IEC 61511-1:2016/COR1:2016

Corrigendum 1 - Functional safety - Safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector - Part 1: Framework, definitions, system, hardware and application programming requirements

Corrigendum 1 - Sécurité fonctionnelle - Systèmes instrumentés de sécurité pour le secteur des industries de transformation - Partie 1: Cadre, définitions, exigences pour le système, le matériel et la programmation d'application

General Information

• Status: Published
• Publication Date: 14-Sep-2016
• ICS: 13.110 - Safety of machinery
• ICS: 25.040.01 - Industrial automation systems in general
• Technical Committee: SC 65A - System aspects
• Current Stage: PPUB - Publication issued
• Start Date: 30-Aug-2016
• Completion Date: 15-Sep-2016

Relations

• Corrects: IEC 61511-1:2016 - Functional safety - Safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector - Part 1: Framework, definitions, system, hardware and application programming requirements
• Effective Date: 05-Sep-2023

Standards Content (Sample)

 IEC 2016
INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION
COMMISSION ÉLECTROTECHNIQUE INTERNATIONALE
____________
IEC 61511-1 IEC 61511-1
Edition 2.0  2016-02 Édition 2.0  2016-02

FUNCTIONAL SAFETY – SECURITE FONCTIONNELLE – SYSTEMES
SAFETY INSTRUMENTED SYSTEMS INSTRUMENTES
FOR THE PROCESS INDUSTRY SECTOR – DE SECURITE POUR LE SECTEUR DES
INDUSTRIES DE TRANSFORMATION –

Part 1: Framework, definitions, system, Partie 1: Cadre, définitions, exigences pour le
hardware and application programming système, le matériel et la programmation
requirements d'application
CO RRI G ENDU M 1
Corrections to the French version appear after the English text.
Les corrections à la version française sont données après le texte anglais.

3.2.39.1
demand mode SIF
Replace 3.2.39.1 notes to entry with the following:
Note 1 to entry: In the event of a dangerous failure of the SIF, a hazardous event can only occur
– if the failure is undetected and a demand occurs before the next proof test;
– if the failure is detected by the diagnostic tests but the related process and its associated equipment has not
been moved to a safe state before a demand occurs.
Note 2 to entry: In high demand mode, it will normally be appropriate to use the continuous mode criteria.
Note 3 to entry: The safety integrity levels for SIF operating in demand mode are defined in Tables 4 and 5.

3.2.75.2
limited variability language
LVL
Replace definition 3.2.75.2 with the following:
programming language for commercial and industrial programmable electronic controllers with
a range of capabilities limited to their application as defined by the associated safety manual.
The notation of this language may be textual or graphical or have characteristics of both.
Note 1 to entry: This type of language is designed to be easily understood by process sector users, and provides
the capability to combine predefined, application specific, library functions to implement the SRS. LVL provides a
close functional correspondence with the functions required to achieve the application.
IEC 61511-1:2016-02/COR1:2016-09(en-fr)

– 2 – IEC 61511-1:2016/COR1:2016
 IEC 2016
Note 2 to entry: IEC 61511 assumes that the constraints necessary to achieve the safety properties are achieved
by the combination of the safety manual, the closeness of the language notations to the functions the application
programmer needs to define the process control algorithms, and the compile time and run time checks which the
logic solver provider embeds into the logic solver system program and the logic solver development environment.
The constraints identified in the certification report and safety manual can ensure the relevant requirements of
IEC 61508-3:2010 are satisfied.
Note 3 to entry: LVL is the most commonly used language when the IEC 61511 series refers to “application
program”.
9.2.5 Replace Subclause 9.2.5 with the following:
9.2.5 In cases where the allocation process results in a risk reduction requirement of
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>10 000 or average frequency of dangerous failures <10 per hour for a single SIS or multiple
SISs or SIS in conjunction with a BPCS protection layer, there shall be a reconsideration of
the application (e.g., process, other protection layers) to determine if any of the risk
parameters can be modified so that the risk reduction requirement of >10 000 or average
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frequency of dangerous failures <10 per hour is avoided. The review shall consider whether:
– the process or vessels/pipe work can be modified to remove or reduce hazards at the
source;
– additional safety-related systems or other risk reduction means, not based on
instrumentation, can be introduced;
– the severity of the consequence can be reduced, e.g., reducing the amount of hazardous
material;
– the likelihood of the specified consequence can be reduced e.g., reducing the likelihood of
the initiating source of the hazardous event.
NOTE Applications which require the use of a single SIF with a risk reduction requirement >10 000 or average
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frequency of dangerous failures <10 per hour need to be avoided because of the difficulty of achieving and
maintaining such high levels of performance throughout the SIS safety life-cycle. Risk reduction requirement
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>10 000 or average frequency of dangerous failures <10 per hour can require high levels of competence and high
levels of coverage for all factory acceptance testing, proof testing, verification, and validation activities.
9.2.6 Replace Subclause 9.2.6 with the following:
9.2.6 If after further consideration of the application and confirmation that a risk reduction
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requirement >10 000 or average frequency of dangerous failures <10 per hour is still
required, then consideration should be given to achieving the safety integrity requirement
using a number of protection layers (e.g., SIS or BPCS) with lower risk reduction
requirements. If the risk reduction is allocated to multiple protection layers then such
protection layers shall be independent from each other or the lack of independence shall be
assessed and shown to be sufficiently low compared to the risk reduction requirements. The
following factors shall be considered during this assessment:
– common cause of failure of SIS and the cause of demand;
NOTE 1 The extent of the common cause can be assessed by considering the diversity of all devices where
failure could cause a demand and all devices of the BPCS protection layer and/or the SIS used for risk
reduction.
NOTE 2 An example of common cause between the SIS and the cause of demand is if loss of process control
through sensor fault or failure can cause a demand and the sensor used for control is of the same type as the
sensor used for the SIS.
– common cause of failure with other protection layers providing risk reduction;
NOTE 3 The extent of the common cause can be assessed by considering the diversity of all devices of the
BPCS protection layer and/or the SIS used to achieve the risk reduction requirements.
NOTE 4 An example of common cause between SISs providing risk reduction is when two separate and
independent SISs with diverse measurements and diverse logic solvers are used but the final actuation
devices are two shut off valves of similar types or a single shut off valve actuated by both SISs.
– any dependencies that may be introduced by common operations, maintenance,
inspection or test activities or by common proof test procedures and proof test times;

 IEC 2016
NOTE 5 Even if the protective layers are diverse then synchronous proof testing will reduce the overall risk
reduction achieved and this can be a significant factor impeding achievement of the necessary risk reduction
for the hazardous event.
NOTE 6 When high levels of risk reduction are required and proof tests are desynchronised according to Note
5 then the dominant factor is normally common cause failure even if multiple independent protection layers are
used to reduce risk. Dependency within and between protection layers providing risk reduction for the same
hazardous event can be assessed and shown to be sufficiently low.

9.2.7 Replace Subclause 9.2.7 with the following:
9.2.7 If a risk reduction requirement >10 000 or average frequency of dangerous failures
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<10 per hour is to be implemented, whether allocated to a single SIS or multiple SIS or SIS
in conjunction with a BPCS protection layer, then a further risk assessment shall be carried
out using a quantitative methodology to confirm that the safety integrity requirements are
achieved. The methodology shall take into consideration dependency and common cause
failures between the SIS and:
– any other protection layer whose failure would place a demand on it;
– any other SIS reducing the likelihood of the hazardous event;
– any other risk reduction means that reduce the likelihood of the hazardous event (e.g.,
safety alarms).
Table 6 – Minimum HFT requirements according to SIL
Replace Table 6 with the following:
Table 6 – Minimum HFT requirements according to SIL
SIL Minimum required HFT
1 (any mode) 0
2 (low demand mode) 0
2 (high demand or continuous mode) 1
3 (any mode) 1
4 (any mode) 2
15.2.2  Replace Subclause 15.2.2 third bullet with the following:

• in accordance with the preceding bullet, the measures (techniques) and procedures that
will be used for confirming that each SIF conforms with the specified safety requirements
and the specified SIL;
– 4 – IEC 61511-1:2016/COR1:2016
 IEC 2016
Corrections à la version française:
3.2.39.1
SIF en mode sollicitation
Remplacer les notes à l'article de 3.2.39.1 par les suivantes:
Note 1 à l'article:  Dans l'éventualité d'une défaillance dangereuse de la SIF, un événement dangereux ne peut se
produire que:
– si la défaillance n'est pas détectée et qu'une sollicitation survient avan
...