SIST ETS 300 391-1 E1:2003

Universal Personal Telecommunication (UPT); Specification of the security architecture for UPT phase 1; Part 1: Specification

This standard covers the necessary security measures for a first introductory stop of a UPT service (Phase 1)

Svetovne osebne telekomunikacije (UPT) – Specifikacija varnostne arhitekture za 1. fazo sistema UPT – 1. del: Specifikacija

General Information

• Status: Published
• Publication Date: 30-Nov-2003
• ICS: 33.040.35 - Telephone networks
• Technical Committee: SS EIT - Technical Board for the electrotechnical, information technology and telecommunications fields
• Current Stage: 6060 - National Implementation/Publication (Adopted Project)
• Start Date: 01-Dec-2003
• Due Date: 01-Dec-2003
• Completion Date: 01-Dec-2003
• Ref Project: ETSI ETS 300 391-1 ed.1 (1995-08) - Universal Personal Telecommunication (UPT); Specification of the security architecture for UPT phase 1; Part 1: Specification

Standards Content (Sample)

SLOVENSKI STANDARD
SIST ETS 300 391-1 E1:2003
01-december-2003
Svetovne osebne telekomunikacije (UPT) – Specifikacija varnostne arhitekture za
1. fazo sistema UPT – 1. del: Specifikacija
Universal Personal Telecommunication (UPT); Specification of the security architecture
for UPT phase 1; Part 1: Specification
Ta slovenski standard je istoveten z: ETS 300 391-1 Edition 1
ICS:
33.040.35 Telefonska omrežja Telephone networks
SIST ETS 300 391-1 E1:2003 en
2003-01.Slovenski inštitut za standardizacijo. Razmnoževanje celote ali delov tega standarda ni dovoljeno.

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SIST ETS 300 391-1 E1:2003

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SIST ETS 300 391-1 E1:2003
EUROPEAN ETS 300 391-1
TELECOMMUNICATION August 1995
STANDARD
Source: ETSI TC-NA Reference: DE/NA-071401
ICS: 33.040
UPT, security, authentication
Key words:
Universal Personal Telecommunication (UPT);
Specification of the security architecture for UPT phase 1;
Part 1: Specification
ETSI
European Telecommunications Standards Institute
ETSI Secretariat
F-06921 Sophia Antipolis CEDEX - FRANCE
Postal address:
650 Route des Lucioles - Sophia Antipolis - Valbonne - FRANCE
Office address:
c=fr, a=atlas, p=etsi, s=secretariat - [e-mail]
X.400: Internet:
Tel.: [phone] - Fax: [phone]
Copyright Notification: No part may be reproduced except as authorized by written permission. The copyright and the
foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media.
© European Telecommunications Standards Institute 1995. All rights reserved.
New presentation - see History box

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Whilst every care has been taken in the preparation and publication of this document, errors in content,
typographical or otherwise, may occur. If you have comments concerning its accuracy, please write to
"ETSI Editing and Committee Support Dept." at the address shown on the title page.

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Contents
Foreword .7
Introduction.7
1 Scope .9
2 Normative references.9
3 Symbols and abbreviations .10
4 Security requirements and security features.10
4.1 Security features in general .10
4.2 UPT security requirements .11
4.2.1 Requirements from the threat analysis .11
4.2.2 Personal data integrity issues.11
4.3 UPT specific security features .12
4.3.1 UPT service features providing security.12
4.3.2 Authentication of UPT user/UPT subscriber .13
4.3.3 Access control features for the UPT access device.14
4.3.4 Access control to service profile information.14
4.3.5 Secure management of the subscription process.14
4.4 UPT security limitations .14
4.5 Security features for IN and inter-network links in general .15
5 Security mechanisms .15
5.1 Access control mechanisms .15
5.1.1 Access control to services.15
5.1.2 Access control to service profile data.16
5.1.3 Access control to the data in the UPT access device .18
5.2 User authentication mechanisms.18
5.2.1 Weak authentication.19
5.2.2 Strong authentication .21
5.3 Security management.23
5.3.1 Security audit trail.23
5.3.2 Event handling.23
5.3.3 Charging control .24
5.3.4 Information management .24
5.4 Service limitations.25
5.5 Security profiles .26
5.5.1 Security profile for weak authentication.26
5.5.2 Security profile for strong authentication .27
6 Parameter sizes and values.27
7 Requirements for the UPT access device.28
7.1 Storage of data .28
7.2 Processing .29
7.2.1 Time-out .30
7.2.2 Calculations by the authentication algorithm.30
7.2.3 Sequence number conversion.30
7.2.4 Authentication code conversion .30
7.2.5 Sequence number incrementation .30
7.3 User interface .30
8 Transmission protocol.31
8.1 Transmission coding.31

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8.2 Weak authentication. 31
8.2.1 The authentication process. 31
8.2.2 Changing of PIN . 31
8.2.3 Authentication with unblocking . 31
8.3 Strong authentication . 32
8.3.1 General structure. 32
8.3.2 The authentication process. 32
9 Requirements for the AE of the SDF. 32
9.1 Check of PUI and authentication type used . 33
9.2 Weak authentication. 33
9.3 Change of PIN. 33
9.4 Strong authentication . 33
9.4.1 Conversions. 33
9.4.2 Checking and expanding of n . 34
s
10 Authentication algorithms . 34
10.1 The specific UPT algorithm. 34
10.2 The TE 9 algorithm. 34
10.3 Other algorithms. 34
Annex A (informative): Device holder verification. 35
A.1 Introduction. 35
A.2 DHV in the UPT access device . 35
Annex B (informative): Interface between General Part and SM in the DTMF device . 36
B.1 Introduction. 36
B.2 Verification of the device holder by an LPIN. 36
B.3 Time-out . 37
B.4 Unblocking of the device. 37
B.5 Change of LPIN . 38
B.6 One pass authentication by use of a sequence number . 38
B.7 Key management. 38
Annex C (informative): Bill limitation . 39
C.1 Absolute bill limitation . 39
C.2 Bill limitation with respect to time. 39
Annex D (informative): Subscription process and key management. 40
D.1 Subscription process . 40
D.2 Key management. 40
D.2.1 Key generation . 40
D.2.2 Key loading. 41
D.2.3 Key use . 41
D.2.4 Lost key. 42
Annex E (informative): Activity monitoring. 43
E.1 Monitoring points . 43

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E.1.1 Network centre.43
E.1.2 Network periphery.43
E.2 Monitored activities.44
E.2.1 Authentication .44
E.2.2 UPT calls.44
E.3 Monitoring procedures.44
E.3.1 Account monitoring .44
E.3.2 Authentication monitoring .45
E.3.3 Call monitoring.45
Annex F (informative): Bibliography.46
History.47

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Foreword
This European Telecommunication Standard (ETS) has been produced by the Network Aspects (NA)
Technical Committee of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI).
This ETS defines the security architecture for Universal Personal Telecommunication (UPT) phase 1.
This ETS consists of 3 parts as follows:
Part 1: "Specification".
Part 2: "Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS) proformas".
Part 3: "Conformance Test Specification (CTS)".
Transposition dates
Date of adoption of this ETS: 28 July 1995
Date of latest announcement of this ETS (doa): 30 November 1995
Date of latest publication of new National Standard
or endorsement of this ETS (dop/e): 31 May 1996
Date of withdrawal of any conflicting National Standard (dow): 31 May 1996
Introduction
UPT is a service which enables improved access to telecommunication services by allowing personal
mobility.
The UPT service enables each UPT user to participate in a user defined set of subscribed services, and
to initiate and receive calls on the basis of a unique, personal, network independent UPT number across
multiple networks at any terminal, fixed, movable or mobile. Such participation is irrespective of
geographic location, limited only by the network capabilities and restrictions imposed by the network
provider. Calls to UPT may also be made by non-UPT users.
ETR 055-2 describes three service scenarios for UPT. This specification of the security architecture deals
only with the restricted, short term UPT service scenario for UPT phase 1. This scenario has restrictions
on networks, services, user friendliness and also on the possibilities to implement security features. The
UPT phase 1 scenario is a set of UPT features that can be implemented without major changes to current
technology, and is basically restricted to provision in Public Switched Telephone Networks (PSTNs) and
Integrated Services Digital Networks (ISDNs). Only the telephone service is provided.
A high level of security is a necessary condition for a telecommunication system like UPT to become a
success. Accountability, incontestable charging and privacy are important examples for requirements that
need to be fulfilled by technical and organizational security measures.
Security mechanisms can only meet their purpose if they are integrated into the system in an appropriate
way. Many of these mechanisms depend on the secure handling of secret information like authentication
keys and Personal Identification Numbers (PINs). Such data needs strong protection against unauthorized
access, e.g. by implementation in logically and physically protected security modules.

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1 Scope
This European Telecommunication Standard (ETS) provides a description of the mechanisms necessary
to provide adequate security within the Universal Personal Telecommunication (UPT) service for phase 1.
It is based on the discussion and the conclusions of the general UPT security architecture given in
ETR 083 [1].
In ETR 083 [1], the threat analysis leads to security features which are needed to counter the threats
detected. Some of the threats are already countered by UPT service features. The security features and
mechanisms against the remaining threats are discussed there for all UPT phases. In this ETS, the
specific security requirements, features and mechanisms for UPT phase 1 are specified in detail.
Clause 4 summarizes the phase 1 relevant security requirements and security features by means of
general descriptions. Clause 5 specifies the security mechanisms, especially for access control,
authentication and some security management aspects. Profiles are specified for weak and strong
authentication, respectively. Service limitations and other measures are recommended due to the
restricted possibilities for the implementation of security features in UPT phase 1, especially if only weak
authentication is used.
In clause 6, the sizes and some values of the parameters used in the following clauses are given. clause 7
specifies the requirements for the UPT access device concerning input, output, data storage and the
processing of data. Clause 8 contains the standardization of the exchanged data in the protocol for
authentication. The security requirements for the Service Data Function (SDF) are specified in clause 9.
Finally, the options for the used authentication algorithm are discussed in clause 10.
Only aspects of the UPT security architecture that concern the security of the overall UPT system or data
exchanges with network components are standardized.
Some security aspects need not be standardized, e.g. the mechanism used for Device Holder Verification
(DHV), bill limitation techniques, the interface between the general part of the Dual Tone Multi Frequency
(DTMF) device and its Security Module (SM), the subscription process and key management. They can
be specified according to the service providers' needs, provided that the general security requirements are
considered. However, examples and recommendations on how to realise these features are given in
informative annexes.
Upwards compatibility to later UPT phases is considered as far as useful and possible. This covers
especially the use of IC cards as recommended for UPT phase 2.
2 Normative references
This ETS incorporates by dated or undated reference, provisions from other publications. These
normative references are cited at the appropriate places in the text and the publications are listed
hereafter. For dated references, subsequent amendments to or revisions of any of these publications
apply to this ETS only when incorporated in it by amendment or revision. For undated references, the
latest edition of the publication referred to applies.
[1] ETR 083 (1993): "Universal Personal Telecommunication (UPT); General UPT
security architecture".
[2] ETS 300 380 (1995): "Universal Personal Telecommunications (UPT); Access
devices Dual Tone Multi Frequency (DTMF) sender for acoustic coupling to the
microphone of a handset telephone".

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3 Symbols and abbreviations
For the purposes of this ETS, the following symbols and abbreviations apply:
AC Authentication Code, calculated in the UPT access device
AC' Authentication Code, calculated in the AE
AE Authenticating Entity
ARA Access Registration Address
CER Call Event Record
d tolerance for the difference between the sequence number sent by the UPT
access device and the sequence number stored in the SDF
DHV Device Holder Verification
DTMF Dual Tone Multi Frequency
f algorithm for the calculation of the AC
FC Feature Code
GP General Part (of the DTMF device)
IN Intelligent Network
K Key
LPIN Local Personal Identification Number
n sequence number, used by the UPT access device
n' expected sequence number, stored in the AE
n sent part of the sequence number, i.e. the 16 least significant bits of n
s
NAP Network Access Point
PABX Private Automatic Branch Exchange
PIN Personal Identification Number
PLMN Public Land Mobile Network
PUI Personal User Identity
RAA Remaining Authentication Attempts
SCF Service Control Function
SDF Service Data Function
SLPIN Special Local Personal Identification Number
SM Security Module
SPIN Special Personal Identification Number
UPT Universal Personal Telecommunication
UPTN UPT Number
4 Security requirements and security features
Security features needed for UPT are specified according to the requirements presented in this ETS and
other related documents.
The different aspects which, alone or combined, serve to create a security feature are described in
subclause 4.1. The security requirements are summarized in subclause 4.2. The chosen security features
for UPT phase 1 are then presented in subclause 4.3, while subclause 4.4 describes some limitations of
UPT security in phase 1. Finally subclause 4.5 gives a statement regarding the need for a secure
Intelligent Network (IN) platform.
4.1 Security features in general
In UPT, as in all practical systems accessible by the general public, many different security features need
to be present and co-operate to give the required level of overall security.
Security services may be distinguished as having one of the following properties:
preventive: intending to make the threat impossible;
reporting: giving the system management or the user information about security problems;
limiting: introducing restrictions into the system in order to limit the consequences of
possible security breaches;

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restoring: making a quick, safe and orderly return to normal operation after security
problems have occurred;
deterrent: having the property that potential mis-users are deterred because they know
about this security feature.
All of these properties are necessary and valuable elements in the overall UPT security architecture.
4.2 UPT security requirements
The main sources for assessing the security requirements are the threat analysis performed in
ETR 083 [1], ETR 055-11 and the requirements on personal data integrity which have been presented in
the legislative arena.
4.2.1 Requirements from the threat analysis
For phase 1, the most important threats are the following:
- masquerading threats, i.e. the threats where intruders masquerade as UPT users for incoming or
outgoing calls;
- threats connected with unauthorized modification of subscription data or service profile data;
- incorrectness of billing data;
- unauthorized use of UPT access device;
- unauthorized remote registrations.
NOTE: For more detailed information, see ETR 083 [1].
Threats connected with secure answer, multiple registration and outcall registration are not relevant,
because these features are not present in phase 1.
4.2.2 Personal data integrity issues
The security requirements on UPT resulting from the need to protect personal data are not, to a large
extent, specific to UPT, but are typical for many telecommunication services, especially those offering
personal or terminal mobility. Furthermore, they will depend heavily on European and national legislation
enforced for the protection of personal data and the protection of third parties.
Therefore, when offering a specific UPT service or when designing data processing functions and defining
the kind of data being generated or stored within the UPT systems, UPT service providers shall consider
the relevant national data protection laws. Provisional guidelines are to be found in CEC
Directive SYN 287. For UPT, special concern in this respect needs to be paid to the contents of personal
data in the UPT service profile. This data and the access conditions to it for the service provider's
personnel, the subscriber and the UPT user need to be limited, to be in close accordance with the relevant
European guidelines and national laws. As these are, to a large extent, being progressed at present, this
ETS only advises service providers to pay close attention to the requirements being formulated in this
area.
Concerning the protection of third parties the most imminent requirement is the one proposed by CEC
Directive SYN 288 regarding the necessary agreement of the third party in the call forwarding situation.
Although this requirement is not yet formally decided it seems likely that this or a similar requirement will
be legally enforced for the UPT service. This should primarily have impact on the UPT features which
make use of remote registration. Remote registration for incoming calls is, in its effect, very similar to
normal call forwarding, whereas local registration (performed at the line subscriber's premises) may be
considered as having the (indirect) agreement of the line subscriber.
The threat analysis in ETR 083 [1] and the special document on third party protection, ETR 055-11, have
also identified this requirement.

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These requirements mean that there is a need for some kind of agreement by third parties in the UPT
remote registration situation, and service providers need to take account of the relevant (forthcoming)
national laws concerning the protection features that are required.
4.3 UPT specific security features
In the service descriptions of UPT some features are defined that serve as countermeasures to some of
the identified threats. These features, as well as some frequently used precautions that are normal
practice in telecommunication based services, are described here together with the more specific security
features needed to fulfil the security requirements.
4.3.1 UPT service features providing security
These features alone are not always sufficient to counteract a particular threat, but they nevertheless
contribute (together with other security measures) to attaining the required security level. Important
security features in this category are:
- bill limitation;
- itemized bills;
- activity monitoring;
- announcements;
- blocking of registration;
- reset of registration;
- contractual agreements.
Bill limitation or credit control is the only effective way to limit the consequences of extensive, possibly
unauthorized, use by the user or fraudulent use by masquerading intruders. The limit for accumulated
charges should be set by the service provider in co-operation with the subscriber. In order to be effective,
the control should be performed in connection with the authentication for every outgoing call (in later
phases this may even be extended to in-call control). In the case of overrun of the limit, the service
provider shall not allow any more calls which increase the charges. The user should be made aware of
this situation immediately before the limit is reached and when making attempts for calls after the limit has
been reached.
For extra protection, follow-on outgoing calls may be restricted by the service provider.
Itemized bills play an important role for some threats, which are not easily discovered or prevented
otherwise. A drawback is
...