TC 57 - Power systems management and associated information exchange

IEC TS 62351-100-4:2023, which is a technical specification, describes test procedures for interoperability conformance testing of data and communication security for power system automation and protection systems which implement MMS, IEC 61850-8-1 (MMS), IEC 61850-8-2 (XMPP) or any other protocol implementing IEC 62351-4:2018/AMD1:2020. The tests described in this document cover only E2E security testing and do not evaluate A-security profile implementation. Thus, citing conformance to this document does not imply that any particular security level has been achieved by the corresponding product, or by the system in which it is used.
The goal of this document is to enable interoperability by providing a standard method of testing protocol implementations, but it does not guarantee the full interoperability of devices. It is expected that using this document during testing will minimize the risk of non interoperability. Additional testing and assurance measures will be required to verify that a particular implementation of IEC 62351-4:2018/AMD1:2020 has correctly implemented all the security functions and that they can be assured to be present in the delivered products. This topic is covered in other IEC standards, for example IEC 62443.
The scope of this document is to specify available common procedures and definitions for conformance and/or interoperability testing of IEC 62351-4:2018/AMD1:2020.
This document deals mainly with cyber security conformance testing; therefore, other requirements, such as safety or EMC are not covered. These requirements are covered by other standards (if applicable) and the proof of compliance for these topics is done according to these standards.
T-profile testing is to be performed prior to E2E security profile testing. T-profile testing is described in IEC 62351-100-3 in the context of IEC 61850-8-1. T-profile testing for IEC 61850-8-2 is to be described in the corresponding IEC 61850-8-2 test specification.

IEC TR 61850-90-7:2023 is available as IEC TR 61850-90-7:2023 RLV which contains the International Standard and its Redline version, showing all changes of the technical content compared to the previous edition.IEC TR 61850-90-7:2023, which is a Technical Report, describes functions for power converter-based distributed energy resources (DER) systems, focused on DC-to-AC and AC-to-AC conversions and including photovoltaic systems (PV), battery storage systems, electric vehicle (EV) charging systems, and any other DER systems with a controllable power converter. The functions defined in this document were used to help define the information models described in IEC 61850-7-420 and which can be used in the exchange of information between these power converter-based DER systems and the utilities, energy service providers (ESPs), or other entities which are tasked with managing the volt, var, and watt capabilities of these power converter-based systems. These power converter-based DER systems can range from very small grid-connected systems at residential customer sites, to medium-sized systems configured as microgrids on campuses or communities, to very large systems in utility-operated power plants, and to many other configurations and ownership models. They may or may not combine different types of DER systems behind the power converter, such as a power converter-based DER system and a battery that are connected at the DC level. This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2013. This edition is primarily an editorial revision in order to be consistent with the publication of Edition 2 of IEC 61850-7-420:2021. This edition includes the following significant changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) Clause 3 has been updated.
b) Clause 8 (IEC 61850 information models for power converter-based functions) has been deleted. This clause defined data models with the transitional namespace “(Tr) IEC 61850-90-7:2012”. The data models are now defined in IEC 61850-7-420.

IEC TR 61850-90-27:2023, which is a Technical Report, is to provide basic aspects that need to be considered when using IEC 61850 for information exchange between systems and components to support applications for thermal systems connected to electric power networks. Thermal systems isolated from electric power networks are outside the scope of this document.
From the perspective of category, this document considers thermal systems that provide thermal energy services for residential and/or commercial buildings and districts. In other words, industrial thermal systems are outside the scope of this document.
From the perspective of energy transformation, this document deals with ones between electricity and thermal energy. Other types of energy such as gas will be documented in a future report.
From the perspective of resource, this document considers generic aspects of thermal energy generators, storage, and loads that may contribute to the operations and management of electric power networks. It also deals with specific types of resources that have electric parts such as power to heat (P2H) that is a kind of electric load, and combined heat and power (CHP) that is an electric generator. This document models the characteristics for such specific units of resources including alarms and ratings. On the other hand, it does not deal with other types of specific units according to the scope of this document. For example, gas boilers, thermal energy tanks, heat exchangers, HVAC, auxiliary devices for thermal systems are not modelled as logical nodes in this document.
As a summary, this document
- gives an overview of thermal energy resources connected to electric power networks.
- provides use cases for typical operations of thermal system and deducts exchanged information necessary for information modelling.
- provides mapping of requirements on LNs based on the use cases.
- defines generic logical nodes for resources in thermal systems.
- defines logical nodes for specific unit types of P2H and CHP.
- defines logical nodes for operations that may contribute to the operations of electric power networks.

IEC 62351-9:2023 specifies cryptographic key management, primarily focused on the management of long-term keys, which are most often asymmetric key pairs, such as public-key certificates and corresponding private keys. As certificates build the base this document builds a foundation for many IEC 62351 services (see also Annex A). Symmetric key management is also considered but only with respect to session keys for group-based communication as applied in IEC 62351-6. The objective of this document is to define requirements and technologies to achieve interoperability of key management by specifying or limiting key management options to be used.
This document assumes that an organization (or group of organizations) has defined a security policy to select the type of keys and cryptographic algorithms that will be utilized, which may have to align with other standards or regulatory requirements. This document therefore specifies only the management techniques for these selected key and cryptography infrastructures. This document assumes that the reader has a basic understanding of cryptography and key management principles.
The requirements for the management of pairwise symmetric (session) keys in the context of communication protocols is specified in the parts of IEC 62351 utilizing or specifying pairwise communication such as:
• IEC 62351-3 for TLS by profiling the TLS options
• IEC 62351-4 for the application layer end-to-end security
• IEC TS 62351-5 for the application layer security mechanism for IEC 60870-5-101/104 and IEEE 1815 (DNP3)
The requirements for the management of symmetric group keys in the context of power system communication protocols is specified in IEC 62351-6 for utilizing group security to protect GOOSE and SV communication. IEC 62351-9 utilizes GDOI as already IETF specified group-based key management protocol to manage the group security parameter and enhances this protocol to carry the security parameter for GOOSE, SV, and PTP.
This document also defines security events for specific conditions which could identify issues which might require error handling. However, the actions of the organisation in response to these error conditions are beyond the scope of this document and are expected to be defined by the organizations security policy.
In the future, as public-key cryptography becomes endangered by the evolution of quantum computers, this document will also consider post-quantum cryptography to a certain extent. Note that at this time being no specific measures are provided.
This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2017. This edition constitutes a technical revision.
This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) Certificate components and verification of the certificate components have been added;
b) GDOI has been updated to include findings from interop tests;
c) GDOI operation considerations have been added;
d) GDOI support for PTP (IEEE 1588) support has been added as specified by IEC/IEEE 61850-9-3 Power Profile;
e) Cyber security event logging has been added as well as the mapping to IEC 62351-14;
f) Annex B with background on utilized cryptographic algorithms and mechanisms has been added.

IEC 62351-3:2023 specifies how to provide confidentiality, integrity protection, and message level authentication for protocols that make use of TCP/IP as a message transport layer and utilize Transport Layer Security when cyber-security is required. This may relate to SCADA and telecontrol protocols, but also to additional protocols if they meet the requirements in this document.
IEC 62351-3 specifies how to secure TCP/IP-based protocols through constraints on the specification of the messages, procedures, and algorithms of Transport Layer Security (TLS) (TLSv1.2 defined in RFC 5246, TLSv1.3 defined in RFC 8446). In the specific clauses, there will be subclauses to note the differences and commonalities in the application depending on the target TLS version. The use and specification of intervening external security devices (e.g., "bump-in-the-wire") are considered out-of-scope.
In contrast to previous editions of this document, this edition is self-contained in terms of completely defining a profile of TLS. Hence, it can be applied directly, without the need to specify further TLS parameters, except the port number, over which the communication will be performed. Therefore, this part can be directly utilized from a referencing standard and can be combined with further security measures on other layers. Providing the profiling of TLS without the need for further specifying TLS parameters allows declaring conformity to the described functionality without the need to involve further IEC 62351 documents.
This document is intended to be referenced as a normative part of other IEC standards that have the need for providing security for their TCP/IP-based protocol exchanges under similar boundary conditions. However, it is up to the individual protocol security initiatives to decide if this document is to be referenced.
The document also defines security events for specific conditions, which support error handling, security audit trails, intrusion detection, and conformance testing. Any action of an organization in response to events to an error condition described in this document are beyond the scope of this document and are expected to be defined by the organization’s security policy.
This document reflects the security requirements of the IEC power systems management protocols. Should other standards bring forward new requirements, this document may need to be revised.
This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2014, Amendment 1:2018 and Amendment 2:2020. This edition constitutes a technical revision.
This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) Inclusion of the TLSv1.2 related parameter required in IEC 62351-3 Ed.1.2 to be specified by the referencing standard. This comprises the following parameter:
• Mandatory TLSv1.2 cipher suites to be supported.
• Specification of session resumption parameters.
• Specification of session renegotiation parameters.
• Revocation handling using CRL and OCSP.
• Handling of security events.
b) Inclusion of a TLSv1.3 profile to be applicable for the power system domain in a similar way as for TLSv1.2 session.

IEC 62351-5:2023 defines the application profile (A-profile) secure communication mechanism specifying messages, procedures and algorithms for securing the operation of all protocols based on or derived from IEC 60870-5, Telecontrol Equipment and Systems – Transmission Protocols.
For the measures described in this document to take effect, they must be accepted and referenced by the specifications for the protocols themselves. This document is written to enable that process.
The subsequent audience for this document is intended to be the developers of products that implement these protocols.
Portions of this document may also be of use to managers and executives in order to understand the purpose and requirements of the work.
This document is organized working from the general to the specific, as follows:
• Clauses 2 through 4 provide background terms, definitions, and references.
• Clause 5 describes the problems this specification is intended to address.
• Clause 6 describes the mechanism generically without reference to a specific protocol.
• Clauses 7 and 8 describe the mechanism more precisely and are the primary normative part of this specification.
• Clause 9 define the interoperability requirements for this secure communication mechanism.
• Clause 10 describes the requirements for other standards referencing this document.
The actions of an organization in response to events and error conditions described in this document are expected to be defined by the organization’s security policy and they are beyond the scope of this document.
This International Standard cancels and replaces IEC TS 62351-5 published in 2013. It constitutes a technical revision. The primary changes in this International Standard are:
a) The secure communication mechanism is performed on per controlling station/controlled station association.
b) User management to add, change or delete a User, was removed.
c) Symmetric method to change the Update Key was removed.
d) Asymmetric method to the change Update Key was reviewed.
e) Challenge/Reply procedure and concepts were removed.
f) Aggressive Mode concept was replaced with the Secure Data message exchange mechanism.
g) Authenticated encryption of application data was added.
h) The list of permitted security algorithms has been updated.
i) The rules for calculating messages sequence numbers have been updated
j) Events monitoring and logging was added

IEC TS 62351-100-6:2022 (E), which is a technical specification, is part of the IEC 62351 suite of standards, which describes test cases for interoperability conformance testing of data and communication security for Substation Automation Systems [SAS] and telecontrol systems which implement IEC TS 62351-6. The tests described in this part do not evaluate the security of the implementation. Thus, citing conformance to this part does not imply that any particular security level has been achieved by the corresponding product, or by the system in which it is used.
The goal of this part of IEC 62351 is to enable interoperability by providing a standard method of testing protocol implementations, but it does not guarantee the full interoperability of devices. It is expected that using this specification during testing will minimize the risk of non-interoperability. Additional testing and assurance measures will be required to verify that a particular implementation of IEC TC 62351-6 has correctly implemented all the security functions and that they can be assured to be present in all delivered products. This topic is covered in other IEC standards, for example IEC 62443.
The scope of this document is to specify common available procedures and definitions for conformance and/or interoperability testing of IEC 62351-6, the IEC 61850-8-1, IEC 61850-9-2 and also their recommendations over IEC 62351-3 for profiles including TCP/IP and IEC 62351 4 for profiles including MMS. These are the security extensions for IEC 61850 and derivatives to enable unambiguous and standardized evaluation of IEC TS 62351-6 and its companion standards protocol implementations.
The detailed test cases per companion standard, containing among others mandatory and optional mandatory test cases per Secure Communication Application Function, secure ASDU (Application Service Data Unit) and transmission procedures, will become available as technical specifications (TS). Other functionality may need additional test cases, but this is outside the scope of this part of IEC 62351. This document is such a technical specification for the mentioned companion standard.
This document deals mainly with data and communication security conformance testing; therefore, other requirements, such as safety or EMC (Electromagnetic compatibility) are not covered. These requirements are covered by other standards (if applicable) and the proof of compliance for these topics is done according to these standards.

IEC 61970-401:2022 describes how IEC 61970-450 (all parts), IEC 61970-600 (all parts) profile specifications are structured and created. Profile specifications describe a subset of the Canonical CIM dedicated to a specific data exchange. The Canonical CIM is described in IEC 61970 300 (all parts) as well as in IEC 61968-11.
Rules for creation or extension of Canonical CIM are outside the scope of this document.
This document specifies the structure of a profile specification and the rules for selecting subsets of information from the Canonical CIM. It standardizes the operations used to create the profile elements from the Canonical CIM. As Canonical CIM is described in UML the operations are described in terms of UML classes, attributes, and roles.
It is possible to map UML to RDFS or OWL, so any of the languages UML, RDFS or OWL can be used to describe the created profiles. Specification of languages (UML, RDFS or OWL) used to describe profiles as well as how profiles are presented and edited in user interfaces are outside the scope of this document. Languages used to describe profiles are specified in other specifications. Relevant specifications are referenced in Clause 2.
UML supports adding free text that describes further restrictions on UML constructs, e.g. classes, attribute values, association roles and cardinalities. Languages such as OCL and SHACL are dedicated to describing constraints. OCL is used to describe constraints for object data described in UML while SHACL is used to describe constraints on graph data described by RDFS or OWL. OCL is within the scope of this document, but SHACL is not.
This document supports profiles describing data exchanged as CIMXML datasets or messages. The exchange format within the scope is in accordance with IEC 61970-552 but other formats are possible.
Tool interoperability and serialisation formats are outside the scope of this document.
This first edition cancels and replaces IEC TS IEC 61970-401 published in 2005. This edition constitutes a technical revision.
This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) The previous edition of IEC TS 61970-401:2005 provided an overview of the Component Interface Specifications (CIS) IEC 61970-402, IEC 61970-403, IEC 61970-404, IEC 61970-405, and IEC 61970-407. IEC 61970-402 to IEC 61970-407 are duplicates of existing OPC interfaces from OPC Foundation and the DAIS/HDA interfaces from OMG. Hence IEC 61970-402 to IEC 61970-407 have been withdrawn and IEC TS 61970-401:2005 no longer serves a purpose.
b) IEC 61970-401 (this document) does not contain an overview of Component Interface Specifications (CIS) but instead a description of how to create profile specifications that describes dataset contents (or message contents). Hence it has been renamed "Profile framework". The profile specifications IEC 61970-450 (all parts) and IEC 61970-600 (all parts) describe dataset contents. The purpose of this document is to define the rules to be followed in the process of creating profile specifications.

IEC 61968-100:2022 defines how messages may be exchanged between cooperating systems in order to facilitate the transfer of application-specific data. Such application-specific data include but are not limited to the message payloads defined in IEC 61968 (Parts 3 to 9 and Part 13), IEC 61970 and IEC 62325.
This IEC 61968-100:2022 edition cancels and replaces the IEC 61968-100:2013 edition published in 2013. This edition constitutes a technical revision.
a) This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition: IEC 61968-100:2022 has been refined to remove ambiguities and redundancies. Informative and normative clauses are marked as such and, in the latter case, appropriate verbal forms of language are used;
b) The messages defined by IEC 61968-100:2022 are in general not backwards compatible with those of IEC 61968-100:2013. Annex I lists the significant technical changes introduced since the publication of IEC 61968-100:2013 and provides appropriate suggestions for migrating to IEC 61968-100:2022.

IEC TR 61850-10-3:2022(E), which is a technical report, is applicable to testing of applications within substations. It is intended to give practical guidelines to perform the stages of quality assurance defined in IEC 61850-4:2011. However, while the quality assurance in that document begins with the IED manufacturer development stage and focuses on the role of the system integrator this document focuses on end-user requirement fulfilment.
The report may be useful to users applying IEC 61850 to other domains, however testing of IEC 61850 systems outside the substation domain is not within the scope of this document.
This document describes:
• A methodical approach to the verification and validation of a substation solution
• The use of IEC 61850 resources for testing in Edition 2.1
• Recommended testing practices for different use cases
• Definition of the process for testing of IEC 61850 based devices and systems using communications instead of hard wired system interfaces (ex. GOOSE and SV instead of hardwired interfaces)
• Use cases related to protection and control functions verification and testing
This document does not cover the conformance testing of devices according to IEC 61850-10 or methodologies for testing of abstract device independent functions.

IEC TR 61850-7-510:2021(E), which is a technical report, is intended to provide explanations on how to use the Logical Nodes defined in IEC 61850-7-410 as well as other documents in the IEC 61850 series to model complex control functions in power plants, including variable speed pumped storage power plants.
IEC 61850-7-410 introduced the general modelling concepts of IEC 61850 for power plants. It is however not obvious from the standard how the modelling concepts can be implemented in actual power plants.
This document explains how the data model and the concepts defined in the IEC 61850 standard can be applied in Hydro; both directly at the process control level, but also for data structuring and data exchange at a higher level. Application of the data model for Thermal is limited to power evacuation (in principle the extraction of the generated electrical power) and the prime mover shaft and bearing system. The interfaces of the fuel and steam valves are modelled for the purpose of process control.
Communication services, and description of the use of mappings of the IEC 61850 data model to different communication protocols, are outside the scope of this document.
This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2012. This edition constitutes a technical revision.
This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) Process modelling according to IEC 61850-6:2009, including IEC 61850-6:2009/AMD1:2018.
b) Examples of application of Reference Designation System together with the process modelling, in particular application of IEC/ISO 81346.
c) Description of modelling related to Steam- and Gas turbines.
d) Annexes with examples of application of SCL according to the examples in the Technical Report.
e) The dynamic exchange of values by using polling, GOOSE, Reporting or Sampled Values is no longer included in the Technical Report.

IEC 61970-456:2021 belongs to the IEC 61970-450 to IEC 61970-499 series that, taken as a whole, defines at an abstract level the content and exchange mechanisms used for data transmitted between power system analyses applications, control centres and/or control centre components.
The purpose of this document is to rigorously define the subset of classes, class attributes, and roles from the CIM necessary to describe the result of state estimation, power flow and other similar applications that produce a steady-state solution of a power network, under a set of use cases which are included informatively in this document.
This document is intended for two distinct audiences, data producers and data recipients, and can be read from those two perspectives. From the standpoint of model export software used by a data producer, the document defines how a producer may describe an instance of a network case in order to make it available to some other program. From the standpoint of a consumer, the document defines what that importing software must be able to interpret in order to consume power flow cases.
There are many different use cases for which use of this document is expected and they differ in the way that the document will be applied in each case. Implementers are expected to consider what use cases they wish to cover in order to know the extent of different options they must cover. As an example, the profiles defined in this document will be used in some cases to exchange starting conditions rather than solved conditions, so if this is an important use case, it means that a consumer application needs to be able to handle an unsolved state as well as one which has met some solution criteria.
This third edition cancels and replaces the second edition published in 2018. This edition constitutes a technical revision. It is based on the IEC 61970 UML version ‘IEC61970CIM17v40’, dated 2020-08-24.
This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) Updated to support CIM17 (IEC 61970-301:2020+AMD1) and align with IEC 61970‑452:ED4.
b) The classes PowerElectronicsConnection, PowerElectronicsUnit and PowerElectronicsWindUnit are added to the Steady State Hypothesis (SSH) profile to match the changes done for Edition 4 of IEC 61970-452 , Core Equipment profile.
c) Added relevant terms used in this document.
d) Clarified use of Equipment.inService and Equipment.normallyInService.

IEC 61970-452:2021 defines the subset of classes, class attributes, and associations from the CIM necessary to execute state estimation and power flow applications between control centres and/or control centre components, such as power systems applications.
The North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) Data Exchange Working Group (DEWG) Common Power System Modelling group (CPSM) produced the original data requirements, which are shown in Annex F. These requirements are based on prior industry practices for exchanging power system model data for use primarily in planning studies. However, the list of required data has been extended starting with the first edition of this standard to facilitate a model exchange that includes parameters common to breaker-oriented applications. Where necessary this document establishes conventions, shown in Clause 6, with which an XML data file must comply in order to be considered valid for exchange of models.
The data exchange use cases which this standard is meant to support are described in Annex A. The idea of a modelling authority as the source responsible for the modeling of a given region is described in Annex B. The concept of a boundary between regions is explained in Annex C. Annex D explains the processing of multiple profiles such as the three profiles described in this standard. The use of different curve styles to define ReactiveCapabilityCurve-s is explained in Annex E.
This document is intended for two distinct audiences, data producers and data recipients, and may be read from two perspectives.
From the standpoint of model export software used by a data producer, this document describes a minimum subset of CIM classes, attributes, and associations which must be present in an XML formatted data file for model exchange. This document does not dictate how the network is modelled, however. It only dictates what classes, attributes, and associations are to be used to describe the source model as it exists.
This fourth edition cancels and replaces the third edition published in 2017. This edition constitutes a technical revision. It is based on the IEC 61970 UML version ‘IEC61970CIM17v40’, dated 2020-08-24.
This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) The classes PowerElectronicsConnection, PowerElectronicsUnit and PowerElectronicsWindUnit are added to the Core Equipment profile.

IEC 61970-600-2:2021 defines the profiles included in the Common Grid Model Exchange Standard (CGMES) that are based on IEC 61970-450-series and IEC 61968-13 profiles. This document refers to the IEC 61970-450-series and IEC 61968-13 profiles only in cases where they are identical. If the referenced profile is not yet published, this document includes the profile definition and related constraints’ definitions. In the case where a CGMES profile makes restriction on the referenced profile, the restriction is defined in this document.
The equipment boundary profile (EQBD) is the only profile that is not part of IEC 61970-450-series and IEC 61968-13 profiles. This profile is deprecated as modifications have been made to align between EQBP and the equipment profile (EQ). Although the updated EQBD is addressing the requirement that boundary also can be located inside a substation, which will be the case for many Distribution System Operators (DSOs), additional information would need to be exchanged. For instance, system integrity protection schemes, that can be shared by multiple utility would require another way of boundary handling. In this document EQBD is included in CGMES only to create better backwards compatibility with previous version of the CGMES.
The machine-readable documentation that supports model driven development of the profiles defined in this part are generated as Resource Description Framework Schema (RDFS) according to IEC 61970-501:2006 (with some extension) and IEC 61970-501:ED2 when published.

IEC 61970-600-1:2021 covers the definition of Common Grid Model Exchange Standard (CGMES), defines the main rules and application’s requirements to meet business requirements for assembled and merged model to fit relevant business services. This document does not define the business requirements, business processes nor how applications are implemented. This document defines how relevant Common Information Model (CIM) standards work together so that specific business requirements can be resolved.
It also includes extensions to the Common Information Model (CIM). The current extensions are defined in IEC 61970-301:2020 and will be covered in its future Amendment 1, but additional extensions can be defined in other standards in the IEC 61970-600-series. The extensions can be used to define additional profiles or to expand IEC 61970-450-series or IEC 61968-13 profiles. However, primary CGMES includes additional constraints on existing profiles and validation of assembled and merged models that is based on existing profiles. This can be done by making optional attributes and associations mandatory (required).
In addition, this document includes the specification of the serialisation that must be supported by referring to an existing standard defined in IEC 61970-550-series, e.g. IEC 61970-552, and making relevant constraints related to it.
The goal is to achieve interoperability between applications using CGMES in a high-performance environment with combined minimum effort so that relevant business processes are satisfied.
This first edition cancels and replaces IEC TS 61970-600-1 published in 2017. This edition constitutes a technical revision.

IEC 61968-3:2021 provides utilities with the means to supervise main substation topology (breaker and switch state), feeder topology and control equipment status through SCADA, AMI and other data sources. It also provides the means for handling network connectivity and loading conditions. Finally, it makes it possible for utilities to locate customer telephone complaints and coordinate activities of field crews with respect to planned and unplanned outages.
IEC 61968-3 specifies the information content of a set of message payloads that can be used to support many of the business functions related to network operations. Typical uses of the message payloads defined in IEC 61968-3 include data acquisition by external systems, fault isolation, fault restoration, trouble management and coordination of the real-time state of the network.
The scope illustrates the possibility of implementing IEC 61968-3 functionality as either a single integrated advanced distribution management system or as a set of separate functions – OMS, DMS and SCADA. Utilities may choose to buy these systems from different vendors and integrate them using the IEC 61968-3 messages. Alternatively, a single vendor could provide two or all of these components as a single integrated system. In the case of more than one system being provided by the same vendor, the vendor may choose to use either extensions of the IEC 61968 messages or a proprietary integration mechanism to provide enhanced functionality over and above what is required/supported by the IEC 61968-3 specification. While this is a possible implementation, Subclause 4.3 defines the scope in terms of business functions that are implemented in common vendor offerings.
Annexes in this document detail integration scenarios or use cases, which are informative examples showing typical ways of using the message payloads defined in this document as well as message payloads to be defined in other parts of the IEC 61968 series
This third edition cancels and replaces the second edition published in 2017. This edition constitutes a technical revision.
This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) major rework of Switch Order related profiles and Outage related profiles;
b) documented profiles in more detail as a result of the analysis of end-to-end use cases;
c) separated Measurement and Control profile into two profiles: PSRMeasurements and PSRControls;
d) replaced Temporary Network Change profile with SwitchingEvents profile;
e) added MeasurementAction, ControlAction, GenericAction and VerificationAction to SwitchingPlans profile. Added examples;
f) added SwitchingActions profile to support the coordination of SwitchingPlan execution between control room and the field crew;
g) added ClampAction to SwitchingPlan, SwitchingAction and SwitchingEvent profiles, to allow clamps to be placed and removed independently of jumpers;
h) separated OutagesAndFaults profile into UnplannedOutages, PlannedOutages, EquipmentFaults, LineFaults;
i) added list of energized and de-energized UsagePoints to the UnplannedOutages profile;
j) added PlannedOutages profile;
k) added PlannedOutageNotifications profile;
l) added SwitchingPlanRequest profile to replace OutageSchedules profile;
m) expanded TroubleOrders profile to include UnplannedOutages and TroubleTickets and to allow crews to be scheduled to individual tasks within the TroubleOrder;
n) expanded use cases and sequence diagrams;
o) sequence diagrams updated to use IEC 61968-100 message patterns;
p) use cases in IEC 62559-2 use case template;
q) added example XML for profiles;
r) replaced xsd in Annex with tables to document the profiles in a serialisation-independent form;
s) clarified FLISR use case to include interactions between DSO and TSO per review comments from Edition 2.
t) removed OperationalTags since it is now part of the TagAction in the SwitchingEvents payload

IEC TR 61850-7-5:2021, which is a technical report, establishes modelling concepts that help the user to understand how to apply the models defined in IEC 61850-7-4 and IEC 61850-7-3 to implement practical applications.
This document provides the basic concepts that are valid for all application domains using IEC 61850. Domain specific concepts are defined in other technical reports as in the document range of IEC 61850-7-5xx; as an example, IEC 61850-7-500 describes modelling concepts for functions related to substation automation.
On one side the number of potential topics for cross-domain modelling may be very high but on the other side it may be limited by domain specific restrictions often created by the historical evolution of IEC 61850 in the domains.
The first topic selected is the common control of power utility primary objects by means of the power utility automation systems based mainly on the long experience in substation automation systems. Common attributes for reliable power utility automation systems in all domains are quality and health. A special function having a broad application range in power utility automation systems is the scheduling of services as provided by the domain distributed energy resources (DER) used in smart grids, especially also for electric mobility. Not yet so much discussed in the context of IEC 61850 but very important for all IEDs is the impact of restart (power cycle) on the data model parameters. Non-agreed behaviour will raise problems for interoperability in multi-vendor systems.

IEC 62488-3:2021 applies to power line carrier terminals and networks used to transmit information over power networks including extra high, high and medium voltage (EHV/HV/MV) power lines using both digital and optionally analogue modulation systems in a frequency range between 16 kHz and 1 MHz (see also IEC 62488-1).
In many countries, power line carrier (PLC) channels represent a significant part of the utility-owned telecommunication system. A circuit normally routed via a PLC channel can also be routed via a channel using a different transmission medium such as point to point radio, optical fibre or open wire circuit.
It is therefore important that the input and output interfaces that are used between terminals in the communication system are standardised.
The issues requiring consideration of DPLC and/or APLC devices as parts of a telecommunication network can be found in IEC 62488-1.
The scope of this document also includes the description of I/O interfaces and test set-ups that are necessary to qualify characteristics of DPLC or ADPLC terminal at link level.

IEC 61968-13:2021 specifies profiles that can be used to exchange Network Models in a Utility or between a Utility and external applications to the utility. This document provides a list of profiles which allow to model balanced and unbalanced distribution networks in order to conduct network analysis (Power flow calculation). Therefore it leverages already existing profiles (IEC 61970-45x based on IEC 61970-301 (CIM base) or profiles based on IEC 61968­11 CIM extension for Distribution). This document reuses some profiles without any change, or eventually extends them or restricts them. Moreover it proposes other profiles to reflect Distribution needs.
Use of CIM in Distribution is not a new topic. This document includes informative parts, as CIM model extensions, which could be integrated in future versions of the IEC CIM Model. These extensions have been used by some utilities for utility internal information exchange use cases and to support information exchanges between different market participants like Transmisstion System Operators (TSO), Distributed System Operators (DSO), Distributed Network Operators (DNO) and Significant Grid Users (SGU) including generators and industry.
This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2008. This edition constitutes a technical revision. This edition was pre-tested during 2016 ENTSO-E interoperability tests. The interoperability test report mentions: "Some vendors demonstrated that the transformation between distribution network and CGMES is possible. This is a first step towards the efforts to have closer integration between CGMES and profiles for exchanging distribution data (CDPSM)."

IEC 61970-457:2021 specifies a standard interface for exchanging dynamic model information needed to support the analysis of the steady state stability (small-signal stability) and/or transient stability of a power system or parts of it. The schema(s) for expressing the dynamic model information are derived directly from the CIM, more specifically from IEC 61970-302.
The scope of this document includes only the dynamic model information that needs to be exchanged as part of a dynamic study, namely the type, description and parameters of each control equipment associated with a piece of power system equipment included in the steady state solution of a complete power system network model. Therefore, this profile is dependent upon other standard profiles for the equipment as specified in IEC 61970-452, CIM static transmission network model profiles, the topology, the steady state hypothesis and the steady-state solution (as specified in IEC 61970-456, Solved power system state profiles) of the power system, which bounds the scope of the exchange. The profile information described by this document needs to be exchanged in conjunction with IEC 61970-452 and IEC 61970-456 profiles’ information to support the data requirements of transient analysis tools. IEC 61970 456 provides a detailed description of how different profile standards can be combined to form various types of power system network model exchanges.
This document supports the exchange of the following types of dynamic models:
• standard models: a simplified approach to exchange, where models are contained in predefined libraries of classes interconnected in a standard manner that represent dynamic behaviour of elements of the power system. The exchange only indicates the name of the model along with the attributes needed to describe its behaviour.
• proprietary user-defined models: an exchange that would provide users the ability to exchange the parameters of a model representing a vendor or user proprietary device where an explicit description of the model is not described in this document. The connections between the proprietary models and standard models are the same as described for the standard models exchange. Recipient of the data exchange will need to contact the sender for the behavioural details of the model.
This document builds on IEC 61970-302, CIM for dynamics which defines the descriptions of the standard dynamic models, their function block diagrams, and how they are interconnected and associated with the static network model. This type of model information is assumed to be pre-stored by all software applications hence it is not necessary to be exchanged in real-time or as part of a dynamics model exchange.

IEC TR 62351-90-3:2021, which is a technical report, provides guidelines for efficiently handling both IT and OT data in terms of their monitoring, classification and correlations on them to deduce any possible useful outcomes about the state of the power system.
The convergence of information technologies (IT) and operational technologies (OT) refers to the integration of the systems, processes and data associated with the domains of IT and OT. This document provides guidelines for a comprehensive security monitoring for power grid components based on IT/OT convergent systems. The emphasis is about the development of a methodology and a set of recommendations for utility operators to build a general monitoring framework based on the analysis of the data collected from different IT and OT systems through network management, traffic inspection, and system activity readings. As such, the monitoring framework that this document introduces relies on the integration of management and logging information obtained using IEC 62351-7 and IEC 62351-14, respectively. Further systems and data sources from IT and OT would be considered such as the data obtained, for instance, through the IT network management using the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP), the passive network monitoring, and the functional characterization of control and automation processes.
This document's recommendations include the implementation of data collection, filtering and correlation mechanisms. The development of data analytics algorithms is out of the scope of this document and would be left to utility operators and owners. Finally, applications of the general monitoring framework guidelines and recommendations are provided for different power grid environments, namely for IEC 61850 substations and for Distributed Energy Resources (DER) systems.

IEC TR 61850-90-13:2021(E), which is a Technical Report, provides information, use cases, and guidance on whether and how to use deterministic networking technologies. Furthermore, this document comprises technology descriptions, provides guidance how to achieve compatibility and interoperability with existing technologies, and lays out migration paths. It will separate the problem statement from the possible solutions.

IEC 62351-6:2020 specifies messages, procedures, and algorithms for securing the operation of all protocols based on or derived from the IEC 61850 series. This document applies to at least those protocols listed below:
IEC 61850-8-1 Communication networks and systems for power utility automation – Part 8-1: Specific communication service mapping (SCSM) – Mappings to MMS (ISO/IEC 9506-1 and ISO/IEC 9506-2) and to ISO/IEC 8802-3
IEC 61850-8-2 Communication networks and systems for power utility automation – Part 8-2: Specific communication service mapping (SCSM) – Mapping to Extensible Messaging Presence Protocol (XMPP)
IEC 61850-9-2 Communication networks and systems for power utility automation – Part 9-2: Specific communication service mapping (SCSM) – Sampled values over ISO/IEC 8802-3
IEC 61850-6 Communication networks and systems for power utility automation – Part 6: Configuration description language for communication in power utility automation systems related to IEDs
The initial audience for this document is intended to be the members of the working groups developing or making use of the protocols listed in Table 1. For the measures described in this specification to take effect, they must be accepted and referenced by the specifications for the protocols themselves. This document is written to enable that process.
The subsequent audience for this document is intended to be the developers of products that implement these protocols.
Portions of this document may also be of use to managers and executives in order to understand the purpose and requirements of the work.

IEC 61968-5:2020 is the description of a set of functions that are needed for enterprise integration of DERMS functions. These exchanges are most likely between a DERMS and a DMS. However, since this is an enterprise integration standard which may leverage IEC 61968-100:2013 for application integration (using web services or JMS) or other loosely-coupled implementations, there are no technical limitations for systems with which a DERMS might exchange information. Also, it should be noted that a DERMS might communicate with individual DER using a variety of standards and protocols such as IEC 61850, IEEE 2030.5, Distribution Network Protocol (DNP), Sunspec Modbus, or perhaps Open Field Message Bus (OpenFMB). One role of the DERMS is to manage this disparity and complexity of communications on the behalf of the system operator. However, the communication to individual DER is out of scope of this standard. Readers should look to those standards to understand communication to individual DER’s smart inverter.
The scope will be limited to the following use case categories:
• DER group creation – a mechanism to manage DER in aggregate
• DER group maintenance – a mechanism to add, remove, or modify the members and/or aggregated capabilities of a given group of DER
• DER group deletion – removing an entire group
• DER group status monitoring – a mechanism for quantifying or ascertaining the current capabilities and/or status of a group of DER
• DER group forecast – a mechanism for predicting the capabilities and/or status of a group of DER for a given time period in the future
• DER group dispatch – a mechanism for requesting that specified capabilities of a group of DER be dispatched to the grid
• DER group voltage ramp rate control – a mechanism for requesting that a DER group following a ramp rate curve
• DER group connect/disconnect – a mechanism to request that DER either isolate themselves, or reconnect to the grid as needed.

IEC TR 61850-90-12:2020, which is a Technical Report, is intended for an audience familiar with electrical power automation based on IEC 61850 and related power system management, and particularly for data network engineers and system integrators. It is intended to help them to understand the technologies, configure a wide area network, define requirements, write specifications, select components, and conduct tests.
This document provides definitions, guidelines, and recommendations for the engineering of WANs, in particular for protection, control and monitoring based on IEC 61850 and related standards.
This document addresses substation-to-substation communication, substation-to-control centre, and control centre-to-control centre communication. In particular, this document addresses the most critical aspects of IEC 61850 such as protection related data transmission via GOOSE and SMVs, and the multicast transfer of large volumes of synchrophasor data.
The document addresses issues such as topology, redundancy, traffic latency and quality of service, traffic management, clock synchronization, security, and maintenance of the network.
This document contains use cases that show how utilities tackle their WAN engineering. This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2015. This edition constitutes a technical revision.
This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) extension of use case with respect to distribution and customer-side applications;
b) extensions of wireless access technologies as well as power line communication ones applicable to the above-mentioned use case;
c) revisions regarding radio communication technology performance;
d) extension of network migration with respect to packet switched network;
e) a new mapping of multiprotocol label switching technology to teleprotection.

IEC 61970-301:2020 lays down the common information model (CIM), which is an abstract model that represents all the major objects in an electric utility enterprise typically involved in utility operations. By providing a standard way of representing power system resources as object classes and attributes, along with their relationships, the CIM facilitates the integration of network applications developed independently by different vendors, between entire systems running network applications developed independently, or between a system running network applications and other systems concerned with different aspects of power system operations, such as generation or distribution management. SCADA is modeled to the extent necessary to support power system simulation and inter-control centre communication. The CIM facilitates integration by defining a common language (i.e. semantics) based on the CIM to enable these applications or systems to access public data and exchange information independent of how such information is represented internally.
This edition reflects the model content version ‘IEC61970CIM17v38’, dated ‘2020-01-21’, and includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) Added Feeder modelling;
b) Added ICCP configuration modelling;
c) Correction of issues found in interoperability testing or use of the standard;
d) Improved documentation;
e) Updated Annex A with custom extensions;
f) Added Annex B Examples of PST transformer modelling;
g) Added Annex C HVDC use cases.

IEC TS 61850-1-2:2020, which is a technical specification, is intended for any users but primarily for standardization bodies that are considering using IEC 61850 as a base standard within the scope of their work and are willing to extend it as allowed by the IEC 61850 standards. This document identifies the required steps and high-level requirements in achieving such extensions of IEC 61850 and provides guidelines for the individual steps.
Within that scope, this document addresses the following cases:
• The management of product-level standards for products that have an interface based on IEC 61850
• The management of domain-level standards based on IEC 61850
• The management of transitional standards based on IEC 61850
• The management of private namespaces based on IEC 61850
• The development of standards offering the mapping of IEC 61850 data model at CDC level
• The development and management of IEC 61850 profiles for domains (underlying the role of IEC TR 62361-103 and IEC TR 61850-7-6)
This document includes both technical and process aspects:
On the technical side, this document:
• Reminds the main basic requirements (mostly referring to the appropriate parts of the series which host the requirements or recommendations)
• Lists all possible flexibilities offered by the standards
• Defines which flexibilities are allowed/possible per type of extension cases
On the process side, the document covers:
• The initial analysis of how the existing IEC 61850 object models and/or communication services may be applied and what allowed extensions may be required for utilizing them in new or specific domains (including private ones). The results of that step are expected to be documented
• The extension of the IEC 61850 object models for new domains. The typical associated work is to identify existing logical nodes which can be reused "as is", to determine if existing logical nodes can be extended, or to define new logical nodes
• The purpose and process to use transitional namespaces, which are expected to be merged eventually into an existing standard namespace
• The management of standard namespaces
• The development of private namespaces

IEC 61968-1:2020 is the first in a series that, taken as a whole, defines interfaces for the major elements of an interface architecture for power system management and associated information exchange.
This document identifies and establishes recommendations for standard interfaces based on an Interface Reference Model (IRM). Subsequent clauses of this document are based on each interface identified in the IRM. This set of standards is limited to the definition of interfaces. They provide for interoperability among different computer systems, platforms, and languages. IEC 61968-100 gives recommendations for methods and technologies to be used to implement functionality conforming to these interfaces.
As used in IEC 61968, distribution management consists of various distributed application components for the utility to manage electrical distribution networks. These capabilities include monitoring and control of equipment for power delivery, management processes to ensure system reliability, voltage management, demand-side management, outage management, work management, network model management, facilities management, and metering. The IRM is specified in Clause 3. The IRM defines the high-level view of the TC 57 reference architecture and the detailed in the relevant 61968 series, 61970 series or 62325 series. The goal of the IRM is to provide a common relevant context view for TC 57 that covers domains like transmission, distribution, market, generation, consumer, regional reliability operators, and regulators.
This third edition cancels and replaces the second edition published in 2012. This edition constitutes a technical revision.
This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) update of IRM section, which has been out of date since the 2nd edition;
b) update to IRM model using ArchiMate modelling language;
c) addition of missing business functions and business objects;
d) alignment with newly released documents from the technical committee;
e) alignment with IEC 61968-100;
f) update of annexes.

IEC 61850-7-4:2010 specifies the information model of devices and functions generally related to common use regarding applications in systems for power utility automation. It also contains the information model of devices and function-related applications in substations. In particular, it specifies the compatible logical node names and data object names for communication between intelligent electronic devices (IED). This includes the relationship between logical nodes and data objects. Major technical changes with regard to the previous edition are as follows:
- corrections and clarifications according to technical issues raised by the users' community; extensions for new logical nodes for the power quality domain;
- extensions for the model for statistical and historical statistical data;
- extensions regarding IEC 61850-90-1;
- extensions for new logical nodes for monitoring functions according to IEC 62271;
- new logical nodes from IEC 61850-7-410 and IEC 61850-7-420 of general interest.
This publication is of core relevance for Smart Grid.

IEC 62351-100-3:2020, which is a technical specification, describes test cases of data and communication security for telecontrol equipment, Substation Automation Systems [SAS] and telecontrol systems, including front-end functions of SCADA.
The goal of this document is to enable interoperability by providing a standard method of testing protocol implementations to verify that a device fulfils the requirement of IEC 62351-3. Note that conformity to IEC 62351-3 does not guarantee interoperability between devices using different implementations. It is expected that using this specification during testing will minimize the risk of non-interoperability. A basic condition for this interoperability is a passed conformance test of both devices.
The scope of this document is the specification of common available procedures and definitions for conformance and/or interoperability testing to ensure conformity to IEC 62351-3. The conformance test cases defined here are focused to verify the conformant integration of the underlying authentication/encryption protocol (TLS), as specified in IEC 62351-3, to protect TCP/IP based communications.
This document is not intended to test the underlying authentication/encryption protocol required by IEC 62351-3 to be implemented over TCP/IP (TLS). The conformance testing of the authentication/encryption protocol over TCP/IP is outside the scope of this document.
This document deals with data and communication security conformance testing; therefore, other requirements, such as safety or EMC are not covered. These requirements are covered by other standards (if applicable) and the proof of compliance for these topics is done according to these standards.

IEC TS 61850-2:2019 (E) contains the glossary of specific terms and definitions used in the context of Substation Automation Systems which are standardized in the various parts of the IEC 61850 series.
This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition, published in 2003. This edition constitutes a technical revision. This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) definition of new definitions used in the new edition of the IEC 61850 standard series;
b) updating of existing definitions to the new domain power utility automation of the IEC 61850 standard series and to provide homogeneity
c) removal of deprecated definitions (logical device class; generic system state event; substation automation system);
d) provision of clarifications and corrections to the first edition of IEC 61850-2.
This publication is of core relevance for Smart Grid

IEC 62357-2:2019 (E), which is a technical report, establishes the list of Use Cases developed by TC 57, Power systems management and associated information exchanges, in order to prepare International Standards, Technical Reports and Technical Specifications. Use Cases are fundamental to TC 57 publications This Technical Report:
• Identifies in existing standards, technical specification, reports and in ongoing TC 57 work (CD, DTS, DTR etc.) the Use Cases used as well as their links to standards, their status as Use Cases (level of description, standardization of the description referring to IEC 62559) and as IEC deliverables (are they in a TR/TS/IS, what is the status of the document CD, CDV etc.)
• Helps System Committees consolidate Use Cases through terminology and term definition work (link with existing relevant standards on the TC Terminology) and building links between roles and modelling frameworks (Role models). For example in TC 57 building links between the Use Case methodology and the roles used in IEC 62913-2 with CIM Interface Reference Model (IRM – IEC 61968).
• Shares and promotes those Use Cases within TC 57 and outside it. TC 57 mainly describes System Use Cases in the standards it publishes. Business roles and business Use Cases are mainly described within SyC SE (System Committee Smart Energy) deliverables (IEC 62559 series and IEC 62913 series).
• This document provides good input in reusing System Use Cases and System Roles inside and outside TC 57.
• Explains the content of its Use Cases to potential users and providing support on using those Use Cases for standardization (Normative context, maturity of the Use Case, location in standardization work, roles implied)
Those Use Cases aimed to be used as tools to identify requirements as input to further development of technical standards (whether TC 57 or not) and improve the consistency in this work and in that way contribute to interoperability. Use Cases facilitate cooperation at a system level with TCs, other standards-developing organizations, non-traditional players of electrotechnology, and regional organizations. Inside the IEC they provide a convergence platform with overall system level value for support of the Technical Committees and other standard development groups.
This document allows TC 57 to self-assess its work on Use Cases through KPIs (Key Performance Indicator) such as:
• % of Use Cases compliant with IEC 62559-2
• % of Business Use Cases (BUC) and System Use Cases (SUC)
• % of Business Roles and System Roles

IEC 61968:2019 specifies the information content of a set of message types that can be used to support many of the business functions related to records and asset management. Typical uses of the message types defined in this document include network extension planning, copying feeder or other network data between systems, network or diagram edits and asset inspection. Message types defined in other parts of IEC 61968 may also be relevant to these use cases.
This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition published in 2007. This edition constitutes a technical revision. This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) removal of edition 1 profiles whose functionality has been superseded by other parts of IEC 61970 and IEC 61968 standards. In particular, NetworkDataSet and ChangeSet have been superseded by standards such as CDPSM (IEC 61968-13) and other ongoing efforts such as change modelling; and Presentation has been superseded by Diagram Layout Profile (IEC 61970-453);
b) revision of the edition 1 profiles AssetList, AssetCatalogue and TypeAssetCatalogue to realign with current use cases and the latest CIM UML release. These profiles are based on an old version of CIM UML and many of the classes in these profiles are no longer in the recent CIM UMLs;
c) addition of several new profiles to enable the exchange of asset condition data, analytics results and alerts, assets' physical, functional and lifecycle details, and assets' work;
d) informative annexes on how this document can be used to enable strategic asset management;
e) informative annexes with illustrative examples for the application of this document;
f) scope coordinated with IEC 61968-13 where applicable;
g) use cases in IEC 62559-2 use case template;
h) traceability of use cases to IEC 62913-2-1 use cases.

IEC TR 61850-7-6:2019(E), which is a technical report, is focused on building application / function profiles and specifies a methodology to define Basic Application Profiles (BAPs). These Basic Application Profiles provide a framework for interoperable interaction within or between typical substation automation functions. BAPs are intended to define a subset of features of IEC 61850 in order to facilitate interoperability in a modular way in practical applications.
It is the intention of this document to provide a common and generic way to describe the functional behaviour of a specific application function in the domain of power utility automation systems as a common denominator of various possible interpretations/implementations of using IEC 61850.

EC 61850-8-2:2018 specifies a method of exchanging data through any kinds of network, including public networks. Among the various kinds of services specified in IEC 61850-7-2, only the client/server and time synchronization services are considered so far.
NOTE Client/server services of GOOSE and SMV models are mapped as well.
For the client/server services, the principle is to map the objects and services of the ACSI (Abstract Communication Service Interface defined in IEC 61850-7-2) to XML messages transported over XMPP. The mapping description includes mainly three aspects:
• The usage of the XMPP protocol itself, describing in details which features are really used and how they are used by the mapping.
• How to achieve end-to-end secured communications.
• The description of the XML payloads corresponding to each ACSI service thanks in particular to the XML Schema and XML message examples.

IEC 62351:2018 specifies security requirements both at the transport layer and at the application layer. While IEC TS 62351-4:2007 primarily provided some limited support at the application layer for authentication during handshake for the Manufacturing Message Specification (MMS) based applications, this document provides support for extended integrity and authentication both for the handshake phase and for the data transfer phase. It provides for shared key management and data transfer encryption at the application layer and it provides security end-to-end (E2E) with zero or more intermediate entities. While IEC TS 62351-4:2007 only provides support for systems based on the MMS, i.e. systems using an Open Systems Interworking (OSI) protocol stack, this document provides support for application protocols using other protocol stacks, e.g. an Internet protocol suite. This support is extended to protect application protocols using XML encoding. This extended security at the application layer is referred to as E2E-security. In addition to E2E security, this part of IEC 62351 also provides mapping to environmental protocols carrying the security related information. Only OSI and XMPP environments are currently considered.

IEC TS 62351-100-1:2018(E), which is a technical specification, describes test cases of data and communication security for telecontrol equipment, substation automation systems (SAS) and telecontrol systems, including front-end functions of SCADA.
The goal of this document is to enable interoperability by providing a standard method of testing protocol implementations to verify that a device fulfils the requirement of the standard. Note that conformity to the standard does not guarantee interoperability between devices using different implementations. It is expected that using this specification during testing will minimize the risk of non-interoperability. A basic condition for this interoperability is a passed conformance test of both devices.
The scope of this document is to specify commonly available procedures and definitions for conformance and/or interoperability testing of IEC TS 62351-5 and IEC TS 60870-5-7. The conformance test cases defined herein are focused to verify the conformant integration of the underlying authentication, as specified in IEC TS 62351-5 and IEC TS 60870-5-7, to protect IEC 60870-5-101 and IEC 6870-5-104-based communications.
This document deals with data and communication security conformance testing; therefore, other requirements, such as safety or EMC, are not covered. These requirements are covered by other standards (if applicable) and the proof of compliance for these topics is done according to these standards.

IEC TR 62351-90-2:2018, which is a technical report, addresses the need to perform Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) on communication channels secured by IEC 62351. The main focus is the illustration of the state-of-the art of DPI techniques that can be applied to the various kinds of channels, highlighting the possible security risks and implementation costs. Additional, beyond state-of-the-art proposals are also described in order to circumvent the main limits of existing solutions.
It is to be noted that some communications secured by IEC 62351 are not encrypted, but only add integrity and non-repudiation of the message – however they are mentioned here for the sake of completeness around IEC 62351 and DPI

IEC 62325-503:2018 specifies a standard for a communication platform which every Transmission System Operator (TSO) in Europe can use to exchange reliably and securely documents for the energy market. Consequently a European market participant (TSO, regional supervision centre, distribution utility, power exchange, etc.) could benefit from a single, common, harmonised and secure platform for message exchange with other participants; thus, reducing the cost of building different information technology (IT) platforms to interface with all the parties involved. This edition cancels and replaces IEC TS 62325-503 published in 2014.
This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) Use of ISO/IEC 19464:2014, Advanced Message Queuing Protocol (AMQP) v1.0 specification;
b) Splitting of the node described in the IEC TS 62325-503:2014 into a broker that implements the messaging function and a directory;
c) Increase of operability and resilience of the communication system with the ability for an endpoint to send and receive messages through several brokers;
d) Benefits of standardisation, performance and scalability of the AMQP protocol for transferring messages.