ETSI TS 102 723-8 V1.1.1 (2016-04)

Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); OSI cross-layer topics; Part 8: Interface between security entity and network and transport layer

DTS/ITS-0050008

General Information

• Status: Published
• Publication Date: 27-Apr-2016
• Technical Committee: ITS WG5 - Security
• Current Stage: 12 - Completion
• Due Date: 18-May-2016
• Completion Date: 28-Apr-2016
• Mandate: M/453

Standards Content (Sample)

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION
Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS);
OSI cross-layer topics;
Part 8: Interface between security entity and network
and transport layer
2 ETSI TS 102 723-8 V1.1.1 (2016-04)

Reference
DTS/ITS-0050008
Keywords
adaption, addressing, interface, ITS
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3 ETSI TS 102 723-8 V1.1.1 (2016-04)
Contents
Intellectual Property Rights . 5
Foreword . 5
Modal verbs terminology . 5
Introduction . 5
1 Scope . 6
2 References . 6
2.1 Normative references . 6
2.2 Informative references . 6
3 Definitions and abbreviations . 7
3.1 Definitions . 7
3.2 Abbreviations . 7
4 Architecture integration . 8
4.1 General . 8
4.1.1 Introduction. 8
4.1.2 Vertical message flow . 8
4.1.3 Horizontal control communication . 9
4.1.4 Protocol work split . 10
4.1.5 Multiple instances . 10
4.1.6 Error handling . 10
4.2 Security services . 10
5 Interfaces between the security entity and the networking and transport layers . 11
5.1 Interface services . 11
5.2 Service primitives and parameters . 12
5.2.1 SN-SIGN . 12
5.2.1.1 Description . 12
5.2.1.2 SN-SIGN.request . 12
5.2.1.3 SN-SIGN.confirm . 13
5.2.2 SN-VERIFY . 13
5.2.2.1 Description . 13
5.2.2.2 SN-VERIFY.request . 13
5.2.2.3 SN-VERIFY.confirm . 13
5.2.3 SN-ENCRYPT . 14
5.2.3.1 Description . 14
5.2.3.2 SN-ENCRYPT.request . 14
5.2.3.3 SN-ENCRYPT.confirm . 15
5.2.4 SN-DECRYPT . 15
5.2.4.1 Description . 15
5.2.4.2 SN-DECRYPT.request . 15
5.2.4.3 SN-DECRYPT.confirm . 15
5.2.5 SN-IDCHANGE-SUBSCRIBE . 15
5.2.5.1 Description . 15
5.2.5.2 SN-IDCHANGE-SUBSCRIBE.request . 16
5.2.5.3 SN-IDCHANGE-SUBSCRIBE.confirm . 16
5.2.6 SN-IDCHANGE-EVENT . 16
5.2.6.1 Description . 16
5.2.6.2 SN-IDCHANGE-EVENT.indication . 16
5.2.6.3 SN-IDCHANGE-EVENT.response . 16
5.2.7 SN-IDCHANGE-UNSUBSCRIBE . 17
5.2.7.1 Description . 17
5.2.7.2 SN-IDCHANGE-UNSUBSCRIBE.request . 17
5.2.7.3 SN-IDCHANGE-UNSUBSCRIBE.confirm . 17
5.2.8 SN-IDCHANGE-TRIGGER. 17
5.2.8.1 Description . 17
5.2.8.2 SN-IDCHANGE-TRIGGER.request . 17
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4 ETSI TS 102 723-8 V1.1.1 (2016-04)
5.2.8.3 SN-IDCHANGE-TRIGGER.confirm . 17
5.2.9 SN-ID-LOCK . 17
5.2.9.1 Description . 17
5.2.9.2 SN-ID-LOCK.request . 18
5.2.9.3 SN-ID-LOCK.confirm . 18
5.2.10 SN-ID-UNLOCK . 18
5.2.10.1 Description . 18
5.2.10.2 SN-ID-UNLOCK.request . 18
5.2.10.3 SN-ID-UNLOCK.confirm . 18
5.2.11 SN-LOG-SECURITY-EVENT. 18
5.2.11.1 Description . 18
5.2.11.2 SN-LOG-SECURITY-EVENT.request . 18
5.2.11.3 SN-LOG-SECURITY-EVENT.confirm . 21
5.2.12 SN-ENCAP . 21
5.2.12.1 Description . 21
5.2.12.2 SN-ENCAP.request . 21
5.2.12.3 SN-ENCAP.confirm. 21
5.2.13 SN-DECAP . 22
5.2.13.1 Description . 22
5.2.13.2 SN-DECAP.request . 22
5.2.13.3 SN-DECAP.confirm. 22
6 SN-SAP procedures . 23
6.1 Outbound message handling. 23
6.1.1 Using SN-SIGN and SN-ENCRYPT . 23
6.1.2 Using SN-ENCAP . 24
6.2 Inbound message handling . 24
6.2.1 Using SN-VERIFY and SN-DECRYPT . 24
6.2.2 Using SN-DECAP . 24
6.3 ID Management . 25
6.3.1 IDCHANGE Notifications . 25
6.3.1.1 Introduction . 25
6.3.1.2 Id-change event hook . 25
6.3.1.3 Two phase commit process . 25
6.3.2 Prevent IDCHANGES . 28
6.3.3 Trigger IDCHANGES . 29
6.4 Log security event . 29
Annex A (informative): SN-Command . 30
A.1 Overview . 30
A.2 Description . 30
A.2.1 SN-IDCHANGE-EVENT service: SN-COMMAND.request (see clause 5.2.6.2) . 30
A.2.2 SN-IDCHANGE-EVENT service: SN-COMMAND.confirm (see clause 5.2.6.3) . 31
Annex B (informative): SN-Request . 32
B.1 Overview . 32
B.2 Description . 32
B.2.1 SN-ENCRYPT service: SN-REQUEST.request (see clause 5.2.3.2) . 32
B.2.2 SN-ENCRYPT service: SN-REQUEST.confirm (see clause 5.2.3.3) . 33
Annex C (informative): Example of service primitives description in the framework of
ISO 24102-3 . 34
C.1 Overview . 34
C.1.1 Introduction . 34
C.1.2 Class for SN-SAP Command.request service primitive functions . 34
C.1.3 Class for SN-SAP Command.confirm service primitive functions . 34
C.1.4 Class for SN-SAP Request.request service primitive functions . 35
C.1.5 Class for SN-SAP Request.confirm service primitive functions . 35
History . 36

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5 ETSI TS 102 723-8 V1.1.1 (2016-04)
Intellectual Property Rights
IPRs essential or potentially essential to the present document may have been declared to ETSI. The information
pertaining to these essential IPRs, if any, is publicly available for ETSI members and non-members, and can be found
in ETSI SR 000 314: "Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs); Essential, or potentially Essential, IPRs notified to ETSI in
respect of ETSI standards", which is available from the ETSI Secretariat. Latest updates are available on the ETSI Web
server (https://ipr.etsi.org/).
Pursuant to the ETSI IPR Policy, no investigation, including IPR searches, has been carried out by ETSI. No guarantee
can be given as to the existence of other IPRs not referenced in ETSI SR 000 314 (or the updates on the ETSI Web
server) which are, or may be, or may become, essential to the present document.
Foreword
This Technical Specification (TS) has been produced by ETSI Technical Committee Intelligent Transport Systems
(ITS).
The present document is part 8 of a multi-part deliverable. Full details of the entire series can be found in part 1 [i.1].
Modal verbs terminology
In the present document "shall", "shall not", "should", "should not", "may", "need not", "will", "will not", "can" and
"cannot" are to be interpreted as described in clause 3.2 of the ETSI Drafting Rules (Verbal forms for the expression of
provisions).
"must" and "must not" are NOT allowed in ETSI deliverables except when used in direct citation.
Introduction
ITS stations are complex systems that may be implemented in different ways. The reference architecture is described in
the communications architecture standard ETSI EN 302 665 [1], clause 4.4. The present document aims to address the
security interface from a functional point of view. Access control to the Service Access Point and further definitions of
station internals are out of scope of the present document.
The SAP specification is specific to the ITS architecture but generic to the concrete technologies used.
Therefore, the present document is structured in the following way:
First, the architecture integration is outlined. Secondly, functionalities are collected from related standards and mapped
to service primitives. Finally, the use of service primitives in procedures is described.
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6 ETSI TS 102 723-8 V1.1.1 (2016-04)
1 Scope
The present document specifies interfaces between the ITS security entity and the ITS network and transport layers
including interface services and service primitives which are extensible in order to achieve general applicability.
Additionally, it specifies related procedures and common parameters.
The SN-SAP description in the present document is functional as according to the ISO model as modified by ETSI
EN 302 665 [1].
2 References
2.1 Normative references
References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or
non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the
referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at
https://docbox.etsi.org/Reference/.
NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee
their long term validity.
The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document.
[1] ETSI EN 302 665: "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Communications Architecture".
[2] ETSI TS 102 940: "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Security; ITS communications security
architecture and security management".
2.2 Informative references
References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or
non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the
referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee
their long term validity.
The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the
user with regard to a particular subject area.
[i.1] ETSI TS 102 723-1: "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); OSI cross-layer topics; Part 1:
Architecture and addressing schemes".
[i.2] ETSI TS 101 539-2: "Intelligent Transport System (ITS); V2X Applications; Intersection Collision
Risk Warning (ICRW) application requirements specification".
[i.3] ETSI TS 101 539-3: "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); V2X Applications; Part 3: Longitudinal
Collision Risk Warning (LCRW) application requirements specification".
[i.4] PRE-DRIVE C2X Deliverable D1.3: "Security Architecture".
[i.5] EVITA Deliverable D3.2: "Secure On-board Architecture Specification".
[i.6] ETSI TS 102 637-1: "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Vehicular Communications; Basic Set
of Applications; Part 1: Functional Requirements".
[i.7] ETSI TS 102 637-2: "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS);Vehicular Communications; Basic Set
of Applications; Part 2: Specification of Cooperative Awareness Basic Service".
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7 ETSI TS 102 723-8 V1.1.1 (2016-04)
[i.8] ETSI ES 202 663: "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); European profile standard for the physical
and medium access control layer of Intelligent Transport Systems operating in the 5 GHz
frequency band".
[i.9] ISO 24102-3: "Intelligent transport systems -- Communications access for land mobiles (CALM) -
- ITS station management -- Part 3: Service access points".
[i.10] ETSI TS 103 097: "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Security; Security header and certificate
formats".
3 Definitions and abbreviations
3.1 Definitions
For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in ETSI EN 302 665 [1], ETSI
TS 102 940 [2] and the following apply:
security association: addressing information and 'security material' for connecting to the 'security management entity'
NOTE: This corresponds to 'enrolment authorities' and 'authorization authorities'.
security entity: functional entity inside an ITS station which offers 'security mechanisms'
security protocol: protocol used to encode and decode 'security material' and messages between ITS Stations
3.2 Abbreviations
For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in ETSI EN 302 665 [1], ETSI TS 102 940 [2] and
the following apply:
ASN Abstract Syntax Notation
CAM Cooperative Awareness Message
DENM Decentralized Environmental Notification Message
ICRW Intersection Collision Risk Warning
ID 'pseudonym' identity
IN-SAP access layer - networking & transport layer SAP
ISO International Organization for Standardization
ITS-S ITS-Station
LCRW Longitudinal Collision Risk Warning
NF-SAP Networking & transport layer - Facilities layer SAP
RX Receiver
SA Security Association
NOTE: SA is contextual dependent either "name of interface between security entity and ITS-S applications" as
given in ETSI EN 302 665 [1] or "Security Association".
SAP Service Access Point
SF-SAP Security entity - Facilities layer SAP
SN-SAP Security entity - Networking & transport layer SAP
TX Transmitter
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8 ETSI TS 102 723-8 V1.1.1 (2016-04)
4 Architecture integration
4.1 General
4.1.1 Introduction
Figure 1 shows the ITS station reference architecture, as defined in ETSI EN 302 665 [1]. The present document
contains the specification of the Service Access Points (SAP), connecting the security entity and the networking and
transport layers, i.e. SN-SAP.

Figure 1: ITS station reference architecture
Interaction between the security entity and the layers may follow two principles. First, the vertical message flow
through the layers from top to bottom or vice versa. Secondly, the horizontal control communication from the security
entity towards the corresponding layer. Both are described in clauses 4.1.2 and 4.1.3.
4.1.2 Vertical message flow
Figure 2 extends the ITS station reference architecture by illustrating the overall information flow through the layers,
from originating application on the left hand side, to the receiving application on the right hand side.

Figure 2: TX (left) and RX (right) information flow through the ITS station
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9 ETSI TS 102 723-8 V1.1.1 (2016-04)
The present document specifies only the SN-SAP, therefore only a subset of the ITS station reference architecture has to
be taken into account. Figure 3 shows the typical information flow between any sending (TX) and receiving (RX) party,
with regard to the SN-SAP only. The security entity acts like a layer inside the networking and transport layers, i.e. it is
called during the processing of messages traversing the networking and transport layers. The security entity will
however not act as a layer above or below the networking and transport layers. This means that interactions with
Facilities and Access layers are achieved via other means, i.e. the NF-SAP is used for the interaction between the
networking and transport layers and Facilities layers, whereas the IN-SAP is used for the interaction between the access
layer and networking and transport layers.

Figure 3: SN-SAP centric Information flow
4.1.3 Horizontal control communication
Figure 4 outlines the second communication principle. There is a horizontal control communication between the
security entity and the corresponding communications layer, networking and transport in this case. This is needed for
the ID change functionality introduced later. In general, the security entity will be able to indicate an ID change to the
corresponding layer and some additional ID change related calls.

Figure 4: Horizontal Control Communication
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4.1.4 Protocol work split
The SN-SAP provides a set of primitive security functions to the networking and transport layer.
Figure 5 shows how a protocol entity within the networking and transport layer handles the sending and receiving of
information but uses some security extensions to invoke the primitive functions of the Security layer in order to meet
the security requirements of this layer. They are supported by the Identity Management Capabilities, specified in ETSI
TS 102 940 [2], clause 6, necessary to apply the Atomic Security Capabilities.

Figure 5: Protocol work split
4.1.5 Multiple instances
The present document does not discuss architecture. However, the SAP shall support different permissions. The
management of different credential sets at the same time can be implemented by using multiple instances of the security
entity at the same time. Different or same components in the networking and transport layers might use multiple
instances of the security entity using the service primitives described in clause 5. Handling and access control of those
is out of scope of the present document.
4.1.6 Error handling
The present document does not make assumptions on implementation specific error handling for using the described
services. I.e. if a call of any of the described services fails for some reason, the present document does not specify if this
should be handled using exceptions or any other error handling technique.
However, the present document does specify the behaviour of services that can have a positive or negative result. E.g. a
SN-VERIFY can be SUCCESSFUL if the verification was successful or it can be unsuccessful, if the signature was
invalid (FALSE_SIGNATURE). This is considered to be within normal operation conditions, and therefore not an
error.
4.2 Security services
The required ITS security services are identified as the first level security services in ETSI TS 102 940 [2], clause 5.2.
In addition to those, security services used in the research projects PRE-DRIVE C2X and EVITA where adopted and
fitted to the existing services. See PRE-DRIVE C2X Deliverable D1.3 [i.4] and EVITA Deliverable D3.2 [i.5] for
documentation on the research project services.
Table 1 summarizes the security services to be specified in the present document, clause 5. Those security services are
invoked directly by applications or other components and layers according to ETSI TS 102 940 [2]. A "security service
group" is introduced to ease the readability of the table.
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Table 1: Security Service to Service Implementation Assignment
Security Service Security Service Name Type/Direction Implemented by (clause 5)
Group
Confidentiality Encrypt Single Message Request SN-ENCRYPT
Decrypt Single Message Request SN-DECRYPT
Authentication and Authorize Single Message Request SN-SIGN
Integrity Validate Authorization on Request SN-VERIFY
Single Message
Identity Management Lock ID Change Request SN-ID-LOCK
Unlock ID Change Request SN-ID-UNLOCK
Subscribe to ID Change Request SN-IDCHANGE-SUBSCRIBE
Notification
Unsubscribe from ID Request SN-IDCHANGE-
Change Notification UNSUBSCRIBE
Change ID Indication send to subscribed SN-IDCHANGE-EVENT
entities
Trigger ID Change Request SN-IDCHANGE-TRIGGER
Extras Log Security Event Request SN-LOG-SECURITY-EVENT
Extract Permissions Request SN-EXTRACT-PERMISSIONS
Encapsulate Message Request SN-ENCAP
Decapsulate Message Request SN-DECAP

5 Interfaces between the security entity and the
networking and transport layers
5.1 Interface services
The following services for the SN-SAP are defined in the present document:
• SN-SIGN
Create authentication information for outgoing ITS messages
• SN-VERIFY
Validate authentication information from incoming ITS messages
• SN-ENCRYPT
Encrypt outgoing ITS single messages
• SN-DECRYPT
Decrypt incoming ITS single messages
• SN-IDCHANGE-SUBSCRIBE
Subscribe for notifications on SN-IDCHANGE-EVENT, used for concurrent identifiers exchange across the
ITS-S
• SN-IDCHANGE-EVENT
The indication sent to subscribers on IDCHANGE
• SN-IDCHANGE-UNSUBSCRIBE
Unsubscribe for IDCHANGE notifications, cf. SN-IDCHANGE-EVENT
• SN-IDCHANGE-TRIGGER
Ask security entity to trigger IDCHANGE procedure
• SN-ID-LOCK
Ask security entity to avoid IDCHANGEs
• SN-ID-UNLOCK
Release SN-ID-LOCK
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12 ETSI TS 102 723-8 V1.1.1 (2016-04)
• SN-LOG-SECURITY-EVENT
Insert external security events
• SN-ENCAP
Encapsulate outbound messages in a security envelope. This is an alternative way of calling the same
functionality that SN-SIGN and/or SN-ENCRYPT offer, where the security parameter selection is done via a
security profile parameter or security entity pre-sets
• SN-DECAP
Decapsulate inbound messages from a security envelope. This is an alternative way of calling the same
functionality that SN-VERIFY and/or SN-DECRYPT offer, and should be used together with SN-ENCAP
5.2 Service primitives and parameters
5.2.1 SN-SIGN
5.2.1.1 Description
The service adds authentication information to the message. Key and identity management is internal to the security
entity. Format of the created security header is dependent on the selected security protocol. The key to use is expected
to be selected by the key and identity management of the security entity. Nevertheless, it is optionally possible to
indicate the key to use via the key_handle parameter.
5.2.1.2 SN-SIGN.request
SN-SIGN.request is sent from the networking and transport layers to the security entity for executing the SIGN service.
The parameters are described in Table 2.
Table 2: SN-SIGN.request
Name Type Valid range Description Status
tbs_message_length INTEGER Length of the message Mandatory
0 to 2 - 1
to be signed
tbs_message OCTET STRING tbs_message_length Octet string containing Mandatory
octets the message to be
signed
its_aid INTEGER ANY ITS-AID of the Mandatory
application payload or
Networking & Transport
management packet to
determine the security
profile to apply
permissions_length INTEGER Length of the Mandatory
0 to 2 - 1
permissions
permissions OCTET STRING Maximum length of Specify the sender's Mandatory
31 octets permissions for the
security entity to decide
which key to use. For
example, when using
ETSI TS 103 097 [i.10]
security protocol, the
permissions contain the
SSP associated with
ITS-AID
context_information OCTET STRING ANY Context information Optional
which could be used in
selecting properties of
the underlying security
protocol for various
purposes
key_handle INTEGER An indicator for the Optional
0 to 2 - 1
security entity to decide
which key to use
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5.2.1.3 SN-SIGN.confirm
SN-SIGN.confirm is sent from the security entity to the networking and transport layers as a corresponding reply to
SN-SIGN.request. The parameters are described in Table 3.
Table 3: SN-SIGN.confirm
Name Type Valid range Description Status
sec_message_length INTEGER Length of the signed Mandatory
0 to 2 - 1
message
sec_message OCTET STRING sec_message_length Octet string of the Mandatory
octets signed message
5.2.2 SN-VERIFY
5.2.2.1 Description
The service verifies the validity of the digital signature and meta information contained in the security header. Its
format, specification, and features are dependent on the selected security protocol.
5.2.2.2 SN-VERIFY.request
SN-VERIFY.request is sent from the networking and transport layers to the security entity for executing the VERIFY
service. The parameters are described in Table 4.
Table 4: SN-VERIFY.request
Name Type Valid range Description Status
sec_header_length INTEGER Length of the security Mandatory
0 to 2 - 1
header
sec_header OCTET STRING sec_header_length octets Octet string containing the Mandatory
security header
message_length INTEGER Length of the message to Mandatory
0 to 2 - 1
be verified
message OCTET STRING message_length octets Octet string containing the Mandatory
message to be verified
5.2.2.3 SN-VERIFY.confirm
SN-VERIFY.confirm is sent from the security entity to the networking and transport layers as a corresponding reply to
SN-VERIFY.request. The parameters are described in Table 5.
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14 ETSI TS 102 723-8 V1.1.1 (2016-04)
Table 5: SN-VERIFY.confirm
Name Type Valid range Description Status
report INTEGER VERIFY return code: Mandatory
0 to 2 - 1
SUCCESS
FALSE_SIGNATURE
INVALID_CERTIFICATE
REVOKED_CERTIFICATE
INCONSISTENT_CHAIN
INVALID_TIMESTAMP
DUPLICATE_MESSAGE
INVALID_MOBILITY_DATA
UNSIGNED_MESSAGE
SIGNER_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND
UNSUPPORTED_SIGNER_IDENTIFIER_TYPE
INCOMPATIBLE_PROTOCOL
certificate_id OCTET 8 octets Identification of the source certificate, e.g. by the Optional
STRING certificate hash, to be forwarded to facilities
its_aid_length INTEGER Length of the its_aid field Mandatory
0 to 2 - 1
its_aid INTEGER ANY ITS-AID of the application payload or Networking Mandatory
& Transport management packet to determine
the security profile to apply
permissions OCTET Maximum In case the used security protocol is capable of Mandatory
STRING length of attaching senders permissions, verify may report
31 octets those back to the caller. The definition is
dependent on the applied security protocol.
For example, when using ETSI TS 103 097 [i.10]
security protocol, the permissions contain the
SSP associated with ITS-AID
5.2.3 SN-ENCRYPT
5.2.3.1 Description
This service encrypts message for specific recipients. The designated recipient has to be known to the security entity.
Therefore, an identifier is required to indicate the recipient. An internal mapping of target_id to certificate_id shall be
possible, to select the proper target key.
5.2.3.2 SN-ENCRYPT.request
SN-ENCRYPT.request is sent from the networking and transport layers to the security entity for executing the
ENCRYPT service. The parameters are described in Table 6.
Table 6: SN-ENCRYPT.request
Name Type Valid range Description Status
tbe_payload_length INTEGER Length of the payload to be Mandatory
0 to 2 - 1
encrypted
tbe_payload OCTET STRING tbe_payload_length Octet string of the Payload Mandatory
octets to be encrypted
target_id_list_length INTEGER Length of the target_id_list Mandatory
0 to 2 - 1
target_id_list SET OF OCTET target_id_list_length Unordered collection of Mandatory
STRING elements each of target IDs, for specifying
8 octets multiple recipients
context_information OCTET STRING ANY Context information which Optional
could be used in selecting
properties of the underlying
security protocol for
various purposes
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15 ETSI TS 102 723-8 V1.1.1 (2016-04)
5.2.3.3 SN-ENCRYPT.confirm
SN-ENCRYPT.confirm is sent from the security entity to the networking and transport layers as a corresponding reply
to SN- ENCRYPT.request. The parameters are described in Table 7.
Table 7: SN-ENCRYPT.confirm
Name Type Valid range Description Status
encrypted_message_length INTEGER Length of the Mandatory
0 to 2 - 1
encrypted_message
encrypted_message OCTET STRING encrypted_message_length Octet string of the Mandatory
octets encrypted_message
5.2.4 SN-DECRYPT
5.2.4.1 Description
This services decrypts messages, which were encrypted using the ENCRYPT service.
5.2.4.2 SN-DECRYPT.request
SN-DECRYPT.request is sent from the networking and transport layers to the security entity for executing the
DECRYPT service. The parameters are described in Table 8.
Table 8: SN-DECRYPT.request
Name Type Valid range Description Status
encrypted_message_length INTEGER Length of the Mandatory
0 to 2 - 1
encrypted_message
encrypted_message OCTET STRING encrypted_message_length Octet string of the Mandatory
octets encrypted_message
5.2.4.3 SN-DECRYPT.confirm
SN-DECRYPT.confirm is sent from the security entity to the networking and transport layers as a corresponding reply
to SN-DECRYPT.request. The parameters are described in Table 9.
Table 9: SN-DECRYPT.confirm
Name Type Valid range Description Status
plaintext_message_length INTEGER Length of the decrypted Mandatory
0 to 2 - 1
message
plaintext_message OCTET plaintext_message_length Octet string containing the Mandatory
STRING octets decrypted message
report INTEGER Decrypt return code: Mandatory
0 to 2 - 1
SUCCESS
UNENCRYPTED_MESSAGE
DECRYPTION_ERROR
INCOMPATIBLE_PROTOCOL
5.2.5 SN-IDCHANGE-SUBSCRIBE
5.2.5.1 Description
Subscribe for notifications on IDCHANGE, used for concurrent identifiers exchange across the ITS-S.
ETSI
16 ETSI TS 102 723-8 V1.1.1 (2016-04)
5.2.5.2 SN-IDCHANGE-SUBSCRIBE.request
SN-IDCHANGE-SUBSCRIBE.request is sent from the networking and transport layers to the security entity for
executing the IDCHANGE-SUBSCRIBE service. The parameters are described in Table 10.
Table 10: SN-IDCHANGE-SUBSCRIBE.request
Name Type Valid range Description Status
idchange_event_hook Not applicable in ASN.1 Not applicable in Callback function, which is Mandatory
ASN.1 called when an ID-change
event occurs. The signature
of the hook function is
specified in clause 5.2.6
subscriber_data OCTET STRING ANY Additional parameter for Optional
callback function internal
use. This will be passed to
the hook function on every
call
5.2.5.3 SN-IDCHANGE-SUBSCRIBE.confirm
SN-IDCHANGE-SUBSCRIBE.confirm is sent from the security entity to the networking and transport layers as a
corresponding reply to SN-IDCHANGE-SUBSCRIBE.request. The parameters are described in Table 11.
Table 11: SN-IDCHANGE-SUBSCRIBE.confirm
Name Type Valid range Description Status
subscription INTEGER Subscription handle for Mandatory
0 to 2 - 1
unsubscribe
5.2.6 SN-IDCHANGE-EVENT
5.2.6.1 Description
Indication for notifications on IDCHANGE, cf. SN-IDCHANGE-SUBSCRIBE in clause 5.2.5.
5.2.6.2 SN-IDCHANGE-EVENT.indication
SN-IDCHANGE-EVENT.indication is sent from the security entity to the networking and transport layers for executing
the IDCHANGE-EVENT service. The parameters are described in Table 12.
Table 12: SN-IDCHANGE-EVENT.indication
Name Type Valid range Description Status
command ENUMERATED PREPARE Id-change phase, see clause 6.3 Mandatory
COMMIT
ABORT
DEREG
id OCTET STRING 8 octets Id to be set Mandatory
subscriber_data OCTET STRING ANY Additional parameter for callback function Optional
internal use. This will be passed to the
hook function on every call
5.2.6.3 SN-IDCHANGE-EVENT.response
SN-IDCHANGE-EVENT.response is sent from the networking and transport layers to the security entity as a
corresponding reply to SN-IDCHANGE-EVENT.indication. The parameters are descri
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