ASTM C1112-99(2005)

Standard Guide for Application of Radiation Monitors to the Control and Physical Security of Special Nuclear Material (Withdrawn 2014)

SIGNIFICANCE AND USE
SNM monitors are an efficient and sensitive means of unobtrusively (without a body search) meeting the requirements of 10 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations) Part 73 or DOE Order 5632.4 (May 1986) that individuals exiting nuclear material access areas (MAAs) be searched for concealed SNM. The monitors sense radiation emitted by SNM, which is an excellent but otherwise imperceptible clue to the presence of the material. Because the monitors operate in a natural radiation environment and must detect small intensity increases as clues, the monitors must be well designed and maintained to operate without unnecessary nuisance alarms.
This guide provides information on different types of monitors for searching pedestrians and vehicles. Each monitor has an inherent sensitivity at a particular nuisance alarm rate that must be low enough to maintain the monitor’credibility. Sensitivity and nuisance alarm rates are both governed by the alarm threshold so it is very important that corresponding values for both be known when measured, estimated, or specified values are discussed. Fitting SNM monitors into a facility physical protection plan must not only consider adequate sensitivity but also a sufficiently low nuisance alarm rate.
SCOPE
1.1 This guide briefly describes the state-of-the-art of radiation monitors for detecting special nuclear material (SNM) (see 3.1.11) in order to establish the context in which to write performance standards for the monitors. This guide extracts information from technical documentation to provide information for selecting, calibrating, testing, and operating such radiation monitors when they are used for the control and protection of SNM. This guide offers an unobtrusive means of searching pedestrians, packages, and motor vehicles for concealed SNM as one part of a nuclear material control or security plan for nuclear materials. The radiation monitors can provide an efficient, sensitive, and reliable means of detecting the theft of small quantities of SNM while maintaining a low likelihood of nuisance alarms.
1.2 Dependable operation of SNM radiation monitors rests on selecting appropriate monitors for the task, operating them in a hospitable environment, and conducting an effective program to test, calibrate, and maintain them. Effective operation also requires training in the use of monitors for the security inspectors who attend them. Training is particularly important for hand-held monitoring where the inspector plays an important role in the search by scanning the instrument over pedestrians and packages or throughout a motor vehicle.
1.3 SNM radiation monitors are commercially available in three forms:
1.3.1 Small Hand-Held Monitors—These monitors may be used by an inspector to manually search pedestrians and vehicles that stop for inspection.
1.3.2 Automatic Pedestrian Monitors—These monitors are doorway or portal monitors that search pedestrians in motion as they pass between radiation detectors, or wait-in monitoring booths that make extended measurements to search pedestrians while they stop to obtain exit clearance.
1.3.3 Automatic Vehicle Monitors—These monitors are portals that monitor vehicles as they pass between radiation detectors, or vehicle monitoring stations that make extended measurements to search vehicles while they stop to obtain exit clearance.  
1.4 Guidance for applying SNM monitors is available as Atomic Energy Commission/Nuclear Regulatory Commission (AEC/NRC) regulatory guides, AEC/ERDA/DOE performance standards, and more recently as handbooks and applications guides published by national laboratories under DOE sponsorship. This broad information base covering the pertinent physics, engineering practice, and equipment available for monitoring has had no automatic mechanism for periodic review and revision. This ASTM series of guides and standards will consolidate the information in a form that is reexamined and updated on a fixe...

General Information

• Status: Withdrawn
• Publication Date: 31-May-2005
• Withdrawal Date: 15-Jan-2014
• ICS: 17.240 - Radiation measurements
• Technical Committee: C26 - Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Relations

• Replaces: ASTM C1112-99 - Standard Guide for Application of Radiation Monitors to the Control and Physical Security of Special Nuclear Material
• Effective Date: 01-Jun-2005
• Referred By: ASTM C1189-11(2018) - Standard Guide to Procedures for Calibrating Automatic Pedestrian SNM Monitors
• Effective Date: 01-Jun-2005

Standards Content (Sample)

NOTICE: This standard has either been superseded and replaced by a new version or withdrawn.
Contact ASTM International (www.astm.org) for the latest information
Designation: C1112 − 99 (Reapproved2005)
Standard Guide for
Application of Radiation Monitors to the Control and
Physical Security of Special Nuclear Material
This standard is issued under the fixed designation C1112; the number immediately following the designation indicates the year of
original adoption or, in the case of revision, the year of last revision.Anumber in parentheses indicates the year of last reapproval.A
superscript epsilon (´) indicates an editorial change since the last revision or reapproval.
1. Scope 1.3.3 Automatic Vehicle Monitors—These monitors are por-
tals that monitor vehicles as they pass between radiation
1.1 This guide briefly describes the state-of-the-art of radia-
detectors, or vehicle monitoring stations that make extended
tionmonitorsfordetectingspecialnuclearmaterial(SNM)(see
measurements to search vehicles while they stop to obtain exit
3.1.11) in order to establish the context in which to write
clearance.
performance standards for the monitors. This guide extracts
information from technical documentation to provide informa-
1.4 Guidance for applying SNM monitors is available as
tion for selecting, calibrating, testing, and operating such
Atomic Energy Commission/Nuclear Regulatory Commission
radiation monitors when they are used for the control and
(AEC/NRC)regulatoryguides,AEC/ERDA/DOEperformance
protection of SNM. This guide offers an unobtrusive means of
standards, and more recently as handbooks and applications
searching pedestrians, packages, and motor vehicles for con-
guides published by national laboratories under DOE sponsor-
cealed SNM as one part of a nuclear material control or
ship. This broad information base covering the pertinent
security plan for nuclear materials. The radiation monitors can
physics, engineering practice, and equipment available for
provide an efficient, sensitive, and reliable means of detecting
monitoring has had no automatic mechanism for periodic
the theft of small quantities of SNM while maintaining a low
reviewandrevision.ThisASTMseriesofguidesandstandards
likelihood of nuisance alarms.
will consolidate the information in a form that is reexamined
1.2 Dependable operation of SNM radiation monitors rests
and updated on a fixed schedule.
on selecting appropriate monitors for the task, operating them
1.5 Up-to-date information on monitoring allows both
in a hospitable environment, and conducting an effective
nuclear facilities and regulatory agencies to be aware of the
program to test, calibrate, and maintain them. Effective opera-
current range of monitoring alternatives. Up-to-date informa-
tionalsorequirestrainingintheuseofmonitorsforthesecurity
tion also allows manufacturers to be aware of the current goals
inspectors who attend them. Training is particularly important
of facilities and regulators, for example, to obtain particular
for hand-held monitoring where the inspector plays an impor-
sensitivities at a low nuisance alarm rate with instrumentation
tant role in the search by scanning the instrument over
pedestrians and packages or throughout a motor vehicle. that is dependable and easy to maintain.
1.3 SNM radiation monitors are commercially available in
1.6 This guide updates and expands the scope of NRC
three forms:
regulatory guides andAEC/ERDA/DOE SNM monitor perfor-
1.3.1 Small Hand-Held Monitors—These monitors may be mance standards using the listed publications as a technical
used by an inspector to manually search pedestrians and basis.
vehicles that stop for inspection.
1.7 The values stated in SI units are to be regarded as the
1.3.2 Automatic Pedestrian Monitors—These monitors are
standard.
doorwayorportalmonitorsthatsearchpedestriansinmotionas
they pass between radiation detectors, or wait-in monitoring 1.8 This standard may involve hazardous materials,
boothsthatmakeextendedmeasurementstosearchpedestrians operations, and equipment. This standard does not purport to
while they stop to obtain exit clearance.
address all of the safety problems associated with its use. It is
the responsibility of the user of this standard to establish
appropriate safety and health practices and determine the
applicability of regulatory limitations prior to use.
This guide is under the jurisdiction ofASTM Committee C26 on Nuclear Fuel
Cycleand is the direct responsibility of Subcommittee C26.12 on Safeguard
Applications.
Current edition approved June 1, 2005. Published October 2005. Originally
approved in 1988. Last previous edition approved in 1999 as C1112–99. DOI: Copiesofout-of-printreferencesmaybeavailablefromGroupNIS6,MS-J562,
10.1520/C1112-99R05. Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM87545.
Copyright © ASTM International, 100 Barr Harbor Drive, PO Box C700, West Conshohocken, PA 19428-2959. United States
C1112 − 99 (2005)
2. Referenced Documents approximate testing with a particular plutonium test source.
3 Gas lantern mantles containing thorium are radioactive and
2.1 ASTM Standards:
sometimes are used to test continuity in hand-held monitors.
C859Terminology Relating to Nuclear Materials
3.1.2 detection sensitivity—specifiedintermsofthemassof
C993Guide for In-Plant Performance Evaluation of Auto-
SNM that will be detected 50% or more of the time when
matic Pedestrian SNM Monitors
carried through the monitor in a specified fashion. This
C1189Guide to Procedures for Calibrating Automatic Pe-
convenient definition greatly simplifies SNM monitor perfor-
destrian SNM Monitors
mancetestingandmakesitpossibletoreadilyverifysensitivity
C1236Guide for In-Plant Performance Evaluation of Auto-
byperforminganexperimentthatmimicsthemonitor’snormal
matic Vehicle SNM Monitors
use. The related masses that would be detected 95% or 99%
C1237Guide to In-Plant Performance Evaluation of Hand-
of the time can be estimated from the 50% mass but would be
Held SNM Monitors
impractical to determine with high confidence by themselves.
2.2 Code of Federal Regulations:
Experiments conducted to determine or verify sensitivity must
Title 10,Part 73, Physical Protection of Plants and Materi-
be thorough enough to have an upper 95% confidence coeffi-
als
cient so that repeating the experiment will probably give the
2.3 AEC/NRC Regulatory Guides:
same result.
5.27Special Nuclear Material Monitors, June 1974
5.7Control of Personnel Access to Protected Areas, Vital 3.1.3 monitoring—the process of detecting increased radia-
Areas, and Material Access Areas, May 1980
tion intensity by making one or more measurements of the
2.4 AEC/ERDA/DOE SNM Monitor Standards: intensity in the vicinity of a pedestrian or motor vehicle for
Personnel Doorway Monitor Standards, January 1974 comparison with an alarm threshold derived from the expected
Standards for Hand-Held SNM Detection Instruments for background radiation intensity.
Personnel, Package, and Vehicle Search, April 1974
3.1.4 NaI(Tl) detector—an inorganic sodium iodide (thal-
2.5 NRC NUREG and NUREG/CR Reports:
lium activated) (NaI(Tl)) scintillation detector that has inher-
NUREG 1321,Testing Standards for Physical Security Sys-
ently good gamma-ray sensitivity but poor neutron response.
tems at Category I Fuel Cycle Facilities, October 1991
3.1.5 nuisance alarms—analarmnotcausedbySNMbutby
NUREG1329,Entry/ExitControlatFuelFabricationFacili-
one of a number of other causes. For example, the statistical
ties Using or Possessing Formula Quantities of Strategic
variation in the measurement process, natural or process-
Special Nuclear Material, November 1985
induced background intensity increases, or the presence of
NUREG/CR 5899 (SAND 92-1339), Entry/Exit Control
non-SNMradiationemitters,amongotherthings,mayincrease
Components for Physical Protection Systems, 1992
a monitor’s measurement result by enough to cause an alarm.
Nuisance alarms from statistical variation, by design, are the
3. Terminology
only ones present during testing and are the ones of concern in
3.1 Definitions of Terms Specific to This Standard:
designing and evaluating SNM monitors. These statistical
3.1.1 alternative test sources—therearenootherradioactive
alarms are expressed in terms of alarms per comparison (test)
isotopes that individually or together can duplicate the radio-
or, more importantly, alarms per passage, which may include a
active emissions of SNM. Hence, performance testing in a
numberofcomparisons.Amonitor’ssusceptibilitytostatistical
laboratory environment will use only SNM test sources.
alarms and its detection sensitivity are directly related.
Operational testing at the recommended three-month interval
3.1.6 passthrough monitor—a radiation monitor that allows
can most often use SNM test sources, although sometimes a
free passage as it makes monitoring measurements and does
more readily available equivalent-intensity highly enriched
notrequirethepersonorvehiclebeingmonitoredtostopunless
uranium (HEU) source may be used in place of a very
it alarms.
expensive and hard to obtain plutonium source. The more
3.1.7 plastic scintillation detector—a solid organic scintil-
frequent daily or weekly operational testing will often substi-
lator that responds to both gamma rays and energetic neutrons
tute alternative isotopic sources. Often these are continuity
through scattering interactions between the incident radiation
tests that can use the cesium-137 ( Cs) sources that are on
and electrons or protons in the scintillator.
handforpulseheightcalibration.Alsobarium-133( Ba)may
be used when a gamma-ray spectrum similar to plutonium is 3.1.8 radiation detector—( 1) a detector consisting of a
needed to make a daily or weekly test that must roughly
scintillating material and attached photomultiplier tube that
produces light from neutron or gamma-ray interactions and
converts the light to electrical signals. (2) a neutron propor-
For referenced ASTM standards, visit the ASTM website, www.astm.org, or
tional counter containing a converter gas to produce electrical
contact ASTM Customer Service at [e-mail]. For Annual Book of ASTM
Standards volume information, refer to the standard’s Document Summary page on
signals from neutron interactions.
the ASTM website.
4 3.1.9 standard SNM performance test source—a metallic
AvailablefromU.S.GovernmentPrintingOfficeSuperintendentofDocuments,
sphereorcubeofSNMhavingmaximumself-attenuationofits
732 N. Capitol St., NW, Mail Stop: SDE, Washington, DC 20401, http://
www.access.gpo.gov.
emitted radiation and an isotopic composition to minimize that
Available from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,
emission. Such minimum radioactive emission sources as
DC20555.
described in 3.1.9.1 and 3.1.9.2 allow testing with the worst-
Chapter 4, Entry-Control Systems Handbook, SAND77-1033, Sandia National
Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM87185. case forms of SNM. As a result of worst-case testing, routine
C1112 − 99 (2005)
operation of a tested monitor in a plant achieves as good or
better performance and the monitor will detect the same or
smaller masses of process SNM.
3.1.9.1 special nuclear material (SNM)—plutonium with an
isotopic content of at least 93% plutonium-239 ( Pu) and
less than 6.5% plutonium-240 ( Pu). The plutonium should
contain less than 0.5% impurities. The form of the material
should be a metallic sphere or cube.The impact of americium-
241 ( Am), a plutonium decay product that will build up in
time and emit increasing amounts of 60-keVgamma radiation,
must be minimized by including a cadmium filter 0.04 to
0.08-cm thick as part of the source encapsulation. Protective
encapsulationshouldbeinasmanylayersaslocalrulesrequire
of a material such as aluminum (≤0.32-cm thickness) or thin
(≤0.16-cm thickness) stainless steel or nickel that minimize
unnecessary radiation absorption.
3.1.9.2 standard uranium test source—highly enriched ura-
nium (HEU) containing at least 93% uranium-235 ( U) and
lessthan0.25%impurities.Theformofthematerialshouldbe
a metallic sphere or cube. Encapsulation should be thin plastic
or thin aluminum (≤0.32-cm thickness) to minimize unneces-
sary radiation absorption in the encapsulation.
3.1.10 special nuclear material (SNM)—plutonium of any
isotopic composition, U, or enriched uranium as defined in
Terminology C859. This is the term normally used to describe
monitors designed for monitoring SNM or strategic SNM,
which is plutonium, uranium-233, and uranium enriched to
20% or more in the U isotope.
3.1.11 special nuclear material (SNM) monitor— a radia-
tiondetectionsystemthatmeasuresambientradiationintensity,
NOTE 1—Hand-held monitors are computer-based radiation detection
determines an alarm threshold from the result, and then when
systems that operate on battery power. The operator plays an important
it is monitoring, alarms if that threshold is exceeded.
part in effective hand-held monitoring
FIG. 1 Hand-Held Monitors
3.1.12 wait-in monitor—a radiation monitor in which the
person or vehicle being monitored is required to stop and
remain stationary during monitoring measurement.
facility physical protection plan must not only consider ad-
4. Significance and Use equate sensitivity but also a sufficiently low nuisance alarm
rate.
4.1 SNM monitors are an efficient and sensitive means of
unobtrusively (without a body search) meeting the require-
5. Types of SNM Monitors
ments of 10 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations) Part 73 or
5.1 Hand-Held Monitors—These small, battery-powered,
DOEOrder5632.4(May1986)thatindividualsexitingnuclear
computer-operatedinstruments(Fig.1)measureambientback-
materialaccessareas(MAAs)besearchedforconcealedSNM.
ground intensity (over8sorso)and then calculate an alarm
The monitors sense radiation emitted by SNM, which is an
threshold on power-up or push-button command. Otherwise,
excellent but otherwise imperceptible clue to the presence of
theycontinuouslymonitor,makingshortmeasurements(0.05s
the material. Because the monitors operate in a natural radia-
long averaged over 0.4 s, for example) and then comparing the
tion environment and must detect small intensity increases as
results to the alarm threshold. Hand-held monitor detectors
clues, the monitors must be well designed and maintained to
may be gamma-ray sensitive NaI(Tl) detectors or, more
operate without unnecessary nuisance alarms.
commonly, plastic scintillation detectors that sense both
4.2 This guide provides information on different types of
gamma rays and neutrons (1-3). The operator of a hand-held
monitors for searching pedestrians and vehicles. Each monitor
monitor scans (at about 0.5 m/s) the instrument over every
has an inherent sensitivity at a particular nuisance alarm rate
surfaceofapedestrianorvehicle,comingwithin5to15cm(2
that must be low
...