics, whether using supervised or unsupervised data capture,
including those using biometric recognition to secure online transactions.
As is the case for biometric recognition, PAD techniques are subject to errors, both false positive and
false negative: false positive indications wrongly categorize routine presentations as attacks, thus
impairing the efficiency of the system, and false negative indications wrongly categorize presentation
attacks as routine, not preventing a security breach. Therefore, the decision to use a specific
implementation of PAD will depend upon the requirements of the application and consideration of the
trade-offs with respect to security and efficiency.
The purpose of this part of ISO/IEC 30107 is to provide a foundation for PAD through defining terms
and establishing a framework through which presentation attack events can be specified and detected
so that they can be categorized, detailed and communicated for subsequent biometric system decision
making and performance assessment activities. This foundation will also benefit other standards
projects in ISO/IEC committees and sub-committees. This International Standard does not advocate a
specific technique as a standard PAD tool.
There are two other parts of ISO/IEC 30107. Part 2 defines data formats for conveying the type of
approach used in biometric presentation attack detection and for conveying the results of presentation
attack detection methods. Part 3 establishes principles and methods for performance assessment of
presentation attack detection algorithms or mechanisms.
© ISO/IEC 2016 – All rights reserved v

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INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ISO/IEC 30107-1:2016(E)
Information technology — Biometric presentation attack
detection —
Part 1:
Framework
1 Scope
This part of ISO/IEC 30107 establishes terms and definitions that are useful in the specification,
characterization and evaluation of presentation attack detection methods.
Outside the scope are
— standardization of specific PAD detection methods;
— detailed information about countermeasures (i.e. anti-spoofing techniques), algorithms, or sensors;
and
— overall system-level security or vulnerability assessment.
The attacks to be considered in ISO/IEC 30107 are those that take place at the sensor during the
presentation and collection of the biometric characteristics.
Any other attacks are considered outside the scope of ISO/IEC 30107.
2 Normative references
The following documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document and are
indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated
references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
ISO/IEC 2382-37:2012, Information technology — Vocabulary — Part 37: Biometrics
NOTE The electronic version of ISO/IEC 2382-37:2012 can be downloaded
for free from the ISO/IEC Information Technology Task Force (ITTF) web site:
http://standards.iso.org/ittf/PubliclyAvailableStandards/index.html
3 Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in ISO/IEC 2382-37:2012 and the
following apply.
3.1
artefact
artificial object or representation presenting a copy of biometric characteristics or synthetic
biometric patterns
3.2
liveness
quality or state of being alive, made evident by anatomical characteristics, involuntary reactions or
physiological functions, or voluntary reactions or subject behaviours
EXAMPLE 1 Absorption of illumination by the skin and blood are anatomical characteristics.
© ISO/IEC 2016 – All rights reserved 1

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ISO/IEC 30107-1:2016(E)

EXAMPLE 2 The reaction of the iris to light and heart activity (pulse) are involuntary reactions (also called
physiological functions).
EXAMPLE 3 Squeezing together one’s fingers in hand geometry and a biometric presentation in response to a
directive cue are both voluntary reactions (also called subject behaviours).
3.3
liveness detection
measurement and analysis of anatomical characteristics or involuntary or voluntary reactions, in order
to determine if a biometric sample is being captured from a living subject present at the point of capture
Note 1 to entry: Liveness detection methods are a subset of presentation attack detection methods.
3.4
normal presentation
interaction of the biometric capture subject and the biometric data capture subsystem in the fashion
intended by the policy of the biometric system
Note 1 to entry: The term “normal” is analogous to “routine” when referring to a “normal presentation.” Any type
of presentation that is not an attack is considered a “normal presentation.”
3.5
presentation attack
presentation to the biometric data capture subsystem with the goal of interfering with the operation of
the biometric system
Note 1 to entry: Presentation attack can be implemented through a number of methods, e.g. artefact,
mutilations, replay, etc.
Note 2 to entry: Presentation attacks may have a number of goals, e.g. impersonation or not being recognized.
Note 3 to entry: Biometric systems may not be able to differentiate between biometric presentation attacks with
the goal of interfering with the systems operation and non-conformant presentations.
3.6
presentation attack detection
PAD
automated determination of a presentation attack
Note 1 to entry: PAD cannot infer the subject’s intent. In fact it may be impossible to derive that difference from
the data capture process or acquired sample.
3.7
presentation attack instrument
PAI
biometric characteristic or object used in a presentation attack
Note 1 to entry: The set of PAI includes artefacts but would also include lifeless biometric characteristics
(i.e. stemming from dead bodies) or altered biometric characteristics (e.g. altered fingerprints) that are used
in an attack.
4 Symbols and abbreviated terms
PAD Presentation Attack Detection
PAI Presentation Attack Instrument
2 © ISO/IEC 2016 – All rights reserved

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ISO/IEC 30107-1:2016(E)

5 Characterisation of presentation attacks
5.1 General
Although attacks on a biometric system can occur anywhere and be instantiated by any actor,
ISO/IEC 30107 focuses on biometric-based attacks on the data capture subsystem by biometric capture
subjects attempting to subvert the intended operation of the system. Attacks by other actors and at
other points of the system have previously been considered in documents such as [2]. ISO/IEC 30107
does not address protecting the data capture subsystem, including the sensor itself, from modification,
replacement, or removal or protecting the communication between the data capture subsystem and
other subsystems.
Figure 1 illustrates several generic attacks against a biometric system. ISO/IEC 30107 only focuses on
attacks pointed out by arrow “1,” in which a biometric characteristic or PAI is presented to a sensor
which is operating properly within a biometric system.
Figure 1 — Examples of points of attack in a biometric system (inspired by [1])
Presentation attacks can be carried out by two types of subversive biometric capture subjects: a
biometric imposter, where the subversive biometric capture subject intends to be recognized as an
individual other than him/herself, or a biometric concealer, where the subversive biometric capture
subject intends to evade being recognized as any individual known to the system.
Biometric imposters may perform attacks in two different ways. In the first sub-type, the subversive
data subject intends to be recognized as a specific individual known to the system. In the second sub-
type, the subversive data subject intends to be recognized as any individual known to the system,
without specification as to which one.
In contrast, biometric concealers will be seeking to conceal his/her own biometric characteristics,
as opposed to modelling the characteristics of known individuals, e.g., using an artefact or through
disguise or alteration of natural biometric characteristics.
© ISO/IEC 2016 – All rights reserved 3

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ISO/IEC 30107-1:2016(
...

INTERNATIONAL ISO/IEC
STANDARD 30107-1
First edition
Information technology — Biometric
presentation attack detection —
Part 1:
Framework
Technologies de l’information — Présentation détection d’attaque
en biométrie —
Partie 1: Structure
PROOF/ÉPREUVE
Reference number
ISO/IEC 30107-1:2015(E)
©
ISO/IEC 2015

---------------------- Page: 1 ----------------------
ISO/IEC 30107-1:2015(E)

COPYRIGHT PROTECTED DOCUMENT
© ISO/IEC 2015, Published in Switzerland
All rights reserved. Unless otherwise specified, no part of this publication may be reproduced or utilized otherwise in any form
or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, or posting on the internet or an intranet, without prior
written permission. Permission can be requested from either ISO at the address below or ISO’s member body in the country of
the requester.
ISO copyright office
Ch. de Blandonnet 8 • CP 401
CH-1214 Vernier, Geneva, Switzerland
Tel. [phone]
Fax [phone]
[e-mail]
www.iso.org
ii © ISO/IEC 2015 – All rights reserved

---------------------- Page: 2 ----------------------
ISO/IEC 30107-1:2015(E)

Contents Page
Foreword .iv
Introduction .v
1 Scope . 1
2 Normative references . 1
3 Terms and definitions . 1
4 Symbols and abbreviated terms . 2
5 Characterisation of presentation attacks . 3
5.1 General . 3
5.2 Presentation attack instruments . 4
6 Framework for presentation attack detection methods . 5
6.1 Types of presentation attack detection . 5
6.2 The role of challenge-response . 5
6.2.1 Challenge-response related to liveness . 6
6.2.2 Liveness not related to challenge-response . 6
6.2.3 Challenge-response not related to biometrics . 6
6.3 Presentation attack detection process . 6
6.4 Presentation attack detection within biometric system architecture . 7
6.4.1 Overview in terms of the generalized biometric framework . 7
6.4.2 PAD processing considerations relative to the other biometric subsystems. 8
6.4.3 PAD location implications regarding data interchange . 8
7 Obstacles to biometric imposter presentation attacks in a biometric system .9
Bibliography .10
© ISO/IEC 2015 – All rights reserved PROOF/ÉPREUVE iii

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ISO/IEC 30107-1:2015(E)

Foreword
ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) is a worldwide federation of national standards
bodies (ISO member bodies). The work of preparing International Standards is normally carried out
through ISO technical committees. Each member body interested in a subject for which a technical
committee has been established has the right to be represented on that committee. International
organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO, also take part in the work.
ISO collaborates closely with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) on all matters of
electrotechnical standardization.
The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are
described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular the different approval criteria needed for the
different types of ISO documents should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the
editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www.iso.org/directives).
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of
patent rights. ISO shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights. Details of
any patent rights identified during the development of the document will be in the Introduction and/or
on the ISO list of patent declarations received (see www.iso.org/patents).
Any trade name used in this document is information given for the convenience of users and does not
constitute an endorsement.
For an explanation on the meaning of ISO specific terms and expressions related to conformity
assessment, as well as information about ISO’s adherence to the WTO principles in the Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT) see the following URL: Foreword - Supplementary information
ISO/IEC 30107-1 was prepared by Technical Committee ISO/TC JTC1, Information technology,
Subcommittee SC 37, Biometrics.
ISO/IEC 30107 consists of the following parts, under the general title Information technology —
Biometric presentation attack detection:
— Part 1: Framework
— Part 2: Data formats
— Part 3: Testing and reporting
iv PROOF/ÉPREUVE © ISO/IEC 2015 – All rights reserved

---------------------- Page: 4 ----------------------
ISO/IEC 30107-1:2015(E)

Introduction
Biometric technologies are used to recognize individuals based on biological and behavioural
characteristics and, consequently, are often used as a component in security systems. A biometric
technology assisted security system may attempt to recognize persons who are known as either friends
or foes, or may attempt to recognize persons who are unknown to the system as either.
Since the beginnings of these technologies, the possibility of subversion of recognition by determined
adversaries has been widely acknowledged, as has the need for countermeasures to detect and defeat
subversive recognition attempts, or presentation attacks. Subversion of the intended function of a
biometric technology can take place at any point within a security system and by any actor, whether
a system insider or an external adversary. This International Standard (ISO/IEC 30107) will be
limited in scope, however, focusing on techniques for the automated detection of presentation attacks
undertaken by biometric capture subjects at the point of presentation and collection of the relevant
biometric characteristics. We will call these automated techniques “Presentation Attack Detection”
(PAD) methods.
The potential for subversion of biometric systems at the point of data collection by determined
individuals acting as biometric capture subjects has limited the use of biometrics in applications
which are unsupervised by an agent of the system owner, such as remote collections over untrusted
networks. Guidelines on e-authentication, for example, do not recommend the use of biometrics as an
authentication factor for this reason. In unattended applications, such as remote authentication over
open networks, automated presentation attack detection methods could be applied to mitigate the
risks of attack. Standards, best practices and independently evaluated techniques could improve the
security of all systems employing biometrics, whether using supervised or unsupervised data capture,
including those using biometric recognition to secure online transactions.
As is the case for biometric recognition, PAD techniques are subject to errors, both false positive and
false negative: false positive indications wrongly categorize routine presentations as attacks, thus
impairing the efficiency of the system, and false negative indications wrongly categorize presentation
attacks as routine, not preventing a security breach. Therefore, the decision to use a specific
implementation of PAD will depend upon the requirements of the application and consideration of the
trade-offs with respect to security and efficiency.
The purpose of this part of ISO/IEC 30107 is to provide a foundation for PAD through defining terms
and establishing a framework through which presentation attack events can be specified and detected
so that they can be categorized, detailed and communicated for subsequent biometric system decision
making and performance assessment activities. This foundation will also benefit other standards
projects in ISO/IEC committees and sub-committees. This International Standard does not advocate a
specific technique as a standard PAD tool.
There are two other parts of ISO/IEC 30107. Part 2 defines data formats for conveying the type of
approach used in biometric presentation attack detection and for conveying the results of presentation
attack detection methods. Part 3 establishes principles and methods for performance assessment of
presentation attack detection algorithms or mechanisms.
© ISO/IEC 2015 – All rights reserved PROOF/ÉPREUVE v

---------------------- Page: 5 ----------------------
INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ISO/IEC 30107-1:2015(E)
Information technology — Biometric presentation attack
detection —
Part 1:
Framework
1 Scope
This part of ISO/IEC 30107 establishes terms and definitions that are useful in the specification,
characterization and evaluation of presentation attack detection methods.
Outside the scope are
— standardization of specific PAD detection methods;
— detailed information about countermeasures (i.e. anti-spoofing techniques), algorithms, or sensors;
and
— overall system-level security or vulnerability assessment.
The attacks to be considered in ISO/IEC 30107 are those that take place at the sensor during the
presentation and collection of the biometric characteristics.
Any other attacks are considered outside the scope of ISO/IEC 30107.
2 Normative references
The following documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document and are
indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated
references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
ISO/IEC 2382-37:2012, Information technology — Vocabulary — Part 37: Biometrics
NOTE The electronic version of ISO/IEC 2382-37:2012 can be downloaded for free from the ISO/IEC Information
Technology Task Force (ITTF) web site: http://standards.iso.org/ittf/PubliclyAvailableStandards/index.html .
3 Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in ISO/IEC 2382-37:2012 and the
following apply.
3.1
artefact
artificial object or representation presenting a copy of biometric characteristics or synthetic
biometric patterns
3.2
liveness
quality or state of being alive, made evident by anatomical characteristics, involuntary reactions or
physiological functions, or voluntary reactions or subject behaviours
EXAMPLE 1 Absorption of illumination by the skin and blood are anatomical characteristics.
© ISO/IEC 2015 – All rights reserved PROOF/ÉPREUVE 1

---------------------- Page: 6 ----------------------
ISO/IEC 30107-1:2015(E)

EXAMPLE 2 The reaction of the iris to light and heart activity (pulse) are involuntary reactions (also called
physiological functions).
EXAMPLE 3 Squeezing together one’s fingers in hand geometry and a biometric presentation in response to a
directive cue are both voluntary reactions (also called subject behaviours).
3.3
liveness detection
measurement and analysis of anatomical characteristics or involuntary or voluntary reactions, in order
to determine if a biometric sample is being captured from a living subject present at the point of capture
Note 1 to entry: Liveness detection methods are a subset of presentation attack detection methods.
3.4
normal presentation
interaction of the biometric capture subject and the biometric data capture subsystem in the fashion
intended by the policy of the biometric system
Note 1 to entry: The term “normal” is analogous to “routine” when referring to a “normal presentation.” Any type
of presentation that is not an attack is considered a “normal presentation.”
3.5
presentation attack
presentation to the biometric data capture subsystem with the goal of interfering with the operation of
the biometric system
Note 1 to entry: Presentation attack can be implemented through a number of methods, e.g. artefact,
mutilations, replay, etc.
Note 2 to entry: Presentation attacks may have a number of goals, e.g. impersonation or not being recognized.
Note 3 to entry: Biometric systems may not be able to differentiate between biometric presentation attacks with
the goal of interfering with the systems operation and non-conformant presentations.
3.6
presentation attack detection
PAD
automated determination of a presentation attack
Note 1 to entry: PAD cannot infer the subject’s intent. In fact it may be impossible to derive that difference from
the data capture process or acquired sample.
3.7
presentation attack instrument
PAI
biometric characteristic or object used in a presentation attack
Note 1 to entry: The set of PAI includes artefacts but would also include lifeless biometric characteristics
(i.e. stemming from dead bodies) or altered biometric characteristics (e.g. altered fingerprints) that are used
in an attack.
Note 2 to entry:
4 Symbols and abbreviated terms
PAD Presentation Attack Detection
PAI Presentation Attack Instrument
2 PROOF/ÉPREUVE © ISO/IEC 2015 – All rights reserved

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ISO/IEC 30107-1:2015(E)

5 Characterisation of presentation attacks
5.1 General
Although attacks on a biometric system can occur anywhere and be instantiated by any actor,
ISO/IEC 30107 focuses on biometric-based attacks on the data capture subsystem by biometric capture
subjects attempting to subvert the intended operation of the system. Attacks by other actors and at
other points of the system have previously been considered in documents such as [2]. ISO/IEC 30107
does not address protecting the data capture subsystem, including the sensor itself, from modification,
replacement, or removal or protecting the communication between the data capture subsystem and
other subsystems.
Figure 1 illustrates several generic attacks against a biometric system. ISO/IEC 30107 only focuses on
attacks pointed out by arrow “1,” in which a biometric characteristic or PAI is presented to a sensor
which is operating properly within a biometric system.
Figure 1 — Examples of points of attack in a biometric system (inspired by [1])
Presentation attacks can be carried out by two types of subversive biometric capture subjects: a
biometric imposter, where the subversive biometric capture subject intends to be recognized as an
individual other than him/herself, or a biometric concealer, where the subversive biometric capture
subject intends to evade being recognized as any individual known to the system.
Biometric imposters may perform attacks in two different ways. In the first sub-type, the subversive
data subject intends to be recognized as a specific individual known to the system. In the second sub-
type, the subversive data subject intends to be recogn
...