Information technology — Security techniques — IT network security — Part 5: Securing communications across networks using virtual private networks

ISO/IEC 18028-5:2006 provides detailed guidance on the security aspects of the management, operation and use of IT networks, and their inter-connections. ISO/IEC 18028-5:2006 defines techniques for securing inter-network connections that are established using virtual private networks (VPNs). It is relevant to all personnel who are involved in the detailed planning, design and implementation of VPN security (for example IT network managers, administrators, engineers, and IT network security officers). The general objectives of ISO/IEC 18028 are to extend the security management guidelines provided in ISO/IEC TR 13335 and ISO/IEC 17799, by detailing the specific operations and mechanisms needed to implement network security controls in a wider range of network environments, providing a bridge between general IT security management issues and network security technical implementations. The objective of ISO/IEC 18028-5:2006 is to provide support service to different organizations, IT network managers, administrators, technicians, and IT security officers in choosing the appropriate virtual private network solution. ISO/IEC 18028-5:2006 describes general principals of organization, structure, framework and usage of a virtual private IT networks (VPN). It discusses functional area, used standards and network protocols, the various different types of VPN, their respective requirements, characteristics, and other aspects.

Technologies de l'information — Techniques de sécurité — Sécurité de réseaux TI — Partie 5: Communications sûres à travers les réseaux utilisant les réseaux privés virtuels

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Publication Date
04-Jul-2006
Withdrawal Date
04-Jul-2006
Current Stage
9599 - Withdrawal of International Standard
Completion Date
29-Jul-2013
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INTERNATIONAL ISO/IEC
STANDARD 18028-5
First edition
2006-07-01


Information technology — Security
techniques — IT network security —
Part 5:
Securing communications across
networks using virtual private networks
Technologies de l'information — Techniques de sécurité — Sécurité de
réseaux TI —
Partie 5: Communications sûres à travers les réseaux utilisant les
réseaux privés virtuels




Reference number
ISO/IEC 18028-5:2006(E)
©
ISO/IEC 2006

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ISO/IEC 18028-5:2006(E)
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ISO/IEC 18028-5:2006(E)
Contents Page
Foreword. iv
Introduction . v
1 Scope .1
2 Normative references .1
3 Terms and definitions .2
3.1 Terms defined in other International Standards.2
3.2 Terms defined in this part of ISO/IEC 18028 .2
4 Abbreviated terms .3
5 Overview of VPNs .3
5.1 Introduction.3
5.2 Types of VPN.4
5.3 VPN techniques.5
5.4 Security aspects .6
6 VPN security objectives .7
7 VPN security requirements.7
7.1 Confidentiality.8
7.2 Integrity.8
7.3 Authentication.8
7.4 Authorization.8
7.5 Availability.8
7.6 Tunnel Endpoints.8
8 Guidelines for the selection of secure VPNs .9
8.1 Regulatory and legislative aspects.9
8.2 VPN management aspects.9
8.3 VPN architectural aspects .9
9 Guidelines for the implementation of secure VPNs.12
9.1 VPN management considerations.12
9.2 VPN technical considerations .12
Annex A (informative) Technologies and protocols used to implement VPNs.15
A.1 Introduction.15
A.2 Layer 2 VPNs.15
A.3 Layer 3 VPNs.17
A.4 Higher Layer VPNs.17
A.5 Comparison of typical VPN protocol security features .19
Bibliography .20
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ISO/IEC 18028-5:2006(E)
Foreword
ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) and IEC (the International Electrotechnical
Commission) form the specialized system for worldwide standardization. National bodies that are members of
ISO or IEC participate in the development of International Standards through technical committees
established by the respective organization to deal with particular fields of technical activity. ISO and IEC
technical committees collaborate in fields of mutual interest. Other international organizations, governmental
and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO and IEC, also take part in the work. In the field of information
technology, ISO and IEC have established a joint technical committee, ISO/IEC JTC 1.
International Standards are drafted in accordance with the rules given in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.
The main task of the joint technical committee is to prepare International Standards. Draft International
Standards adopted by the joint technical committee are circulated to national bodies for voting. Publication as
an International Standard requires approval by at least 75 % of the national bodies casting a vote.
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent
rights. ISO and IEC should not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.
ISO/IEC 18028-5 was prepared by Joint Technical Committee ISO/IEC JTC 1, Information technology,
Subcommittee SC 27, IT Security techniques.
ISO/IEC 18028 consists of the following parts, under the general title Information technology — Security
techniques — IT network security:
⎯ Part 1: Network security management
⎯ Part 2: Network security architecture
⎯ Part 3: Securing communications between networks using security gateways
⎯ Part 4: Securing remote access
⎯ Part 5: Securing communications across networks using virtual private networks

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ISO/IEC 18028-5:2006(E)
Introduction
The telecommunications and information technology industries are seeking cost-effective comprehensive
security solutions. A secure network should be protected against malicious and inadvertent attacks, and
should meet the business requirements for confidentiality, integrity, availability, non-repudiation, accountability,
authenticity and reliability of information and services. Securing a network is also essential for maintaining the
accuracy of billing or usage information as appropriate. Security capabilities in products are crucial to overall
network security (including applications and services). However, as more products are combined to provide
total solutions, the interoperability, or the lack thereof, will define the success of the solution. Security must not
only be a thread of concern for each product or service, but must be developed in a manner that promotes the
interweaving of security capabilities in the overall end-to-end security solution. Thus, the purpose of
ISO/IEC 18028 is to provide detailed guidance on the security aspects of the management, operation and use
of information system networks, and their inter-connections. Those individuals within an organization that are
responsible for information security in general, and network security in particular, should be able to adapt the
material in ISO/IEC 18028 to meet their specific requirements. Its main objectives are as follows:
⎯ in ISO/IEC 18028-1, to define and describe the concepts associated with, and provide management
guidance on, network security – including on how to identify and analyze the communications related
factors to be taken into account to establish network security requirements, with an introduction to the
possible control areas and the specific technical areas (dealt with in subsequent parts of ISO/IEC 18028);
⎯ in ISO/IEC 18028-2, to define a standard security architecture, which describes a consistent framework to
support the planning, design and implementation of network security;
⎯ in ISO/IEC 18028-3, to define techniques for securing information flows between networks using security
gateways;
⎯ in ISO/IEC 18028-4, to define techniques for securing remote access;
⎯ in ISO/IEC 18028-5, to define techniques for securing inter-network connections that are established
using virtual private networks (VPNs).
ISO/IEC 18028-1 is relevant to anyone involved in owning, operating or using a network. This includes senior
managers and other non-technical managers or users, in addition to managers and administrators who have
specific responsibilities for information security and/or network security, network operation, or who are
responsible for an organization's overall security program and security policy development.
ISO/IEC 18028-2 is relevant to all personnel who are involved in the planning, design and implementation of
the architectural aspects of network security (for example network managers, administrators, engineers, and
network security officers).
ISO/IEC 18028-3 is relevant to all personnel who are involved in the detailed planning, design and
implementation of security gateways (for example network managers, administrators, engineers and network
security officers).
ISO/IEC 18028-4 is relevant to all personnel who are involved in the detailed planning, design and
implementation of remote access security (for example network managers, administrators, engineers, and
network security officers).
ISO/IEC 18028-5 is relevant to all personnel who are involved in the detailed planning, design and
implementation of VPN security (for example network managers, administrators, engineers, and network
security officers).
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INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ISO/IEC 18028-5:2006(E)

Information technology — Security techniques — IT network
security —
Part 5:
Securing communications across networks using virtual private
networks
1 Scope
This part of ISO/IEC 18028 provides detailed direction with respect to the security aspects of using Virtual
Private Network (VPN) connections to inter-connect networks, and also to connect remote users to networks.
It builds upon the network management direction provided in ISO/IEC 18028-1.
It is aimed at those individuals responsible for the selection and implementation of the technical controls
necessary to provide network security when using VPN connections, and for the subsequent network
monitoring of VPN security thereafter.
This part of ISO/IEC 18028 provides an overview of VPNs, presents VPN security objectives, and summarizes
VPN security requirements. It gives guidance on the selection of secure VPNs, on the implementation of
secure VPNs, and on the network monitoring of VPN security. It also provides information on typical
technologies and protocols used by VPNs.
2 Normative references
The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document. For dated
references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced
document (including any amendments) applies.
ISO/IEC 7498 (all parts), Information technology — Open Systems Interconnection — Basic Reference Model
ISO/IEC 13335-1:2004, Information technology — Security techniques — Management of information and
communications technology security — Part 1: Concepts and models for information and communications
technology security management
ISO/IEC 17799:2005, Information technology — Security techniques — Code of practice for information
security management
ISO/IEC 18028-1:2006, Information technology — Security techniques — IT network security — Part 1:
Network security management
ISO/IEC 18028-2:2006, Information technology — Security techniques — IT network security — Part 2:
Network security architecture
ISO/IEC 18028-3:2005, Information technology — Security techniques — IT network security — Part 3:
Securing communications between networks using security gateways
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ISO/IEC 18028-5:2006(E)
ISO/IEC 18028-4:2005, Information technology — Security techniques — IT network security — Part 4:
Securing remote access
3 Terms and definitions
3.1 Terms defined in other International Standards
For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in ISO/IEC 7498 (all parts) and
ISO/IEC 18028-1 apply, as do the following terms defined in ISO/IEC 13335-1: accountability, asset,
authenticity, availability, baseline controls, confidentiality, data integrity, impact, integrity, security policy, non-
repudiation, reliability, risk, risk analysis, risk management, safeguard, threat, and vulnerability.
3.2 Terms defined in this part of ISO/IEC 18028
For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.
3.2.1
layer 2 switching
technology that uses internal switching mechanisms to establish and control connections between devices
using layer 2 protocols
NOTE It is typically used to simulate a LAN environment to upper layer protocols.
3.2.2
layer 2 VPN
virtual private network used to provide a simulated LAN environment over a network infrastructure
NOTE Sites linked by a layer 2 VPN can operate as though they are on the same LAN.
3.2.3
layer 3 switching
technology that uses internal switching mechanisms in combination with standard routing mechanisms, or
which employs MPLS techniques, in order to establish and control connections between networks
3.2.4
layer 3 VPN
virtual private network used to provide a simulated WAN environment over a network infrastructure
NOTE Sites linked by a layer 3 VPN can operate as though they are on a private WAN.
3.2.5
private
restricted to members of an authorized group: in the context of VPNs, it refers to the traffic flowing in a VPN
connection
3.2.6
private network
network that is subject to access controls which are intended to restrict use to members of an authorized
group
3.2.7
protocol encapsulation
enveloping one data flow inside another by transporting protocol data units wrapped inside another protocol
NOTE This is one method which can be used to establish tunnels in VPN technology.
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ISO/IEC 18028-5:2006(E)
3.2.8
virtual circuit
data path between network devices established using a packet or cell switching technology such as X.25,
ATM or Frame Relay
4 Abbreviated terms
For the purposes of this document, the abbreviated terms given in ISO/IEC 18028-1 and the following apply.
AH Authentication Header
ESP Encapsulating Security Payload
IKE Internet Key Exchange
IPX Internetwork Packet Exchange
ISAKMP Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol
L2F Layer Two Forwarding (Protocol)
L2TP Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol
LDP Label Distribution Protocol
MPPE Microsoft Point-to-Point Encryption
NAS Network Area Storage
NCP Point-to-Point Protocol
PPP Point-to-Point Protocol
PPTP Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
VPLS Virtual Private LAN Service
VPWS Virtual Private Wire Service
5 Overview of VPNs
5.1 Introduction
VPNs have developed rapidly as a means of inter-connecting networks, and as a method of connecting
remote users to networks. A VPN is an example of a type of technology that can implement the
Communication Flow Security Dimension described in ISO/IEC 18028-2, the security for which is considered
as part of the Services Security Layer (as defined in ISO/IEC 18028-2).
There exists a broad range of definitions for VPNs. In their simplest form, they provide a mechanism for
establishing a secure data channel or channels over an existing network or point-to-point connection. They
are assigned to the exclusive use of a restricted user group, and can be established and removed dynamically,
as needed. The hosting network may be private or public.
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ISO/IEC 18028-5:2006(E)
An example representation of a VPN, with the secure data channel connecting the two endpoints across an
insecure public network, is shown in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1 — Example representation of a VPN
Remote access using a VPN is implemented over the top of a normal point-to-point connection, which should
first be established between the local user and the remote location in line with ISO/IEC 18028-4. The
connection could take the form of wired or wireless network technology.
Some VPNs are provided as a managed service, in which secure, reliable connectivity, management and
addressing, equivalent to that on a private network, are provided on a shared infrastructure. Additional
security controls, as indicated in this standard, may therefore need to be taken into account to strengthen the
VPN.
The data and code transiting a VPN should be restricted to the organization using the VPN and should be kept
separate from other users of the underlying network. It should not be possible for data and code belonging to
other users to access the same VPN channel. The level of trust in the confidentiality and other security
aspects of the organization owning or providing the VPN should be taken into consideration when evaluating
the extent of additional security controls that may be required.
5.2 Types of VPN
As stated above, there are multiple ways of expressing types of VPN.
Architecturally, VPNs comprise either:
⎯ a single point-to-point connection (e.g. client device remotely accessing an organization's network via a
site gateway, or a site gateway connecting to another site gateway), or
⎯ a point-to-cloud connection (e.g. implemented by MPLS technology).
From an OSI Basic Reference Model perspective, there are three main types of VPN:
⎯ Layer 2 VPNs offer a simulated LAN facility, using VPN connections running over a hosting network (e.g.
a provider’s network) to link sites of an organization or to provide a remote connection to an organization.
Typical provider offerings in this area include Virtual Private Wire Service (VPWS), which provides a
simulated “wires only connection”, or Virtual Private LAN Service (VPLS), which provides a more
complete simulated LAN service.
⎯ Layer 3 VPNs offer a simulated WAN facility, again using VPNs running over a network infrastructure.
These offerings provide sites with simulated “OSI Network Layer” connectivity. A basic attraction here is
the ability to use private IP addressing schemes over a public infrastructure, a practice that would not be
permitted over a “normal” public IP connection. Whilst private addresses can be used over public
networks via NAT (Network Address Translation), this can complicate IPsec VPN establishment and use,
although there are work-arounds available.
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ISO/IEC 18028-5:2006(E)
⎯ Higher Layer VPNs are used for securing transactions across public networks. They typically provide a
secure channel between communicating applications, thus ensuring data confidentiality and integrity
during the transaction. This type may also be known as a Layer 4 VPN because the VPN connection is
usually established over TCP which is a Layer 4 protocol.
Specific technologies and protocols typically used by types of VPN are further described in Annex A.
5.3 VPN techniques
VPNs are constructed from the system resources of a physical network, e.g. by using encryption and/or by
tunneling links of the virtual network across the real network.
VPNs can be implemented entirely within a private network under the control of the owning organization, they
can be implemented across networks in the public domain, or they can be implemented across combinations
of the two. (Whilst it is perfectly possible for VPNs to be built over existing private WANs, the general
availability of relatively low cost access to the Internet has made this public network system appear to be a
cost effective vehicle for supporting wide area VPNs and remote access VPNs, in many applications.)
Alternatively, the channels may be established employing secure channels built using tunnels running through
Internet Service provider networks. In this case the public Internet is effectively the underlying transport
system. This implies a greater degree of uncertainty as to the confidentiality of the VPN.
A tunnel is a data path between networked devices, which is established across an existing network
infrastructure. It is transparent to normal network operations and, for most practical purposes, can be used
similar to normal network connections. It can easily be switched on or off as required without any change to
the underlying physical network infrastructure. A VPN created with tunnels is therefore more flexible then a
network based on physical links.
Tunnels can be created by using:
⎯ virtual circuits,
⎯ label switching, or
⎯ protocol encapsulation.
Tunnels created as virtual circuits are typically established in conventional WAN facilities as leased lines using
packet switching technologies (e.g. Frame Relay or ATM). These technologies assure that data flows between
tunnels are separated.
Label switching is another way of creating tunnels. All data packets flowing in one tunnel are assigned with
one identifying label. This label ensures that every packet with a different label will be excluded from the
specified path through the network.
Although the techniques used for tunneling do assure that data flows between tunnels and the underlying
networks are properly separated, they do not fulfill general confidentiality requirements. If confidentiality is
needed, encryption technologies need to be used to provide the required security level.
Tunnels can also be created by using a protocol encapsulation technique whereby one protocol's data unit is
wrapped and carried in another protocol. For example, an IP packet is wrapped using the IPsec ESP
protocol’s tunnel mode. An additional IP header is inserted, and the packet is then transmitted over an IP
network.
VPN tunnels can be created on different layers of the OSI model. Virtual circuits form tunnels on Layer 2.
Label switching techniques allows tunnels to be created at Layer 2 or 3. Protocol encapsulation can be used
on all layers except the Physical Layer (most implementations are on Layer 3 and above).
Encryption may be used to provide an additional level of security for tunnels based on virtual circuits, protocol
encapsulation and label switching.
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ISO/IEC 18028-5:2006(E)
5.4 Security aspects
Although tunnels are hidden from normal network users, they are not invisible, and therefore not inherently
secure. The basic partitioning (into virtual circuits or label-switched paths) or encapsulation process used to
construct a tunnel is not protected from determined inspection by attackers using network analyzers or
interceptors. If the tunnel is not implemented using encryption, then the attacker would be able to access the
traffic, and even if encryption is utilized, the existence of the tunnel and its endpoints would still not be hidden.
In addition, the end-points of the tunnel may also not be necessarily protected from unauthorized logical
and/or physical access. In order to achieve secure VPN implementations, it is therefore necessary to apply
security controls to tunnels depending on the organizational security policy and risk acceptance levels.
It will depend on the organizational security policy whether such vulnerabilities are acceptable or not.
5.4.1 Virtual circuits
The security controls which establish the underlying secure channels may use virtual circuits in conventional
wide area telecommunications facilities, e.g. leased lines, using technologies such as Frame Relay or ATM. In
these technologies the underlying networks are also essentially secure, to the extent that the
telecommunications operators maintain separation between leased line facilities for private subscribers, and
provision of public access Internet services. The technology used in virtual circuits inherently confers a degree
of confidentiality, but not absolute security, to the channel. A VPN built over such traditional virtual circuits is
considered relatively unlikely to be compromised, as security breaches or attacks would typically need to
originate within the provider’s core network.
5.4.2 Label switching
Security issues for label switched VPNs include:
⎯ address space and routing separation between VPNs carried over the label switched network:
⎯ ensuring that the internal structure of the label switched network core is not visible to outside networks
(e.g. to limit information available to a potential attacker);
⎯ providing resistance to denial of service attacks;
⎯ providing resistance to unauthorized access attacks;
⎯ protecting against label spoofing (although whilst it may be possible to insert wrong labels into a label
switched network from the outside, because of address separation the spoofed packet would only harm
the VPN from which the spoofed packet originated).
5.4.3 Protocol encapsulation
The level of confidentiality sustained using protocol encapsulation is dependent on the property of the
encapsulating protocol. For example, if an IPsec tunnel with only AH protocol is used to create a tunnel; it
does not provide confidentiality because any data intercepted by third party will be clearly visible. This is
because the AH protocol provides only authentication for the communicating parties.
5.4.4 Encryption
Guidance on the general security aspects of cryptography are provided in ISO/IEC 18028-1, ISO/IEC 11770-1
and ISO/IEC 17799. Information on specific algorithms and protocols are addressed in other publications and
should be considered as part of the secure VPN selection (see Clause 8).
5.4.5 Integrity protection
Encrypted packets without integrity protection can be subject to tampering. For that reason, traffic that is
susceptible to alteration, whether or not it is encrypted,
...

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