IEC TR 60663:1980
(Main)Planning of (single-sideband) power line carrier systems
Planning of (single-sideband) power line carrier systems
Planning of (single-sideband) power line carrier systems
Conception des systèmes à courants porteurs (à bande latérale unique) sur lignes d'énergie
Planning of (single-sideband) power line carrier systems
General Information
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Standards Content (Sample)
SLOVENSKI STANDARD
01-avgust-1997
Planning of (single-sideband) power line carrier systems
Planning of (single-sideband) power line carrier systems
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Ta slovenski standard je istoveten z: IEC 60663 Ed. 1.0
ICS:
29.240.20 Daljnovodi Power transmission and
distribution lines
2003-01.Slovenski inštitut za standardizacijo. Razmnoževanje celote ali delov tega standarda ni dovoljeno.
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IEC TR 61850-80-5:2024, which is a Technical Report, specifies the mapping rules for building and configuring a system using both IEC 61850 and IEC 61158-6 (Industrial communication networks - Fieldbus specification, CPF Type 15, Modbus) protocols by utilizing gateways between IEC 61850 and IEC 61158-6 IEDs / subsystems. The objective is to enable operational run-time data exchange among these IEDs / subsystems, and to automate the configuration of a gateway as much as possible.
Please note that for the purposes of this document, "Modbus" is used to represent both serial Modbus (Modbus RTU) and IEC 61158-6 (Modbus TCP).
Within the capability of each protocol, some configuration attributes (IEC 61850-7-3:2010+AMD1:2020 attributes with functional constraint CF) are also mapped in addition to the operational real-time data.
The rules specified in this document are based on the published standards and do not make any proposed changes to IEC 61850 or 61158-6. This standard does not specify any rules for an IEC 61850 IED to directly communicate with a Modbus IED and vice versa, except through a gateway.
This document does not mandate which data items that a particular IED shall support, regardless of whether the implementation uses Modbus or IEC 61850. Instead this document provides rules specifying how a gateway maps any given data item from one protocol to the other, given that the data item is already available and is transmitted using one of the protocols.
Similarly, this document does not mandate which mapping rules a given gateway shall support. When this document is republished as a Technical Specification, conformance requirements will be identified.
This document recognizes that there will be situations in which a user will require that a gateway perform non-standard protocol mappings. Non-standard mappings are outside the scope of this document.
This document also recognizes that gateways typically manipulate the data passing through them in a variety of ways. Some of these functions include alarm trigger grouping, data suppression, interlocking and command blocking. Conformance to this document does not preclude a gateway from performing such functions, even though this document primarily specifies "straight through" mapping of Modbus data to IEC 61850-7-3:2010+AMD1:2020 data. Subclause 7.4 of this document describes how some of these functions may be specified to a gateway by a mapping tool using equation notation in XML. However, some of these functions may be too complex for a mapping tool to specify in an automated manner.
The mapping architecture for the exchange of the run-time information consists of four parts:
1) Conceptual architecture of a gateway and associated use case
2) Mapping of the information model (Assign semantic to the Modbus data)
3) Mapping of the data (which is in fact part of the information model)
4) Mapping of the services (out of scope for this document)
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IEC 61970-457:2024 specifies a standard interface for exchanging dynamic model information needed to support the analysis of the steady state stability (small-signal stability) and/or transient stability of a power system or parts of it. The schema(s) for expressing the dynamic model information are derived directly from the CIM, more specifically from IEC 61970-302.
The scope of this document includes only the dynamic model information that needs to be exchanged as part of a dynamic study, namely the type, description and parameters of each control equipment associated with a piece of power system equipment included in the steady state solution of a complete power system network model. Therefore, this profile is dependent upon other standard profiles for the equipment as specified in IEC 61970-452: CIM static transmission network model profiles, the topology, the steady state hypothesis and the steady state solution (as specified in IEC 61970-456: Solved power system state profiles) of the power system, which bounds the scope of the exchange. The profile information described by this document needs to be exchanged in conjunction with IEC 61970-452 and IEC 61970-456 profiles’ information to support the data requirements of transient analysis tools. IEC 61970-456 provides a detailed description of how different profile standards can be combined to form various types of power system network model exchanges.
This document supports the exchange of the following types of dynamic models:
• standard models: a simplified approach to exchange, where models are contained in predefined libraries of classes interconnected in a standard manner that represent dynamic behaviour of elements of the power system. The exchange only indicates the name of the model along with the attributes needed to describe its behaviour.
• proprietary user-defined models: an exchange that would provide users the ability to exchange the parameters of a model representing a vendor or user proprietary device where an explicit description of the model is not described in this document. The connections between the proprietary models and standard models are the same as described for the standard models exchange. Recipient of the data exchange will need to contact the sender for the behavioural details of the model.
This document builds on IEC 61970-302, CIM for dynamics which defines the descriptions of the standard dynamic models, their function block diagrams, and how they are interconnected and associated with the static network model. This type of model information is assumed to be pre-stored by all software applications hence it is not necessary to be exchanged in real-time or as part of a dynamics model exchange.
This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2021. This edition constitutes a technical revision.
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g) A model to enable exchange of simulation results was added in IEC 61970-302:2022. This results in the creation of two additional profiles in this document. These are the Simulation Settings profile and Simulation Results profile;
h) The work on the
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IEC 61970-302:2024 specifies a Dynamics package which contains part of the CIM to support the exchange of models between software applications that perform analysis of the steady-state stability (small-signal stability) or transient stability of a power system as defined by IEEE / CIGRE, Definition and classification of power system stability IEEE/CIGRE joint task force on stability terms and definitions.
The model descriptions in this document provide specifications for each type of dynamic model as well as the information that needs to be included in dynamic case exchanges between planning/study applications.
The scope of the CIM Dynamics package specified in this document includes:
• standard models: a simplified approach to describing dynamic models, where models representing dynamic behaviour of elements of the power system are contained in predefined libraries of classes which are interconnected in a standard manner. Only the names of the selected elements of the models along with their attributes are needed to describe dynamic behaviour.
• proprietary user-defined models: an approach providing users the ability to define the parameters of a dynamic behaviour model representing a vendor or user proprietary device where an explicit description of the model is not provided by this document. The same libraries and standard interconnections are used for both proprietary user-defined models and standard models. The behavioural details of the model are not documented in this document, only the model parameters.
• A model to enable exchange of models’ descriptions. This approach can be used to describe user defined and standard models.
• A model to enable exchange of simulation results.
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b) IEEE 421.5-2016 on Excitation systems is fully covered;
c) The IEEE turbine report from 2013 was considered and as a result a number of gas, steam and hydro turbines/governors are added;
d) IEC 61400-27-1:2020 on wind turbines is fully incorporated;
e) WECC Inverter-Based Resource (IBR) models, Hybrid STATCOM models and storage models are added;
f) The user defined models are enhanced with a model which enables modelling of detailed dynamic model;
g) A model to enable exchange of simulation results is added;
h) The work on the HVDC models is not complete. The HVDC dynamics models are a complex domain in which there are no models that are approved or widely recognised on international level, i.e. there are only project-based models. At this stage IEC 61970-302:2022 only specifies some general classes. However, it is recognised that better coverage of HVDC will require a further edition of this document;
i) Models from IEEE 1547-2018 "IEEE Standard for Interconnection and Interoperability of Distributed Energy Resources with Associated Electric Power Systems Interfaces" are added.
j) Statements have been added to certain figures, tables, schemas, and enumerations throughout the document that indicate that they are reproduced with the permission of the UCA International User Group (UCAIug). These items are derived from the CIM.
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IEC TS 62351-100-4:2023, which is a technical specification, describes test procedures for interoperability conformance testing of data and communication security for power system automation and protection systems which implement MMS, IEC 61850-8-1 (MMS), IEC 61850-8-2 (XMPP) or any other protocol implementing IEC 62351-4:2018/AMD1:2020. The tests described in this document cover only E2E security testing and do not evaluate A-security profile implementation. Thus, citing conformance to this document does not imply that any particular security level has been achieved by the corresponding product, or by the system in which it is used.
The goal of this document is to enable interoperability by providing a standard method of testing protocol implementations, but it does not guarantee the full interoperability of devices. It is expected that using this document during testing will minimize the risk of non interoperability. Additional testing and assurance measures will be required to verify that a particular implementation of IEC 62351-4:2018/AMD1:2020 has correctly implemented all the security functions and that they can be assured to be present in the delivered products. This topic is covered in other IEC standards, for example IEC 62443.
The scope of this document is to specify available common procedures and definitions for conformance and/or interoperability testing of IEC 62351-4:2018/AMD1:2020.
This document deals mainly with cyber security conformance testing; therefore, other requirements, such as safety or EMC are not covered. These requirements are covered by other standards (if applicable) and the proof of compliance for these topics is done according to these standards.
T-profile testing is to be performed prior to E2E security profile testing. T-profile testing is described in IEC 62351-100-3 in the context of IEC 61850-8-1. T-profile testing for IEC 61850-8-2 is to be described in the corresponding IEC 61850-8-2 test specification.
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IEC TR 61850-90-7:2023 is available as IEC TR 61850-90-7:2023 RLV which contains the International Standard and its Redline version, showing all changes of the technical content compared to the previous edition.IEC TR 61850-90-7:2023, which is a Technical Report, describes functions for power converter-based distributed energy resources (DER) systems, focused on DC-to-AC and AC-to-AC conversions and including photovoltaic systems (PV), battery storage systems, electric vehicle (EV) charging systems, and any other DER systems with a controllable power converter. The functions defined in this document were used to help define the information models described in IEC 61850-7-420 and which can be used in the exchange of information between these power converter-based DER systems and the utilities, energy service providers (ESPs), or other entities which are tasked with managing the volt, var, and watt capabilities of these power converter-based systems. These power converter-based DER systems can range from very small grid-connected systems at residential customer sites, to medium-sized systems configured as microgrids on campuses or communities, to very large systems in utility-operated power plants, and to many other configurations and ownership models. They may or may not combine different types of DER systems behind the power converter, such as a power converter-based DER system and a battery that are connected at the DC level. This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2013. This edition is primarily an editorial revision in order to be consistent with the publication of Edition 2 of IEC 61850-7-420:2021. This edition includes the following significant changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) Clause 3 has been updated.
b) Clause 8 (IEC 61850 information models for power converter-based functions) has been deleted. This clause defined data models with the transitional namespace “(Tr) IEC 61850-90-7:2012”. The data models are now defined in IEC 61850-7-420.
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IEC TR 61850-90-27:2023, which is a Technical Report, is to provide basic aspects that need to be considered when using IEC 61850 for information exchange between systems and components to support applications for thermal systems connected to electric power networks. Thermal systems isolated from electric power networks are outside the scope of this document.
From the perspective of category, this document considers thermal systems that provide thermal energy services for residential and/or commercial buildings and districts. In other words, industrial thermal systems are outside the scope of this document.
From the perspective of energy transformation, this document deals with ones between electricity and thermal energy. Other types of energy such as gas will be documented in a future report.
From the perspective of resource, this document considers generic aspects of thermal energy generators, storage, and loads that may contribute to the operations and management of electric power networks. It also deals with specific types of resources that have electric parts such as power to heat (P2H) that is a kind of electric load, and combined heat and power (CHP) that is an electric generator. This document models the characteristics for such specific units of resources including alarms and ratings. On the other hand, it does not deal with other types of specific units according to the scope of this document. For example, gas boilers, thermal energy tanks, heat exchangers, HVAC, auxiliary devices for thermal systems are not modelled as logical nodes in this document.
As a summary, this document
- gives an overview of thermal energy resources connected to electric power networks.
- provides use cases for typical operations of thermal system and deducts exchanged information necessary for information modelling.
- provides mapping of requirements on LNs based on the use cases.
- defines generic logical nodes for resources in thermal systems.
- defines logical nodes for specific unit types of P2H and CHP.
- defines logical nodes for operations that may contribute to the operations of electric power networks.
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IEC 62351-3:2023 specifies how to provide confidentiality, integrity protection, and message level authentication for protocols that make use of TCP/IP as a message transport layer and utilize Transport Layer Security when cyber-security is required. This may relate to SCADA and telecontrol protocols, but also to additional protocols if they meet the requirements in this document.
IEC 62351-3 specifies how to secure TCP/IP-based protocols through constraints on the specification of the messages, procedures, and algorithms of Transport Layer Security (TLS) (TLSv1.2 defined in RFC 5246, TLSv1.3 defined in RFC 8446). In the specific clauses, there will be subclauses to note the differences and commonalities in the application depending on the target TLS version. The use and specification of intervening external security devices (e.g., "bump-in-the-wire") are considered out-of-scope.
In contrast to previous editions of this document, this edition is self-contained in terms of completely defining a profile of TLS. Hence, it can be applied directly, without the need to specify further TLS parameters, except the port number, over which the communication will be performed. Therefore, this part can be directly utilized from a referencing standard and can be combined with further security measures on other layers. Providing the profiling of TLS without the need for further specifying TLS parameters allows declaring conformity to the described functionality without the need to involve further IEC 62351 documents.
This document is intended to be referenced as a normative part of other IEC standards that have the need for providing security for their TCP/IP-based protocol exchanges under similar boundary conditions. However, it is up to the individual protocol security initiatives to decide if this document is to be referenced.
The document also defines security events for specific conditions, which support error handling, security audit trails, intrusion detection, and conformance testing. Any action of an organization in response to events to an error condition described in this document are beyond the scope of this document and are expected to be defined by the organization’s security policy.
This document reflects the security requirements of the IEC power systems management protocols. Should other standards bring forward new requirements, this document may need to be revised.
This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2014, Amendment 1:2018 and Amendment 2:2020. This edition constitutes a technical revision.
This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) Inclusion of the TLSv1.2 related parameter required in IEC 62351-3 Ed.1.2 to be specified by the referencing standard. This comprises the following parameter:
• Mandatory TLSv1.2 cipher suites to be supported.
• Specification of session resumption parameters.
• Specification of session renegotiation parameters.
• Revocation handling using CRL and OCSP.
• Handling of security events.
b) Inclusion of a TLSv1.3 profile to be applicable for the power system domain in a similar way as for TLSv1.2 session.
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IEC 62351-9:2023 specifies cryptographic key management, primarily focused on the management of long-term keys, which are most often asymmetric key pairs, such as public-key certificates and corresponding private keys. As certificates build the base this document builds a foundation for many IEC 62351 services (see also Annex A). Symmetric key management is also considered but only with respect to session keys for group-based communication as applied in IEC 62351-6. The objective of this document is to define requirements and technologies to achieve interoperability of key management by specifying or limiting key management options to be used.
This document assumes that an organization (or group of organizations) has defined a security policy to select the type of keys and cryptographic algorithms that will be utilized, which may have to align with other standards or regulatory requirements. This document therefore specifies only the management techniques for these selected key and cryptography infrastructures. This document assumes that the reader has a basic understanding of cryptography and key management principles.
The requirements for the management of pairwise symmetric (session) keys in the context of communication protocols is specified in the parts of IEC 62351 utilizing or specifying pairwise communication such as:
• IEC 62351-3 for TLS by profiling the TLS options
• IEC 62351-4 for the application layer end-to-end security
• IEC TS 62351-5 for the application layer security mechanism for IEC 60870-5-101/104 and IEEE 1815 (DNP3)
The requirements for the management of symmetric group keys in the context of power system communication protocols is specified in IEC 62351-6 for utilizing group security to protect GOOSE and SV communication. IEC 62351-9 utilizes GDOI as already IETF specified group-based key management protocol to manage the group security parameter and enhances this protocol to carry the security parameter for GOOSE, SV, and PTP.
This document also defines security events for specific conditions which could identify issues which might require error handling. However, the actions of the organisation in response to these error conditions are beyond the scope of this document and are expected to be defined by the organizations security policy.
In the future, as public-key cryptography becomes endangered by the evolution of quantum computers, this document will also consider post-quantum cryptography to a certain extent. Note that at this time being no specific measures are provided.
This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2017. This edition constitutes a technical revision.
This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) Certificate components and verification of the certificate components have been added;
b) GDOI has been updated to include findings from interop tests;
c) GDOI operation considerations have been added;
d) GDOI support for PTP (IEEE 1588) support has been added as specified by IEC/IEEE 61850-9-3 Power Profile;
e) Cyber security event logging has been added as well as the mapping to IEC 62351-14;
f) Annex B with background on utilized cryptographic algorithms and mechanisms has been added.
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