SIST EN 300 175-7 V2.9.1:2022
(Main)Digital Enhanced Cordless Telecommunications (DECT) - Common Interface (CI) - Part 7: Security features
Digital Enhanced Cordless Telecommunications (DECT) - Common Interface (CI) - Part 7: Security features
The present document is one of the parts of the specification of the Digital Enhanced Cordless Telecommunications
(DECT) Common Interface (CI).
The present document specifies the security architecture, the types of cryptographic algorithms required, the way in
which they are to be used, and the requirements for integrating the security features provided by the architecture into the
DECT CI. It also describes how the features can be managed and how they relate to certain DECT fixed systems and
local network configurations.
The security architecture is defined in terms of the security services which are to be supported at the CI, the
mechanisms which are to be used to provide the services, and the cryptographic parameters, keys and processes which
are associated with these mechanisms.
The security processes specified in the present document are each based on one of three cryptographic algorithms:
• an authentication algorithm;
• a key stream generator for MAC layer encryption; and
• a key stream generator plus a Message Authentication Code generator for CCM authenticated encryption.
The architecture is, however, algorithm independent, and either the DECT standard algorithms, or appropriate
proprietary algorithms, or indeed a combination of both can, in principle, be employed. The use of the employed
algorithm is specified in the present document.
Integration of the security features is specified in terms of the protocol elements and processes required at the Network
(NWK) and Medium Access Control (MAC) layers of the CI.
The relationship between the security features and various network elements is described in terms of where the security
processes and management functions may be provided.
The present document does not address implementation issues. For instance, no attempt is made to specify whether the
DSAA or DSAA2 should be implemented in the PP at manufacture, or whether the DSAA, DSAA2 or a proprietary
authentication algorithm should be implemented in a detachable module. Similarly, the present document does not
specify whether the DSC or DSC2 should be implemented in hardware in all PPs at manufacture, or whether special
PPs should be manufactured with the DSC, DSC2 or proprietary ciphers built into them. The security architecture
supports all these options, although the use of proprietary algorithms may limit roaming and the concurrent use of PPs
in different environments.
Within the standard authentication algorithms, DSAA2, DSC2 and CCM are stronger than DSAA and DSC and provide
superior protection. DSAA2 and DSC2 are based on AES [10] and were created in 2011. CCM is also based on
AES [10] and was added to the standard in 2012.
The present document includes New Generation DECT, a further development of the DECT standard introducing
wideband speech, improved data services, new slot types and other technical enhancements.
The present document also includes DECT Ultra Low Energy (ULE), a low rate data technology based on DECT
intended for M2M applications with ultra low power consumption.
Digitalne izboljšane brezvrvične telekomunikacije (DECT) - Skupni vmesnik (CI) - 7. del: Varnostne lastnosti
Ta dokument je eden od delov specifikacije skupnega vmesnika (CI) za digitalne izboljšane brezvrvične telekomunikacije (DECT).
V tem dokumentu so določeni varnostna arhitektura, vrste zahtevanih kriptografskih algoritmov in način njihove uporabe ter zahteve za integriranje varnostnih lastnosti arhitekture v skupni vmesnik za digitalne izboljšane brezvrvične telekomunikacije. Opisuje tudi načine upravljanja funkcij ter njihovo povezavo z določenimi fiksnimi sistemi digitalnih izboljšanih brezvrvičnih telekomunikacij in lokalnimi konfiguracijami omrežij.
Varnostna arhitektura je določena v okviru varnostnih storitev, ki jih podpira skupni vmesnik, pri čemer mehanizmi tega vmesnika zagotavljajo storitve ter kriptografske parametre, ključe in procese, povezane s temi mehanizmi.
Varnostni procesi, opredeljeni v tem dokumentu, so osnovani na treh kriptografskih algoritmih:
• algoritem preverjanja pristnosti,
• generator toka ključev za šifriranje plasti kode MAC ter
• generator toka ključev in generator kode pristnosti sporočil za preverjeno šifriranje CCM.
Vendar je arhitektura neodvisna od algoritma, zato je načeloma mogoče uporabiti algoritme standarda digitalnih izboljšanih brezvrvičnih telekomunikacij, ustrezne lastniške algoritme ali kombinacijo obeh. Uporaba algoritma je določena v tem dokumentu.
Integriranje varnostnih lastnosti je določeno v okviru protokolnih elementov in postopkov, ki se zahtevajo v omrežnih (NWK) plasteh in plasteh krmiljenja dostopa do prenosnega medija (MAC) skupnega vmesnika.
Razmerje med varnostnimi lastnostmi in različnimi omrežnimi elementi je opisano glede na lokacije, na katerih bodo zagotovljeni varnostni postopki in funkcije upravljanja.
Ta dokument ne obravnava vprašanj uvedbe. Ta dokument na primer ne vsebuje nobene navedbe, ki bi določala uvedbo DSAA ali DSAA2 v PP med proizvodnjo oz. uvedbo DSAA, DSAA2 ali lastniškega algoritma za preverjanje pristnosti v snemljivi modul. Prav tako ta dokument ne določa uvedbe DSC ali DSC2 v strojno opremo vseh PP-jev med proizvodnjo oz. proizvodnje posebnih PP-jev z vgrajenimi DSC, DSC2 ali lastniškimi šiframi. Varnostna arhitektura podpira vse te možnosti, čeprav lahko uporaba lastniških algoritmov omejuje gostovanje in hkratno uporabo PP-jev v različnih okoljih.
V okviru standardnih algoritmov za preverjanje pristnosti so DSAA2, DSC2 in CCM zanesljivejši od DSAA in DSC ter zagotavljajo nadstandardno zaščito. DSAA2 in DSC2 temeljita na AES [10] ter sta bila izdelana leta 2011. Tudi CCM temelji na AES [10] in je bil v standard dodan leta 2012.
Ta dokument vključuje novo generacijo digitalnih izboljšanih brezvrvičnih telekomunikacij, nadaljnji razvoj standarda o digitalnih izboljšanih brezvrvičnih telekomunikacijah, ki uvaja širokopasovni govor, izpopolnjene podatkovne storitve, nove tipe rež in druge tehnične izpopolnitve.
Ta dokument vključuje tudi DECT ULE (ultra nizka poraba energije), podatkovno tehnologijo nizke stopnje, ki temelji na DECT in je namenjena uporabi M2M z ultra nizko porabo energije.
General Information
Buy Standard
Standards Content (Sample)
ETSI EN 300 175-7 V2.9.1 (2022-03)
EUROPEAN STANDARD
Digital Enhanced Cordless Telecommunications (DECT);
Common Interface (CI);
Part 7: Security features
---------------------- Page: 1 ----------------------
2 ETSI EN 300 175-7 V2.9.1 (2022-03)
Reference
REN/DECT-00357
Keywords
authentication, DECT, IMT-2000, mobility, radio,
security, TDD, TDMA
ETSI
650 Route des Lucioles
F-06921 Sophia Antipolis Cedex - FRANCE
Tel.: +33 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16
Siret N° 348 623 562 00017 - APE 7112B
Association à but non lucratif enregistrée à la
Sous-Préfecture de Grasse (06) N° w061004871
Important notice
The present document can be downloaded from:
http://www.etsi.org/standards-search
The present document may be made available in electronic versions and/or in print. The content of any electronic and/or
print versions of the present document shall not be modified without the prior written authorization of ETSI. In case of any
existing or perceived difference in contents between such versions and/or in print, the prevailing version of an ETSI
deliverable is the one made publicly available in PDF format at www.etsi.org/deliver.
Users of the present document should be aware that the document may be subject to revision or change of status.
Information on the current status of this and other ETSI documents is available at
https://portal.etsi.org/TB/ETSIDeliverableStatus.aspx
If you find errors in the present document, please send your comment to one of the following services:
https://portal.etsi.org/People/CommiteeSupportStaff.aspx
If you find a security vulnerability in the present document, please report it through our
Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure Program:
https://www.etsi.org/standards/coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure
Notice of disclaimer & limitation of liability
The information provided in the present deliverable is directed solely to professionals who have the appropriate degree of
experience to understand and interpret its content in accordance with generally accepted engineering or
other professional standard and applicable regulations.
No recommendation as to products and services or vendors is made or should be implied.
In no event shall ETSI be held liable for loss of profits or any other incidental or consequential damages.
Any software contained in this deliverable is provided "AS IS" with no warranties, express or implied, including but not
limited to, the warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose and non-infringement of intellectual property
rights and ETSI shall not be held liable in any event for any damages whatsoever (including, without limitation, damages
for loss of profits, business interruption, loss of information, or any other pecuniary loss) arising out of or related to the use
of or inability to use the software.
Copyright Notification
No part may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and
microfilm except as authorized by written permission of ETSI.
The content of the PDF version shall not be modified without the written authorization of ETSI.
The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media.
© ETSI 2022.
All rights reserved.
ETSI
---------------------- Page: 2 ----------------------
3 ETSI EN 300 175-7 V2.9.1 (2022-03)
Contents
Intellectual Property Rights . 10
Foreword . 10
Modal verbs terminology . 11
Introduction . 11
1 Scope . 15
2 References . 16
2.1 Normative references . 16
2.2 Informative references . 17
3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations . 17
3.1 Terms . 17
3.2 Symbols . 18
3.3 Abbreviations . 18
4 Security architecture . 20
4.1 Background . 20
4.2 Security services . 20
4.2.1 Authentication of a PT . 20
4.2.2 Authentication of an FT . 20
4.2.3 Mutual authentication . 21
4.2.4 Data confidentiality. 21
4.2.5 User authentication . 21
4.3 Security mechanisms . 21
4.3.0 General . 21
4.3.1 Authentication of a PT (type 1 procedure) . 21
4.3.2 Authentication of an FT (type 1 procedure) . 23
4.3.3 Mutual authentication . 24
4.3.4 Data confidentiality. 24
4.3.4.0 General . 24
4.3.4.1 Derived Cipher Key (DCK) . 25
4.3.4.2 Static Cipher Key (SCK) . 25
4.3.4.3 Default Cipher Key (DefCK) . 25
4.3.5 User authentication . 25
4.3.6 Authentication of a PT (type 2 procedure) . 26
4.3.7 Authentication of a FT (type 2 procedure) . 28
4.4 Cryptographic parameters and keys . 30
4.4.1 Overview . 30
4.4.2 Cryptographic parameters . 31
4.4.2.0 Description of parameters . 31
4.4.2.1 Provisions related to the generation of random numbers . 33
4.4.3 Cryptographic keys . 33
4.4.3.0 General . 33
4.4.3.1 Authentication key K . 33
4.4.3.2 Authentication session keys KS and KS' . 34
4.4.3.3 Cipher key CK . 35
4.5 Security processes . 36
4.5.1 Overview . 36
4.5.2 Derivation of authentication key, K . 36
4.5.2.0 General . 36
4.5.2.1 K is derived from UAK . 36
4.5.2.2 K is derived from AC . 36
4.5.2.3 K is derived from UAK and UPI . 37
4.5.3 Authentication processes . 37
4.5.3.0 General . 37
4.5.3.1 Processes for the derivation of KS and KS' . 37
4.5.3.2 Processes for the derivation of DCK, RES1 and RES2 . 37
ETSI
---------------------- Page: 3 ----------------------
4 ETSI EN 300 175-7 V2.9.1 (2022-03)
4.5.4 Key stream generation . 38
4.5.5 CCM Authenticated Encryption . 39
4.6 Combinations of security services . 39
4.6.0 Service combinations and related considerations . 39
4.6.1 Combinations of security algorithms . 40
4.6.1.0 General . 40
4.6.1.1 Limitations related to capering algorithms . 40
5 Algorithms for security processes . 40
5.1 Background . 40
5.1.0 General . 40
5.1.1 A algorithm . 41
5.1.1.0 A algorithm, general. 41
5.1.1.1 A algorithm, DSAA based (A-DSAA) . 41
5.1.1.2 A algorithm, DSAA2 based (A-DSAA2) . 41
5.1.1.3 A algorithm, proprietary . 42
5.2 Derivation of session authentication key(s) . 42
5.2.1 A11 process . 42
5.2.2 A21 process . 43
5.3 Authentication and cipher key generation processes . 43
5.3.1 A12 process . 43
5.3.2 A22 process . 44
5.4 CCM algorithm . 45
6 Integration of security . 45
6.1 Background . 45
6.2 Association of keys and identities . 45
6.2.1 Authentication key . 45
6.2.1.0 General . 45
6.2.1.1 K is derived from UAK . 45
6.2.1.2 K derived from AC. 46
6.2.1.3 K derived from UAK and UPI . 46
6.2.2 Cipher keys . 46
6.2.3 Cipher keys for CCM . 47
6.2.3.0 General . 47
6.2.3.1 Single use of the keys for CCM . 47
6.2.3.2 Cipher keys for CCM encryption of C/L multicast channels . 48
6.3 NWK layer procedures . 48
6.3.1 Background . 48
6.3.2 Authentication exchanges . 48
6.3.3 Authentication procedures . 50
6.3.3.1 Authentication of a PT type 1 procedure . 50
6.3.3.2 Authentication of an FT type 1 procedure . 50
6.3.3.3 Authentication of a PT type 2 procedure . 51
6.3.3.4 Authentication of an FT type 2 procedure . 51
6.3.4 Transfer of Cipher Key, CK. 52
6.3.5 Re-Keying . 52
6.3.6 Encryption with Default Cipher Key . 52
6.3.7 Transfer of Cipher Key CK for CCM . 52
6.3.7.0 General . 52
6.3.7.1 Transfer by Virtual Call setup CC procedure . 52
6.3.7.2 Transfer using MM procedures for CCM re-keying and sequence reset . 53
6.3.8 Transfer of Cipher Keys for CCM encryption of multicast channels . 53
6.3.8.1 General . 53
6.3.8.2 Multicast encryption parameter assignation procedure, FT initiated . 53
6.3.8.2.0 General . 53
6.3.8.2.1 Transport of the security parameters . 54
6.3.8.2.2 <> coding . 54
6.3.8.3 Multicast encryption parameter retrieval procedure, PT initiated . 54
6.3.8.3.0 General . 54
6.3.8.3.1 Transport of the security parameters . 55
6.3.8.3.2 <> coding . 55
ETSI
---------------------- Page: 4 ----------------------
5 ETSI EN 300 175-7 V2.9.1 (2022-03)
6.3.8.4 Error cases . 55
6.3.8.4.1 FT initiated parameter assignation procedure - PT reject . 55
6.3.8.4.2 PT initiated parameter retrieval procedure - FT reject . 55
6.3.8.4.3 Coding of the {MM-INFO-REJECT} in the error cases . 56
6.3.9 Transfer of Cipher Keys to Wireless Relay Stations (WRS) . 56
6.3.9.1 General . 56
6.3.9.2 Security considerations . 56
6.3.9.3 Indication of cipher key FT initiated procedure . 56
6.3.9.4 Cipher key retrieval procedure. PT initiated . 57
6.3.9.5 Error cases . 59
6.3.9.5.1 PT initiated cipher key retrieval procedure - FT reject . 59
6.4 MAC layer procedures . 60
6.4.1 Background . 60
6.4.2 MAC layer field structure . 60
6.4.3 Data to be encrypted . 62
6.4.4 Encryption process . 62
6.4.5 Initialization and synchronization of the encryption process . 65
6.4.5.0 General . 65
6.4.5.1 Construction of CK . 65
6.4.5.2 The Initialization Vector (IV) . 65
6.4.5.3 Generation of two Key Stream segments . 65
6.4.6 Encryption mode control . 66
6.4.6.1 Background . 66
6.4.6.2 MAC layer messages. 66
6.4.6.3 Procedures for switching to encrypt mode . 66
6.4.6.3.1 General . 66
6.4.6.3.2 PT procedure for switching from clear to encrypt mode with a DCK . 67
6.4.6.3.3 FT procedure for switching from clear to encrypt mode with a DCK . 67
6.4.6.3.4 PT procedure for switching from clear to encrypt mode with a Default Cipher Key (DefCK) . 68
6.4.6.3.5 Error handling - poor link . 70
6.4.6.4 Procedures for switching to clear mode . 72
6.4.6.5 Procedures for re-keying . 73
6.4.6.5.1 Re-keying to a DCK . 73
6.4.6.5.2 Re-keying to a DefCK . 74
6.4.6.5.3 FT Indication of re-keying to a DefCK . 75
6.4.6.6 Insertion of WAIT . 76
6.4.7 Handover of the encryption process . 77
6.4.7.0 General . 77
6.4.7.1 Bearer handover, uninterrupted ciphering . 77
6.4.7.2 Connection handover, uninterrupted ciphering . 77
6.4.7.3 External handover - handover with ciphering . 78
6.4.8 Modifications for half and long slot specifications (2-level modulation) . 78
6.4.8.1 Background . 78
6.4.8.2 MAC layer field structure . 78
6.4.8.3 Data to be encrypted. 79
6.4.8.4 Encryption process . 79
6.4.8.5 Initialization and synchronization of the encryption process . 80
6.4.8.6 Encryption mode control . 80
6.4.8.7 Handover of the encryption process . 80
6.4.9 Modifications for double slot specifications (2-level modulation) . 80
6.4.9.1 Background . 80
6.4.9.2 MAC layer field structure . 80
6.4.9.3 Data to be encrypted. 81
6.4.9.4 Encryption process . 81
6.4.9.5 Initialization and synchronization of the encryption process . 82
6.4.9.6 Encryption mode control .
...
SLOVENSKI STANDARD
SIST EN 300 175-7 V2.9.1:2022
01-maj-2022
Digitalne izboljšane brezvrvične telekomunikacije (DECT) - Skupni vmesnik (CI) - 7.
del: Varnostne lastnosti
Digital Enhanced Cordless Telecommunications (DECT) - Common Interface (CI) - Part
7: Security features
Ta slovenski standard je istoveten z: ETSI EN 300 175-7 V2.9.1 (2022-03)
ICS:
33.070.30 Digitalne izboljšane Digital Enhanced Cordless
brezvrvične telekomunikacije Telecommunications (DECT)
(DECT)
SIST EN 300 175-7 V2.9.1:2022 en
2003-01.Slovenski inštitut za standardizacijo. Razmnoževanje celote ali delov tega standarda ni dovoljeno.
---------------------- Page: 1 ----------------------
SIST EN 300 175-7 V2.9.1:2022
---------------------- Page: 2 ----------------------
SIST EN 300 175-7 V2.9.1:2022
ETSI EN 300 175-7 V2.9.1 (2022-03)
EUROPEAN STANDARD
Digital Enhanced Cordless Telecommunications (DECT);
Common Interface (CI);
Part 7: Security features
---------------------- Page: 3 ----------------------
SIST EN 300 175-7 V2.9.1:2022
2 ETSI EN 300 175-7 V2.9.1 (2022-03)
Reference
REN/DECT-00357
Keywords
authentication, DECT, IMT-2000, mobility, radio,
security, TDD, TDMA
ETSI
650 Route des Lucioles
F-06921 Sophia Antipolis Cedex - FRANCE
Tel.: +33 4 92 94 42 00 Fax: +33 4 93 65 47 16
Siret N° 348 623 562 00017 - APE 7112B
Association à but non lucratif enregistrée à la
Sous-Préfecture de Grasse (06) N° w061004871
Important notice
The present document can be downloaded from:
http://www.etsi.org/standards-search
The present document may be made available in electronic versions and/or in print. The content of any electronic and/or
print versions of the present document shall not be modified without the prior written authorization of ETSI. In case of any
existing or perceived difference in contents between such versions and/or in print, the prevailing version of an ETSI
deliverable is the one made publicly available in PDF format at www.etsi.org/deliver.
Users of the present document should be aware that the document may be subject to revision or change of status.
Information on the current status of this and other ETSI documents is available at
https://portal.etsi.org/TB/ETSIDeliverableStatus.aspx
If you find errors in the present document, please send your comment to one of the following services:
https://portal.etsi.org/People/CommiteeSupportStaff.aspx
If you find a security vulnerability in the present document, please report it through our
Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure Program:
https://www.etsi.org/standards/coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure
Notice of disclaimer & limitation of liability
The information provided in the present deliverable is directed solely to professionals who have the appropriate degree of
experience to understand and interpret its content in accordance with generally accepted engineering or
other professional standard and applicable regulations.
No recommendation as to products and services or vendors is made or should be implied.
In no event shall ETSI be held liable for loss of profits or any other incidental or consequential damages.
Any software contained in this deliverable is provided "AS IS" with no warranties, express or implied, including but not
limited to, the warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose and non-infringement of intellectual property
rights and ETSI shall not be held liable in any event for any damages whatsoever (including, without limitation, damages
for loss of profits, business interruption, loss of information, or any other pecuniary loss) arising out of or related to the use
of or inability to use the software.
Copyright Notification
No part may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and
microfilm except as authorized by written permission of ETSI.
The content of the PDF version shall not be modified without the written authorization of ETSI.
The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media.
© ETSI 2022.
All rights reserved.
ETSI
---------------------- Page: 4 ----------------------
SIST EN 300 175-7 V2.9.1:2022
3 ETSI EN 300 175-7 V2.9.1 (2022-03)
Contents
Intellectual Property Rights . 10
Foreword . 10
Modal verbs terminology . 11
Introduction . 11
1 Scope . 15
2 References . 16
2.1 Normative references . 16
2.2 Informative references . 17
3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations . 17
3.1 Terms . 17
3.2 Symbols . 18
3.3 Abbreviations . 18
4 Security architecture . 20
4.1 Background . 20
4.2 Security services . 20
4.2.1 Authentication of a PT . 20
4.2.2 Authentication of an FT . 20
4.2.3 Mutual authentication . 21
4.2.4 Data confidentiality. 21
4.2.5 User authentication . 21
4.3 Security mechanisms . 21
4.3.0 General . 21
4.3.1 Authentication of a PT (type 1 procedure) . 21
4.3.2 Authentication of an FT (type 1 procedure) . 23
4.3.3 Mutual authentication . 24
4.3.4 Data confidentiality. 24
4.3.4.0 General . 24
4.3.4.1 Derived Cipher Key (DCK) . 25
4.3.4.2 Static Cipher Key (SCK) . 25
4.3.4.3 Default Cipher Key (DefCK) . 25
4.3.5 User authentication . 25
4.3.6 Authentication of a PT (type 2 procedure) . 26
4.3.7 Authentication of a FT (type 2 procedure) . 28
4.4 Cryptographic parameters and keys . 30
4.4.1 Overview . 30
4.4.2 Cryptographic parameters . 31
4.4.2.0 Description of parameters . 31
4.4.2.1 Provisions related to the generation of random numbers . 33
4.4.3 Cryptographic keys . 33
4.4.3.0 General . 33
4.4.3.1 Authentication key K . 33
4.4.3.2 Authentication session keys KS and KS' . 34
4.4.3.3 Cipher key CK . 35
4.5 Security processes . 36
4.5.1 Overview . 36
4.5.2 Derivation of authentication key, K . 36
4.5.2.0 General . 36
4.5.2.1 K is derived from UAK . 36
4.5.2.2 K is derived from AC . 36
4.5.2.3 K is derived from UAK and UPI . 37
4.5.3 Authentication processes . 37
4.5.3.0 General . 37
4.5.3.1 Processes for the derivation of KS and KS' . 37
4.5.3.2 Processes for the derivation of DCK, RES1 and RES2 . 37
ETSI
---------------------- Page: 5 ----------------------
SIST EN 300 175-7 V2.9.1:2022
4 ETSI EN 300 175-7 V2.9.1 (2022-03)
4.5.4 Key stream generation . 38
4.5.5 CCM Authenticated Encryption . 39
4.6 Combinations of security services . 39
4.6.0 Service combinations and related considerations . 39
4.6.1 Combinations of security algorithms . 40
4.6.1.0 General . 40
4.6.1.1 Limitations related to capering algorithms . 40
5 Algorithms for security processes . 40
5.1 Background . 40
5.1.0 General . 40
5.1.1 A algorithm . 41
5.1.1.0 A algorithm, general. 41
5.1.1.1 A algorithm, DSAA based (A-DSAA) . 41
5.1.1.2 A algorithm, DSAA2 based (A-DSAA2) . 41
5.1.1.3 A algorithm, proprietary . 42
5.2 Derivation of session authentication key(s) . 42
5.2.1 A11 process . 42
5.2.2 A21 process . 43
5.3 Authentication and cipher key generation processes . 43
5.3.1 A12 process . 43
5.3.2 A22 process . 44
5.4 CCM algorithm . 45
6 Integration of security . 45
6.1 Background . 45
6.2 Association of keys and identities . 45
6.2.1 Authentication key . 45
6.2.1.0 General . 45
6.2.1.1 K is derived from UAK . 45
6.2.1.2 K derived from AC. 46
6.2.1.3 K derived from UAK and UPI . 46
6.2.2 Cipher keys . 46
6.2.3 Cipher keys for CCM . 47
6.2.3.0 General . 47
6.2.3.1 Single use of the keys for CCM . 47
6.2.3.2 Cipher keys for CCM encryption of C/L multicast channels . 48
6.3 NWK layer procedures . 48
6.3.1 Background . 48
6.3.2 Authentication exchanges . 48
6.3.3 Authentication procedures . 50
6.3.3.1 Authentication of a PT type 1 procedure . 50
6.3.3.2 Authentication of an FT type 1 procedure . 50
6.3.3.3 Authentication of a PT type 2 procedure . 51
6.3.3.4 Authentication of an FT type 2 procedure . 51
6.3.4 Transfer of Cipher Key, CK. 52
6.3.5 Re-Keying . 52
6.3.6 Encryption with Default Cipher Key . 52
6.3.7 Transfer of Cipher Key CK for CCM . 52
6.3.7.0 General . 52
6.3.7.1 Transfer by Virtual Call setup CC procedure . 52
6.3.7.2 Transfer using MM procedures for CCM re-keying and sequence reset . 53
6.3.8 Transfer of Cipher Keys for CCM encryption of multicast channels . 53
6.3.8.1 General . 53
6.3.8.2 Multicast encryption parameter assignation procedure, FT initiated . 53
6.3.8.2.0 General . 53
6.3.8.2.1 Transport of the security parameters . 54
6.3.8.2.2 <> coding . 54
6.3.8.3 Multicast encryption parameter retrieval procedure, PT initiated . 54
6.3.8.3.0 General . 54
6.3.8.3.1 Transport of the security parameters . 55
6.3.8.3.2 <> coding . 55
ETSI
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SIST EN 300 175-7 V2.9.1:2022
5 ETSI EN 300 175-7 V2.9.1 (2022-03)
6.3.8.4 Error cases . 55
6.3.8.4.1 FT initiated parameter assignation procedure - PT reject . 55
6.3.8.4.2 PT initiated parameter retrieval procedure - FT reject . 55
6.3.8.4.3 Coding of the {MM-INFO-REJECT} in the error cases . 56
6.3.9 Transfer of Cipher Keys to Wireless Relay Stations (WRS) . 56
6.3.9.1 General . 56
6.3.9.2 Security considerations . 56
6.3.9.3 Indication of cipher key FT initiated procedure . 56
6.3.9.4 Cipher key retrieval procedure. PT initiated . 57
6.3.9.5 Error cases . 59
6.3.9.5.1 PT initiated cipher key retrieval procedure - FT reject . 59
6.4 MAC layer procedures . 60
6.4.1 Background . 60
6.4.2 MAC layer field structure . 60
6.4.3 Data to be encrypted . 62
6.4.4 Encryption process . 62
6.4.5 Initialization and synchronization of the encryption process . 65
6.4.5.0 General . 65
6.4.5.1 Construction of CK . 65
6.4.5.2 The Initialization Vector (IV) . 65
6.4.5.3 Generation of two Key Stream segments . 65
6.4.6 Encryption mode control . 66
6.4.6.1 Background . 66
6.4.6.2 MAC layer messages. 66
6.4.6.3 Procedures for switching to encrypt mode . 66
6.4.6.3.1 General . 66
6.4.6.3.2 PT procedure for switching from clear to encrypt mode with a DCK . 67
6.4.6.3.3 FT procedure for switching from clear to encrypt mode with a DCK . 67
6.4.6.3.4 PT procedure for switching from clear to encrypt mode with a Default Cipher Key (DefCK) . 68
6.4.6.3.5 Error handling - poor link . 70
6.4.6.4 Procedures for switching to clear mode . 72
6.4.6.5 Procedures for re-keying . 73
6.4.6.5.1 Re-keying to a DCK . 73
6.4.6.5.2 Re-keying to a DefCK . 74
6.4.6.5.3 FT Indication of re-keying to a DefCK . 75
6.4.6.6 Insertion of WAIT . 76
6.4.7 Handover of the encryption process . 77
6.4.7.0 General . 77
6.4.7.1 Bearer handover, uninterrupted ciphering . 77
6.4.7.2 Connection handover, uninterrupted ciphering . 77
6.4.7.3 External handover - handover with ciphering . 78
6.4.8 Modifications for half and long slot specifications (2-level modulation) . 78
6.4.8.1 Background . 78
6.4.8.2 MAC layer field structure . 78
6.4.8.3 Data to be encrypted. 79
6.4.8.4 Encryption process . 79
6.4.8.5 Initialization and synchronization of the encryption process . 80
6.4.8.6 Encryption mode control . 80
6.4.8.7 Handover of the encryption process . 80
6.4.9 Modifications for double slot specifications (2-level modulation)
...
SLOVENSKI STANDARD
oSIST prEN 300 175-7 V2.8.5:2022
01-marec-2022
Digitalne izboljšane brezvrvične telekomunikacije (DECT) - Skupni vmesnik (CI) - 7.
del: Varnostne lastnosti
Digital Enhanced Cordless Telecommunications (DECT) - Common Interface (CI) - Part
7: Security features
Ta slovenski standard je istoveten z: ETSI EN 300 175-7 V2.8.5 (2021-12)
ICS:
33.070.30 Digitalne izboljšane Digital Enhanced Cordless
brezvrvične telekomunikacije Telecommunications (DECT)
(DECT)
oSIST prEN 300 175-7 V2.8.5:2022 en
2003-01.Slovenski inštitut za standardizacijo. Razmnoževanje celote ali delov tega standarda ni dovoljeno.
---------------------- Page: 1 ----------------------
oSIST prEN 300 175-7 V2.8.5:2022
---------------------- Page: 2 ----------------------
oSIST prEN 300 175-7 V2.8.5:2022
Draft ETSI EN 300 175-7 V2.8.5 (2021-12)
EUROPEAN STANDARD
Digital Enhanced Cordless Telecommunications (DECT)
Common Interface (CI);
Part 7: Security features
---------------------- Page: 3 ----------------------
oSIST prEN 300 175-7 V2.8.5:2022
2 Draft ETSI EN 300 175-7 V2.8.5 (2021-12)
Reference
REN/DECT-00357
Keywords
authentication, DECT, IMT-2000, mobility, radio,
security, TDD, TDMA
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ETSI
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oSIST prEN 300 175-7 V2.8.5:2022
3 Draft ETSI EN 300 175-7 V2.8.5 (2021-12)
Contents
Intellectual Property Rights . 10
Foreword . 10
Modal verbs terminology . 11
Introduction . 11
1 Scope . 15
2 References . 16
2.1 Normative references . 16
2.2 Informative references . 17
3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations . 17
3.1 Terms . 17
3.2 Symbols . 18
3.3 Abbreviations . 18
4 Security architecture . 20
4.1 Background . 20
4.2 Security services . 20
4.2.1 Authentication of a PT . 20
4.2.2 Authentication of an FT . 20
4.2.3 Mutual authentication . 21
4.2.4 Data confidentiality. 21
4.2.5 User authentication . 21
4.3 Security mechanisms . 21
4.3.0 General . 21
4.3.1 Authentication of a PT (type 1 procedure) . 21
4.3.2 Authentication of an FT (type 1 procedure) . 23
4.3.3 Mutual authentication . 24
4.3.4 Data confidentiality. 24
4.3.4.0 General . 24
4.3.4.1 Derived Cipher Key (DCK) . 25
4.3.4.2 Static Cipher Key (SCK) . 25
4.3.4.3 Default Cipher Key (DefCK) . 25
4.3.5 User authentication . 25
4.3.6 Authentication of a PT (type 2 procedure) . 26
4.3.7 Authentication of a FT (type 2 procedure) . 28
4.4 Cryptographic parameters and keys . 30
4.4.1 Overview . 30
4.4.2 Cryptographic parameters . 31
4.4.2.0 Description of parameters . 31
4.4.2.1 Provisions related to the generation of random numbers . 33
4.4.3 Cryptographic keys . 33
4.4.3.0 General . 33
4.4.3.1 Authentication key K . 33
4.4.3.2 Authentication session keys KS and KS' . 34
4.4.3.3 Cipher key CK . 35
4.5 Security processes . 36
4.5.1 Overview . 36
4.5.2 Derivation of authentication key, K . 36
4.5.2.0 General . 36
4.5.2.1 K is derived from UAK . 36
4.5.2.2 K is derived from AC . 36
4.5.2.3 K is derived from UAK and UPI . 37
4.5.3 Authentication processes . 37
4.5.3.0 General . 37
4.5.3.1 Processes for the derivation of KS and KS' . 37
4.5.3.2 Processes for the derivation of DCK, RES1 and RES2 . 37
ETSI
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oSIST prEN 300 175-7 V2.8.5:2022
4 Draft ETSI EN 300 175-7 V2.8.5 (2021-12)
4.5.4 Key stream generation . 38
4.5.5 CCM Authenticated Encryption . 39
4.6 Combinations of security services . 39
4.6.0 Service combinations and related considerations . 39
4.6.1 Combinations of security algorithms . 40
4.6.1.0 General . 40
4.6.1.1 Limitations related to capering algorithms . 40
5 Algorithms for security processes . 40
5.1 Background . 40
5.1.0 General . 40
5.1.1 A algorithm . 41
5.1.1.0 A algorithm, general. 41
5.1.1.1 A algorithm, DSAA based (A-DSAA) . 41
5.1.1.2 A algorithm, DSAA2 based (A-DSAA2) . 41
5.1.1.3 A algorithm, proprietary . 42
5.2 Derivation of session authentication key(s) . 42
5.2.1 A11 process . 42
5.2.2 A21 process . 43
5.3 Authentication and cipher key generation processes . 43
5.3.1 A12 process . 43
5.3.2 A22 process . 44
5.4 CCM algorithm . 45
6 Integration of security . 45
6.1 Background . 45
6.2 Association of keys and identities . 45
6.2.1 Authentication key . 45
6.2.1.0 General . 45
6.2.1.1 K is derived from UAK . 45
6.2.1.2 K derived from AC. 46
6.2.1.3 K derived from UAK and UPI . 46
6.2.2 Cipher keys . 46
6.2.3 Cipher keys for CCM . 47
6.2.3.0 General . 47
6.2.3.1 Single use of the keys for CCM . 47
6.2.3.2 Cipher keys for CCM encryption of C/L multicast channels . 48
6.3 NWK layer procedures . 48
6.3.1 Background . 48
6.3.2 Authentication exchanges . 48
6.3.3 Authentication procedures . 50
6.3.3.1 Authentication of a PT type 1 procedure . 50
6.3.3.2 Authentication of an FT type 1 procedure . 50
6.3.3.3 Authentication of a PT type 2 procedure . 51
6.3.3.4 Authentication of an FT type 2 procedure . 51
6.3.4 Transfer of Cipher Key, CK. 52
6.3.5 Re-Keying . 52
6.3.6 Encryption with Default Cipher Key . 52
6.3.7 Transfer of Cipher Key CK for CCM . 52
6.3.7.0 General . 52
6.3.7.1 Transfer by Virtual Call setup CC procedure . 52
6.3.7.2 Transfer using MM procedures for CCM re-keying and sequence reset . 53
6.3.8 Transfer of Cipher Keys for CCM encryption of multicast channels . 53
6.3.8.1 General . 53
6.3.8.2 Multicast encryption parameter assignation procedure, FT initiated . 53
6.3.8.2.0 General . 53
6.3.8.2.1 Transport of the security parameters . 54
6.3.8.2.2 <> coding . 54
6.3.8.3 Multicast encryption parameter retrieval procedure, PT initiated . 54
6.3.8.3.0 General . 54
6.3.8.3.1 Transport of the security parameters . 55
6.3.8.3.2 <> coding . 55
ETSI
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oSIST prEN 300 175-7 V2.8.5:2022
5 Draft ETSI EN 300 175-7 V2.8.5 (2021-12)
6.3.8.4 Error cases . 55
6.3.8.4.1 FT initiated parameter assignation procedure - PT reject . 55
6.3.8.4.2 PT initiated parameter retrieval procedure - FT reject . 55
6.3.8.4.3 Coding of the {MM-INFO-REJECT} in the error cases . 56
6.3.9 Transfer of Cipher Keys to Wireless Relay Stations (WRS) . 56
6.3.9.1 General . 56
6.3.9.2 Security considerations . 56
6.3.9.3 Indication of cipher key FT initiated procedure . 56
6.3.9.4 Cipher key retrieval procedure. PT initiated . 57
6.3.9.5 Error cases . 59
6.3.9.5.1 PT initiated cipher key retrieval procedure - FT reject . 59
6.4 MAC layer procedures . 60
6.4.1 Background . 60
6.4.2 MAC layer field structure . 60
6.4.3 Data to be encrypted . 62
6.4.4 Encryption process . 62
6.4.5 Initialization and synchronization of the encryption process . 65
6.4.5.0 General . 65
6.4.5.1 Construction of CK . 65
6.4.5.2 The Initialization Vector (IV) . 65
6.4.5.3 Generation of two Key Stream segments . 65
6.4.6 Encryption mode control . 66
6.4.6.1 Background . 66
6.4.6.2 MAC layer messages. 66
6.4.6.3 Procedures for switching to encrypt mode . 66
6.4.6.3.1 General . 66
6.4.6.3.2 PT procedure for switching from clear to encrypt mode with a DCK . 67
6.4.6.3.3 FT procedure for switching from clear to encrypt mode with a DCK . 67
6.4.6.3.4 PT procedure for switching from clear to encrypt mode with a Default Cipher Key (DefCK) . 68
6.4.6.3.5 Error handling - poor link . 70
6.4.6.4 Procedures for switching to clear mode . 72
6.4.6.5 Procedures for re-keying . 73
6.4.6.5.1 Re-keying to a DCK . 73
6.4.6.5.2 Re-keying to a DefCK . 74
6.4.6.5.3 FT Indication of re-keying to a DefCK . 75
6.4.6.6 Insertion of WAIT . 76
6.4.7 Handover of the encryption process . 77
6.4.7.0 General . 77
6.4.7.1 Bearer handover, uninterrupted ciphering . 77
6.4.7.2 Connection handover, uninterrupted ciphering . 77
6.4.7.3 External handover - handover with ciphering . 78
6.4.8 Modifications for half and long slot specifications (2-level modulation) . 78
6.4.8.1 Background . 78
6.4.8.2 MAC layer field structure . 78
6.4.8.3 Data to be encrypted. 79
6.4.8.4 Encryption process . 79
6.4.8.5 Initialization and synchronization of the encryption process . 80
6.4.8.6 Encryption mode control . 80
6.4.8.7 Handover of the encryption process . 80
6.4.9 Modifications for double slot specifications (2-level modulation) . 80
6.4.9.1 Background .
...
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