ISO/IEC 29167-12:2015

Information technology — Automatic identification and data capture techniques — Part 12: Crypto suite ECC-DH security services for air interface communications

ISO/IEC 29167-12:2015 defines the crypto suite for ECC-DH for the ISO/IEC 18000 air interfaces standards for radio frequency identification (RFID) devices. Its purpose is to provide a common crypto suite with Diffie-Hellmann-based authentication using ECC (elliptic curve cryptography) over binary fields for security for RFID devices that may be referred by ISO committees for air interface standards and application standards. ISO/IEC 29167-12:2015 specifies a crypto suite for ECC-DH for air interface for RFID systems. The crypto suite is defined in alignment with existing air interfaces. ISO/IEC 29167-12:2015 defines various authentication methods and methods of use for the cipher. A Tag and an Interrogator may support one, a subset, or all of the specified options, clearly stating what is supported.

Technologies de l'information — Techniques automatiques d'identification et de capture de donnees — Partie 12: Services de sécurité par suite cryptographique ECC-DH pour communications par interface radio

General Information

• Status: Published
• Publication Date: 20-May-2015
• ICS: 35.040 - Information coding
• ICS: 35.040.50 - Automatic identification and data capture techniques
• Technical Committee: ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 31 - Automatic identification and data capture techniques
• Drafting Committee: ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 31/WG 4 - Radio communications
• Current Stage: 9093 - International Standard confirmed
• Completion Date: 04-Jan-2021

Standards Content (Sample)

INTERNATIONAL ISO/IEC
STANDARD 29167-12
First edition
2015-05-15
Information technology — Automatic
identification and data capture
techniques —
Part 12:
Crypto suite ECC-DH security services
for air interface communication
Technologies de l’information — Techniques automatiques
d’identification et de capture de donnees —
Partie 12: Services de sécurité par suite cryptographique ECC-DH
pour communications par interface radio
Reference number
ISO/IEC 29167-12:2015(E)
©
ISO/IEC 2015

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ISO/IEC 29167-12:2015(E)

COPYRIGHT PROTECTED DOCUMENT
© ISO/IEC 2015, Published in Switzerland
All rights reserved. Unless otherwise specified, no part of this publication may be reproduced or utilized otherwise in any form
or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, or posting on the internet or an intranet, without prior
written permission. Permission can be requested from either ISO at the address below or ISO’s member body in the country of
the requester.
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ii © ISO/IEC 2015 – All rights reserved

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ISO/IEC 29167-12:2015(E)

Contents Page
Foreword .v
Introduction .vi
1 Scope . 1
2 Conformance . 1
2.1 Claiming conformance . 1
2.2 Interrogator conformance and obligations . 1
2.3 Tag conformance and obligations . 2
3 Normative references . 2
4 Terms and definitions . 2
5 Symbols and abbreviated terms . 3
5.1 Symbols . 3
5.2 Abbreviated terms . 4
6 Introduction of the ECC-DH crypto suite . 5
6.1 Core functionality . 5
6.2 Design principles of the crypto suite . 6
7 Parameter definitions . 6
7.1 Elliptic curve parameters . 6
7.2 Parameters of the EPIF Format . 7
7.3 Random number generation . 7
8 Crypto suite state diagram . 7
9 Initialization and resetting . 8
10 Tag Authentication . 8
10.1 Introduction . 8
10.2 Message and Response formatting . 9
10.2.1 Concept . 9
10.2.2 Description of Message and Response concept. 9
10.2.3 Transmission order of the data . 9
10.2.4 Parsing the Message . . 9
10.3 TAM1.0 .10
10.3.1 TAM1.0 Message — write certificate data .10
10.3.2 TAM1.0 Response .
status of write operation .11
10.3.3 Protection of certificate record .11
10.4 TAM1.1 .11
10.4.1 TAM1.1 Message .
request certificate data .11
10.4.2 TAM1.1 Response .
certificate data .11
10.5 TAM1.2 .12
10.5.1 TAM1.2: Message .
send Interrogator challenge .12
10.5.2 TAM1.2 Response .
authentication result .12
10.6 TAM1.3 .13
10.6.1 TAM1.3: Message .
request certificate data and send challenge.13
10.6.2 TAM1.3 Response .
certificate data and authentication result.13
11 Certificate memory .13
11.1 Concept .13
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ISO/IEC 29167-12:2015(E)

11.2 Certificate memory structure .14
11.3 Certificate record .15
11.4 Compressed X.509 certificate .15
11.5 X.509 certificate .17
11.6 Custom certificates .17
12 Tag authentication procedure .17
12.1 Processing steps .17
12.2 IChallenge generation and formatting .17
12.3 IChallenge examination .18
12.4 TResponse generation and formatting .18
12.5 TResponse examination .19
13 Communication .19
14 Key table and key update .20
Annex A (normative) Cryptographic suite State transition table .21
Annex B (normative) Error conditions and error handling .22
Annex C (normative) Cipher description .23
Annex D (informative) Examples ECC cryptographic protocol .25
Annex E (normative) Air Interface Protocol specific information .27
Annex F (normative) Reconstruction of X.509 Certificate .30
Bibliography .39
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ISO/IEC 29167-12:2015(E)

Foreword
ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) and IEC (the International Electrotechnical
Commission) form the specialized system for worldwide standardization. National bodies that are
members of ISO or IEC participate in the development of International Standards through technical
committees established by the respective organization to deal with particular fields of technical
activity. ISO and IEC technical committees collaborate in fields of mutual interest. Other international
organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO and IEC, also take part in the
work. In the field of information technology, ISO and IEC have established a joint technical committee,
ISO/IEC JTC 1.
The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are
described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular the different approval criteria needed for
the different types of document should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the
editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www.iso.org/directives).
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject
of patent rights. ISO and IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.
Details of any patent rights identified during the development of the document will be in the Introduction
and/or on the ISO list of patent declarations received (see www.iso.org/patents).
Any trade name used in this document is information given for the convenience of users and does not
constitute an endorsement.
For an explanation on the meaning of ISO specific terms and expressions related to conformity
assessment, as well as information about ISO’s adherence to the WTO principles in the Technical Barriers
to Trade (TBT), see the following URL: Foreword — Supplementary information.
The committee responsible for this document is ISO/IEC JTC 1, Information technology, Subcommittee
SC 31, Automatic identification and data capture.
ISO/IEC 29167 consists of the following parts, under the general title Information technology —
Automatic identification and data capture techniques:
— Part 1: Security services for RFID air interfaces
— Part 10: Crypto suite AES-128 security services for air interface communications
— Part 11: Crypto suite PRESENT-80 security services for air interface communications
— Part 12: Crypto suite ECC-DH security services for air interface communication
— Part 13: Crypto suite Grain-128A security services for air interface communications
— Part 14: Crypto suite AES OFB security services for air interface communications
— Part 16: Crypto suite ECDSA-ECDH security services for air interface communications
— Part 17: Crypto suite cryptoGPS security services for air interface communications
— Part 19: Crypto suite RAMON security services for air interface communications
The following parts are under preparation:
— Part 15: Crypto suite XOR security services for air interface communications
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ISO/IEC 29167-12:2015(E)

Introduction
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is an approach to public-key cryptography based on the algebraic
structure of elliptic curves over finite fields. For elliptic-curve-based protocols, it is assumed that finding
the discrete logarithm of a random elliptic curve element with respect to a publicly-known base point is
computationally infeasible. The size of the elliptic curve determines the difficulty of the problem.
This part of ISO/IEC 29167 specifies the security services for an RFID Tag with an ECC-DH crypto suite
based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm. It specifies the details of a protocol and interface
format for application with RFID Tags which provide unilateral authentication capability, based on the
use of ECC. Although such Tags can operate in any frequency band legitimate for such applications, the
main focus of this part of ISO/IEC 29167 is on externally-powered (also called “passive”) Tags designed
for the HF/UHF frequency bands, where the demands on low silicon footprint and power consumption
are most stringent.
This part of ISO/IEC 29167 defines only Tag authentication for the ECC-DH cipher.
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and International Electrotechnical Commission
(IEC) draw attention to the fact that it is claimed that compliance with this part of ISO/IEC 29167 may
involve the use of patents concerning radio-frequency identification and cryptographic technologies
given in the clauses identified below.
ISO and IEC take no position concerning the evidence, validity and scope of these patent rights.
The holders of these patent rights have ensured the ISO and IEC that they are willing to negotiate licenses
under reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions with applicants throughout the world.
In this respect, the statements of the holders of these patent rights are registered with ISO and IEC.
Information on the declared patents may be obtained from:
Impinj, Inc.
701 N 34th Street, Suite 300 Seattle, WA 98103 USA
The latest information on IP that may be applicable to this part of ISO/IEC 29167 can be found at www.
iso.org/patents.
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INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ISO/IEC 29167-12:2015(E)
Information technology — Automatic identification and
data capture techniques —
Part 12:
Crypto suite ECC-DH security services for air interface
communication
1 Scope
This part of ISO/IEC 29167 defines the crypto suite for ECC-DH for the ISO/IEC 18000 air interfaces
standards for radio frequency identification (RFID) devices. Its purpose is to provide a common crypto
suite with Diffie-Hellmann-based authentication using ECC (elliptic curve cryptography) over binary
fields for security for RFID devices that may be referred by ISO committees for air interface standards
and application standards.
This part of ISO/IEC 29167 specifies a crypto suite for ECC-DH for air interface for RFID systems. The
crypto suite is defined in alignment with existing air interfaces.
This part of ISO/IEC 29167 defines various authentication methods and methods of use for the cipher.
A Tag and an Interrogator may support one, a subset, or all of the specified options, clearly stating what
is supported.
2 Conformance
2.1 Claiming conformance
To claim conformance with this part of ISO/IEC 29167, an Interrogator or Tag shall comply with all
relevant clauses of this part of ISO/IEC 29167, except those marked as “optional”.
2.2 Interrogator conformance and obligations
To conform to this part of ISO/IEC 29167, an Interrogator shall
— implement the mandatory commands defined in this part of ISO/IEC 29167, and conform to the
relevant part of ISO/IEC 18000.
To conform to this part of ISO/IEC 29167, an Interrogator may
— implement any subset of the optional commands defined in this part of ISO/IEC 29167.
To conform to this part of ISO/IEC 29167, the Interrogator shall not
— implement any command that conflicts with this part of ISO/IEC 29167, or
— require the use of an optional, proprietary, or custom command to meet the requirements of this
part of ISO/IEC 29167.
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ISO/IEC 29167-12:2015(E)

2.3 Tag conformance and obligations
To conform to this part of ISO/IEC 29167, a Tag shall
— implement the mandatory commands defined in this part of ISO/IEC 29167 for the supported types,
and conform to the relevant part of ISO/IEC 18000.
To conform to this part of ISO/IEC 29167, a Tag may
— implement any subset of the optional commands defined in this part of ISO/IEC 29167.
To conform to this part of ISO/IEC 29167, a Tag shall not
— implement any command that conflicts with this part of ISO/IEC 29167, or
— require the use of an optional, proprietary, or custom command to meet the requirements of this
part of ISO/IEC 29167.
3 Normative references
The following documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document and are
indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated
references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
ISO/IEC 18000-63, Information technology — Radio frequency identification for item management — Part
63: Parameters for air interface communications at 860 MHz to 960 MHz Type C
ISO/IEC 19762 (all parts), Information technology — Automatic identification and data capture (AIDC)
techniques — Harmonized vocabulary
ISO/IEC 29167-1, Information technology — Automatic identification and data capture techniques —
Part 1: Security services for RFID air interfaces
1)
FIPS PUB 186-4, Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
4 Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in ISO/IEC 19762 (all parts) and the
following apply.
4.1
Command (Message)
command that Interrogator sends to Tag with “Message” as parameter
4.2
Certificate
digitally signed statement binding a Public Key to an Identity
Note 1 to entry: The term “Certificate” is also known as “Public Key Certificate”.
4.3
double-word
bit string comprised of 32 bits
4.4
entropy
randomness collected by an operating system or application for use in cryptography or other uses that
require random data
1) http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf
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4.5
isomorphism
one-to-one correspondence between the elements of two sets such that the result of an operation on
elements of one set corresponds to the result of the analogous operation on their images in the other set
4.6
Message
part of the Command that is defined by the crypto suite
4.7
Reply (Response)
reply that Tag returns to the Interrogator with “Response” as parameter
4.8
weight
number of non-zero coefficients in the polynomial
4.9
Response
part of the Reply (stored or sent) that is defined by the crypto suite
4.10
X.509
ITU-T standard that defines what information should go into a certificate and describes the format
5 Symbols and abbreviated terms
5.1 Symbols
xxxx binary notation of term “xxxx”, where “x” represents a binary digit
b
xxxx hexadecimal notation of term “xxxx”, where “x” represents a hexadecimal digit
h
In this part of ISO/IEC 29167 the bytes in the hexadecimal numbers are presented with
the MSB at the left and the LSB at the right. The bit order per byte is also presented
with the MSB at the left and the LSB at the right
For example in “ABCDEF ” the byte “AB” is the MSB and the byte “EF” is the LSB
h
|| Concatenation of syntax elements
For example “123456 ” || “ABCDEF ” results in “123456ABCDEF ”, where the byte “12”
h h h
is the MSB and the byte “EF” is the LSB.
() x-coordinate of an elliptic curve point
x
−1
() the modular inverse of the polynomial defined within the braces, where the modulus
is as indicated in the expression context
b(t) polynomial basis representation of the curve parameter b (FIPS186-4)
cert(Q) certificate of the public key Q
c(t) check polynomial used in the EPIF Format
2 163
s(t) such that s (t) mod p(t) = b(t) i.e. the square root of b(t) in the field GF(2 )
E elliptic curve
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ISO/IEC 29167-12:2015(E)

Field[a:b] Selection from a string of bits in Field. Selection ranges from bit a till and including
bit b from the bits of the string in Field, whereby Field[0] represents the least signifi-
cant bit. For example Field[2:0] represents the selection of the three least significant
bits of Field
G base point on the elliptic curve B-163 defined in FIPS 186-4
n
GF(2)[t]/p(t) GF(2 ) represented as the field of polynomials modulo a polynomial p(t) of degree n
m(t) the defining polynomial of the ring GF(2)[t]/m(t) used by the EPIF Format
N degree of the polynomial p(t)
ɸ order of the base point on the chosen curve; the bit length of ɸ is considered to be
the key size (FIPS186-4 Notation: n)
p(t) the field polynomial (FIPS186-4)
p’(t) the defining polynomial of the isomorphic field GF(2)[t]/p’(t) used by the EPIF For-
mat
Polstr() binary transmission of the polynomial defined within the braces, highest possible
degree bit first i.e. including leading zeros; hence if the maximum possible degree of
a polynomial is 170, then 171 bits are transmitted i.e. coefficients of terms of degree
170 down to degree 0
Q private key value of the Tag, a scalar in the range 2.ɸ-2
Q public key of the Tag is the elliptic curve point; Q = qG
R random value chosen by the Interrogator in the range 2.ɸ-2 (FIPS186-4)
Ρ isomorphism from GF(2)[t]/p(t) to GF(2)[t]/p’(t)
Σ mapping from GF(2)[t]/p’(t) to GF(2)[t]/m(t)
n 2
Trace() function which is a mapping from GF(2 ) to GF(2); the quadratic equation y + y + α
n
= 0 has a solution in GF(2 ) when Trace(α) = 0
5.2 Abbreviated terms
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
EPIF Error-Protected Isomorphic Field
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard
GF(x) Galois Field (with x elements)
HF High Frequency (i.e. the frequency band 3MHz to 30 MHz)
NIST (United States) National Institute of Standards and Technology
toEPIF function which describes the transformation to the EPIF format
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6 Introduction of the ECC-DH crypto suite
6.1 Core functionality
Elliptic curve cryptography has been the basis for many cryptographic protocols for authentication and
key agreement. The oldest of these protocols is due to Diffie and Hellmann, and was originally described
in Reference [1] as a method of key agreement between two parties performing computations in the
multiplicative group of GF(p). This method and its analogous implementation using operations in a
group of points on an elliptic curve defined over a finite field, are well known since the inception of
public key cryptography, and are not described further here. Instead, attention is drawn to the specific
idea of using this protocol for entity authentication, in which:
— One party (the proving entity or “prover”) has a static public/private key-pair and a public key
certificate which uses a digital signature to bind the public key with the name of the organization
that produced the key-pair. In a real life application the certificate (with the digital signature) should
be generated by a certification authority.
— The other party (the “verifier”), presents an ephemeral public key to the prover. The prover is
required to perform an operation with the private key using this ephemeral public key as an input,
and to return the result to the verifier.
— The verifier compares this result with that obtained from his own private key operation, using the
ephemeral private key (effectively just a random number) and the prover’s public key as an input.
The private key operation corresponds to multiplication of a point by the private key (a scalar). The
public key corresponds to the multiplication of the private key (scalar) by a predetermined point on the
curve, chosen as a domain parameter of the system. This protocol is i
...