ASTM E2601-23

Standard Practice for Radiological and Nuclear Emergency Response

SIGNIFICANCE AND USE
5.1 It is essential for response agency personnel to plan, develop, implement, and train on standardized guidelines that encompass policy, strategy, operations, and tactical decisions prior to responding to a radiological or nuclear incident. Use of this practice is recommended for all levels of the response structure.  
5.2 Documents developed from this practice should be reviewed and revised as necessary on a two-year cycle or according to each jurisdiction’s normal practices. The review should consider new and updated requirements and guidance, technologies, and other information or equipment that might have a significant impact on the management and outcome of radiological incidents.
SCOPE
1.1 This practice provides decision-making considerations for response to both accidental and intentional incidents that involve radioactive material. It provides information and guidance for what to include in response planning and what activities to conduct during a response. It also encompasses the practices to respond to any situation complicated by radiation in conjunction with the associated guidance for the specific type of incident.  
1.1.1 The intended audience for the standard includes planners as well as emergency responders, incident commanders, and other emergency workers who should be protected from radiation.  
1.1.2 The scope of this practice applies to all types of radiological emergencies. While it does not fully consider response to an NPP accident,3 an explosive RDD, or nuclear detonation, detailed guidance to respond to such incidents is provided in other documents, such as those cited in the introduction. With respect to the guidance documents, this practice provides the general principles that apply to the broad range of incidents and associated planning goals but relies on the AHJ to apply and tailor their response planning based on those documents as well as the limitation of the personnel and equipment resources in the jurisdiction. In addition, the AHJ should use those documents to identify improvements to planning and resources to be better prepared for the more complex emergencies.  
1.1.3 This practice does not expressly address emergency response to contamination of food or water supplies.  
1.1.4 The Emergency Response Guide (ERG) published by the Department of Transportation provides valuable information for response to traffic accidents involving radioactive materials. For other radiological or nuclear incidents, however, the ERG may not provide adequate information on appropriate protective measures and should not be the sole resource used.  
1.2 This practice applies to those emergency response agencies that have a role in the response to an accidental or intentional radiological or nuclear incident. It should be used by emergency response organizations such as law enforcement, fire service, emergency medical services, and emergency management.  
1.3 This practice assumes that implementation begins with the recognition of a radiological or nuclear incident and ends when emergency response actions cease or the response is supported by specialized regional, state, or federal response assets.  
1.4 AHJs using this practice should identify hazards, develop a plan, acquire and track equipment, and provide training consistent with the descriptions provided in Section 6.  
1.5 While response to radiological hazards is the focus of this practice, responders must consider all hazards during a response; it is possible that non-radiological hazards may present a greater danger at an incident, particularly in incidents with wide area dispersion.  
1.5.1 This practice does not fully address assessing the risks from airborne radioactivity. Equipment to determine this potential hazard is not widely available in emergency responder communities. Like other responses to unknown hazards, respiratory protection commonly used by responders is required until a complete hazard i...

General Information

• Status: Published
• Publication Date: 30-Sep-2023
• ICS: 13.200 - Accident and disaster control
• Technical Committee: E54 - Homeland Security Applications
• Drafting Committee: E54.01 - CBRNE Detection and CBRN Protection

Relations

• Replaces: ASTM E2601-15 - Standard Practice for Radiological Emergency Response
• Effective Date: 01-Oct-2023
• Referred By: ASTM E2770-17 - Standard Guide for Operational Guidelines for Initial Response to Suspected Biological Agents and Toxins
• Effective Date: 01-Oct-2023
• Referred By: ASTM E2771-11(2019) - Standard Terminology for Homeland Security Applications
• Effective Date: 01-Oct-2023

Overview

ASTM E2601-23: Standard Practice for Radiological and Nuclear Emergency Response provides a comprehensive framework for emergency response agencies tasked with managing incidents involving radioactive material. Issued by ASTM Committee E54 on Homeland Security Applications, this standard addresses both accidental and intentional releases of radioactive materials, offering guidance on planning, preparedness, and initial response operations. With an emphasis on risk-based decision-making, alignment with the National Incident Management System (NIMS), and use of plain language, ASTM E2601-23 is designed for all levels of emergency responders, planners, and incident commanders.

Key Topics

• Comprehensive Emergency Response Planning
  ASTM E2601-23 underscores the necessity for all emergency response organizations to develop, implement, and regularly train on standardized guidelines that integrate policy, strategy, and tactical operations for radiological and nuclear incidents.

• Scope of Incidents Covered
  The document addresses response protocols for a wide range of radiological emergencies, from traffic accidents involving radioactive shipments to the intentional or accidental release of hazardous materials intended to cause harm, property damage, or disruption.

• Risk Assessment and Protective Measures
  The practice highlights the importance of risk assessment for responders, including determining the appropriate balance between lifesaving actions and radiation exposure. Guidance is also provided on the use of personal protective equipment (PPE) and radiation detection instruments.

• Adoption of Incident Command System (ICS) and NIMS Compliance
  The standard uses ICS terminology and aligns response practices with NIMS requirements, supporting clear communication and unified command during emergencies.

• Continuous Improvement and Review
  ASTM E2601-23 recommends a review and update cycle for local response plans every two years or as dictated by jurisdictional procedures, ensuring that advancements in technology and new regulatory requirements are incorporated.

• Integration with Other Guidance
  While it covers the emergency response phase for most radiological events, the practice refers users to existing federal and international guidance for specific high-impact scenarios such as nuclear detonations or large-scale nuclear power plant accidents.

Applications

The scope of ASTM E2601-23 encompasses practical guidelines for emergency response agencies involved in:

• Law enforcement
• Fire services
• Emergency medical services (EMS)
• Emergency management organizations

Practical applications include:

• Initial Incident Recognition and Response
  Implementation begins with incident acknowledgment and continues through the stabilization phase, or until specialized regional, state, or federal support arrives.

• Hazard Identification and Planning
  Authorities having jurisdiction (AHJs) are instructed to assess hazards, develop appropriate response plans, procure and track necessary equipment, and maintain responder training programs.

• Multi-Hazard Considerations
  While focused on radiological hazards, the standard recognizes that non-radiological risks (such as chemical or structural hazards) may coexist, requiring an all-hazards approach during emergency operations.

• Supplementing Other Resources
  ASTM E2601-23 supports and supplements, but does not replace, other established resources like the Department of Transportation's Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG) for highway incidents involving radioactive materials.

Related Standards

ASTM E2601-23 is part of a broader ecosystem of standards and guidance documents for hazardous materials and emergency response:

• NFPA 470 - Hazardous Materials/Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Standard for Responders
• ANSI/HPS N13.36 - Radiation Safety Training for Workers
• IEEE/ANSI N42 Series - Portable Radiation Detection Instrumentation
• EPA PAG Manual - Protective Action Guides for Radiological Incidents
• IAEA Manual for First Responders to a Radiological Emergency
• 49 CFR 173 - U.S. DOT Regulations for Shipments of Radioactive Materials
• FEMA and NIMS guidelines for radiological planning and response

ASTM E2601-23 ensures that response agencies are aligned with federal guidance, regulatory standards, and industry best practices, providing a robust foundation for the development, implementation, and continuous improvement of radiological and nuclear emergency response plans. This ultimately promotes responder safety, effective incident management, and public protection.

Standards Content (Sample)

This international standard was developed in accordance with internationally recognized principles on standardization established in the Decision on Principles for the
Development of International Standards, Guides and Recommendations issued by the World Trade Organization Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee.
Designation: E2601 − 23
Standard Practice for
Radiological and Nuclear Emergency Response
This standard is issued under the fixed designation E2601; the number immediately following the designation indicates the year of
original adoption or, in the case of revision, the year of last revision. A number in parentheses indicates the year of last reapproval. A
superscript epsilon (´) indicates an editorial change since the last revision or reapproval.
INTRODUCTION
Terrorist attacks around the world, including the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the continued
proliferation of nuclear weapons bring the recognition that weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
including the threats posed by radiological and nuclear weapons, remain a relevant concern. Since the
attacks of 2001 and subsequent expressions of interest in acquiring radiological or nuclear weapons,
or both, by terrorist groups and nation states, many jurisdictions have recognized the need for
radiological and nuclear emergency preparedness. Incident response is still based on accepted
procedures and safe work practices developed over the years, but it has become the norm to plan for
both accidents and an intentional release of hazardous materials (including radioactive materials)
designed to kill or injure, to cause destruction of property, or to deny access to areas, or combinations
thereof. This practice provides guidance for the initial response to any type of incident complicated
by radiation, and the basic radiation principles described will enable responders to perform their duties
to save lives, protect the public and minimize radiation dose in keeping with the ALARA principle;
however, this practice is not intended to replace the large body of work that has already been
developed that addresses responses to accidents at commercial nuclear power plants, nuclear
detonations, or large-scale radiological incidents and those that are included in the list of references.
This practice provides decision making considerations that jurisdictions can use to respond to
incidents that involve radiological or nuclear materials. This practice also provides a consistent set of
practices that can be incorporated into the development, planning, training, and implementation of
guidelines for radiological emergency response. While the practice does not fully treat the
complexities of large-scale radiological (for example, a radiological attack) or nuclear (for example,
a nuclear attack) incidents, or commercial nuclear power plant (NPP) accidents, it refers jurisdictions
to recent guidance documents and practices to incorporate into their own procedures for an initial
response, with the assumption that concurrent requests are made to summon specialized regional,
state, and federal radiological expertise and equipment, as appropriate to the incident. This practice
does not incorporate intermediate or long-term recovery or mitigation considerations.
The following are key concepts associated with this practice:
• This practice applies to the initial response to an incident, which begins with the recognition of
the radiological or nuclear nature of the incident and ends when emergency response actions cease or
the response is supported by specialized regional, state, or federal response assets (if requested).
• In the first hours of the response, it is unlikely that significant levels of federal and state support
will be on scene. This means that State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial (SLTT) jurisdictions and agencies
must rely on their own immediately available assets, technical equipment, and training.
• This practice recognizes that response to all radiological incidents calls for assessing the risks to
responders to determine whether the prospective benefit(s) justify an offensive mode of operations,
and that response to a nuclear detonation calls for immediate sheltering for all emergency responders
who do not have radiation detection equipment available;
• It adheres to a risk-based response; this means the guidance presented is intended to be coupled
with the authority having jurisdiction’s (AHJ) understanding of local hazards, vulnerabilities, and
capabilities when developing its plans and guidance documents on the subject;
• It is compliant with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and uses Incident
Command System (ICS) common terminology. Full compliance with NIMS is recognized as an
essential part of emergency response planning;
• It uses plain language: in developing this practice, every effort was made to ensure that the text,
Copyright © ASTM International, 100 Barr Harbor Drive, PO Box C700, West Conshohocken, PA 19428-2959. United States
E2601 − 23
including definitions, is presented in plain language according to Ref (1);
• It acknowledges that response to a nuclear incident is far more complex than a radiological
response and will require a different level of effort, time, and available resources to resolve;
• It notes that only a nuclear detonation requires responders to immediately seek shelter (if they have
radiation detection instruments), to conduct only quick, critical lifesaving activities outside in areas
where radiation exposure rates are greater than 10 R/h (if they have radiation instruments) or, if
without radiation instruments, to remain in shelter until they are instructed to respond or relocate by
an appropriate person in their chain of command (X4.2.2);
• While the dose accrued in an emergency is not subject to regulatory requirements and it is
desirable to keep below 5 rem, in an emergency this may not be possible. This standard recognizes the
dose in an emergency is managed under the Environmental Protection Agency guidance described in
Section 4 and not by occupational limits. In addition to the Environmental Protection Agency
guidance, there are numerous supporting references in this practice to implement that guidance, as
cited in the paragraph below. In addition, Chapter 7 in Ref (2) contains a comprehensive discussion
on the status of emergency workers with regulations and guidance (1);
• It is consistent with other planning guidance documents such as: Refs (2-6);
• It is intended to complement existing guidance (for example, Ref (7)) but it is not intended to
replace existing guidance for responding to commercial nuclear power plant accidents. The state of
preparedness for communities in close proximity to nuclear power plants far exceeds the minimum
requirements and capabilities described in this practice; and
• It emphasizes the importance of working with or consulting with radiation safety professionals
throughout the process of incorporating the contents of this practice into radiological and nuclear
emergency response plans.
This practice is under the jurisdiction of ASTM Committee E54 on Homeland Security Applications and is the direct responsibility of Subcommittee E54.01 on CBRNE
Detection and CBRN Protection.
Current edition approved Oct. 1, 2023. Published November 2023. Originally approved in 2008. Last previous edition approved in 2015 as E2601 – 15. DOI:
10.1520/E2601-23.
The boldface numbers in parentheses refer to a list of references at the end of this standard.
1. Scope planning and resources to be better prepared for the more
complex emergencies.
1.1 This practice provides decision-making considerations
1.1.3 This practice does not expressly address emergency
for response to both accidental and intentional incidents that
response to contamination of food or water supplies.
involve radioactive material. It provides information and guid-
1.1.4 The Emergency Response Guide (ERG) published by
ance for what to include in response planning and what
the Department of Transportation provides valuable informa-
activities to conduct during a response. It also encompasses the
tion for response to traffic accidents involving radioactive
practices to respond to any situation complicated by radiation
materials. For other radiological or nuclear incidents, however,
in conjunction with the associated guidance for the specific
the ERG may not provide adequate information on appropriate
type of incident.
protective measures and should not be the sole resource used.
1.1.1 The intended audience for the standard includes plan-
ners as well as emergency responders, incident commanders,
1.2 This practice applies to those emergency response
and other emergency workers who should be protected from
agencies that have a role in the response to an accidental or
radiation.
intentional radiological or nuclear incident. It should be used
1.1.2 The scope of this practice applies to all types of
by emergency response organizations such as law enforcement,
radiological emergencies. While it does not fully consider
fire service, emergency medical services, and emergency
response to an NPP accident, an explosive RDD, or nuclear
management.
detonation, detailed guidance to respond to such incidents is
1.3 This practice assumes that implementation begins with
provided in other documents, such as those cited in the
the recognition of a radiological or nuclear incident and ends
introduction. With respect to the guidance documents, this
when emergency response actions cease or the response is
practice provides the general principles that apply to the broad
supported by specialized regional, state, or federal response
range of incidents and associated planning goals but relies on
assets.
the AHJ to apply and tailor their response planning based on
1.4 AHJs using this practice should identify hazards, de-
those documents as well as the limitation of the personnel and
equipment resources in the jurisdiction. In addition, the AHJ velop a plan, acquire and track equipment, and provide training
consistent with the descriptions provided in Section 6.
should use those documents to identify improvements to
1.5 While response to radiological hazards is the focus of
this practice, responders must consider all hazards during a
Local response to nuclear facility incidents should follow nuclear facility plans.
response; it is possible that non-radiological hazards may
E2601 − 23
present a greater danger at an incident, particularly in incidents 2.2 IEEE/ANSI Standards:
with wide area dispersion. IEEE/ANSI N42.17AC Performance Specifications for
1.5.1 This practice does not fully address assessing the risks Health Physics Instrumentation-Portable Survey Instru-
from airborne radioactivity. Equipment to determine this po- mentation for Use in Normal and Extreme Environmental
tential hazard is not widely available in emergency responder Conditions
communities. Like other responses to unknown hazards, respi- IEEE/ANSI N42.32 Performance Criteria for Alarming Per-
ratory protection commonly used by responders is required sonal Radiation Detectors for Homeland Security
until a complete hazard identification assessment is complete. IEEE/ANSI N42.33 Portable Radiation Detection Instru-
mentation for Homeland Security
1.6 This practice is divided into the following sections:
IEEE/ANSI N42.37 Training Requirements for Homeland
Section Title
Security Purposes using Radiation Detection Instrumen-
1 Scope
tation for Interdiction and Prevention
2 Referenced Documents
IEEE/ANSI N42.42 American National Standard Data For-
3 Terminology
4 Summary of Practice
mat for Radiation Detectors Used for Homeland Security
5 Significance and Use
IEEE/ANSI, N42.49A Performance Criteria for Alarming
6 Prerequisites for Radiological or Nuclear Emergency
Electronic Personal Emergency Radiation Detectors
Response
7 Nuclear Detonation Response
(PERDs) for Exposure Control
8 Radiological Emergency Response
IEEE/ANSI N42.49B Performance Criteria for Non-
Appendix X1 Operational Guidance for Responding to Radiological or
alarming Personal Emergency Radiation Detectors
Nuclear Incidents, or both, and Emergencies
Appendix X2 Summary of Blast and Radiation Zones Following a
(PERDs) for Exposure Control
Nuclear Detonation
IEEE/ANSI N323AB Standard for Radiation Protection In-
Appendix X3 Practicing ALARA Using Time, Distance, and Shielding:
strumentation Test and Calibration, Portable Survey In-
Determining Radiological Dose
Appendix X4 Radiological Emergency Response Guidelines
struments (Revision and Redesignation of IEEE/ANSI
Appendix X5 Emergency Response Checklist for Radiological Incidents
N323A-1997 and IEEE/ANSI N323B-2002)
Appendix X6 Radiation Detection Instruments
Appendix X7 Example Radiation Safety Procedures
2.3 NFPA Standards:
Appendix X8 Sample Radiation Safety Procedures
NFPA 470 Hazardous Materials/Weapons of Mass Destruc-
Appendix X9 Training Resources
tion (WMD) Standard for Responders
Appendix X10 Radiation Units, Conversions, and Abbreviations
N/A References
NFPA 472 Standard for Competence of Responders to Haz-
N/A Bibliography
ardous Materials Incidents
1.7 The values stated in inch-pound units are to be regarded
NFPA 3000 Standard for an Active Shooter/Hostile Event
as standard. The values given in parentheses are mathematical
Response (ASHER) Program
conversions to SI units that are provided for information only
NFPA Glossary of Terms (2021)
and are not considered standard.
2.4 Other Standards:
1.8 This standard does not purport to address all of the
ANSI/HPS N13.36 Radiation Safety Training for Workers
safety concerns, if any, associated with its use. It is the EPA-402-K-22-008 Communicating Radiation Risks, Office
responsibility of the user of this standard to establish appro-
of Radiation and Indoor Air
priate safety, health, and environmental practices and deter-
3. Terminology
mine the applicability of regulatory limitations prior to use.
1.9 This international standard was developed in accor-
3.1 Definitions:
dance with internationally recognized principles on standard-
3.1.1 Active Shooter/Hostile Event (ASHE), n—an incident
ization established in the Decision on Principles for the
involving one or more individuals who are or have been
Development of International Standards, Guides and Recom-
actively engaged in harming, killing, or attempting to kill
mendations issued by the World Trade Organization Technical
people in a populated area by means such as firearms,
Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee.
explosives, toxic substances, vehicles, edged weapons, fire, or
a combination thereof. NFPA 3000 (2021a)
2. Referenced Documents
3.1.2 ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable), n—a prin-
ciple of radiation protection philosophy that requires that
2.1 Federal Standards:
exposures to ionizing radiation should be kept as low as
10 CFR 20.1001 Standards for Protection Against Radiation
reasonably achievable, economic and social factors being taken
29 CFR 1910 Occupational Safety and Health Standards
29 CFR 1926.502 Occupational Safety and Health Standards
49 CFR 173 Shippers General Requirements for Shipments
Available from Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE),
and Packages
445 Hoes Ln., Piscataway, NJ 08854-4141, http://www.ieee.org.
18 U.S. Code §2332a Use of weapons of mass destruction 6
Available from National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), 1 Batterymarch
29 U.S. Code §654 Duties of employers and employees Park, Quincy, MA 02169-7471, http://www.nfpa.org.
Available from American National Standards Institute (ANSI), 25 W. 43rd St.,
4th Floor, New York, NY 10036, http://www.ansi.org.
Available from United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), William
Available from U.S. Government Publishing Office (GPO), 732 N. Capitol St., Jefferson Clinton Bldg., 1200 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20460,
NW, Washington, DC 20401, http://www.gpo.gov. http://www.epa.gov.
E2601 − 23
into account; the ALARA principle is satisfied when the 3.1.14 emergency response, n—the performance of actions
expenditure of further resources would be unwarranted by the to mitigate the consequences of an emergency for human
reduction in exposure that would be achieved (8). health and safety, quality of life, the environment, and prop-
erty; it may also provide a basis for the resumption of normal
3.1.3 authority having jurisdiction (AHJ), n—an entity that
social and economic activity (12).
can create and administer processes to qualify, certify, and
credential personnel for incident-related positions. AHJs in- 3.1.15 emergency response personnel (emergency response
clude state, tribal, or federal government departments and provider), n—(1) personnel assigned to organizations that have
agencies, training commissions, NGOs, or companies, as well the responsibility for responding to hazardous materials emer-
as local organizations such as police, fire, public health, or gencies (NFPA Glossary of Terms); (2) federal, state, and local
emergency public safety, law enforcement, emergency
public works departments (1).
response, emergency medical (including hospital emergency
3.1.4 community reception center (CRC), n—non-medical
facilities), and related personnel, agencies, and authorities (13).
facility established to monitor members of the public for
radioactive contamination and to provide decontamination if 3.1.16 emergency worker, n—anyone with a role in respond-
necessary (8). ing to the incident, whether a radiation worker previously or
not, who should be protected from radiation exposure (14).
3.1.5 dangerous radiation zone, n—an area where radiation
levels exceed 10 R/h (0.1 Gy/h) (8). 3.1.17 evacuation, n—organized, phased, and supervised
withdrawal, dispersal, or removal of people from dangerous or
3.1.6 decision points, n—predefined exposure rates or expo-
potentially dangerous areas, and their reception and care in safe
sures at which a decision-maker must determine a path forward
areas (1).
to maximize responder safety and public protection (9).
3.1.18 high exposure rate, n—exposure rate beyond which
3.1.7 decontamination, n—(1) the removal of radionuclide
emergency response is not recommended for rescue operations
contaminants from surfaces (for example, skin) by cleaning
unless the incident commander (IC) determines it can be
and washing (8); (2) the physical or chemical, or both, process
carefully controlled for a short duration for priority operations
of reducing and preventing the spread and effects of contami-
(for example, lifesaving), and the emergency responder is
nants to people, animals, the environment, or equipment
informed of the hazards and consents to performing the
involved at hazardous materials/weapons of mass destruction
operation(s); the recommendation of this practice is that areas
(WMD) incidents. NFPA 470
in which exposure rate is greater than or equal to 100 R/h
3.1.8 defensive mode, n—an operating mode characterized
(1 Gy ⁄h) be considered to have a high exposure rate; for the
as medium risk to emergency responders, in which responders
purposes of this practice, the term “high dose rate” is equiva-
do not have direct contact with the hazardous materials/
lent to “high exposure rate” (12).
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), focusing on safely
3.1.19 hot spot, n—the region in a radiation/contamination
controlling or limiting the effects of a release. NFPA 470
area where the level of radiation/contamination is significantly
3.1.9 dose, n—a general term denoting the quantity of
greater than in neighboring regions in the area (11).
energy from ionizing radiation absorbed in a tissue or organ
3.1.19.1 Discussion—A hot spot is a localized area with
from either an external source or from radionuclides in the
elevated radiation or contamination levels, or both, while a
body (10).
“zone” (for example, dangerous radiation zone) is an extended
3.1.10 dose rate (also exposure rate), n—a measure of dose area. Thus, while the hot zone might have local areas in which
delivered per unit time; dose rate can refer to any dose quantity
radiation exposure rates exceed 10 R/h, these local areas will
(for example, absorbed dose, dose equivalent); dose rate is be posted as “hot spots” within the much larger hot zone.
measured in units of R/h, mR/h, microR/h, and so forth with
3.1.20 hot zone, n—an area where (1) radiation levels
other units of radiation exposure and dose (rem, Sv, Gy, etc.)
exceed 10 mR/h (0.1 mGy/h); or (2) contamination levels
(8). 2
exceed 60 000 dpm ⁄cm beta and gamma at 1.5 cm (~0.5 in.)
3.1.11 dosimeter, n—a small, portable instrument (such as a from the surface being surveyed; or (3) alpha contamination
film badge, thermoluminescent dosimeter, or pocket dosimeter) levels exceed 6000 dpm/cm at a distance of 0.5 cm (~0.25 in.)
used to measure and record the total accumulated personal dose from the surface being surveyed, as measured with an alpha
of ionizing radiation (11). probe (8, 15, 16); all personnel working in the hot zone must
receive training and wear personal protective equipment (PPE)
3.1.12 dosimetry, n—the science or technique of determin-
appropriate for the risks (for example, contamination, danger-
ing radiation dose; strictly speaking, involving measured
ous atmosphere, radiation etc.) that are present.
quantities, but also used informally to mean “dose assessment”
(that is, involving measurements or theoretical calculations, or 3.1.21 improvised nuclear device, n—a device designed by
both) (2). terrorists to produce a nuclear detonation; this includes stolen
and subsequently modified nuclear weapons but does not
3.1.13 emergency operations center (EOC), n—a facility
include stockpiled weapons in the custody of the military (17).
from which staff provide information management, resource
allocation and tracking, or advanced planning support to 3.1.22 incident command system (ICS), n—a management
personnel on scene or at other EOCs (for example, a state system designed to enable effective and efficient domestic
center supporting a local center), or combinations thereof (1). incident management by integrating a combination of facilities,
E2601 − 23
equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications oper- 3.1.32 personal protective equipment (PPE), n—the protec-
ating within a common organizational structure (1). tive clothing and respiratory protective equipment provided to
shield or isolate a person from the hazards encountered at
3.1.23 incident commander (IC), n—the individual respon-
hazardous materials/weapons of mass destruction incident
sible for on-scene incident activities, including developing
operations. NFPA Glossary of Terms
incident objectives and ordering and releasing resources; the
3.1.33 personal radiation detector (PRD), n—a PRD is a
incident commander has overall authority and responsibility
pocket-sized battery-powered alarming electronic instrument
for conducting incident operations (1).
that is worn on the body and used to detect photon-emitting,
3.1.24 jurisdiction, n—jurisdiction has two definitions de-
and optionally neutron-emitting, radioactive materials; PRDs
pending on the context: (1) a range or sphere of authority:
have user-readable displays related to the intensity of radiation,
public agencies have jurisdiction at an incident related to their
but they are distinct from, and typically more sensitive than,
legal responsibilities and authority; jurisdictional authority at
electronic personal dosimeters, which are designed to measure
an incident can be political or geographical (for example, local,
the dose equivalent to workers occupationally exposed to
state, tribal, territorial, and federal boundary lines) or func-
radiation. IEEE/ANSI N42.32-2016
tional (for example, law enforcement, public health), or both;
3.1.34 preventive radiological/nuclear detection (PRND) or
or (2) a political subdivision: (for example, municipality,
radiological/nuclear detection (RND), n—capability to detect
county, parish, state, federal) with the responsibility for ensur-
illicit radiological/nuclear materials and radiological/nuclear
ing public safety, health, and welfare within its legal authorities
WMDs at the points of manufacture, transportation, and use,
and geographic boundaries (1).
and to identify the nature of material through adjudication or
3.1.25 light damage zone (LDZ), n—the area furthest from
resolution of the detection alarm; this does not include actions
the site of a nuclear detonation, in which nearly all windows
taken to respond to the consequences of the release of
are shattered and building facades are damaged; most injuries
radiological/nuclear materials (such as response to the detona-
in the LDZ are not life-threatening but there are likely to be
tion of an RDD (19).
many injuries from flying glass and debris (4).
3.1.35 radiation source, n—radioactive material or byprod-
3.1.26 low exposure rate, n—radiation exposure rate less
uct that is specifically manufactured or obtained for the
than 10 mR/h (milliR/h) (0.1 mSv/h (milliSv/h)) at 1 m (3.3 ft)
purpose of using the emitted radiation; such sources are
from the object or at 1 m (3.3 ft) above the ground or surface
commonly used in teletherapy or industrial radiography; in
being surveyed; for the purposes of this practice, the term “low
various types of industrial gauges, irradiators, and gamma
dose rate” is equivalent to “low exposure rate.”
knives; and as power sources for batteries (such as those used
in spacecraft); these sources usually consist of a known
3.1.27 multiagency coordination system (MACS), n—an
quantity of radioactive material, which is encased in a man-
overarching term for the NIMS Command and Coordination
made capsule, sealed between layers of nonradioactive
systems: the incident command system (ICS), emergency
material, or firmly bonded to a nonradioactive substrate to
operations centers (EOCs), the multiagency coordination
prevent radiation leakage (11).
(MAC) group/policy groups, and joint information centers
(JICs) (1). 3.1.35.1 Discussion—For the purpose of this document a
“legitimate” radiation source is a source of radiation that is
3.1.28 nonintervention mode, n—an operating mode used
being used in the manner intended (for example, radioactivity
where the risk to emergency responders is greater than the
administered to a nuclear medicine patient, radioactivity pres-
benefit, in which responders do not operate near the hazardous
ent in a “nuclear” soil gauge in use at a construction site, etc.).
materials/weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or container,
3.1.36 radiological dispersal device (RDD), n—a device
focusing on public protective actions only and allowing the
designed to spread radioactive material through a detonation of
container or product to take its natural course. NFPA 470
conventional explosive or other (non-nuclear) means (9).
3.1.29 offensive mode, n—an operating mode characterized
3.1.37 radiation exposure device (RED), n—a device con-
as higher risk to emergency responders, in which responders
sisting of a large quantity of radioactive material clandestinely
could have direct contact with the hazardous materials/
placed to expose people to ionizing radiation (8).
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), taking aggressive ac-
tions to control the release of hazardous materials/WMD.
3.1.38 rem, n—(from Roentgen Equivalent Man) a measure
NFPA 470
of the biological damage caused by exposure to ionizing
radiation, equal to the absorbed dose in rads multiplied by the
3.1.30 orphan source, n—a radioactive source that is not
radiation weighting factor for the type of radiation causing the
under regulatory control, either because it has never been under
exposure; 1 rem = 10 mSv (8).
regulatory control, or because it has been abandoned, lost,
misplaced, stolen, or transferred without proper authorization
3.1.39 responder protection, n—preventative measures
(18).
taken to mitigate hostile actions against response personnel,
resources, facilities, and critical information (20).
3.1.31 personal emergency radiation detector (PERD), n—a
high range, alarming, body-worn device capable of operating 3.1.40 roentgen (R), n—a unit of exposure to ionizing
above 10 R/h and potentially up to 1000 R/h (0.1 Gy/h and radiation as determined by measuring the amount of ionization
potentially as high as 10 Gy/h). IEEE/ANSI N42.49A produced in a small volume of air (21); for the purpose of this
E2601 − 23
practice, 1 R of exposure is equal to 1 rem, 1 rad, and 10 mSv grenade, rocket, missile, or mine); (2) any weapon that is
of dose to the human body. designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury
through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or
1000 micro-roentgen (microR or μR) = 1 milli-roentgen (mR)
1000 milli-roentgen (mR) = 1 roentgen (R), thus
poisonous chemicals, or their precursors; (3) any weapon
1 000 000 microR = 1 roentgen (R)
involving a biological agent, toxin, or vector; (4) any weapon
that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level
3.1.40.1 Discussion—To improve clarity in
dangerous to human life. 18 USC §2332a
communications, the unit roentgen may be spoken as “R”
3.1.47.1 Discussion—WMD is often referred to by the
instead of pronouncing “roentgen.” The SI prefix “micro” (one
collection of categories that make up the set of weapons:
millionth) may be written as a lower case “u” or the phrase
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive
“micro” instead of the lower case Greek letter mu (μ) and may
(CBRNE). These are weapons that have a relatively large-scale
be spoken as either “micro” or “U.” Similarly, the SI prefix
impact on people, property, or infrastructure, or combinations
“milli” (one thousandth) may be written as either “milli” or
thereof (19).
“m” and spoken as either “milli” or “M.” For example, the
value of 25 μR may be written as “25 uR” or “25 microR” and
3.2 Acronyms:
pronounced as “25 U-R” or “25 micro-R.” Likewise, the value
3.2.1 AHJ—Authority Having Jurisdiction
of 2 mR could be spoken as “2 M-R” or “2 milli-R.”
3.2.2 ALARA—As Low as Reasonably Achievable
3.1.41 safety offıcer (hazardous materials), n—the person
3.2.3 ANSI—American National Standards Institute
who works within an incident command system (specifically,
3.2.4 ASHE—Active Shooter/Hostile Event
the hazardous materials branch/group) to ensure that recog-
nized hazardous materials/weapons of mass destruction 3.2.5 CBRNE—Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
(WMD) safe practices are followed at hazardous materials/ Nuclear, and Explosive
WMD incidents. NFPA 470
3.2.6 CDC—Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
3.1.42 secondary threats, n—secondary threats include
3.2.7 CFR—Code of Federal Regulations
armed personnel or explosive devices that are placed to cause
3.2.8 CRCPD—Conference of Radiation Control Program
casualties among emergency personnel responding to incidents
Directors
(22); see also Active Shooter/Hostile Event.
3.2.9 CTOS—CTOS Center for Radiological/Nuclear Train-
3.1.43 shelter in place, n—the strategy and tactics used to
ing at the Nevada National Security Site
protect or shelter people or animals, or both, from a threat in a
3.2.10 DHS—Department of Homeland Security
safe area, as an alternative to evacuation.
NFPA Glossary of Terms 3.2.11 DOE—Department of Energy
3.2.12 DOT—Department of Transportation
3.1.44 termination, n—that portion of incident management
after the cessation of tactical operations in which personnel are
3.2.13 DRZ—Dangerous Radiation Zone
involved in documenting safety procedures, site operations,
3.2.14 EOC—Emergency Operations Center
hazards faced, and lessons learned from the incident.
3.2.15 EPA—Environmental Protection Agency
NFPA Glossary of Terms
3.2.16 ERG—Emergency Response Guidebook
3.1.45 terrorism, n—any activity that (A) involves an act
3.2.17 FEMA—Federal Emergency Management Agency
that (i) is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of
critical infrastructure or key resources; and (ii) is a violation of
3.2.18 FRMAC—Federal Radiological Monitoring and As-
the criminal laws of the United States or any state or other
sessment Center
subdivision of the United States; and (B) appears to be
3.2.19 FSLTT—Federal, State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial
intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to
3.2.20 GM—Geiger-Mueller
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass
3.2.21 HZ—Hot Zone
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping (13).
3.2.22 IAEA—International Atomic Energy Agency
3.1.46 transport index, n—the dimensionless number
3.2.23 IAP—Incident Action Plan
(rounded up to the next tenth) placed on the label of a package
3.2.24 IC—Incident Commander
to designate the degree of control to be exercised by the carrier
3.2.25 ICP—Incident Command Post
during transportation; the transport index is determined by
multiplying the maximum radiation level in millisieverts
3.2.26 ICS—Incident Command System
(mSv) per hour at 1 m (3.3 ft) from the external surface of the
3.2.27 ICRP—International Commission on Radiation Pro-
package by 100 (equivalent to the maximum radiation level in
tection
millirem per hour (mrem/h) at 1 m (3.3 ft). 49 CFR 173.403
3.2.28 ICRU—International Commission on Radiation
3.1.47 weapon of mass destruction (WMD), n—defined in
Units and Measurements
U.S. law as a weapon meeting one or more of the following
3.2.29 IND—Improvised Nuclear Device
four categories: (1) any “destructive device” (such as
explosives, incendiary material, or poison gas in a bomb, 3.2.30 LDZ—Light Damage Zone
E2601 − 23
3.2.31 MACS—Multiagency Coordination System incident. In incidents encompassing multiple agencies, mul-
tiple victims, and damage to environment and infrastructure,
3.2.32 MDZ—Moderate Damage Zone
the EOC or MACS, or both, would be operating at least at the
3.2.33 NCRP—National Council on Radiation Protection
local level. It is imperative that representatives at the EOC or
and Measurements
MACS, or both, be aware of and understand this practice and
3.2.34 NFPA—National Fire Protection Association
operate in concert with emergency response communities that
3.2.35 NIMS—National Incident Management System adopt this practice.
3.2.36 NIST—National Institute of Standards and Technol-
4.3 The flowchart shown in Fig. 1 summarizes the actions to
ogy
take during a radiological or nuclear response. Note that, as
3.2.37 NPP—Nuclear Power Plant discussed in Section 7, the default response to a nuclear
detonation should be to immediately seek safe shelter, instruct-
3.2.38 NRF—National Response Framework
ing members of the public to seek shelter as well. Once
3.2.39 OSHA—Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
sheltering, emergency responders who have radiation survey
tion
equipment should use their instruments to assess radiation
3.2.40 PAGs—Protective Action Guidelines
exposure rates outdoors and should respond in accordance with
3.2.41 PERD—Personal Emergency Radiation Detector
the decision points noted in Fig. 1 and discussed in Table 1. In
a nuclear detonation incident, emergency responders who do
3.2.42 PPE—Personal Protective Equipment
not have radiation detection instruments should continue to
3.2.43 PRD—Personal Radiation Detector
shelter for 12 h to 24 h, until they receive radiation
3.2.44 PRND/RND—Preventive Radiological/Nuclear De-
instruments, or are provided situational awareness of where the
tection or Radiological/Nuclear Detection
dangerous levels of radiation are present and where it is safe to
3.2.45 R—Roentgen respond, how to avoid lethal levels of radiation, and which
locations are safe to conduct response or relocation activities
3.2.46 R/h—Roentgen per hour
(5). In contrast, during a response to a radiological (non-
3.2.47 RDD—Radiological Dispersal Device
nuclear) emergency, responders are encouraged to conduct
3.2.48 REAC/TS—Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/
lifesaving activities as quickly as possible (even if no personal
Training Site
detection equipment is available), since it is unlikely that
3.2.49 RED—Radiation Exposure Device radiation levels are high enough to present an immediate
hazard during a short period of time.
3.2.50 REMM—Radiation Emergency Medical Manage-
ment
4.4 A discussion of the short- and long-term health effects of
3.2.51 RIID—Radio Isotope Identifier radiation exposure is found in Appendix X1, in Table X1.1,
and Table X1.2.
3.2.52 SDZ—Severe Damage Zone
3.2.53 SI—International System of Units
4.5 This practice follows a risk-based response approach
because the risk of developing short-term (for example, radia-
3.2.54 SOP—Standard Operating Procedure
tion sickness, skin burns) or long-term (for example, cancer)
3.2.55 SLTT—State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial
health effects is proportional to the amount of radiation dose
3.2.56 TI—Transport Index
received; because the amount of radiation dose received is
3.2.57 US—United States related to the dose rate or exposure rate in which one works;
and because radiological safety recommendations are provided
3.2.58 USC—United States Code
in terms of reducing radiation exposure in accordance with the
3.2.59 WMD—Weapon of Mass Destruction
ALARA principle.
4. Summary of Practice
5. Significance and Use
4.1 This practice is based on existing resources and experi-
5.1 It is essential for response agency personnel to plan,
ence related to the development of radiological emergency
develop, implement, and train on standardized guidelines that
response guidelines. This experience base is translated into a
encompass policy, strategy, operations, and tactical decisions
practice to guide responder agencies toward the goal of
prior to responding to a radiological or nuclear incident. Use of
building operational guidelines for the first hours of radiologi-
this practice is recommended for all levels of the response
cal or nuclear incident response. The practice is intended to
structure.
enhance the ability, knowledge, and understanding of
personnel, agencies, or departments that are responsible for
5.2 Documents developed from this practice should be
responding to a radiological or nuclear incident.
reviewed and revised as necessary on a two-year cycle or
4.2 This practice shall be incorporated as a reference in according to each jurisdiction’s normal practices. The review
emergency operation centers, emergency operation plans, and should consider new and updated requirements and guidance,
multiagency coordination systems to assist in policy formula- technologies, and other information or equipment that might
tion and development of strategic objectives consistent with the have a significant impact on the management and outcome of
objectives and needs of the incident commander throughout the radiological incidents.
E2601 − 23
FIG. 1 Radiological/Nuclear Emergency Response Flowchart
E2601 − 23
TABLE 1 Radiation Exposure and Exposure Rate Guidelines for Those Responding to Radiological or Nuclear Emergencies
NOTE 1—For the purpose of this practice, 1 R of exposure is equal to 1 rem, 1 rad, and 10 mSv of dose to the human body.
Guideline Activity Condition
Exposure or dose rate in area (R/h, Sv/h)
F, G, I
>10 mR/h (0.1 mGy/h) Work in HZ All personnel working in HZ should have appropriate training and PPE (including
radiation dosimeters) for all hazards they are expected to encounter.
A, B, G
>10 R/h (0.1 Gy/h) Work in DRZ – lifesaving activities Entry into the DRZ should only be made to conduct lifesaving actions or attempt-
ing to prevent a catastrophic situation and with the informed consent of those
making the entry.
A, B, G
>100 R/h (1 Gy/h) Work in DRZ – to perform lifesaving actions In addition to the requirements to enter the DRZ, entry should only be made with
or when attempting to prevent a cata- the permission of the Incident Commander.
strophic situation.
J
Total dose to the worker (rem, Sv)
A, C, D, E, F, H, I
5 rem (50 mSv) Occupational limit for radiation workers un- All reasonably achievable actions have been taken to minimize dose.
der routine circumstances
5 rem to 10 rem Protecting critical infrastructure necessary Exceeding 5 rem (50 mSv) is unavoidable and appropriate actions have been
A, B, E, I
(50 mSv to 100 mSv) for public welfare (for example, a power taken to reduce dose. Monitoring is available to project or to measure the dose to
plant) individuals.
10 rem to 25 rem Lifesaving or protection of large populations Exceeding 5 rem (50 mSv) is unavoidable and all appropriate actions have been
A, B, E, H, I
(100 mSv to 250 mSv) taken to reduce dose and with the informed consent of those making the entry.
Monitoring is available to project or to measure dose.
25 rem to 50 rem Lifesaving or protection of large populations
A, B, E, H, I
(500 mSv) All conditions for exceeding a dose of 25 rem have been met and those making
50 rem to 100 rem Lifesaving or protection of large populations the entry are fully aware of the risks involved.
A, B, E, G, H, I
(1 Sv)
A
Medical monitoring should be considered for potential doses in excess of 5 rem (50 mSv).
B
In the case of very large incidents (for example, nuclear detonation), the IC should consider raising the dose guidelines to prevent large-scale loss of life and widespread
destruction.
C
From EPA Protection Action Guidelines (14).
D
From NCRP 1993 (23).
E
From ICRP Publication 96 (18).
F
From CRCPD 2006 (16).
G
From IAEA 2006 (12).
H
From DHS 2008 (24).
I
From NCRP 2010 (8).
J
According to Ref (14), any dose in excess of 5 rem (50 mSv) is assumed to occur only once in a lifetime and that any responder receiving a dose in excess of 5 rem
(50 mSv) “should not take part in the later stages of the response.”
6. Prerequisites for Radiological or Nuclear Emergency (b) The source is legitimate, and
Response (c) The source does not presently pose an exposure risk to
human health or the environment, or
6.1 AHJs over a radiological or nuclear response are respon-
(2) Incidents in which radioactive materials may pose a
sible for providing the planning, resources, training, and safety
risk because:
necessary to implement standardized procedures.
(a) The radioactive materials have been released, have the
6.2 Planning—AHJs shall determine the specific require-
potential to be released, present an exposure hazard, or all of
ments and planning elements for a response plan. The plan, and
these; and
the documents that have significant impact on it or those that
(b) Radiation exposures or contamination, or both, are above
flow from it, shall be revised as necessary. Radiological and
typical background levels; or
nuclear response plans should consider the guidelines and other
(c) Implementation of protective actions may be necessary.
information summarized in Table 1 and the cited references,
6.2.1.2 The immediate default response to radiological in-
and should address the following:
cidents should focus on lifesaving tasks (that is, saving lives
6.2.1 Planning the Response to Radiological Incidents—
through rescue operations), life safety practices and precau-
Radiological incidents and incident responses rarely pose an
tions intended to keep members of the public and emergency
immediate threat to life or health and only rarely expose
responders safe, and stabilizing the scene. Radiological inci-
responders to dangerously high levels of radiation. For this
dents and incident response rarely pose an immediate threat to
reason, radiological response plans can focus on immediate
life or health. Therefore, rescue, lifesaving, first aid, fire
response to the scene. Because radiological incidents can vary
suppression, and addressing other immediate hazards are a
from a minor accident to a terrorist attack, a radiological
higher priority than measuring radiation levels (25).
incident response plan must be able to accommodate incidents
that pose little to no risk as well as those that may pose a risk
to responders.
6.2.1.1 The following points will help to differentiate be-
For the purposes of this document, term “legitimate radioactive source” refers
to a radioactive source that is under regulatory control or that can be identified as
tween these possibilities.
natural, medical, or industrial in nature and that is being used as intended. For
(1) Incidents in which radioactive materials are unlikely to
example, Cs-137 that is identified and is found to be a source in a soil density gauge
pose a risk because:
in the possession of its licensed user is
...

This document is not an ASTM standard and is intended only to provide the user of an ASTM standard an indication of what changes have been made to the previous version. Because
it may not be technically possible to adequately depict all changes accurately, ASTM recommends that users consult prior editions as appropriate. In all cases only the current version
of the standard as published by ASTM is to be considered the official document.
Designation: E2601 − 15 E2601 − 23
Standard Practice for
Radiological and Nuclear Emergency Response
This standard is issued under the fixed designation E2601; the number immediately following the designation indicates the year of
original adoption or, in the case of revision, the year of last revision. A number in parentheses indicates the year of last reapproval. A
superscript epsilon (´) indicates an editorial change since the last revision or reapproval.
INTRODUCTION
One of the legacies of the Oklahoma City bombing and Terrorist attacks around the world, including
the attacks of September 11, 2001 is recognition that terrorists use 2001, and the continued
proliferation of nuclear weapons bring the recognition that weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This
awareness has changed the philosophy of emergency response across disciplines. (WMD), including
the threats posed by radiological and nuclear weapons, remain a relevant concern. Since the attacks
of 2001 and subsequent expressions of interest in acquiring radiological or nuclear weapons, or both,
by terrorist groups and nation states, many jurisdictions have recognized the need for radiological and
nuclear emergency preparedness. Incident response is still based on accepted procedures and safe
work practices developed over the years, but the new mission must include concerns that are specific
to it has become the norm to plan for both accidents and an intentional release of hazardous materials
(including radioactive materials) designed to kill or injure andinjure, to cause destruction of property.
This standard property, or to deny access to areas, or combinations thereof. This practice provides
guidance for responding to incidents where radioactive materials might be used with that intent. The
standard also applies guidance for general radiological emergency response. The purpose of the
guidance is the initial response to any type of incident complicated by radiation, and the basic
radiation principles described will enable responders to perform their duties to save lives, minimize
radiation dose, and move members of the public out of perceived danger areas.protect the public and
minimize radiation dose in keeping with the ALARA principle; however, this practice is not intended
to replace the large body of work that has already been developed that addresses responses to accidents
at commercial nuclear power plants, nuclear detonations, or large-scale radiological incidents and
those that are included in the list of references.
This standard practice provides decision making considerations that jurisdictions can use to respond
to incidents that involve radioactive materials. The standard practice radiological or nuclear materials.
This practice also provides a consistent set of practices that can be incorporated into the development,
planning, training, and implementation of guidelines for radiological emergency response. The
standardWhile the practice does not incorporate long-term recovery or mitigation considerations, nor
does it include provisions for improvised nuclear devicefully treat the complexities of large-scale
radiological (for example, a radiological attack) or nuclear (for (INDs) detonations or example, a
nuclear attack) incidents, or commercial nuclear power plant (NPP) accidents. Jurisdictions using the
standard practice shall incorporate accidents, it refers jurisdictions to recent guidance documents and
practices to incorporate into their own procedures for notification and requests for assistance from
specialized radiological response assets.an initial response, with the assumption that concurrent
requests are made to summon specialized regional, state, and federal radiological expertise and
equipment, as appropriate to the incident. This practice does not incorporate intermediate or long-term
recovery or mitigation considerations.
This practice is under the jurisdiction of ASTM Committee E54 on Homeland Security Applications and is the direct responsibility of Subcommittee E54.01 on CBRNE
Detection and CBRN Protection.
Current edition approved Feb. 15, 2015Oct. 1, 2023. Published March 2015November 2023. Originally approved in 2008. Last previous edition approved in 20082015
as E2601 – 08.E2601 – 15. DOI: 10.1520/E2601-15.10.1520/E2601-23.
Copyright © ASTM International, 100 Barr Harbor Drive, PO Box C700, West Conshohocken, PA 19428-2959. United States
E2601 − 23
The following are key concepts associated with this standard practice:practice:
The standard• This practice applies to the emergency phase of an event (0 to 24 h or until
specialized resources arrive on scene if they areinitial response to an incident, which begins with the
recognition of the radiological or nuclear nature of the incident and ends when emergency response
actions cease or the response is supported by specialized regional, state, or federal response assets (if
requested).
• In the first hours of the response, it is unlikely that significant levels of federal and state support
will be on scene. This means that State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial (SLTT) jurisdictions and agencies
must rely on their own immediately available assets, technical equipment, and training.
• This practice recognizes that response to all radiological incidents calls for assessing the risks to
responders to determine whether the prospective benefit(s) justify an offensive mode of operations,
and that response to a nuclear detonation calls for immediate sheltering for all emergency responders
who do not have radiation detection equipment available;
• It adheres to a risk-based response; this means the guidance presented is intended to be coupled
with the authority having jurisdiction’s (AHJ’s)(AHJ) understanding of local vulnerability and
capabilityhazards, vulnerabilities, and capabilities when developing its plans and guidance documents
on the subject.subject;
• It is compliant with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and uses Incident
Command System (ICS) common terminology. Full compliance with NIMS is recognized as an
essential part of emergency response planning. In developing this standard practice, every effort was
made to ensure that all communications between organizational elements during an incident are
presented in plain language according to NIMS 2007. In keeping with this NIMS requirement, key
definitions and terms, using plain English, are incorporated.planning;
• It uses plain language: in developing this practice, every effort was made to ensure that the text,
including definitions, is presented in plain language according to Ref (1);
• It acknowledges that response to a nuclear incident is far more complex than a radiological
response and will require a different level of effort, time, and available resources to resolve;
• It notes that only a nuclear detonation requires responders to immediately seek shelter (if they have
radiation detection instruments), to conduct only quick, critical lifesaving activities outside in areas
where radiation exposure rates are greater than 10 R/h (if they have radiation instruments) or, if
without radiation instruments, to remain in shelter until they are instructed to respond or relocate by
an appropriate person in their chain of command (X4.2.2);
• While the dose accrued in an emergency is not subject to regulatory requirements and it is
desirable to keep below 5 rem, in an emergency this may not be possible. This standard recognizes the
dose in an emergency is managed under the Environmental Protection Agency guidance described in
Section 4 and not by occupational limits. In addition to the Environmental Protection Agency
guidance, there are numerous supporting references in this practice to implement that guidance, as
cited in the paragraph below. In addition, Chapter 7 in Ref (2) contains a comprehensive discussion
on the status of emergency workers with regulations and guidance (1);
It is not intended for large-scale nuclear scenarios (for example, IND),• It is consistent with other
planning guidance documents such as: Refs which (2-6may )quickly exhaust the capabilities of local
emergency responders.;
The standard practice • It is intended to complement existing guidance (for example, Ref (7)) but
it is not intended to prepare communities for replace existing guidance for responding to commercial
nuclear power plant accidents. The state of preparedness for communities in close proximity to nuclear
power plants far exceeds the minimum requirements and capabilities described in this standard
practice.practice; and
TRACEM (Thermal, Radiological, Asphyxiant, Chemical, Etiological, Mechanical) issues were
considered throughout. While response to radiological hazards is the focus of this standard practice,
responders must consider all hazards during a response; it is possible that non-radiological hazards
may present a greater danger at an incident.
The standard practice does not address airborne contamination levels of radioactive materials
exposure. Equipment to determine this potential hazard is not widely available in emergency
responder communities. Respiratory protection is required for emergency responders until a complete
An improvised nuclear device is defined as follows: A device incorporating fissile materials designed or constructed outside of an official government agency and that
has, or appears to have, or is claimed to have the capability to produce a nuclear explosion. It also may be a nuclear weapon that is no longer in the custody of competent
authority or custodian, or has been modified from its designated firing sequence, or it may have been assembled from illegally obtained nuclear weapons components or special
nuclear materials.The boldface numbers in parentheses refer to a list of references at the end of this standard.
E2601 − 23
hazard identification assessment is complete.• It emphasizes the importance of working with or
consulting with radiation safety professionals throughout the process of incorporating the contents of
this practice into radiological and nuclear emergency response plans.
1. Scope
1.1 This practice provides decision-making considerations for response to both accidental and intentional incidents that involve
radioactive materials.material. It provides information and guidance for what to include in response planning,planning and what
activities to conduct during a response. The scope of this standard practice does not explicitly consider response to INDs or nuclear
power plant accidents.It also encompasses the practices to respond to any situation complicated by It does not expressly address
emergency response to contamination of food or water supplies. radiation in conjunction with the associated guidance for the
specific type of incident.
1.1.1 The intended audience for the standard includes planners as well as emergency responders, incident commanders, and other
emergency workers who should be protected from radiation.
1.1.2 The scope of this practice applies to all types of radiological emergencies. While it does not fully consider response to an
NPP accident, an explosive RDD, or nuclear detonation, detailed guidance to respond to such incidents is provided in other
documents, such as those cited in the introduction. With respect to the guidance documents, this practice provides the general
principles that apply to the broad range of incidents and associated planning goals but relies on the AHJ to apply and tailor their
response planning based on those documents as well as the limitation of the personnel and equipment resources in the jurisdiction.
In addition, the AHJ should use those documents to identify improvements to planning and resources to be better prepared for the
more complex emergencies.
1.1.3 This practice does not expressly address emergency response to contamination of food or water supplies.
1.1.4 The Emergency Response Guide (ERG) published by the Department of Transportation provides valuable information for
response to traffic accidents involving radioactive materials. For other radiological or nuclear incidents, however, the ERG may
not provide adequate information on appropriate protective measures and should not be the sole resource used.
1.2 This practice applies to those emergency response agencies that have a role in the response to a radiological incident, excluding
an IND an accidental or intentional radiological or nuclear incident. It should be used inby emergency services response
organizations such as law enforcement, fire department, and emergency medical response actions. service, emergency medical
services, and emergency management.
1.3 This practice assumes that implementation begins with the recognition of a radiological or nuclear incident and ends when
emergency response actions cease or the response is assumedsupported by specialized regional, state, or federal response
teams.assets.
1.4 AHJs using this practice willshould identify hazards, develop a plan, acquire and track equipment, and provide training
consistent with the descriptions provided in Section 6. AHJs not able to meet the requirements should refer to the United States
(US) Department of Transportation (DOT) Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG) for guidance on how to manage radiological
incidents (DOT, current version). This standard practice provides additional guidance and is not intended to replace the ERG, rather
to supplement it (see Annex A1).
1.5 While response to radiological hazards is the focus of this practice, responders must consider all hazards during a response;
it is possible that non-radiological hazards may present a greater danger at an incident, particularly in incidents with wide area
dispersion.
1.5.1 This practice does not fully address assessing the risks from airborne radioactivity. Equipment to determine this potential
hazard is not widely available in emergency responder communities. Like other responses to unknown hazards, respiratory
protection commonly used by responders is required until a complete hazard identification assessment is complete.
Local response to nuclear facilitiesfacility incidents should follow nuclear facility plans, especially in accordance to ingestion pathway zone actions, such as distribution
of potassium iodine.plans.
E2601 − 23
1.6 This practice is divided into the following sections:
Section Title
1 Scope
2 Referenced Documents
3 Terminology
4 Summary of Practice
5 Significance and Use
6 Prerequisites for Radiological or Nuclear Emergency Response
7 Nuclear Detonation Response
8 Radiological Emergency Response
Appendix X1 Operational Guidance for Responding to Radiological or Nuclear Incidents, or both, and Emergencies
Appendix X2 Summary of Blast and Radiation Zones Following a Nuclear Detonation
Appendix X3 Practicing ALARA Using Time, Distance, and Shielding: Determining Radiological Dose
Appendix X4 Radiological Emergency Response Guidelines
Appendix X5 Emergency Response Checklist for Radiological Incidents
Appendix X6 Radiation Detection Instruments
Appendix X7 Example Radiation Safety Procedures
Appendix X8 Sample Radiation Safety Procedures
Appendix X9 Training Resources
Appendix X10 Radiation Units, Conversions, and Abbreviations
N/A References
N/A Bibliography
1.7 The values stated in inch-pound units are to be regarded as standard. The values given in parentheses are mathematical
conversions to SI units that are provided for information only and are not considered standard.
1.8 This standard practice does not purport to address all of the safety concerns, if any, associated with its use. It is the
responsibility of the user of this standard practice to establish appropriate safety and healthsafety, health, and environmental
practices and determine the applicability of regulatory limitations prior to use.
1.9 This international standard was developed in accordance with internationally recognized principles on standardization
established in the Decision on Principles for the Development of International Standards, Guides and Recommendations issued
by the World Trade Organization Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee.
2. Referenced Documents
2.1 Federal Standards:
10 CFR 20.1001 Standards for Protection Against Radiation
29 CFR 1910 Occupational Safety and Health Standards
29 CFR 1926.502 Occupational Safety and Health Standards
49 CFR 173 Shippers General Requirements for Shipments and Packages
18 U.S. Code §2332a Use of weapons of mass destruction
29 U.S. Code §654 Duties of employers and employees
2.2 Referenced Standards and Documents:IEEE/ANSI Standards:
ANSI N42.33IEEE/ANSI N42.17AC American National Standard for Portable Radiation Detection Instrumentation for
Homeland SecurityPerformance Specifications for Health Physics Instrumentation-Portable Survey Instrumentation for Use
in Normal and Extreme Environmental Conditions
ANSIIEEE/ANSI N42.32 American National Standard Performance Criteria for Alarming Personal Radiation Detectors for
Homeland Security
IEEE/ANSI N42.33 Portable Radiation Detection Instrumentation for Homeland Security
IEEE/ANSI N42.37 Training Requirements for Homeland Security Purposes using Radiation Detection Instrumentation for
Interdiction and Prevention
IEEE/ANSI N42.42 American National Standard Data Format for Radiation Detectors Used for Homeland Security
ANSIIEEE/ANSI, N42.49A American National Standard for Performance Criteria for Alarming Electronic Personal Emergency
Radiation Detectors (PERDs) for Exposure Control
CDC 2007 Population Monitoring in Radiation Emergencies: A Guide for State and Local Public Health Planners
CRCPD 2006 Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD)—First Responder’s Guide, the First 12 Hours
CTOS 2014 WMD Definitions for Use in the DHS Course Materials Developed by CTOS
29 CFR 1910 Occupational Safety and Health Standards
Available from U.S. Government Publishing Office (GPO), 732 N. Capitol St., NW, Washington, DC 20401, http://www.gpo.gov.
Available from Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE), 445 Hoes Ln., Piscataway, NJ 08854-4141, http://www.ieee.org.
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49 CFR 173 Shippers General Requirements for Shipments and Packages
DOT, current version, Emergency Response Guidelines (ERG)
EPA 400-R-92-001 Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents
EPA PAG Manual Protective Actions Guides and Planning Guidance for Radiological Incidents, 2013 (Draft for Interim Use and
Public Comment)
EPA-402-F-07-008 Communicating Radiation Risks, Office of Radiation and Indoor Air
FEMA 2008 Application of Protective Action Guides for Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) and Improvised Nuclear Device
(IND) Incidents
Homeland Security Act of 2002
IAEA 2006 Manual for First Responders to a Radiological Emergency
ICRP Publication 96 Protecting People against Radiation Exposure in the Event of a Radiological Attack, 96
NCRP Commentary No. 19 Key Elements of Preparing Emergency Responders for Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism
NCRP Report No. 138 Management of Terrorist Events Involving Radioactive Material
NCRP Report No. 116 Limitation of Exposure to Ionizing Radiation
NCRP Report No. 165 Responding to a Radiological or Nuclear Terrorism Incident: A Guide for Decision Makers
NFPA 472 Standard for Professional Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials Incidents
NIMS 2007 Draft revised NIMS for interim use
NRF 2008
NIST 2006a Results of Test and Evaluation of Commercially Available Survey Meters for the Department of Homeland
Security—Round 2
NIST 2006b Results of Test and Evaluation of Commercially Available Personal Radiation Detectors (PRDs) and Radiation
Pagers for the Department of Homeland Security—Round 2
NIST 2005a Results of Test and Evaluation of Commercially Available Survey Meters for the Department of Homeland
Security
NIST 2005b Results of Test and Evaluation of Commercially Available Personal Radiation Detectors (PRDs) and Radiation
Pagers for the Department of Homeland Security
NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 AddendaIEEE/ANSI N42.49B Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological
Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Final ReportPerformance Criteria for
Non-alarming Personal Emergency Radiation Detectors (PERDs) for Exposure Control
NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1IEEE/ANSI N323AB Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Re-
sponse Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power PlantsStandard for Radiation Protection Instrumentation Test and
Calibration, Portable Survey Instruments (Revision and Redesignation of IEEE/ANSI N323A-1997 and IEEE/ANSI
N323B-2002)
2.3 NFPA Standards:
NFPA 470 Hazardous Materials/Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Standard for Responders
NFPA 472 Standard for Competence of Responders to Hazardous Materials Incidents
NFPA 3000 Standard for an Active Shooter/Hostile Event Response (ASHER) Program
NFPA Glossary of Terms (2021)
2.4 Other Standards:
ANSI/HPS N13.36 Radiation Safety Training for Workers
EPA-402-K-22-008 Communicating Radiation Risks, Office of Radiation and Indoor Air
3. Terminology
3.1 Definitions:
3.1.1 authority having jurisdiction (AHJ)—Active Shooter/Hostile Event (ASHE), n—the organization, office, or individual
responsible for approving equipment, materials, an installation, or a procedure.an incident involving one or more individuals who
are or have been actively engaged in harming, killing, or attempting to kill people in a populated area by means such as firearms,
explosives, toxic substances, vehicles, edged weapons, fire, or a combination thereof. NFPA 4723000 (2021a)
3.1.2 ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable)—achievable), n—a principle of radiation protection philosophy that requires that
exposures to ionizing radiation should be kept as low as reasonably achievable, economic and social factors being taken into
Annex A1 material is labeled to complement the standard practice section numbers and can be found at the end of the standard before the appendices. The annex provides
additional information for responder consideration. Available from National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), 1 Batterymarch Park, Quincy, MA 02169-7471,
http://www.nfpa.org.
Available from http://standards.ieee.org/getN42/. American National Standards Institute (ANSI), 25 W. 43rd St., 4th Floor, New York, NY 10036, http://www.ansi.org.
For access to document, go to http://www.bt.cdc.gov/radiation/pdf/population-monitoring-guide.pdf. Available from United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), William Jefferson Clinton Bldg., 1200 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20460, http://www.epa.gov.
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account; the ALARA principle is satisfied when the expenditure of further resources would be unwarranted by the reduction in
exposure that would be achieved.achieved (8). NCRP Report No. 165
3.1.3 authority having jurisdiction (AHJ), n—an entity that can create and administer processes to qualify, certify, and credential
personnel for incident-related positions. AHJs include state, tribal, or federal government departments and agencies, training
commissions, NGOs, or companies, as well as local organizations such as police, fire, public health, or public works departments
(1).
3.1.4 committed effective dose equivalentcommunity reception center (CRC), (CEDE)—n— committed effective dose equivalent
is the sum of the products of the weighting factors applicable to each of the body organs or tissues that are irradiated and the
committed dose equivalent to these organs or tissues.non-medical facility established to monitor members of the public for
radioactive contamination and to provide decontamination if necessary (8).
3.1.5 dangerous radiation zone, n—an area where radiation levels exceed 10 R/h (0.1 Gy/h) (8).
3.1.6 decision points—points, n—predefined exposure rates or dosesexposures at which a decision-maker must determine a path
forward to maximize responder safety and public protection.protection (9).
3.1.7 decontamination—decontamination, n—(1(1)) the removal of radionuclide contaminants from surfaces (for example, skin)
by cleaning and washing (NCRP Report No. 165); (8); 2(2)) the physical or chemical chemical, or both, process of reducing and
preventing the spread and effects of contaminants fromto people, animals, the environment, or equipment involved at hazardous
materials/weapons of mass destruction (WMD) incidents (2013 Edition NFPA 472 3.3.17). incidents. NFPA 470
3.1.8 defensive mode, n—an operating mode characterized as medium risk to emergency responders, in which responders do not
have direct contact with the hazardous materials/weapons of mass destruction (WMD), focusing on safely controlling or limiting
the effects of a release. NFPA 470
3.1.9 defensivedose, operation(s)—n—emergency response measures taken from a safe distance (for example, outside the hot
zone) to prevent or limit radiation exposure or the spread of hazardous material; life-safety operations are not a concern if defensive
operations are the onlya general term denoting the quantity of energy from ionizing radiation absorbed in a tissue or organ from
either an external source or from radionuclides in the body operations (10supporting ).the response.
3.1.10 dose—dose rate (also exposure rate), n—radiation absorbed by an individual’s body; general term used to denote mean
absorbed dose, equivalent dose, effective dose, or effective equivalent dose, and to denote dose received or committed dose;a
measure of dose delivered per unit time; dose rate can refer to any dose quantity (for example, absorbed dose, dose equivalent);
dose rate is measured in units of R/h, mR/h, microR/h, and so forth with other units of radiation exposure and dose (rem, Sv, Gy,
etc.) see (8Total ).Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE). CRCPD 2006
3.1.11 dosimeter—dosimeter, n—a small, portable instrument (such as a film badge, thermoluminescent dosimeter, or pocket
dosimeter) used to measure and record the total accumulated personal dose of ionizing radiation.radiation (11). U.S. NRC
Glossary
3.1.12 emergencydosimetry, decontamination—n—the physical process of immediately reducing contamination of individuals in
potentially life-threatening situations with or without the formal establishment of a decontamination corridor. A goal of emergency
decontamination is reducing dose to a lower level; however it may not be possible to completely eliminatescience or technique
of determining radiation dose; strictly speaking, involving measured quantities, but also used informally to mean “dose
assessment” (that is, involving measurements or theoretical calculations, or both) contamination.(2).
3.1.13 emergency operations center (EOC)—(EOC), n—the physical location at which the coordination of information and
resources to support incident management activities normally takes place. An EOC may be a temporary facility or in a permanently
established location in aa facility from which staff provide information management, resource allocation and tracking, or advanced
planning support to personnel on scene or at other EOCs (for example, a state center supporting a local center), or combinations
thereof jurisdiction.(1). NIMS 2007
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3.1.11 emergency responder—emergency response providers include federal, state, and local government, fire, law enforcement,
emergency medical, and related personnel, agencies, and authorities. Homeland Security Act of 2002
3.1.14 emergency response—response, n—the performance of actions to mitigate the consequences of an emergency for human
health and safety, quality of life, the environment and property. Itenvironment, and property; it may also provide a basis for the
resumption of normal social and economic activity.activity (12). IAEA 2006
3.1.15 emergency response personnel (emergency response provider), n—(1) personnel assigned to organizations that have the
responsibility for responding to hazardous materials emergencies (NFPA Glossary of Terms); (2) federal, state, and local
emergency public safety, law enforcement, emergency response, emergency medical (including hospital emergency facilities), and
related personnel, agencies, and authorities (13).
3.1.16 emergency worker, n—anyone with a role in responding to the incident, whether a radiation worker previously or not, who
should be protected from radiation exposure (14).
3.1.17 evacuation—evacuation, n—organized, phased, and supervised withdrawal, dispersal, or removal of civilianspeople from
dangerous or potentially dangerous areas, and their reception and care in safe areas.areas (1). NIMS 2007
3.1.18 high exposure rate—rate, n—exposure rate beyond which emergency response is not recommended for rescue operations
unless the incident commander (IC) determines it can be carefully controlled for a short duration for priority operations such as
life-saving,(for example, lifesaving), and the emergency responder is informed of the hazards and consents to performing the
operation(s); the recommendation of this standard practice is for a high exposure rate less practice is that areas in which exposure
rate is greater than or equal to 100 R/h (1(1 Gy Sv/h). For ⁄h) be considered to have a high exposure rate; for the purposes of this
standard practice, the term “high dose rate” is equivalent to “high exposure rate.”rate” (12).
3.1.19 hot zone—spot, n—the control zone immediately surrounding a hazardous materials incident, which extends far enough to
prevent adverse effects from hazardous materials releases to personnel outside the zone.region in a radiation/contamination area
where the level of radiation/contamination is significantly greater than in neighboring regions in the area (11). NFPA 472
3.1.19.1 Discussion—
A hot spot is a localized area with elevated radiation or contamination levels, or both, while a “zone” (for example, dangerous
radiation zone) is an extended area. Thus, while the hot zone might have local areas in which radiation exposure rates exceed 10
R/h, these local areas will be posted as “hot spots” within the much larger hot zone.
3.1.20 hot line—zone, n—the line ofan area where demarcation(1) that may become a decision point to controlradiation levels
exceed 10 mR/h (0.1 mGy/h); or the(2) hot zone; for a radiologicalcontamination levels exceed 60 000 dpm ⁄cm response, the hot
line shall correspond to a previously established exposure rate (for example, the low exposure rate)beta and gamma at 1.5 cm (~0.5
in.) from the surface being surveyed; or (3)contamination level above which alpha contamination levels exceed 6000 dpm/cm at
a distance of 0.5 cm (~0.25 in.) from the surface being surveyed, as measured with an alpha probe (8, 15, 16)personnel shall be
trained and protected appropriately by ; all personnel working in the hot zone must receive training and wear personal protective
equipment (PPE) to operate. The location of the hot line may not be determined based on radiation exposure rate or contamination
level if a higher hazard associated with the incident presents greater risk.appropriate for the risks (for example, contamination,
dangerous atmosphere, radiation etc.) that are present.
3.1.21 improvised nuclear device, (IND)—n—a device incorporating fissile materials designed or constructed outside of an official
government agency and that has, or appears to have, or is claimed to have the capability to designed by terrorists to produce a
nuclear explosion. It also may be a nuclear weapon that is no longer detonation; this includes stolen and subsequently modified
nuclear weapons but does not include stockpiled weapons in the custody of competent authoritythe military or (17custodian, ).or
has been modified from its designated firing sequence, or it may have been assembled from illegally obtained nuclear weapons
components or special nuclear materials. CTOS 2014
3.1.22 incident command system (ICS), n—a management system designed to enable effective and efficient domestic incident
management by integrating a combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating within
a common organizational structure (1).
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3.1.23 incident commander (IC)—(IC), n—the individual responsible for allon-scene incident activities, including the develop-
ment of strategies and tactics and the ordering and release of resources. The ICdeveloping incident objectives and ordering and
releasing resources; the incident commander has overall authority and responsibility for conducting incident operations and (1is
).responsible for the management of all incident operations at the incident site NIMS 2007
3.1.24 jurisdiction—jurisdiction, n—jurisdiction has two definitions depending on the context: (1) a range or sphere of
authority.authority Public: public agencies have jurisdiction at an incident within their area of responsibility. Jurisdictional related
to their legal responsibilities and authority; jurisdictional authority at an incident can be political, geographic (for example, city,
county, tribal, state, orpolitical or geographical (for example, local, state, tribal, territorial, and federal boundary lines) or functional
(for example, law enforcement, public health).health), or both; or (2) a political subdivision: (for example, municipality, county,
parish, state, federal) with the responsibility for ensuring public safety, health, and welfare within its legal authorities and
geographic boundaries (1). NIMS 2007
3.1.25 light damage zone (LDZ), n—the area furthest from the site of a nuclear detonation, in which nearly all windows are
shattered and building facades are damaged; most injuries in the LDZ are not life-threatening but there are likely to be many
injuries from flying glass and debris (4).
3.1.26 low exposure rate—rate, n—the radiation exposure rate that marks the hot line if the radiation exposure hazard poses the
greatest risk at an incident. It is recommended that the low exposure rate not exceed less than 10 mR/h (milliR/h) (0.1 mSv/h
(milliSv/h)) at 1 m (3.3 ft) from the object or at 1 m (3.3 ft) above the ground or surface. For surface being surveyed; for the
purposes of this standard practice, the term “low dose rate” is equivalent to “low exposure rate.”
3.1.27 multiagency coordination system (MACS)—(MACS), n— a system that provides the architecture to support coordination for
incident prioritization, critical resource allocation, communications systems integration, and information coordination. The
elements of the MACS include facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications. An EOC is a commonly used
element. These systems assist agencies and organizations responding to anan overarching term for the NIMS Command and
Coordination systems: the incident command system (ICS), emergency operations centers (EOCs), the multiagency coordination
(MAC) group/policy groups, and joint information centers (JICs) incident.(1). NIMS 2007
3.1.28 nonintervention mode, n—an operating mode used where the risk to emergency responders is greater than the benefit, in
which responders do not operate near the hazardous materials/weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or container, focusing on
public protective actions only and allowing the container or product to take its natural course. NFPA 470
3.1.29 offensive operation(s)—mode, n—emergency response measures taken to reduce or minimize exposure from hazardous
circumstances and materials to responders and civilians (for example, operations required within the hot zone); life-safety
operations are top priority in offensive operations however evidence preservation shall be considered.an operating mode
characterized as higher risk to emergency responders, in which responders could have direct contact with the hazardous
materials/weapons of mass destruction (WMD), taking aggressive actions to control the release of hazardous materials/WMD.
NFPA 470
3.1.30 orphan source—source, n—a radioactive source that is not under regulatory control, either because it has never been under
regulatory control, or because it has been abandoned, lost, misplaced, stolen, or transferred without proper authorization.authori-
zation (18). ICRP Publication 96
3.1.31 personal emergency radiation detector (PERD)—(PERD), n—an alarming electronic radiation measurement instrument
used to manage exposure by alerting the emergency responders when they are exposed to gamma radiation. The instrument
provides rapid and clear indication of the level of radiation exposure (dose) or exposure rate (dose rate), or both, and readily
recognizable alarms. The alarms are both audible and visual, and distinguishable between exposure rate and exposure.a high range,
alarming, body-worn device capable of operating above 10 R/h and potentially up to 1000 R/h (0.1 Gy/h and potentially as high
as 10 Gy/h). COTS 2014IEEE/ANSI N42.49A
3.1.32 personal protective equipment (PPE)—(PPE), n—the protective clothing and respiratory protective equipment provided to
shield or isolate a person from hazards (TRACEM) that can be the hazards encountered at hazardous materials/WMD
incidents.materials/weapons of mass destruction incident operations. NFPA 472Glossary of Terms
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3.1.33 personal radiation detector (PRD)—(PRD), n—a pocket-sized detection instrument worn by an operator to detect the
presence of radiological/nuclear material in a limited area in the vicinity of the operator. PRDs detect small increases in gamma
radiation above background levels and alert the operator. Some models have additional capabilities to measure gamma radiation
exposure rate levels, measure the accumulated gamma radiation dose, or a limited capability to detect neutron radiation, or
combinations thereof.PRD is a pocket-sized battery-powered alarming electronic instrument that is worn on the body and used to
detect photon-emitting, and optionally neutron-emitting, radioactive materials; PRDs have user-readable displays related to the
intensity of radiation, but they are distinct from, and typically more sensitive than, electronic personal dosimeters, which are
designed to measure the dose equivalent to workers occupationally exposed to radiation. CTOS 2014IEEE/ANSI N42.32-2016
3.1.34 preventive radiological/nuclear detection (PRND) or Radiological/Nuclear Detection (RND)—radiological/nuclear
detection (RND), n—capability to detect,detect illicit radiological/nuclear materials and radiological/nuclear WMDs at the points
of manufacture, transportation, and use, and to identify the nature of material through adjudication or resolution of the detection
alarm. Thisalarm; this does not include actions taken to respond to the consequences of the release of radiological/nuclear materials
(such as response to the detonation of a Radiologicalan RDD Dispersal (19Device). ).Also called Preventative Radiological/
Nuclear Detection (PRND) CTOS 2014
3.1.35 radiation source, n—radioactive material or byproduct that is specifically manufactured or obtained for the purpose of using
the emitted radiation; such sources are commonly used in teletherapy or industrial radiography; in various types of industrial
gauges, irradiators, and gamma knives; and as power sources for batteries (such as those used in spacecraft); these sources usually
consist of a known quantity of radioactive material, which is encased in a manmade capsule, sealed between layers of
nonradioactive material, or firmly bonded to a nonradioactive substrate to prevent radiation leakage (11).
3.1.35.1 Discussion—
For the purpose of this document a “legitimate” radiation source is a source of radiation that is being used in the manner intended
(for example, radioactivity administered to a nuclear medicine patient, radioactivity present in a “nuclear” soil gauge in use at a
construction site, etc.).
3.1.36 radiological dispersal device (RDD)—(RDD), n—any device that intentionally spreads radioactive material across an area
with the intent to cause harm, without a nuclear explosion occurring. An RDD that uses explosives for spreading or dispersing
radioactive material is called an “explosive RDD.” The term “dirty bomb” is used by media, government, and others as a
well-known, non-technical term for an explosive RDD. Non-explosive RDDs could a device designed to spread radioactive
material using common items such as pressurized containers, fans, building air-handling systems, sprayers, crop dusters, or even
spreading bythrough a detonation of conventional explosive or other (non-nuclear) means hand.(9). CTOS 2014
3.1.37 radiation exposure device (RED)—(RED), n—a device intended to cause harm by exposing people to radiation without
spreading radioactive material. An example of a RED is unshielded or partially shielded radioactive material placed in any type
of container and in a location capable of causing a radiation exposure to one or more individuals. Alsoconsisting of a large quantity
of radioactive material clandestinely placed to expose people to ionizing radiation called (8a ).“Radiological Exposure Device
(RED).” CTOS 2014
3.1.38 rem—rem, n—a unit of biological/risk equivalent dose; not all radiation produces the same biological effect, even for the
same amount of absorbed dose; rem relates (from Roentgen Equivalent Man) a measure of the biological damage caused by
exposure to ionizing radiation, equal to the absorbed dose in human tissue to the effective biological damage of the radiation. For
the purpose of this standard practice, the 1 rem of dose is equal to 10 mSv.rads multiplied by the radiation weighting factor for
the type of radiation causing the exposure; 1 rem = 10 mSv (8).
3.1.39 responder protection, n—preventative measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against response personnel, resources,
facilities, and critical information (20).
3.1.40 roentgen (R)—(R), n—a unit of exposure to ionizing radiation. It is the primary standard of measurement used in the
emergency responder community inradiation as determined by measuring the amount of ionization produced in a small volume of
air the(21) United States. For the ; for the purpose of this standard practice, 1 R of exposure is equal to 1 rem rem, 1 rad, and 10
mSv of dose to the human body.
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1000 micro-roentgen (microR or uR) = 1 milli-roentgen (mR)
1000 micro-roentgen (microR or μR) = 1 milli-roentgen (mR)
1000 milli-roentgen (mR) = 1 roentgen (R), thus
1 000 000 microR = 1 roentgen (R)
3.1.40.1 Discussion—
To improve clarity in communications, the unit roentgen may be spoken as “R” instead of pronouncing “roentgen.” The SI prefix
“micro” (one millionth) may be written as a lower case “u” or the phrase “micro” instead of the lower case Greek letter mu (μ)
and may be spoken as either “micro” or “U.” Similarly, the SI prefix “milli” (one thousandth) may be written as either “milli” or
“m” and spoken as either “milli” or “M.” For example, the value of 25 μR may be written as “25 uR” or “25 microR” and
pronounced as “25 U-R” or “25 micro-R.” Likewise, the value of 2 mR could be spoken as “2 M-R” or “2 milli-R.”
3.1.41 roentgen per hour (R/h)—safety offıcer (hazardous materials), n—a unit used to express exposure per unit of time (exposure
rate). For the purpose of this standard practice, the roentgen unit of exposure is assumed to be equivalent to the sievert unit of dose
and “1 R = 10 mSv” will be applied as the basis for comparison of traditional and SI units. For the purpose of this standard practice,
the term “dose rate” is equivalent to “exposure rate.”the person who works within an incident command system (specifically, the
hazardous materials branch/group) to ensure that recognized hazardous materials/weapons of mass destruction (WMD) safe
practices are followed at hazardous materials/WMD incidents. NFPA 470
3.1.42 secondary threats—threats, n—any object or person(s) designed to cause harm to persons responding to ansecondary threats
include armed personnel or explosive devices that are placed to cause casu
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