ISO/TR 24374:2023
(Main)Financial services — Security information for PKI in blockchain and DLT implementations
Financial services — Security information for PKI in blockchain and DLT implementations
This document describes the management of cryptographic keys in a blockchain, or distributed system used in the financial sector The objective of this document is to consider the impact of different types of key management processes that are required for PKI implementations in Blockchain and DLT projects
Services financiers
General Information
Buy Standard
Standards Content (Sample)
TECHNICAL ISO/TR
REPORT 24374
First edition
2023-04
Financial services — Security
information for PKI in blockchain and
DLT implementations
Reference number
ISO/TR 24374:2023(E)
© ISO 2023
---------------------- Page: 1 ----------------------
ISO/TR 24374:2023(E)
COPYRIGHT PROTECTED DOCUMENT
© ISO 2023
All rights reserved. Unless otherwise specified, or required in the context of its implementation, no part of this publication may
be reproduced or utilized otherwise in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, or posting on
the internet or an intranet, without prior written permission. Permission can be requested from either ISO at the address below
or ISO’s member body in the country of the requester.
ISO copyright office
CP 401 • Ch. de Blandonnet 8
CH-1214 Vernier, Geneva
Phone: +41 22 749 01 11
Email: copyright@iso.org
Website: www.iso.org
Published in Switzerland
ii
© ISO 2023 – All rights reserved
---------------------- Page: 2 ----------------------
ISO/TR 24374:2023(E)
Contents Page
Foreword .iv
Introduction .v
1 Scope . 1
2 Normative references . 1
3 Terms and definitions . 1
4 Symbols and abbreviated terms.2
5 Relevant issues - Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) / Blockchain and PKI .3
5.1 DLT/Blockchain data security and privacy concerns . 3
5.1.1 General . 3
5.1.2 From centralised to decentralized . 3
5.1.3 Instant exploitation . 3
5.1.4 Protecting the key is critical . 3
5.2 Problems and attacks associated with PKI systems . 4
5.2.1 Current Challenges of Public Key Infrastructure . 4
5.2.2 Attacks to PKI . . . 4
5.3 Security objectives . 5
5.4 Summary of the use of asymmetric key cryptography in blockchain networks . 5
5.5 Private key storage . 6
6 Security and privacy activities .6
6.1 Cryptographic tools . 6
6.2 Governance activities . 7
6.3 Operation activities . 7
7 Blockchain and DLT controls . 7
7.1 Technical Controls . 7
8 Security and privacy processes . 8
8.1 General . 8
8.2 Standard advice on organisation security and privacy processes. 8
8.2.1 General . 8
8.2.2 Standard advice on risk analysis . 8
8.3 Technical Design Elements . 9
8.4 Legal Risk . 9
9 Blockchain based PKI implementations .10
Annex A (Informative) .11
Annex B (Informative) .15
Bibliography .17
iii
© ISO 2023 – All rights reserved
---------------------- Page: 3 ----------------------
ISO/TR 24374:2023(E)
Foreword
ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) is a worldwide federation of national standards
bodies (ISO member bodies). The work of preparing International Standards is normally carried out
through ISO technical committees. Each member body interested in a subject for which a technical
committee has been established has the right to be represented on that committee. International
organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO, also take part in the work.
ISO collaborates closely with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) on all matters of
electrotechnical standardization.
The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are
described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular, the different approval criteria needed for the
different types of ISO documents should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the
editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www.iso.org/directives).
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of
patent rights. ISO shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights. Details of
any patent rights identified during the development of the document will be in the Introduction and/or
on the ISO list of patent declarations received (see www.iso.org/patents).
Any trade name used in this document is information given for the convenience of users and does not
constitute an endorsement.
For an explanation of the voluntary nature of standards, the meaning of ISO specific terms and
expressions related to conformity assessment, as well as information about ISO's adherence to
the World Trade Organization (WTO) principles in the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), see
www.iso.org/iso/foreword.html.
This document was prepared by Technical Committee ISO/TC 68, Financial Services, Subcommittee SC
2, Financial Services, security.
Any feedback or questions on this document should be directed to the user’s national standards body. A
complete listing of these bodies can be found at www.iso.org/members.html.
iv
© ISO 2023 – All rights reserved
---------------------- Page: 4 ----------------------
ISO/TR 24374:2023(E)
Introduction
Even though DLT/Blockchain-based solutions are at a relatively early stage of adoption and significant
[7]
challenges remain, they hold the potential for major opportunities across several sectors. While
the financial sector has shown widespread early interest in DLT/Blockchain, other public and private
sector organisations that rely on the keeping of records and management of secure transactions also
benefit. DLT/Blockchain also provide opportunities in the healthcare, pharmaceutical, creative, and
food sectors.
In light of the growing interest in DLT/Blockchain, standardisation efforts have
gathered momentum, particularly with the setting up of the ISO technical committee
https://www.iso.org/committee/6266604.html on Blockchain and electronic distributed ledger
technologies (ISO/TC 307 Blockchain and distributed ledger technologies).
ISO/DTR 23245 states that: ‘(i) The essential part of key lifecycle management for blockchain is similar
to an ordinary PKI type system (ii) Some blockchain applications do not have the revocation process for
the key pair. In such cases different type of key management process is needed.’
Consideration of the major implications and the impact that DLT/ Blockchain will have on current PKI
implementations for financial services is essential to minimise any potential disruption.
v
© ISO 2023 – All rights reserved
---------------------- Page: 5 ----------------------
TECHNICAL REPORT ISO/TR 24374:2023(E)
Financial services — Security information for PKI in
blockchain and DLT implementations
1 Scope
This document describes the management of cryptographic keys in a blockchain, or distributed system
used in the financial sector
The objective of this document is to consider the impact of different types of key management processes
that are required for PKI implementations in Blockchain and DLT projects
2 Normative references
There are no normative references in this document.
3 Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.
ISO and IEC maintain terminology databases for use in standardization at the following addresses:
— ISO Online browsing platform: available at https:// www .iso .org/ obp
— IEC Electropedia: available at https:// www .electropedia .org/
3.1
blockchain
distributed ledger (3.4) with confirmed blocks organized in an append-only, sequential chain using
cryptographic links
Note 1 to entry: blockchains are designed to be tamper-proof and to create final, definitive, and immutable ledger
records (3.10).
3.2
consensus
agreement among DLT nodes that a) a transaction is validated and b) that the distributed ledger (3.4)
contains a consistent set and ordering of validated transactions
3.3
consensus mechanism
rules and procedures by which consensus (3.2) is reached
3.4
distributed ledger
ledger (3.9) that is shared across a set of DLT nodes and synchronized between the DLT nodes using a
consensus mechanism (3.3)
[SOURCE: ISO 22739:2020, 3.44]
3.5
distributed ledger technology system
DLT system
system that implements a distributed ledger (3.4)
1
© ISO 2023 – All rights reserved
---------------------- Page: 6 ----------------------
ISO/TR 24374:2023(E)
3.6
distributed ledger technology
DLT
technology that enables the operation and use of distributed ledgers (3.4)
3.7
distributed ledger technology node
DLT node
distributed ledger technology device or process that participates in a network and stores a complete or
partial replica of the ledger records (3.10)
3.8
hardware security module
HSM
hardware implementation of a secure crypto-processor using an ITU-T X.509 certificate and a private
key to provide secure authentication (ISO/IEC 19790:2012 security level 3 or higher)
3.9
ledger
information store that keeps records of transactions that are intended to be final, definitive, and
immutable
3.10
ledger record
distributed ledger technology record comprising hashes of transaction records or references to
transaction records recorded on a blockchain (3.1) or distributed ledger system
[SOURCE: ISO 22739:2020, 3.30]
4 Symbols and abbreviated terms
API Application Program Interface
BCP Business Continuity Plan
BTC Bitcoin
CA Certificate authority
DHT Distributed hash table
CRL Certificate Revocation List
DTR Draft technical report
ETL Extract, transfer, and load
HSM Hardware security module
KYC Know your customer
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
MITM Man-In-The-Middle
OCSP Online certificate status protocol
PAX Paxos Standard
PKI Public key infrastructure
2
© ISO 2023 – All rights reserved
---------------------- Page: 7 ----------------------
ISO/TR 24374:2023(E)
VPN Virtual Private Network
WoT Web of Trust
5 Relevant issues - Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) / Blockchain and PKI
5.1 DLT/Blockchain data security and privacy concerns
5.1.1 General
Blockchain and DLT systems involve nodes on a peer-to-peer network that store data, where the data
finality is agreed upon via a consensus mechanism. Each node has a cryptographic module to conduct
cryptographic operations as specified in the underlying protocol. Though blockchain networks and
services do not have a centralized server, it does not mean protection of a node is not needed. Best
efforts to protect each node is an essential part in securing the entire blockchain based system.
At its most basic, blockchain technology projects are a peer to peer based distributed ledger or
databased organized by a set of protocols combined with a blockchain, i.e., a series of encrypted sets of
data that record immutable changes over time.
One of blockchains greatest assets is its write-once, append many distributed nature; it can be easily
deployed across disparate nodes on the web, yet each record contains its own hash making it immutable.
To this end, cryptography is the primary means to protect the applications, networks, infrastructure,
and services from cyber-threats. However, the existing public key infrastructure (PKI) is based on a
central certificate authority (CA) that can become a bottleneck which will affect the efficiency of
the cryptographic protocols because of the overhead incurred by the verification of cryptographic
signatures and certificates. Recently, blockchain has also been leveraged to aid PKI without the need
7
for a central authority. But it also creates unique security challenges which are described in clause 5.
5.1.2 From centralised to decentralized
Blockchain shifts data storage and protection from a centralized to a decentralized model. In traditional
centralized models, security methods can be consolidated with the technology products they serve.
Blockchain, however, requires innovative security measures to protect the dynamic and highly
distributed financial products the technology aims to support.
As with any crypto-based infrastructure, protecting keys is paramount to ensuring a blockchain
system’s security.
A successful blockchain system needs highly reliable methods of interfacing with the strong key
protection practices afforded by HSMs, secure elements, and other computing environments designed
for secure execution of code, and all of these deliver the scaling and flexibility a decentralized blockchain
model needs.
5.1.3 Instant exploitation
Anyone who obtains the key can monetize and exploit the asset instantly. As seen in security breaches
in public blockchain settings, such as Bitfinex, Mt. Gox and others, the malicious transfer of ‘value’ can
be instantaneous, irreversible, and significant. Participants in these systems lost millions of dollars
because of compromised security systems. However, note that these attacks exploited vulnerabilities at
the application layer—the wallets holding the keys to the assets—rather than the underlying blockchain
protocol. So far, blockchain technology itself has proved tamper-proof, within the limits presented by
the consensus mechanism adopted by the network.
5.1.4 Protecting the key is critical
The ability to add transactions to a transaction database broadens the technology’s applicability.
3
© ISO 2023 – All rights reserved
---------------------- Page: 8 ----------------------
ISO/TR 24374:2023(E)
Traditional PKI is CA based, so the security of PKI systems are at risk if one CA is compromised For
example, a framework mitigates the problems with PKI such as the difficulties with rapid certificate
revocation, elimination of single points of failure and CAs’ malfunctions. Note that If the root CA were
to be compromised, an attacker could gain control of the entire PKI and compromise trust in the entire
[1]
system, including any sub-systems reliant on the PKI.
5.2 Problems and attacks associated with PKI systems
5.2.1 Current Challenges of Public Key Infrastructure
The most commonly employed approach to PKIs is the Web PKI. It is a Certificate Authority based
system that adopts a centralized trust infrastructure. The purpose of a PKI is to facilitate the secure
electronic transfer of information for a range of network activities such as e-commerce, internet
banking and confidential email. Verification is required to check the authenticity of the party with
whom the secure connection is established. The most important task is to establish the correspondence
between the identity (identification data) and the user's public key. This problem is solved using a
public key certificate — an electronic document used to prove ownership of a public key. The certificate
contains the public key and user credentials, as well as the electronic signature of the trusted party
that verifies the user. To ensure the integrity and authenticity of the certificate, it is signed by a trusted
party – a certification authority.
Centralized Web PKI solutions have several significant problems.
a) There are some challenges associated with quick notification of key compromise, since the
formation and distribution of the list of revoked certificates can take from several minutes to
an hour, unless synchronous verification protocols like OCSP are used. As a result, there is no
100% guarantee that this key is still valid. This problem is also relevant for DLT systems, where a
transaction could be signed by a key that is no longer valid or under the sole responsibility of the
owner. If the certificate is verified online (by request to the certification authority), then the user’s
privacy is violated, since the certification authority will know the entire history of user interaction.
b) The definition of the list of trusted CAs in a PKI system could be complex and could require some
specific out-of-protocol management, although successful collaborations have resulted in highly-
federated environments, like the European Trusted Services List. A decentralized system could
also be impacted by this problem.
c) The centre of the system is always an attack point and compromising the root certificate will
expose the entire system to a bunch of vulnerabilities.
d) Identifier management is in the hands of a centralized organization and does not belong to the
identifier owner himself.
There are significant sources of failures of PKI that neither the usability nor traditional computer
security community is engaging. Specifically, there are incidents that illustrate systematic weaknesses
of organizational practices that create risks for all who rely upon PKI. However, there are organizational
[15]
and configuration choices that could avoid or mitigate some of these risks.
In decentralized PKI, blockchain can act as a decentralized key-value storage. It is capable of securing
the data read to prevent MITM (Man-In-The-Middle) attacks, and to minimize the power of third parties.
5.2.2 Attacks to PKI
PKI is exposed to risks due to potential failures of certificate authorities (CAs) that can be used to issue
unauthorized certificates for end-users. Many breaches show that if a CA is compromised, the security
of the corresponding end-users will be in risk. There are many cases where CA’s errors or breaches
[12]
have resulted in unauthorized certificates being issued.
Another important weakness of PKIs concerns the reliability and security of certificate revocation
lists (CRLs or associated OCSP servers), which are used to ensure proper lifecycle management of
4
© ISO 2023 – All rights reserved
---------------------- Page: 9 ----------------------
ISO/TR 24374:2023(E)
certificates, particularly the revocation, and are to be queried any time a certificate is used. Classically,
the CRL for a set of certificates is maintained by the same (and sole) certification authority (CA) that
issued the certificates, and this introduces a single point of failure into the system.
In fact, CRLs do not operate in real time; they are commonly updated periodically by the issuing CA,
and there can be a delay between a security breach and the subsequent CRL update, resulting in the
temporary use of compromised certificates. The theft of a certificate (with its associated private key)
[10]
could be unknown to the CA, and the certificate is not revoked in this case. See Annex A for possible
solutions.
5.3 Security objectives
DLTs that use cryptographic PKI as their security mechanism are resistant to attackers who are not in
possession of the appropriate keys. This, in addition to the shared data and tamper-resistant properties
of blockchain solutions, means that DLTs have a high level of security. For this reason, provided that
[7]
controls, see Annex B, such as key management follow industry best practice, DLTs are potentially
more robust from a cybersecurity perspective than systems relying on physical or network security,
or which are locked with manually-generated passwords rather than cryptographic private keys. DLT
also presents integration challenges with hardware security modules (HSMs) for key storage and
generation, and security infrastructure such as virtual private networks (VPNs).
HSMs provide limited mechanisms for detection of key misuse, e.g., data encryption versus PIN
encryption, signature keys versus encryption keys. DLTs could be based on cryptographic schemes
that are not necessarily supported by HSMs, secure elements, nor properly managed by other security
components, and that need to consume and process information signed with those keys Also if an
attacker compromises a system or application that has permissions to use keys in the HSM, or if a rogue
insider abuses such permissions, this will give them the ability to sign fraudulent cryptocurrency
[10].
transactions. One such signature is enough to empty all cryptocurrency in a specific address
Integration challenges with DLTs relate to their security model, which is largely based on PKI (public key
[10]
infrastructure) . Access rights to writing blockchain state data typically require data transactions to
be signed by a specific private key, while reading blockchain state data requires access to either the
ledger file (stored on several servers) or access to the interface mechanisms placed over the blockchain
data. These interfaces are typically secured via a network credential system (linked to the corporate
directory) or a custom password authentication mechanism. Note this varies between DLT systems and
in fact does not exist for public permissionless DLT systems.
Security mechanisms are an important consideration when integrating highly secure, cryptographically-
based blockchain security protocols with other, potentially looser access and control rules in existing
legacy systems. Integration from a data point of view is relatively straightforward via standard
programming interfaces, assuming that the data integration takes place within the established security
framework and standard ETL processes. Once blockchain systems have a secure standard interface, (to
be defined) they essentially become another enterprise component, albeit with the unique properties of
DLT systems - specifically the immutable record of transactions in a decentralised network where peer
nodes share data, assets, and value.
Blockchains can also be used to secure the data in other systems. For example, database backups can be
timestamped with a hash of the data to ensure integrity of the backups for regulatory purposes.
[18]
Cryptographic approaches such as Merkle trees, make it possible to secure large amounts of data at
an individual data row level. A Merkle tree separates the validation of the data from the data itself —
the Merkle tree can reside locally, or on a trusted authority, or can itself reside on a distributed system.
5.4 Summary of the use of asymmetric key cryptography in blockchain networks
Here is a summary of the use of asymmetric-key cryptography in many blockchain networks.
— Private keys are used to digitally sign transactions.
— Public keys are used to derive addresses.
5
© ISO 2023 – All rights reserved
---------------------- Page: 10 ----------------------
ISO/TR 24374:2023(E)
— Public keys are used to verify signatures generated with private keys.
— Asymmetric-key cryptography provides the ability to verify that the user transferring value to
another user is in possession of the private key capable of signing the transaction.
Some permissioned blockchain networks can leverage a business’s existing public key infrastructure
for asymmetric-key cryptography to provide user credentials – rather than having each blockchain
network user manage their own asymmetric-keys. This is done by utilizing existing directory services
and using that information within the blockchain network. Blockchain networks which utilize an
existing directory service can access it via existing protocols, such as the Lightweight Directory Access
[10],
Protocol (LDAP) and utilize the information from the directory natively, or import it into an internal
[9]
certificate authority within the blockchain network.
5.5 Private key storage
If a user loses a private key, then any digital asset associated with that key is lost, because it is
computationally infeasible to regenerate the same private key. If a private key is stolen, the attacker
will have full access to all digital assets controlled by that private key. The security of private keys is
so important that many users use special secure hardware to store them; alternatively, users can take
advantage of an emerging industry of private key escrow services.
These key escrow services can also satisfy KYC laws in addition to storing private keys, as users
provide proof of their identity when creating an account. Private key storage is an extremely important
aspect of blockchain technology. When it is reported in the news that “Cryptocurrency XYZ was stolen
[13]
from…”, (one of the biggest cryptocurrency thefts ever) it almost certainly means some private keys
were found and used to sign a transaction sending the money to a new account, not that the blockchain
network itself was compromised. Note that because blockchain data cannot generally be changed, once
a criminal steals a private key and publicly transfers the associated funds to another account, that
transaction generally cannot be undone.
6 Security and privacy activities
6.1 Cryptographic tools
The security of an arrangement is central to the safety and soundness of the financial system.
Cryptographic tools, such as public key cryptography, play a central role in ensuring the security of
existing systems and are of critical importance in DLT arrangements. While current cryptographic
tools are considered effective and are widely used today, future technological advancements could
render existing cryptographic tools less secure and effective. This issue is of particular concern
[3]
for an arrangement with a weak governance structure, which is not able to react quickly enough
to e
...
© ISO #### – All rights reserved
Confidential
ISO/TR 24374
ISO TC 68/SC 2/WG 8
Date: 2022-09-12-02
Secretariat: BSI
Financial services -— Security information for PKI in Blockchain and DLT implementations
TR stage
Warning for WDs and CDs
This document is not an ISO International Standard. It is distributed for review and comment. It is subject to
change without notice and may not be referred to as an International Standard.
Recipients of this draft are invited to submit, with their comments, notification of any relevant patent rights of
which they are aware and to provide supporting documentation.
---------------------- Page: 1 ----------------------
CCoonnffiiddenenttiiaall
© ISO 2018
---------------------- Page: 2 ----------------------
ISO #####-#:####(X)
Confidential
© ISO 2023
All rights reserved. Unless otherwise specified, or required in the context of its implementation, no part
of this publication may be reproduced or utilized otherwise in any form or by any means, electronic or
mechanical, including photocopying, or posting on the internet or an intranet, without prior written
permission. Permission can be requested from either ISO at the address below or ISO’s member body
in the country of the requester.
ISO copyright office
CP 401 • Ch. de Blandonnet 8
CH-1214 Vernier, Geneva
Phone: +41 22 749 01 11
Fax: +41 22 749 09 47
Email: copyright@iso.org
Website: www.iso.orgwww.iso.org
Published in Switzerland
iv © ISO #### – All rights reserved
---------------------- Page: 3 ----------------------
ISO #####-#:####(X)
Confidential
Contents
Foreword . iv
Introduction . v
1 Scope . 1
2 Normative references . 1
3 Terms and definitions . 1
4 Symbols and abbreviated terms . 2
5 Relevant issues - Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) / Blockchain and PKI . 3
5.1 DLT / Blockchain data security and privacy concerns . 3
5.1.1 From centralised to decentralized . 3
5.1.2 Instant exploitation . 3
5.1.3 Protecting the key is critical . 3
5.2 Problems and attacks associated with PKI systems . 4
5.2.1 Current Challenges of Public Key Infrastructure . 4
5.2.2 Attacks to PKI . 4
5.3 Security objectives . 5
5.4 Summary of the use of asymmetric key cryptography in blockchain networks . 5
5.5 Private key storage . 6
6 Security and privacy activities . 6
6.1 Governance activities . 7
6.2 Operation activities . 7
7 Blockchain and DLT controls . 7
7.1 Technical Controls . 7
8 Security and privacy processes . 7
8.1 General . 7
8.2 Standard advice on organisation security and privacy processes . 8
8.2.1 General . 8
8.2.2 Standard advice on risk analysis . 8
8.3 Technical Design Elements . 9
8.4 Legal Risk . 10
9 Blockchain based PKI implementations . 10
Annex A . 12
A1. informative Use cases . 12
A2. BCP with PKI. 13
A3. The implementation of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and Blockchain. . 13
A4. How Blockchain Addresses Public Key Infrastructure Shortcomings . 14
A5. Example solutions . 14
Annex B . 16
B.1 Blockchain and DLT controls . 16
Bibliography . 17
© ISO #### – All rights reserved v
---------------------- Page: 4 ----------------------
ISO #####-#:####(X)
Confidential
Foreword
ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) is a worldwide federation of national standards
bodies (ISO member bodies). The work of preparing International Standards is normally carried out
through ISO technical committees. Each member body interested in a subject for which a technical
committee has been established has the right to be represented on that committee. International
organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO, also take part in the work. ISO
collaborates closely with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) on all matters of
electrotechnical standardization.
The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are
described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. NoteIn particular, the different approval criteria needed for
the different types of ISO documents. should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the
editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www.iso.org/directives).
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of
patent rights. ISO isshall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights. Details of
any patent rights identified during the development of the document will be in the Introduction and/or
on the ISO list of patent declarations received (see www.iso.org/patents).
Any trade name used in this document is information given for the convenience of users and does not
constitute an endorsement.
For an explanation of the voluntary nature of standards, the meaning of ISO specific terms and
expressions related to conformity assessment, as well as information about ISO's adherence to the World
Trade Organization (WTO) principles in the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), see
www.iso.org/iso/foreword.html.
This document was prepared by Technical Committee ISO/TC 68, SC2, WG8Financial Services,
Subcommittee SC 2, Financial Services, security.
Direct anyAny feedback or questions on this document should be directed to the user’s national standards
body. A complete listing of these bodies can be found at www.iso.org/members.html.
vi © ISO #### – All rights reserved
---------------------- Page: 5 ----------------------
ISO #####-#:####(X)
Confidential
Introduction
Even though DLT/Blockchain-based solutions are at a relatively early stage of adoption and significant
challenges remain, they hold the potential for major opportunities across several sectors. While the
financial sector has shown widespread early interest in DLT/Blockchain, other public and private sector
organisations that rely on the keeping of records and management of secure transactions also benefit.
DLT/Blockchain also provide opportunities in the healthcare, pharmaceutical, creative, and food sectors.
In the light of the growing interest in DLT/Blockchain, standardisation efforts have gathered momentum,
particularly with the setting up of the ISO technical committee
https://www.iso.org/committee/6266604.html on Blockchain and electronic distributed ledger
technologies (ISO/TC 307 Blockchain and distributed ledger technologies).
ISO/DTR 23245 states that: ‘(i) The essential part of key lifecycle management for blockchain is similar
to an ordinary PKI type system (ii) Some blockchain applications do not have the revocation process for
the key pair. In such cases different type of key management process is needed.’
Consideration of the major implications and the impact that DLT/ Blockchain will have on current PKI
implementations for financial services is essential to minimise any potential disruption.
© ISO #### – All rights reserved vii
---------------------- Page: 6 ----------------------
ISO #####-#:####(X/TR 24374:2023(E)
Confidential
1
© ISO #### – All rights reserved
ii © ISO 2023 – All rights reserved
---------------------- Page: 7 ----------------------
Confidential
DRAFT TECHNICAL REPORT ISO/TR 24374:2023(E)
Financial services — Security information for PKI in Blockchain
and DLT implementations
1 Scope
This document describes the management of cryptographic keys in a blockchain, or distributed system
used in the financial sector
The objective of this document is to consider the impact of different types of key management processes
that are required for PKI implementations in Blockchain and DLT projects
2 2 Normative references
The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all their content
constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For
undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
There are no normative references in this document.
3 3 Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.
ISO and IEC maintain terminology databases for use in standardization at the following addresses:
— ISO Online browsing platform: available at https://www.iso.org/obp
— IEC Electropedia: available at https://www.electropedia.org/
3.1
blockchain
distributed ledger (3.4) with confirmed blocks organized in an append-only, sequential chain using
cryptographic links
Note 1 to entry: blockchains are designed to be tamper-proof and to create final, definitive, and immutable ledger
records (3.10).
3.2
consensus
agreement among DLT nodes that a) a transaction is validated and b) that the distributed ledger (3.4)
contains a consistent set and ordering of validated transactions
3.3
consensus mechanism
rules and procedures by which consensus (3.2) is reached
3.4
© ISO 2022 – All rights reserved 1
---------------------- Page: 8 ----------------------
ISO/TR 24374:2023(E)
Confidential
distributed ledger
ledger (3.9) that is shared across a set of DLT nodes and synchronized between the DLT nodes using a
consensus mechanism (3.3)
[SOURCE :]: ISO 22739:2020, 3.44]
3.5
distributed ledger technology system
(DLT system)
system that implements a distributed ledger (3.4)
3.6
distributed ledger technology
(DLT)
technology that enables the operation and use of distributed ledgers (3.4)
3.7
distributed ledger technology node
(DLT node)
distributed ledger technology> device or process that participates in a network and stores a complete or
partial replica of the ledger records (3.10)
3.8
HSM hardware security module
HSM
hardware implementation of a secure crypto-processor using an ITU-T X.509 certificate and a private key
to provide secure authentication (ISO/IEC 19790:2012 security level 3 or higher)
3.9
ledger
information store that keeps records of transactions that are intended to be final, definitive, and
immutable
3.10
ledger record
distributed ledger technology record comprising hashes of transaction records or references to
transaction records recorded on a blockchain (3.1) or distributed ledger system
[SOURCE: ISO] 22739:2020, 3.30]
54 4 Symbols and abbreviated terms
API Application Program Interface
BCP Business Continuity Plan
BTC Bitcoin
© ISO #### – All rights reserved
2 © ISO 2023 – All rights reserved
---------------------- Page: 9 ----------------------
ISO/TR 24374:2022(E)
Confidential
CA Certificate authority
DHT Distributed hash table
CRL Certificate Revocation List
DTR Draft technical report
ETL Extract, transfer, and load
HSM Hardware security module
KYC Know your customer
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
MITM Man-In-The-Middle
OCSP Online certificate status protocol
PAX Paxos Standard
PKI Public key infrastructure
VPN Virtual Private Network
WoT Web of Trust
5
API Application Program Interface
BCP Business Continuity Plan
BTC Bitcoin
CA Certificate authority
DHT Distributed hash table
CRL Certificate Revocation List
DTR Draft technical report
ETL Extract, transfer, and load
HSM Hardware security module
KYC Know your customer
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
MITM Man-In-The-Middle
OCSP Online certificate status protocol
PAX Paxos Standard
PKI Public key infrastructure
© ISO #### – All rights reserved © ISO 2023 – All 3
rights reserved
---------------------- Page: 10 ----------------------
ISO/TR 24374:2023(E)
Confidential
VPN Virtual Private Network
WoT Web of Trust
65 Relevant issues - Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) / Blockchain and PKI
6.15.1 5.1 DLT / /Blockchain data security and privacy concerns
5.1.1 General
Blockchain and DLT systems involve nodes on a peer-to-peer network that store data, where the data
finality is agreed upon via a consensus mechanism. Each node has a cryptographic module to conduct
cryptographic operations as specified in the underlying protocol. Though blockchain networks and
services do not have a centralized server, it does not mean protection of a node is not needed. Best efforts
to protect each node is an essential part in securing the entire blockchain based system.
At its most basic, blockchain technology projects are a peer to peer based distributed ledger or databased
organized by a set of protocols combined with a blockchain, i.e., a series of encrypted sets of data that
record immutable changes over time.
One of blockchains greatest assets is its write-once, append many distributed nature; it can be easily
deployed across disparate nodes on the web, yet each record contains its own hash making it immutable.
To this end, cryptography is the primary meanmeans to protect the applications, networks,
infrastructure, and services from cyber-threats. However, the existing Public Key Infrastructurepublic
key infrastructure (PKI) is based on a central Certificate Authoritycertificate authority (CA) that can
become a bottleneck which will affect the efficiency of the cryptographic protocols because of the
overhead incurred by the verification of cryptographic signatures and certificates. Recently, blockchain
has also been leveraged to aid PKI without the need for a central authority. But it also creates unique
7
security challenges which are described in clause 5.
6.1.15.1.2 5.1.1 From centralised to decentralized
Blockchain shifts data storage and protection from a centralized to a decentralized model. In traditional
centralized models, security methods can be consolidated with the technology products they serve.
Blockchain, however, requires innovative security measures to protect the dynamic and highly
distributed financial products the technology aims to support.
As with any crypto-based infrastructure, protecting keys is paramount to ensuring a blockchain system’s
security.
A successful blockchain system needs highly reliable methods of interfacing with the strong key
protection practices afforded by HSMs, secure elements, and other computing environments designed for
secure execution of code, and all of these deliver the scaling and flexibility a decentralized blockchain
model needs.
6.1.25.1.3 5.1.2 Instant exploitation
Anyone who obtains the key can monetize and exploit the asset instantly. As seen in security breaches in
public blockchain settings, such as Bitfinex, Mt. Gox and others, the malicious transfer of ‘value’ can be
instantaneous, irreversible, and significant. Participants in these systems lost millions of dollars because
of compromised security systems. However, note that these attacks exploited vulnerabilities at the
application layer—the wallets holding the keys to the assets—rather than the underlying blockchain
© ISO #### – All rights reserved
4 © ISO 2023 – All rights reserved
---------------------- Page: 11 ----------------------
ISO/TR 24374:2022(E)
Confidential
protocol. So far, blockchain technology itself has proved tamper-proof, within the limits presented by the
consensus mechanism adopted by the network.
6.1.35.1.4 5.1.3 Protecting the key is critical
The ability to add transactions to a transaction database broadens the technology’s applicability.
Traditional PKI is CA based, so the security of PKI systems are at risk if one CA is compromised For
example, a framework mitigates the problems with PKI such as the difficulties with rapid certificate
revocation, elimination of single points of failure and CAs’ malfunctions. Note that If the root CA were to
be compromised, an attacker could gain control of the entire PKI and compromise trust in the entire
system, including any sub-systems reliant on the PKI.
6.25.2 5.2 Problems and attacks associated with PKI systems
6.2.15.2.1 5.2.1 Current Challenges of Public Key Infrastructure
The most commonly employed approach to public key infrastructures (PKIs) is the Web PKI. It is a
Certificate Authority based system that adopts a centralized trust infrastructure. The purpose of a PKI is
to facilitate the secure electronic transfer of information for a range of network activities such as e-
commerce, internet banking and confidential email. Verification is required to check the authenticity of
the party with whom the secure connection is established. The most important task is to establish the
correspondence between the identity (identification data) and the user's public key. This problem is
solved using a public key certificate — an electronic document used to prove ownership of a public key.
The certificate contains the public key and user credentials, as well as the electronic signature of the
trusted party that verifies the user. To ensure the integrity and authenticity of the certificate, it is signed
by a trusted party – a certification authority.
Centralized Web PKI solutions have several significant problems:
Centralized Web PKI solutions have several significant problems.
a) There are some challenges associated with quick notification of key compromise, since the formation
and distribution of the list of revoked certificates can take from several minutes to an hour, unless
synchronous verification protocols like OCSP are used. As a result, there is no 100% guarantee that
this key is still valid. This problem is also relevant for DLT systems, where a transaction could be
signed by a key that is no longer valid or under the sole responsibility of the owner. If the certificate
is verified online (by request to the certification authority), then the user’s privacy is violated, since
the certification authority will know the entire history of user interaction.
b) The definition of the list of trusted CAs in a PKI system could be complex and could require some
specific out-of-protocol management, although successful collaborations have resulted in highly-
federated environments, like the European Trusted Services List. A decentralized system could also
be impacted by this problem.
c) The centre of the system is always an attack point and compromising the root certificate will expose
the entire system to a bunch of vulnerabilities.
d) Identifier management is in the hands of a centralized organization and does not belong to the
identifier owner himself.
There are significant sources of failures of PKI that neither the usability nor traditional computer security
community is engaging. Specifically, there are incidents that illustrate systematic weaknesses of
organizational practices that create risks for all who rely upon PKI. However, there are organizational
[26 [15]
and configuration choices that could avoid or mitigate some of these risks. .
© ISO #### – All rights reserved © ISO 2023 – All 5
rights reserved
---------------------- Page: 12 ----------------------
ISO/TR 24374:2023(E)
Confidential
In decentralized PKI, blockchain can act as a decentralized key-value storage. It is capable of securing the
data read to prevent MITM (Man-In-The-Middle) attacks, and to minimize the power of third parties.
6.2.35.2.2 5.2.2 Attacks to PKI
PKI is exposed to risks due to potential failures of certificate authorities (CAs) that can be used to issue
unauthorized certificates for end-users. Many breaches show that if a CA is compromised, the security of
the corresponding end-users will be in risk. There are many cases where a CA’s errors or breaches have
[23 [12]
resulted in unauthorized certificates being issued. .
Another important weakness of PKIs concerns the reliability and security of certificate revocation lists
(CRLs or associated OCSP servers), which are used to ensure proper lifecycle management of certificates,
particularly the revocation, and are to be queried any time a certificate is used. Classically, the CRL for a
set of certificates is maintained by the same (and sole) certification authority (CA) that issued the
certificates, and this introduces a single point of failure into the system.
In fact, CRLs do not operate in real time; they are commonly updated periodically by the issuing CA, and
there can be a delay between a security breach and the subsequent CRL update, resulting in the
temporary use of compromised certificates. The theft of a certificate (with its associated private key)
[17 [10]
could be unknown to the CA, and the certificate is not revoked in this case. . See Annex A for possible
solutions.
6.35.3 5.3 Security objectives
DLTs that use cryptographic PKI as their security mechanism are resistant to attackers who are not in
possession of the appropriate keys. This, in addition to the shared data and tamper-resistant properties
of blockchain solutions, means that DLTs have a high level of security. For this reason, provided that
[127]
controls, see Annex B, such as key management follow industry best practice, DLTs are potentially
more robust from a cybersecurity perspective than systems relying on physical or network security, or
which are locked with manually-generated passwords rather than cryptographic private keys. DLT also
presents integration challenges with hardware security modules (HSMs) for key storage and generation,
and security infrastructure such as virtual private networks (VPNs).
HSMs provide limited mechanisms for detection of key misuse, e.g., data encryption versus PIN
encryption, signature keys versus encryption keys. DLTs could be based on cryptographic schemes that
are not necessarily supported by HSMs, secure elements, nor properly managed by other security
components, and that need to consume and process information signed with those keys Also if an attacker
compromises a system or application that has permissions to use keys in the HSM, or if a rogue insider
abuses such permissions, this will give them the ability to sign fraudulent cryptocurrency transactions.
.
[10] ].
One such signature is enough to empty all cryptocurrency in a specific address
Integration challenges with DLTs relate to their security model, which is largely based on PKI (public key
17] [10]
infrastructure).[ ) . Access rights to writing blockchain state data typically require data transactions
to be signed by a specific private key, while reading blockchain state data requires access to either the
ledger file (stored on several servers) or access to the interface mechanisms placed over the blockchain
data. These interfaces are typically secured via a network credential system (linked to the corporate
directory) or a custom password authentication mechanism. Note this varies between DLT systems and
in fact does not exist for public permissionless DLT systems.
Security mechanisms are an important consideration when integrating highly secure, cryptographically-
based blockchain security protocols with other, potentially looser access and control rules in existing
legacy systems. Integration from a data point of view is relatively straightforward via standard
© ISO #### – All rights reserved
6 © ISO 2023 – All rights reserved
---------------------- Page: 13 ----------------------
ISO/TR 24374:2022(E)
Confidential
programming interfaces, assuming that the data integration takes place within the established security
framework and standard ETL processes. Once blockchain systems have a secure standard interface, (to
be defined) they essentially become another enterprise component, albeit with the unique properties of
DLT systems - specifically the immutable record of transactions in a decentralised network where peer
nodes share data, assets, and value.
Blockchains can also be used to secure the data in other systems. For example, database backups can be
timestamped with a hash of the data to ensure integrity of the backups for regulatory purposes.
Cryptographic approaches such as Merkle trees, make it possible to secure large amounts of data at an
individual data row level, A Merkle tree separates the validation of the data from the data itself --— the
Merkle tree can reside locally, or on a trusted authority, or can itself reside on a distributed system.
6.45.4 5.4 Summary of the use of asymmetric key cryptography in blockchain networks
Here is a summary of the use of asymmetric-key cryptography in many blockchain networks:.
• — Private keys are used to digitally sign transactions.
• — Public keys are used to derive addresses.
• — Public keys are used to verify signatures generated with private keys.
• — Asymmetric-key cryptography provides the ability to verify that the user transferring value to
another user is in possession of the private key capable of signing the transaction.
Some permissioned blockchain networks can leverage a business’s existing public key infrastructure for
asymmetric-key cryptography to provide user credentials – rather than having each blockchain network
user manage their own asymmetric-keys. This is done by utilizing existing directory services and using
that information within the blockchain network. Blockchain networks which utilize an existing directory
[10],
service can access it via existing protocols, such as the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)
and utilize the information from the directory natively, or import it into an internal certificate authority
[15 [9]
within the blockchain network. .
6.55.5 5.5 Private key storage
If a user loses a private key, then any digital asset associated with that key is lost, because it is
computationally infeasible to regenerate the same private key. If a private key i
...
TECHNICAL ISO/TR
REPORT 24374
First edition
Financial services — Security
information for PKI in blockchain and
DLT implementations
PROOF/ÉPREUVE
Reference number
ISO/TR 24374:2023(E)
© ISO 2023
---------------------- Page: 1 ----------------------
ISO/TR 24374:2023(E)
COPYRIGHT PROTECTED DOCUMENT
© ISO 2023
All rights reserved. Unless otherwise specified, or required in the context of its implementation, no part of this publication may
be reproduced or utilized otherwise in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, or posting on
the internet or an intranet, without prior written permission. Permission can be requested from either ISO at the address below
or ISO’s member body in the country of the requester.
ISO copyright office
CP 401 • Ch. de Blandonnet 8
CH-1214 Vernier, Geneva
Phone: +41 22 749 01 11
Email: copyright@iso.org
Website: www.iso.org
Published in Switzerland
ii
PROOF/ÉPREUVE © ISO 2023 – All rights reserved
---------------------- Page: 2 ----------------------
ISO/TR 24374:2023(E)
Contents Page
Foreword .iv
Introduction .v
1 Scope . 1
2 Normative references . 1
3 Terms and definitions . 1
4 Symbols and abbreviated terms.2
5 Relevant issues - Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) / Blockchain and PKI .3
5.1 DLT/Blockchain data security and privacy concerns . 3
5.1.1 General . 3
5.1.2 From centralised to decentralized . 3
5.1.3 Instant exploitation . 3
5.1.4 Protecting the key is critical . 3
5.2 Problems and attacks associated with PKI systems . 4
5.2.1 Current Challenges of Public Key Infrastructure . 4
5.2.2 Attacks to PKI . . . 4
5.3 Security objectives . 5
5.4 Summary of the use of asymmetric key cryptography in blockchain networks . 5
5.5 Private key storage . 6
6 Security and privacy activities .6
6.1 General . 6
6.2 Governance activities . 7
6.3 Operation activities . 7
7 Blockchain and DLT controls . 7
7.1 Technical Controls . 7
8 Security and privacy processes . 8
8.1 General . 8
8.2 Standard advice on organisation security and privacy processes. 8
8.2.1 General . 8
8.2.2 Standard advice on risk analysis . 8
8.3 Technical Design Elements . 9
8.4 Legal Risk . 9
9 Blockchain based PKI implementations .10
Annex A (Informative) .11
Annex B (Informative) .15
Bibliography .17
iii
© ISO 2023 – All rights reserved PROOF/ÉPREUVE
---------------------- Page: 3 ----------------------
ISO/TR 24374:2023(E)
Foreword
ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) is a worldwide federation of national standards
bodies (ISO member bodies). The work of preparing International Standards is normally carried out
through ISO technical committees. Each member body interested in a subject for which a technical
committee has been established has the right to be represented on that committee. International
organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO, also take part in the work.
ISO collaborates closely with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) on all matters of
electrotechnical standardization.
The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are
described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular, the different approval criteria needed for the
different types of ISO documents should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the
editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www.iso.org/directives).
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of
patent rights. ISO shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights. Details of
any patent rights identified during the development of the document will be in the Introduction and/or
on the ISO list of patent declarations received (see www.iso.org/patents).
Any trade name used in this document is information given for the convenience of users and does not
constitute an endorsement.
For an explanation of the voluntary nature of standards, the meaning of ISO specific terms and
expressions related to conformity assessment, as well as information about ISO's adherence to
the World Trade Organization (WTO) principles in the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), see
www.iso.org/iso/foreword.html.
This document was prepared by Technical Committee ISO/TC 68, Financial Services, Subcommittee SC
2, Financial Services, security.
Any feedback or questions on this document should be directed to the user’s national standards body. A
complete listing of these bodies can be found at www.iso.org/members.html.
iv
PROOF/ÉPREUVE © ISO 2023 – All rights reserved
---------------------- Page: 4 ----------------------
ISO/TR 24374:2023(E)
Introduction
Even though DLT/Blockchain-based solutions are at a relatively early stage of adoption and significant
challenges remain, they hold the potential for major opportunities across several sectors. While the
financial sector has shown widespread early interest in DLT/Blockchain, other public and private
sector organisations that rely on the keeping of records and management of secure transactions also
benefit. DLT/Blockchain also provide opportunities in the healthcare, pharmaceutical, creative, and
food sectors.
In light of the growing interest in DLT/Blockchain, standardisation efforts have
gathered momentum, particularly with the setting up of the ISO technical committee
https://www.iso.org/committee/6266604.html on Blockchain and electronic distributed ledger
technologies (ISO/TC 307 Blockchain and distributed ledger technologies).
ISO/DTR 23245 states that: ‘(i) The essential part of key lifecycle management for blockchain is similar
to an ordinary PKI type system (ii) Some blockchain applications do not have the revocation process for
the key pair. In such cases different type of key management process is needed.’
Consideration of the major implications and the impact that DLT/ Blockchain will have on current PKI
implementations for financial services is essential to minimise any potential disruption.
v
© ISO 2023 – All rights reserved PROOF/ÉPREUVE
---------------------- Page: 5 ----------------------
TECHNICAL REPORT ISO/TR 24374:2023(E)
Financial services — Security information for PKI in
blockchain and DLT implementations
1 Scope
This document describes the management of cryptographic keys in a blockchain, or distributed system
used in the financial sector
The objective of this document is to consider the impact of different types of key management processes
that are required for PKI implementations in Blockchain and DLT projects
2 Normative references
There are no normative references in this document.
3 Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.
ISO and IEC maintain terminology databases for use in standardization at the following addresses:
— ISO Online browsing platform: available at https:// www .iso .org/ obp
— IEC Electropedia: available at https:// www .electropedia .org/
3.1
blockchain
distributed ledger (3.4) with confirmed blocks organized in an append-only, sequential chain using
cryptographic links
Note 1 to entry: blockchains are designed to be tamper-proof and to create final, definitive, and immutable ledger
records (3.10).
3.2
consensus
agreement among DLT nodes that a) a transaction is validated and b) that the distributed ledger (3.4)
contains a consistent set and ordering of validated transactions
3.3
consensus mechanism
rules and procedures by which consensus (3.2) is reached
3.4
distributed ledger
ledger (3.9) that is shared across a set of DLT nodes and synchronized between the DLT nodes using a
consensus mechanism (3.3)
[SOURCE: ISO 22739:2020, 3.44]
3.5
distributed ledger technology system
DLT system
system that implements a distributed ledger (3.4)
1
© ISO 2023 – All rights reserved PROOF/ÉPREUVE
---------------------- Page: 6 ----------------------
ISO/TR 24374:2023(E)
3.6
distributed ledger technology
DLT
technology that enables the operation and use of distributed ledgers (3.4)
3.7
distributed ledger technology node
DLT node
distributed ledger technology> device or process that participates in a network and stores a complete
or partial replica of the ledger records (3.10)
3.8
hardware security module
HSM
hardware implementation of a secure crypto-processor using an ITU-T X.509 certificate and a private
key to provide secure authentication (ISO/IEC 19790:2012 security level 3 or higher)
3.9
ledger
information store that keeps records of transactions that are intended to be final, definitive, and
immutable
3.10
ledger record
distributed ledger technology record comprising hashes of transaction records or references to
transaction records recorded on a blockchain (3.1) or distributed ledger system
[SOURCE: ISO 22739:2020, 3.30]
4 Symbols and abbreviated terms
API Application Program Interface
BCP Business Continuity Plan
BTC Bitcoin
CA Certificate authority
DHT Distributed hash table
CRL Certificate Revocation List
DTR Draft technical report
ETL Extract, transfer, and load
HSM Hardware security module
KYC Know your customer
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
MITM Man-In-The-Middle
OCSP Online certificate status protocol
PAX Paxos Standard
PKI Public key infrastructure
2
PROOF/ÉPREUVE © ISO 2023 – All rights reserved
---------------------- Page: 7 ----------------------
ISO/TR 24374:2023(E)
VPN Virtual Private Network
WoT Web of Trust
5 Relevant issues - Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) / Blockchain and PKI
5.1 DLT/Blockchain data security and privacy concerns
5.1.1 General
Blockchain and DLT systems involve nodes on a peer-to-peer network that store data, where the data
finality is agreed upon via a consensus mechanism. Each node has a cryptographic module to conduct
cryptographic operations as specified in the underlying protocol. Though blockchain networks and
services do not have a centralized server, it does not mean protection of a node is not needed. Best
efforts to protect each node is an essential part in securing the entire blockchain based system.
At its most basic, blockchain technology projects are a peer to peer based distributed ledger or
databased organized by a set of protocols combined with a blockchain, i.e., a series of encrypted sets of
data that record immutable changes over time.
One of blockchains greatest assets is its write-once, append many distributed nature; it can be easily
deployed across disparate nodes on the web, yet each record contains its own hash making it immutable.
To this end, cryptography is the primary means to protect the applications, networks, infrastructure,
and services from cyber-threats. However, the existing public key infrastructure (PKI) is based on a
central certificate authority (CA) that can become a bottleneck which will affect the efficiency of
the cryptographic protocols because of the overhead incurred by the verification of cryptographic
signatures and certificates. Recently, blockchain has also been leveraged to aid PKI without the need
7
for a central authority. But it also creates unique security challenges which are described in clause 5.
5.1.2 From centralised to decentralized
Blockchain shifts data storage and protection from a centralized to a decentralized model. In traditional
centralized models, security methods can be consolidated with the technology products they serve.
Blockchain, however, requires innovative security measures to protect the dynamic and highly
distributed financial products the technology aims to support.
As with any crypto-based infrastructure, protecting keys is paramount to ensuring a blockchain
system’s security.
A successful blockchain system needs highly reliable methods of interfacing with the strong key
protection practices afforded by HSMs, secure elements, and other computing environments designed
for secure execution of code, and all of these deliver the scaling and flexibility a decentralized blockchain
model needs.
5.1.3 Instant exploitation
Anyone who obtains the key can monetize and exploit the asset instantly. As seen in security breaches
in public blockchain settings, such as Bitfinex, Mt. Gox and others, the malicious transfer of ‘value’ can
be instantaneous, irreversible, and significant. Participants in these systems lost millions of dollars
because of compromised security systems. However, note that these attacks exploited vulnerabilities at
the application layer—the wallets holding the keys to the assets—rather than the underlying blockchain
protocol. So far, blockchain technology itself has proved tamper-proof, within the limits presented by
the consensus mechanism adopted by the network.
5.1.4 Protecting the key is critical
The ability to add transactions to a transaction database broadens the technology’s applicability.
3
© ISO 2023 – All rights reserved PROOF/ÉPREUVE
---------------------- Page: 8 ----------------------
ISO/TR 24374:2023(E)
Traditional PKI is CA based, so the security of PKI systems are at risk if one CA is compromised For
example, a framework mitigates the problems with PKI such as the difficulties with rapid certificate
revocation, elimination of single points of failure and CAs’ malfunctions. Note that If the root CA were
to be compromised, an attacker could gain control of the entire PKI and compromise trust in the entire
system, including any sub-systems reliant on the PKI.
5.2 Problems and attacks associated with PKI systems
5.2.1 Current Challenges of Public Key Infrastructure
The most commonly employed approach to PKIs is the Web PKI. It is a Certificate Authority based
system that adopts a centralized trust infrastructure. The purpose of a PKI is to facilitate the secure
electronic transfer of information for a range of network activities such as e-commerce, internet
banking and confidential email. Verification is required to check the authenticity of the party with
whom the secure connection is established. The most important task is to establish the correspondence
between the identity (identification data) and the user's public key. This problem is solved using a
public key certificate — an electronic document used to prove ownership of a public key. The certificate
contains the public key and user credentials, as well as the electronic signature of the trusted party
that verifies the user. To ensure the integrity and authenticity of the certificate, it is signed by a trusted
party – a certification authority.
Centralized Web PKI solutions have several significant problems.
a) There are some challenges associated with quick notification of key compromise, since the
formation and distribution of the list of revoked certificates can take from several minutes to
an hour, unless synchronous verification protocols like OCSP are used. As a result, there is no
100% guarantee that this key is still valid. This problem is also relevant for DLT systems, where a
transaction could be signed by a key that is no longer valid or under the sole responsibility of the
owner. If the certificate is verified online (by request to the certification authority), then the user’s
privacy is violated, since the certification authority will know the entire history of user interaction.
b) The definition of the list of trusted CAs in a PKI system could be complex and could require some
specific out-of-protocol management, although successful collaborations have resulted in highly-
federated environments, like the European Trusted Services List. A decentralized system could
also be impacted by this problem.
c) The centre of the system is always an attack point and compromising the root certificate will
expose the entire system to a bunch of vulnerabilities.
d) Identifier management is in the hands of a centralized organization and does not belong to the
identifier owner himself.
There are significant sources of failures of PKI that neither the usability nor traditional computer
security community is engaging. Specifically, there are incidents that illustrate systematic weaknesses
of organizational practices that create risks for all who rely upon PKI. However, there are organizational
[15]
and configuration choices that could avoid or mitigate some of these risks.
In decentralized PKI, blockchain can act as a decentralized key-value storage. It is capable of securing
the data read to prevent MITM (Man-In-The-Middle) attacks, and to minimize the power of third parties.
5.2.2 Attacks to PKI
PKI is exposed to risks due to potential failures of certificate authorities (CAs) that can be used to issue
unauthorized certificates for end-users. Many breaches show that if a CA is compromised, the security
of the corresponding end-users will be in risk. There are many cases where a CA’s errors or breaches
[12]
have resulted in unauthorized certificates being issued.
Another important weakness of PKIs concerns the reliability and security of certificate revocation
lists (CRLs or associated OCSP servers), which are used to ensure proper lifecycle management of
4
PROOF/ÉPREUVE © ISO 2023 – All rights reserved
---------------------- Page: 9 ----------------------
ISO/TR 24374:2023(E)
certificates, particularly the revocation, and are to be queried any time a certificate is used. Classically,
the CRL for a set of certificates is maintained by the same (and sole) certification authority (CA) that
issued the certificates, and this introduces a single point of failure into the system.
In fact, CRLs do not operate in real time; they are commonly updated periodically by the issuing CA,
and there can be a delay between a security breach and the subsequent CRL update, resulting in the
temporary use of compromised certificates. The theft of a certificate (with its associated private key)
[10]
could be unknown to the CA, and the certificate is not revoked in this case. See Annex A for possible
solutions.
5.3 Security objectives
DLTs that use cryptographic PKI as their security mechanism are resistant to attackers who are not in
possession of the appropriate keys. This, in addition to the shared data and tamper-resistant properties
of blockchain solutions, means that DLTs have a high level of security. For this reason, provided that
[7]
controls, see Annex B, such as key management follow industry best practice, DLTs are potentially
more robust from a cybersecurity perspective than systems relying on physical or network security,
or which are locked with manually-generated passwords rather than cryptographic private keys. DLT
also presents integration challenges with hardware security modules (HSMs) for key storage and
generation, and security infrastructure such as virtual private networks (VPNs).
HSMs provide limited mechanisms for detection of key misuse, e.g., data encryption versus PIN
encryption, signature keys versus encryption keys. DLTs could be based on cryptographic schemes
that are not necessarily supported by HSMs, secure elements, nor properly managed by other security
components, and that need to consume and process information signed with those keys Also if an
attacker compromises a system or application that has permissions to use keys in the HSM, or if a rogue
insider abuses such permissions, this will give them the ability to sign fraudulent cryptocurrency
[10].
transactions. One such signature is enough to empty all cryptocurrency in a specific address
Integration challenges with DLTs relate to their security model, which is largely based on PKI (public key
[10]
infrastructure) . Access rights to writing blockchain state data typically require data transactions to
be signed by a specific private key, while reading blockchain state data requires access to either the
ledger file (stored on several servers) or access to the interface mechanisms placed over the blockchain
data. These interfaces are typically secured via a network credential system (linked to the corporate
directory) or a custom password authentication mechanism. Note this varies between DLT systems and
in fact does not exist for public permissionless DLT systems.
Security mechanisms are an important consideration when integrating highly secure, cryptographically-
based blockchain security protocols with other, potentially looser access and control rules in existing
legacy systems. Integration from a data point of view is relatively straightforward via standard
programming interfaces, assuming that the data integration takes place within the established security
framework and standard ETL processes. Once blockchain systems have a secure standard interface, (to
be defined) they essentially become another enterprise component, albeit with the unique properties of
DLT systems - specifically the immutable record of transactions in a decentralised network where peer
nodes share data, assets, and value.
Blockchains can also be used to secure the data in other systems. For example, database backups can be
timestamped with a hash of the data to ensure integrity of the backups for regulatory purposes.
Cryptographic approaches such as Merkle trees, make it possible to secure large amounts of data at an
individual data row level, A Merkle tree separates the validation of the data from the data itself — the
Merkle tree can reside locally, or on a trusted authority, or can itself reside on a distributed system.
5.4 Summary of the use of asymmetric key cryptography in blockchain networks
Here is a summary of the use of asymmetric-key cryptography in many blockchain networks.
— Private keys are used to digitally sign transactions.
— Public keys are used to derive addresses.
5
© ISO 2023 – All rights reserved PROOF/ÉPREUVE
---------------------- Page: 10 ----------------------
ISO/TR 24374:2023(E)
— Public keys are used to verify signatures generated with private keys.
— Asymmetric-key cryptography provides the ability to verify that the user transferring value to
another user is in possession of the private key capable of signing the transaction.
Some permissioned blockchain networks can leverage a business’s existing public key infrastructure
for asymmetric-key cryptography to provide user credentials – rather than having each blockchain
network user manage their own asymmetric-keys. This is done by utilizing existing directory services
and using that information within the blockchain network. Blockchain networks which utilize an
existing directory service can access it via existing protocols, such as the Lightweight Directory Access
[10],
Protocol (LDAP) and utilize the information from the directory natively, or import it into an internal
[9]
certificate authority within the blockchain network.
5.5 Private key storage
If a user loses a private key, then any digital asset associated with that key is lost, because it is
computationally infeasible to regenerate the same private key. If a private key is stolen, the attacker
will have full access to all digital assets controlled by that private key. The security of private keys is
so important that many users use special secure hardware to store them; alternatively, users can take
advantage of an emerging industry of private key escrow services.
These key escrow services can also satisfy KYC laws in addition to storing private keys, as users
provide proof of their identity when creating an account. Private key storage is an extremely important
aspect of blockchain technology. When it is reported in the news that “Cryptocurrency XYZ was stolen
[13]
from…”, (one of the biggest cryptocurrency thefts ever) it almost certainly means some private keys
were found and used to sign a transaction sending the money to a new account, not that the blockchain
network itself was compromised. Note that because blockchain data cannot generally be changed, once
a criminal steals a private key and publicly transfers the associated funds to another account, that
transaction generally cannot be undone.
6 Security and privacy activities
6.1 General
The security of an arrangement is central to the safety and soundness of the financial system.
Cryptographic tools, such as public key cryptography, play a central role in ensuring the security of
existing systems and are of critical importance in DLT arrangements. While current cryptographic
tools are considered effective and are widely used today, future technological advancements could
render existing cryptographic tools less secure and effective. This issue is of partic
...
Questions, Comments and Discussion
Ask us and Technical Secretary will try to provide an answer. You can facilitate discussion about the standard in here.