Cybersecurity aspects of devices used for power metering and monitoring, power quality monitoring, data collection and analysis

IEC TS 63383:2022 deals with cybersecurity related to measuring devices (PMD according to IEC 61557-12 and PQI according to IEC 62586-1) and devices for data collection (devices according to IEC 62974-1) that are intended to be installed in restricted access areas.
This document deals with cybersecurity aspects (e.g. device hardening or device resilience) of device(s) used for power metering and monitoring, power quality monitoring, data collection and analysis, but does not cover requirements for organisational cybersecurity (e.g. end-user security policy).
This document is a first attempt to develop awareness by manufacturers and other relevant stakeholders about cybersecurity aspects and provide basic guidance for achieving the appropriate security mitigation against vulnerabilities to security threats:
– in coherence with device/system approaches described in relevant standards such as IEC 62443 (all parts) and ISO/IEC 27001,
– based on generic system use-cases.
This document does not cover billing meters covered by the IEC 62053-2x set of standards.

General Information

Status
Published
Publication Date
22-Nov-2022
Current Stage
PPUB - Publication issued
Start Date
30-Dec-2022
Completion Date
23-Nov-2022
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IEC TS 63383
®

Edition 1.0 2022-11
TECHNICAL
SPECIFICATION

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Cybersecurity aspects of devices used for power metering and monitoring,
power quality monitoring, data collection and analysis
IEC TS 63383:2022-11(en)

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IEC TS 63383

®


Edition 1.0 2022-11




TECHNICAL



SPECIFICATION








colour

inside










Cybersecurity aspects of devices used for power metering and monitoring,

power quality monitoring, data collection and analysis


























INTERNATIONAL

ELECTROTECHNICAL


COMMISSION





ICS 17.220.20; 29.240.01 ISBN 978-2-8322-6115-6



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® Registered trademark of the International Electrotechnical Commission

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– 2 – IEC TS 63383:2022 © IEC 2022
CONTENTS
FOREWORD . 4
INTRODUCTION . 6
1 Scope . 7
2 Normative references . 7
3 Terms, definitions, symbols and abbreviated terms . 7
3.1 Definitions related to cybersecurity . 7
3.2 Definitions related to devices . 11
3.3 Symbols and abbreviated terms . 12
4 Security objectives . 13
5 Cybersecurity risk assessment (generic approach) . 13
5.1 Risk assessment . 13
5.2 Risk management . 14
5.2.1 General . 14
5.2.2 Examples of metrics . 14
5.2.3 Examples for prioritization . 15
6 Requirements . 15
6.1 Overview. 15
6.2 Requirements for risk assessment . 16
6.3 Requirements for countermeasures . 17
6.4 Requirements for testing . 17
6.5 Requirements for lifecycle security management . 18
6.6 Requirements for instructions of use . 18
Annex A (informative) Example of generic risk assessment for PMDs, PQIs, data
gateways (DGW), energy data loggers (EDL) and energy servers (ESE) . 19
A.1 General . 19
A.2 Generic roles . 19
A.3 Generic system use-case . 19
A.4 Generic functions achieved by devices within a system . 20
A.4.1 PMD and PQI devices . 20
A.4.2 Data gateways (DGW), energy data loggers (EDL), energy servers
(ESE) . 21
A.5 Generic assessment of devices within the system . 22
A.5.1 Generic list of feared events . 22
A.5.2 Generic list of device-feared events . 23
A.5.3 Generic list of accesses allowing potential vulnerabilities . 25
A.5.4 Generic list of device accesses allowing potential vulnerabilities . 26
Annex B (informative) Example of generic countermeasures . 27
B.1 General . 27
B.2 Recommendations for manufacturers during design phase . 27
B.3 Recommendations for manufacturers during manufacturing . 27
B.4 Recommendations for manufacturers putting devices on the market . 27
B.5 Recommendations for integrators building systems within facilities . 27
B.6 Recommendations for commissioning . 27
B.7 Recommendations for facility managers operating systems within facilities . 28
B.8 Recommendations for facility managers during maintenance . 28
B.9 Recommendations for facility managers during de-commissioning . 28

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IEC TS 63383:2022 © IEC 2022 – 3 –
B.10 Recommendations for facility managers during disposal . 28
Bibliography . 29

Figure 1 – Generic examples for classification of device(s) within an organisational
environment . 13
Figure 2 – Typical graph of acceptable and non-acceptable risks . 15
Figure 3 – Requirements in 5 phases . 16
Figure 4 – Examples of device accesses . 17
Figure A.1 – Example of generic system use-case . 20
Figure A.2 – Example of data processing within DGW, EDL and ESE . 22
Figure A.3 – Example of device assets together with its interfaces . 26

Table 1 – Example of a simple 3 × 3 risk matrix . 15
Table A.1 – Example of generic roles . 19
Table A.2 – Kind of data measured by PMD and PQI . 21
Table A.3 – Generic device feared events (potential security problems) . 23
Table A.4 – Generic device-feared events (security problems) definition . 24
Table A.5 – Generic example of device accesses . 26

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– 4 – IEC TS 63383:2022 © IEC 2022
INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION
____________

CYBERSECURITY ASPECTS OF DEVICES USED
FOR POWER METERING AND MONITORING, POWER QUALITY
MONITORING, DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

FOREWORD
1) The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) is a worldwide organization for standardization comprising
all national electrotechnical committees (IEC National Committees). The object of IEC is to promote international
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rights. IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.
IEC TS 63383 has been prepared by IEC technical committee 85: Measuring equipment for
electrical and electromagnetic quantities. It is a Technical Specification.
The text of this Technical Specification is based on the following documents:
Draft Report on voting
85/832/DTS 85/839/RVDTS

Full information on the voting for its approval can be found in the report on voting indicated in
the above table.
The language used for the development of this Technical Specification is English.
This document was drafted in accordance with ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2, and developed in
accordance with ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1 and ISO/IEC Directives, IEC Supplement, available
at www.iec.ch/members_experts/refdocs. The main document types developed by IEC are
described in greater detail at www.iec.ch/publications.

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IEC TS 63383:2022 © IEC 2022 – 5 –
The committee has decided that the contents of this document will remain unchanged until the
stability date indicated on the IEC website under webstore.iec.ch in the data related to the
specific document. At this date, the document will be
• reconfirmed,
• withdrawn,
• replaced by a revised edition, or
• amended.

IMPORTANT – The "colour inside" logo on the cover page of this document indicates that it
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– 6 – IEC TS 63383:2022 © IEC 2022
INTRODUCTION
This publication can be regarded as a generic document to be referenced for cybersecurity
aspects within other TC 85 publications. It contains general information for measuring
equipment and related systems used in low-voltage applications for which cybersecurity can be
a concern.
The growing use of measuring devices (e.g. power metering and monitoring devices as defined
in IEC 61557-12:2018), power quality instruments (defined in IEC 62586-1:2017) and data
collection, gathering and analysis devices (e.g. gateways, energy servers, as defined in
IEC 62974-1:2017) is being accompanied by a growing increase in cybersecurity risks. This is
enhanced by the growing use of interconnected devices in electrical installations.
Thus, maintenance of an acceptable information level for devices and environmental policy
should be considered by facility managers to limit the risks. To keep the largest freedom of
innovation, good practices when designing devices to withstand cybersecurity threats during its
whole lifecycle are preferably based on a risk assessment approach.
This document uses British spelling.
This document follows IEC Guide 120:2018.

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IEC TS 63383:2022 © IEC 2022 – 7 –
CYBERSECURITY ASPECTS OF DEVICES USED
FOR POWER METERING AND MONITORING, POWER QUALITY
MONITORING, DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS



1 Scope
This document deals with cybersecurity related to measuring devices (PMD according to
IEC 61557-12 and PQI according to IEC 62586-1) and devices for data collection (devices
according to IEC 62974-1) that are intended to be installed in restricted access areas.
This document deals with cybersecurity aspects (e.g. device hardening or device resilience) of
device(s) used for power metering and monitoring, power quality monitoring, data collection and
analysis, but does not cover requirements for organisational cybersecurity (e.g. end-user
security policy).
NOTE Organisational cybersecurity is essential for trustworthy operation of the device(s).
This document is a first attempt to develop awareness by manufacturers and other relevant
stakeholders about cybersecurity aspects and provide basic guidance for achieving the
appropriate security mitigation against vulnerabilities to security threats:
– in coherence with device/system approaches described in relevant standards such as
IEC 62443 (all parts) and ISO/IEC 27001,
– based on generic system use-cases.
This document does not cover billing meters covered by the IEC 62053-2x set of standards.
2 Normative references
There are no normative references in this document.
3 Terms, definitions, symbols and abbreviated terms
For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.
ISO and IEC maintain terminological databases for use in standardization at the following
addresses:
• IEC Electropedia: available at http://www.electropedia.org/
• ISO Online browsing platform: available at http://www.iso.org/obp
3.1 Definitions related to cybersecurity
3.1.1
assets
entities that the owner of a component presumably places value upon
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009, 3.1.2, modified – In the definition, "TOE" has been replaced
with "component".]

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– 8 – IEC TS 63383:2022 © IEC 2022
3.1.2
attack
attempt to destroy, expose, alter, disable, steal or gain unauthorized access to or make
unauthorized use of an asset
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 27000:2018, 3.2]
3.1.3
attack vector
path or means by which an attacker can gain access to a device in order to generate an attack
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 27032:2012, 4.10, modified – In the definition, "computer or network server"
replaced with "device" and "deliver a malicious outcome" with "generate an attack".]
3.1.4
authenticity
property that an entity is what it claims to be
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 27000:2018, 3.6]
3.1.5
availability
property of being accessible and usable on demand by an authorized entity
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 27000:2018, 3.7]
3.1.6
component
smallest selectable set of elements on which requirements may be based
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009, 3.1.12]
3.1.7
confidentiality
property that information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities,
or processes
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 27000:2018, 3.10]
3.1.8
control
measure that is modifying the risk
Note 1 to entry: Controls include any process, policy, device, practice, or other actions which modify risk.
Note 2 to entry: It is possible that controls do not always exert the intended or assumed modifying effect.
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 27000:2018, 3.14]

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IEC TS 63383:2022 © IEC 2022 – 9 –
3.1.9
countermeasure
action, device, procedure, or technique that reduces a threat, a vulnerability, or an attack by
eliminating or preventing it, by minimizing the harm it can cause, or by discovering and reporting
it so that corrective action can be taken
Note 1 to entry: Other terms such as "measures", "means", "controls" or "mitigations", are also used in other
standards instead of "countermeasures".
[SOURCE: IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, 3.2.33, modified – The Note has been deleted and a new
Note to entry has been added.]
3.1.10
cybersecurity
actions required to preclude unauthorized use of, denial of service to, modifications to,
disclosure of, loss of revenue from, or destruction of critical systems or informational assets
Note 1 to entry: The objective is to reduce the risk of causing personal injury or endangering public health, losing
public or consumer confidence, disclosing sensitive assets, failing to protect business assets or failing to comply
with regulations. These concepts are applied to any system in the production process and include both stand-alone
and networked components. Communications between systems may be either through internal messaging or by any
human or machine interfaces that authenticate, operate, control, or exchange data with any of these control systems.
Cybersecurity includes the concepts of identification, authentication, accountability, authorization, availability, and
privacy.
[SOURCE: IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009, 3.2.36]
3.1.11
debug interface
physical interface used by the manufacturer to communicate with the device during
development or to perform triage of issues with the device and that is not used as part of the
consumer-facing functionality
EXAMPLE: Test points, UART, SWD, JTAG
[SOURCE: ETSI EN 303 645:2020 V2.1.0]
3.1.12
device hardening
improvement of device ability to withstand a cyberattack by reducing the likelihood of success
of an attack
3.1.13
element
indivisible statement of a security need
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009, 3.1.24]
3.1.14
event
occurrence or change of a particular set of circumstances
Note 1 to entry: An event can be one or more occurrences and can have several causes.
Note 2 to entry: An event can consist of something not happening.
Note 3 to entry: An event can sometimes be referred to as an "incident" or "accident".
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 27000:2018, 3.21]

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– 10 – IEC TS 63383:2022 © IEC 2022
3.1.15
information security
preservation of confidentiality, integrity and availability of information
Note 1 to entry: In addition, other properties, such as authenticity, accountability, non-repudiation and reliability
can also be involved.
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 27000:2018, 3.28]
3.1.16
integrity
property of accuracy and completeness
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 27000:2018, 3.36]
3.1.17
level of risk
magnitude of a risk expressed in terms of the combination of consequences and their likelihood
[SOURCE: ISO Guide 73:2009, modified – "or combination of risks," has been deleted.]
3.1.18
likelihood
chance of something happening
[SOURCE: ISO Guide 73:2009]
3.1.19
non-repudiation
ability to prove the occurrence of a claimed event or action and its originating entities
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 27000:2018, 3.48]
3.1.20
operational environment
environment in which a component is operated
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009, 3.1.48, modified – In the definition, "the TOE" has been
replaced with "a component".]
3.1.21
organisational security policy
set of security rules, procedures, or guidelines for an organisation
Note 1 to entry: A policy may pertain to a specific operational environment.
3.1.22
reliability
property of consistent intended behaviour and results
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 27000:2018, 3.55]
3.1.23
threat
potential cause of an unwanted incident, which can result in harm to a system or organisation
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 27000:2018, 3.74]

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IEC TS 63383:2022 © IEC 2022 – 11 –
3.1.24
vulnerability
weakness of an asset or control that can be exploited by one or more threats
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 27000:2018, 3.77]
3.1.25
security functionality
combined functionality of all hardware, software, and firmware of a component that is relied
upon for the correct enforcement of the cybersecurity properties
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 15408-1, 3.1.74, modified – In the definition, "must be" has been replaced
with "is", "SFRs" has been replaced with "cybersecurity properties", and "TOE" has been
replaced with "component".]
3.2 Definitions related to devices
3.2.1
data gateway
DGW
devices in charge of transmission of information between networks in electrical distribution
systems of industrial, commercial and similar plants
[SOURCE: IEC 62974-1:2017, 3.2.3]
3.2.2
energy servers
ESE
devices in charge of computation and retention of energy data, relevant variables, and
visualisation through a local display or remote access, in electrical distribution systems of
industrial, commercial and similar plants
[SOURCE: IEC 62974-1:2017, 3.2.1]
3.2.3
energy data logger
EDL
devices in charge of logging and exporting information to networks, in electrical distribution
systems of industrial, commercial and similar plants
[SOURCE: IEC 62974-1:2017, 3.2.2]
3.2.4
I/O data concentrator
IODC
devices for collection of digital and/or analogue energy data in electrical distribution system of
industrial, commercial and similar plants
[SOURCE: IEC 62974-1:2017, 3.2.4]
3.2.5
measuring device
device able to measure energy data
[SOURCE: IEC 62974-1:2017, 3.2.5]

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– 12 – IEC TS 63383:2022 © IEC 2022
3.2.6
power metering and monitoring device
PMD
combination in one or more devices of several functional modules dedicated to metering and
monitoring electrical parameters in energy distribution systems or electrical installations, used
for applications such as energy efficiency, power monitoring and network performance
Note 1 to entry: Under the generic term "monitoring" are also included functions of recording, alarm management,
etc.
Note 2 to entry: These devices can include demand side quality functions for monitoring inside
commercial/industrial installations.
[SOURCE: IEC 61557-12:2018, 3.1.1]
3.2.7
power quality instrument
PQI
instrument whose main function is to measure, record and possibly monitor power quality
parameters in power supply systems, and whose measuring methods (class A or class S) are
defined in IEC 61000-4-30
[SOURCE: IEC 62586-1:2017, 3.1.1]
3.2.8
billing
process that allows energy suppliers or their representatives to invoice their customers
according to a defined contract
Note 1 to entry: These applications can be covered by international standards, regulations such as MID in Europe
or NMI in Australia, and/or utility specifications.
[SOURCE: IEC TR 63213:2019, 3.2.4]
3.2.9
sub-billing
process that allows a landlord, property management firm, condominium association,
homeowner association or other multi-tenant property to spread out invoice over energy users
(assign portions of invoice to users), for measured usages or services
Note 1 to entry: This fee is usually combined with other tenant's facility fees.
Note 2 to entry: The landlord does not commit on the quality of the supply.
[SOURCE: IEC TR 63213:2019, 3.2.5]
3.3 Symbols and abbreviated terms
HMI Human Machine Interface
USB Universal Serial Bus
NFC near-field communication
LAN local area network
WAN wide area network
JTAG Joint Test Action Group (IEEE 1149.1)

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IEC TS 63383:2022 © IEC 2022 – 13 –
4 Security objectives
For devices within electrical distribution systems, the overall security objectives are to ensure
they operate as designed and configured, provide trustworthy operation of components and
avoid system intrusion which could lead to unintended operations.
For trustworthy operation, the main security aspects to be considered should be detailed in
terms of what needs to be protected and how this can be achieved:
– all assets can be subject to different threats (see a generic example in Table A.3);
– assets should be protected appropriately against relevant threats (see a generic example in
Table A.4).
Figure 1 provides a generic description of devices, using generic terms, and includes
3 examples of construction, also considering the organisational environment (access policy,
password management, etc.).

Figure 1 – Generic examples for classification of device(s)
within an organisational environment
NOTE Organisational security policy is usually based on an approach specified in standards such as ISO/IEC 27001
and IEC TS 62443-1-1:2009.
Depending on the type of device, the assessment can be different, for example when a
component comes from a third-party supplier or is home-made.
5 Cybersecurity risk assessment (generic approach)
5.1 Risk assessment
In general, a generic cybersecurity risk assessment is based on a device for its intended
environment. Potential threats and known vulnerabilities should be considered for defining their
potential influence and the relevant countermeasures to fulfil the overall security objectives.
NOTE A specific cybersecurity risk assessment is usually conducted by the system integrator and/or facility
manager for its operational environme
...

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