ISO/TS 16901:2022
(Main)Guidance on performing risk assessment in the design of onshore LNG installations including the ship/shore interface
Guidance on performing risk assessment in the design of onshore LNG installations including the ship/shore interface
This document provides a common approach and guidance to those undertaking assessment of the major safety hazards as part of the planning, design, and operation of LNG facilities onshore and at shoreline using risk-based methods and standards, to enable a safe design and operation of LNG facilities. The environmental risks associated with an LNG release are not addressed in this document. This document is applicable both to export and import terminals but can be applicable to other facilities such as satellite and peak shaving plants. This document is applicable to all facilities inside the perimeter of the terminal and all hazardous materials including LNG and associated products: LPG, pressurized natural gas, odorizers, and other flammable or hazardous products handled within the terminal. The navigation risks and LNG tanker intrinsic operation risks are recognised, but they are not in the scope of this document. Hazards arising from interfaces between port and facility and ship are addressed and requirements are normally given by port authorities. It is assumed that LNG carriers are designed according to the IGC code, and that LNG fuelled vessels receiving bunker fuel are designed according to IGF code. Border between port operation and LNG facility is when the ship/shore link (SSL) is established. This document is not intended to specify acceptable levels of risk; however, examples of tolerable levels of risk are referenced. See IEC 31010 and ISO 17776 with regard to general risk assessment methods, while this document focuses on the specific needs scenarios and practices within the LNG industry.
Recommandations sur l’évaluation des risques dans la conception d’installations terrestres pour le GNL en incluant l’interface terre/navire
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TECHNICAL ISO/TS
SPECIFICATION 16901
Second edition
2022-12
Guidance on performing risk
assessment in the design of onshore
LNG installations including the ship/
shore interface
Recommandations sur l’évaluation des risques dans la conception
d’installations terrestres pour le GNL en incluant l’interface terre/
navire
Reference number
ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
© ISO 2022
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ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
COPYRIGHT PROTECTED DOCUMENT
© ISO 2022
All rights reserved. Unless otherwise specified, or required in the context of its implementation, no part of this publication may
be reproduced or utilized otherwise in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, or posting on
the internet or an intranet, without prior written permission. Permission can be requested from either ISO at the address below
or ISO’s member body in the country of the requester.
ISO copyright office
CP 401 • Ch. de Blandonnet 8
CH-1214 Vernier, Geneva
Phone: +41 22 749 01 11
Email: copyright@iso.org
Website: www.iso.org
Published in Switzerland
ii
© ISO 2022 – All rights reserved
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ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
Contents Page
Foreword .v
1 Scope . 1
2 Normative references . 1
3 Terms and definitions . 1
4 Abbreviated terms . 6
5 Safety risk management . 8
5.1 Decision support framework for risk management . 8
5.2 Prescriptive safety or risk performance . 8
5.3 Risk assessment in relation to project development . 9
6 Risk .11
6.1 What is risk . 11
6.2 Safety philosophy and risk criteria .12
6.3 Risk control strategy . .12
6.4 ALARP .12
6.5 Ways to express risk to people . 13
6.5.1 General .13
6.5.2 Risk contours (RC) . 14
6.5.3 Risk transects (RT) . 14
6.5.4 Individual risk (IR) . 14
6.5.5 Potential loss of life (PLL). 15
6.5.6 Fatal accident rate (FAR) . 15
6.5.7 Cost to avert a fatality (CAF) . 15
6.5.8 F/N curves (FN) . .15
6.5.9 Uncertainties in QRA .15
7 Methodologies.16
7.1 Main steps of risk assessment . . 16
7.2 Qualitative risk analysis . 16
7.2.1 HAZID . 16
7.2.2 Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) . 18
7.2.3 Risk matrix . 18
7.2.4 Bow-tie . 18
7.2.5 HAZOP . 20
7.2.6 SIL analysis . 21
7.3 Quantitative analysis: consequence and impact assessment . 21
7.3.1 General . 21
7.3.2 Consequence assessment . 22
7.3.3 Impact assessment. 24
7.4 Quantitative analysis: frequency assessment . 25
7.4.1 General . 25
7.4.2 Failure data . 25
7.4.3 Consensus data . 25
7.4.4 FAULT tree . 26
7.4.5 Event tree analysis (ETA) . 26
7.4.6 Exceedance curves based on probabilistic simulations .26
7.5 Risk assessments (consequence*frequency) . 27
7.5.1 Risk assessment tools . 27
7.5.2 Ad hoc developed risk assessment tools . 27
7.5.3 Proprietary risk assessment tools .28
8 Accident scenarios .29
8.1 Overview accident scenarios .29
8.2 LNG import facilities including SIMOPS .29
8.3 LNG export facilities . 31
iii
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ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
9 Standard presentation of risk.33
Annex A (informative) Impact criteria .34
Annex B (informative) Chain of events following release scenarios .53
Bibliography .57
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ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
Foreword
ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) is a worldwide federation of national standards
bodies (ISO member bodies). The work of preparing International Standards is normally carried out
through ISO technical committees. Each member body interested in a subject for which a technical
committee has been established has the right to be represented on that committee. International
organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO, also take part in the work.
ISO collaborates closely with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) on all matters of
electrotechnical standardization.
The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are
described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular, the different approval criteria needed for the
different types of ISO documents should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the
editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www.iso.org/directives).
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of
patent rights. ISO shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights. Details of
any patent rights identified during the development of the document will be in the Introduction and/or
on the ISO list of patent declarations received (see www.iso.org/patents).
Any trade name used in this document is information given for the convenience of users and does not
constitute an endorsement.
For an explanation of the voluntary nature of standards, the meaning of ISO specific terms and
expressions related to conformity assessment, as well as information about ISO's adherence to
the World Trade Organization (WTO) principles in the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), see
www.iso.org/iso/foreword.html.
This document was prepared by Technical Committee ISO/TC 67, Oil and gas industries including lower
carbon energy, Subcommittee SC 9, Production, transport and storage facilities for cryogenic liquefied
gases.
This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition (ISO/TS 16901:2015), which has been
technically revised.
The main changes are as follows:
— reference to IGF code added to the scope;
— references updated in Clause 2 and the bibliography;
— definitions added for HSE critical activity and HSE critical element.
Any feedback or questions on this document should be directed to the user’s national standards body. A
complete listing of these bodies can be found at www.iso.org/members.html.
v
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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
Guidance on performing risk assessment in the design
of onshore LNG installations including the ship/shore
interface
1 Scope
This document provides a common approach and guidance to those undertaking assessment of the
major safety hazards as part of the planning, design, and operation of LNG facilities onshore and at
shoreline using risk-based methods and standards, to enable a safe design and operation of LNG
facilities. The environmental risks associated with an LNG release are not addressed in this document.
This document is applicable both to export and import terminals but can be applicable to other facilities
such as satellite and peak shaving plants.
This document is applicable to all facilities inside the perimeter of the terminal and all hazardous
materials including LNG and associated products: LPG, pressurized natural gas, odorizers, and other
flammable or hazardous products handled within the terminal.
The navigation risks and LNG tanker intrinsic operation risks are recognised, but they are not in
the scope of this document. Hazards arising from interfaces between port and facility and ship are
addressed and requirements are normally given by port authorities. It is assumed that LNG carriers
are designed according to the IGC code, and that LNG fuelled vessels receiving bunker fuel are designed
according to IGF code.
Border between port operation and LNG facility is when the ship/shore link (SSL) is established.
This document is not intended to specify acceptable levels of risk; however, examples of tolerable levels
of risk are referenced.
See IEC 31010 and ISO 17776 with regard to general risk assessment methods, while this document
focuses on the specific needs scenarios and practices within the LNG industry.
2 Normative references
The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content
constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For
undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
ISO Guide 73, Risk management — Vocabulary
3 Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in ISO Guide 73 and the following
apply.
ISO and IEC maintain terminology databases for use in standardization at the following addresses:
— ISO Online browsing platform: available at https:// www .iso .org/ obp
— IEC Electropedia: available at https:// www .electropedia .org/
1
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ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
3.1
as low as reasonably practicable
ALARP
reducing a risk (3.28) to a level that represents the point, objectively assessed, at which the time,
trouble, difficulty, and cost of further reduction measures become unreasonably disproportionate to
the additional risk reduction obtained
3.2
boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion
BLEVE
sudden release of the content of a vessel containing a pressurized flammable liquid followed by a fireball
Note 1 to entry: This hazard is not applicable to atmospheric LNG tanks, but to pressurized forms of hydrocarbon
storage.
[SOURCE: ISO/TS 18683, 3.1.2, modified — Note to entry added.]
3.3
bow-tie
pictorial representation of how a hazard can be hypothetically released and further developed into a
number of consequences (3.6)
Note 1 to entry: The left-hand side of the diagram is constructed from the fault tree (causal) analysis and involves
those threats associated with the hazard, the controls associated with each threat, and any factors that escalate
likelihood. The right-hand side of the diagram is constructed from the hazard event tree (consequence) analysis
and involves escalation factors and recovery preparedness measures. The centre of the bow-tie is commonly
referred to as the “top event”.
3.4
cost to avert a fatality
CAF
value calculated by dividing the costs to install and operate the protection/mitigation (3.20) by the
reduction in potential loss (3.22) of life (PLL)
Note 1 to entry: It is a measure of effectiveness of the protection/mitigation.
3.5
computational fluid dynamics
CFD
numerical methods and algorithms to solve and analyse problems that involve fluid flows
3.6
consequence
outcome of an event
3.7
cost benefit analysis
CBA
means used to assess the relative cost and benefit of a number of risk (3.28) reduction alternatives
Note 1 to entry: The ranking of the risk reduction alternatives evaluated is usually shown graphically.
3.8
design accidental load
DAL
most severe accidental load that the function or system is able to withstand during a required period of
time, in order to meet the defined risk (3.28) acceptance criteria
2
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ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
3.9
explosion barrier
structural barrier installed to prevent explosion damage in adjacent areas
EXAMPLE A wall.
3.10
F/N curve
FN
plot of cumulative frequency versus N or more persons that sustain a given level of harm from defined
sources of hazards
3.11
failure mode and effect analysis
FMEA
analytically derived identification of the conceivable equipment failure modes and the potential adverse
effects of those modes on the system and mission
Note 1 to entry: It is primarily used as a design tool for review of critical components.
3.12
fatal accident rate
FAR
number of fatalities per 100 million hours exposure for a certain activity
3.13
harm
physical injury or damage to the health of people or damage to property or the environment
3.14
hazard
potential source of harm (3.13)
3.15
hazard identification
HAZID
brainstorming exercise using checklists the hazards in a project are identified and gathered in a risk
register (3.39) for follow up in the project
3.16
hazard and operability study
HAZOP
systematic approach by an interdisciplinary team to identify hazards and operability problems
occurring as a result of deviations from the intended range of process conditions
Note 1 to entry: It consists of four steps: definition, preparation, documentation/follow up and examination to
manage a hazard completely.
3.17
health, safety and environmental critical activity
HSE critical activity
activity or task that provides or maintains barriers
3.18
health, safety and environmental critical element
HSE critical element
component or system whose failure could cause or substantially contribute to the loss of integrity and
safety of a system and whose purpose is to prevent or mitigate from the effects of hazards
3
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ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
3.19
impact assessment
assessment of how consequences (3.6) (fires, explosions, etc.) do affect people, structures the
environment, etc.
3.20
mitigation
limitation of any negative consequence (3.6) of a particular event
3.21
Monte Carlo simulation
simulation having many repeats, each time with a different starting value, to obtain distribution
function
3.22
potential loss
product of frequency and harm (3.13) summed over all the outcomes of a number of top events
3.23
probability
extent to which an event is likely to occur
3.24
probit
inverse cumulative distribution function associated with the standard normal distribution
Note 1 to entry: Probit is used in QRA to describe the relation between exposure, e.g. to radiation or toxics, and
fraction fatalities.
3.25
protective measure
means used to reduce risk
3.26
quantitative risk assessment
QRA
techniques that allow the risk (3.28) associated with a particular activity to be estimated in absolute
quantitative terms rather than in relative terms such as high or low
Note 1 to entry: QRA may be used to determine all risk dimensions, including risk to personnel, risk to the
environment, risk to the installation, and/or the assets and financial interests of the company. See ISO 17776:2016,
B.12.
3.27
residual risk
risk (3.28) remaining after protective measures (3.25) have been taken
3.28
risk
combination of the probability (3.23) of occurrence of harm (3.13) and the severity of that harm
3.29
risk analysis
systematic use of information to identify sources and to estimate the risk (3.28)
3.30
risk assessment
overall process of risk analysis (3.29) and risk evaluation (3.33)
4
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ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
3.31
risk contour
RC
two-dimensional representation of risk (3.28) on a map
Note 1 to entry: Also called individual risk contours (IRC) or location-specific risk (LSR).
3.32
risk criteria
terms of reference by which the significance of risk (3.28) is assessed
3.33
risk evaluation
procedure based on the risk analysis (3.29) to determine whether the tolerable risk (3.47) has been
achieved
3.34
risk management
coordinated activities to direct and control an organization with regard to risk (3.28)
3.35
risk management system
set of elements of an organization’s management system concerned with managing risk (3.28)
3.36
risk matrix
matrix portraying risk (3.28) as the product of probability (3.23) and consequence (3.6), used as the
basis for risk determination
Note 1 to entry: Considerations for the assessment of probability are shown on the horizontal axis. Considerations
for the assessment of consequence are shown on the vertical axis. Multiple consequence categories are included:
impact on people, environment, assets, and reputation. Plotting the intersection of the two considerations on the
matrix provides an estimate of the risk.
3.37
risk perception
way in which a stakeholder (3.46) views a risk (3.28) based on a set of values or concerns
3.38
risk ranking
outcome of a qualitative risk analysis (3.29) with a numerical annotation of risk (3.28)
Note 1 to entry: It allows accident scenarios and their risk to be ranked numerically so that the most severe risks
are evident and can be addressed.
3.39
risk register
hazard management communication document that demonstrates that hazards have been identified,
assessed, are being properly controlled, and that recovery preparedness measures are in place in the
event control is ever lost
3.40
risk transect
RT
representation of risk (3.28) as a function of distance from the hazard
3.41
rollover
sudden mixing of two layers in a tank resulting to a massive vapour generation
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ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
3.42
rapid phase transition
RPT
explosive change from liquid into vapour phase
Note 1 to entry: When two liquids at two different temperatures come into contact, explosive forces can occur,
given certain circumstances. This phenomenon, called rapid phase transition (RPT), can occur when LNG and
water come into contact. Although no combustion occurs, this phenomenon has all the other characteristics
of an explosion. RPTs resulting from an LNG spill on water have been both rare and with relatively limited
consequences (3.6).
3.43
safety
freedom from unacceptable risk (3.28)
3.44
SIMOPS
concatenation of simultaneous operations
Note 1 to entry: SIMOPS often refers to events such as maintenance or construction work in an existing plant
when there are more personnel near a live operating plant and who are exposed to a higher level of risk (3.28)
than normal.
3.45
showstopper
event or consequence (3.6) that produces an unacceptable level of risk (3.28) such that the project cannot
proceed and where the level of risk cannot be mitigated to an acceptable level
3.46
stakeholder
individual, group, or organization that can affect, be affected by, or perceive itself to be affected by a
risk (3.28)
3.47
tolerable risk
risk (3.28) that is accepted in a given context based on the current values of society
3.48
individual risk
probability of being killed (or harmed at certain level) on an annual basis from all hazards (3.13)
3.49
potential loss of life
expected value of the number of fatalities per year (or over the life time of a project)
4 Abbreviated terms
ALARP as low as reasonably practicable
BLEVE boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion
CAF cost to avert a fatality
CFD computational fluid dynamics
CBA cost benefit analysis
DAL design accidental load
EDP emergency depressuring
6
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ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
ERC emergency release coupling
ESD emergency shutdown
ETA event tree analysis
FAR fatal accident rate
FEED front-end engineering design
FEM finite element method
FN frequency vs number (of affected individuals)
FMEA failure mode and effect analysis
FMECA failure, modes, effects, and criticality analysis
HAZID hazard identification
HAZOP hazard and operability study
HEMP hazards and effects management process
HSE health, safety and environmental
IR individual risk contour
LSR location-specific risk
LOPA layers of protection analysis
MTTF mean time to failure
MTTR mean time to repair
OBE operating basis earthquake
PERC power emergency release coupler
P&IDs process and instrument diagrams
PIMS pipeline integrity management system
PLL potential loss of life
QRA quantitative risk assessment
RC risk contour
RPT rapid phase transition
RT risk transect
SIL safety integrity level
SMS safety management system
SSE safe shutdown earthquake
SSL ship/shore link
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ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
5 Safety risk management
5.1 Decision support framework for risk management
Safety risk management is integrated in the project development and decision-making processes and
need as consistent support for decisions in all phases of an LNG development but does not include the
full operational lifecycle.
The approach to risk management should address the project-specific requirements as agreed between
the different parties and stakeholders and also establish an agreed format to communicate risk and
ensure that decisions are made in a consistent and agreed format through the life of the project.
The acceptance criteria including the format should be defined in conformity with company standards.
The format of the acceptance criteria prescribes thereby the approach as discussed below.
There is a wide range of tools and approaches that can be used to support decisions related to risk
management. UK Offshore Operators Association (UKOOA) presented a framework for decision
support reflecting the significance of the decision as well decision context. The framework as shown
for information in Figure 1 illustrates the balancing between use of codes and standards, QRA, and
decision processes reflecting company and societal values.
Figure 1 — Decision support framework for risk management
5.2 Prescriptive safety or risk performance
Both prescriptive and risk-based approaches are used in the planning, design, and operation of LNG
facilities.
Prescriptive approaches represent industry experience and practices.
The main advantages with prescriptive approaches are predictability and effective decision processes
in the design.
The main objections to the use of prescriptive approaches are that they do not accommodate new
solutions and thereby can limit novel development and improvement. Further, when the requirements
are met, the p
...
ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
Date: 2022-09-13
ISO TC 67/SC 9/WG 11
Date: 2022-07-26
Guidance on performing risk assessment in the design of onshore LNG installations
including the ship/shore interface
Guide pourRecommandations sur l’évaluation des risques dans la conception d’installations
terrestres pour le GNL en incluant l’interface terre/navire
Publication stage
A model manuscript of a draft International Standard (known as “The Rice Model”) is available at
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ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
© ISO 2022
All rights reserved. Unless otherwise specified, or required in the context of its implementation, no
part of this publication may be reproduced or utilized otherwise in any form or by any means,
electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, or posting on the internet or an intranet, without
prior written permission. Permission can be requested from either ISO at the address below or
ISO’s member body in the country of the requester.
ISO copyright office
CP 401 • Ch. de Blandonnet 8
CH-1214 Vernier, Geneva
Phone: +41 22 749 01 11
Email: copyright@iso.org
Website: www.iso.orgwww.iso.org
Published in Switzerland
© ISO 2022 – All rights reserved
ii © ISO 2022 – All rights reserved
---------------------- Page: 2 ----------------------
ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
Contents
Foreword . v
1 Scope . 1
2 Normative references . 1
3 Terms and definitions . 2
4 Abbreviations . 1
5 Safety Risk Management . 2
5.1 Decision support framework for risk management . 2
5.2 Prescriptive safety or risk performance . 3
5.3 Risk assessment in relation to project development . 3
6 Risk . 6
6.1 What is risk . 6
6.2 Safety philosophy and risk criteria . 6
6.3 Risk control strategy . 6
6.4 ALARP . 7
6.5 Ways to express risk to people . 8
6.5.1 General . 8
6.5.2 Risk contours (RC) . 8
6.5.3 Risk transects (RT) . 9
6.5.4 Individual risk (IR) . 9
6.5.5 Potential loss of life (PLL) . 9
6.5.6 Fatal accident rate (FAR) . 9
6.5.7 Cost to avert a fatality (CAF) . 9
6.5.8 F/N curves (FN) . 9
6.5.9 Uncertainties in QRA . 10
7 Methodologies . 10
7.1 Main steps of risk assessment . 10
7.2 Qualitative risk analysis . 10
7.2.1 HAZID . 10
7.2.2 Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) . 12
7.2.3 Risk matrix . 12
7.2.4 Bow-tie . 13
7.2.5 HAZOP . 14
7.2.6 SIL analysis . 15
7.3 Quantitative analysis: consequence and impact assessment . 16
7.3.1 Consequence assessment . 16
7.3.2 Impact assessment . 18
7.4 Quantitative analysis: frequency assessment . 19
7.4.1 General . 19
7.4.2 Failure data . 19
7.4.3 Consensus data . 20
7.4.4 FAULT tree . 20
7.4.5 Event tree analysis (ETA) . 20
7.4.6 Exceedance curves based on probabilistic simulations . 20
7.5 Risk assessments (consequence*frequency) . 21
7.5.1 Risk assessment tools . 21
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ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
7.5.2 Ad hoc developed risk assessment tools . 21
7.5.3 Proprietary risk assessment tools . 22
8 Accident scenarios. 23
8.1 Overview accident scenarios . 23
8.2 LNG import facilities including SIMOPS . 23
8.3 LNG export facilities . 26
9 Standard presentation of risk . 27
Annex A (informative) Impact criteria . 29
A.1 Accident impact criteria . 29
A.1.1 Thermal radiation . 29
A.1.2 Overpressure . 29
A.2 Simple risk calculations . 30
A.3 Failure data . 31
A.4 List of hazards to be considered (reflecting experience data) . 33
A.5 Risk assessment with respect to earthquake . 36
A.6 Safety management . 37
A.6.1 General . 37
A.6.2 Operational procedures . 37
A.6.3 Maintenance procedures . 37
A.6.4 Training . 38
A.6.5 Emergency for worst case scenarios . 38
A.7 National regulations . 39
A.8 Example of project-specific QRA criteria . 45
A.8.1 Risk tolerance criteria to own personnel and contractors . 45
A.8.1.1 Individual risk to workers . 45
A.8.1.2 Risk to main safety functions for offshore facilities . 47
A.8.2 Risk to members of the public . 47
A.8.3 Escalation risk control criteria. 47
Annex B (informative) Chain of events following release scenarios . 50
Bibliography . 54
© ISO 2022 – All rights reserved
iv © ISO 2022 – All rights reserved
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ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
Foreword
ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) is a worldwide federation of national standards
bodies (ISO member bodies). The work of preparing International Standards is normally carried out
through ISO technical committees. Each member body interested in a subject for which a technical
committee has been established has the right to be represented on that committee. International
organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO, also take part in the work. ISO
collaborates closely with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) on all matters of
electrotechnical standardization.
The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are
described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular, the different approval criteria needed for the
different types of ISO documents should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the
editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www.iso.org/directives).
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of
patent rights. ISO shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights. Details of any
patent rights identified during the development of the document will be in the Introduction and/or on
the ISO list of patent declarations received (see www.iso.org/patents).
Any trade name used in this document is information given for the convenience of users and does not
constitute an endorsement.
For an explanation of the voluntary nature of standards, the meaning of ISO specific terms and
expressions related to conformity assessment, as well as information about ISO's adherence to the World
Trade Organization (WTO) principles in the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), see
www.iso.org/iso/foreword.html.
This document was prepared by Technical Committee ISO/TC 67 Materials, equipment, Oil and offshore
structures for petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries including lower carbon energy,
Subcommittee SC 9, Liquefied natural gas installations and equipment.
This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition (ISO/TS 16901:2015), which has been
editoriallytechnically revised.
The main changes are as follows:
— reference to IGF code added into the scope;
— references updated in Chapter Clause 2 and the bibliography;
— definitions added for HSE critical activity and HSE critical element.
Any feedback or questions on this document should be directed to the user’s national standards body. A
complete listing of these bodies can be found at www.iso.org/members.html.
© ISO 2022 – All rights reserved © ISO 2022 – All rights v
reserved
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ISO/TS 16901
Guidance on performing risk assessment in the design of onshore
LNG installations including the ship/shore interface
1 Scope
This Technical Specificationdocument provides a common approach and guidance to those undertaking
assessment of the major safety hazards as part of the planning, design, and operation of LNG facilities
onshore and at shoreline using risk-based methods and standards, to enable a safe design and operation
of LNG facilities. The environmental risks associated with an LNG release are not addressed in this
Technical Specificationdocument.
This Technical Specificationdocument is aimed to be applied applicable both to export and import
terminals, but can be applicable to other facilities such as satellite and peak shaving plants.
It appliesThis document is applicable to all facilities inside the perimeter of the terminal and all
hazardous materials including LNG and associated products: LPG, pressurisedpressurized natural gas,
odorizers, and other flammable or hazardous products handled within the terminal.
The navigation risks and LNG tanker intrinsic operation risks are recognised, but they are not in the scope
of this Technical Specification.document. Hazards arising from interfaces between port and facility and
ship are addressed and requirements are normally given by port authorities. It is assumed that LNG
carriers are designed according to the IGC code, and that LNG fuelled vessels receiving bunker fuel are
designed according to IGF code.
Border between port operation and LNG facility is when the ship/shore link (SSL) is established.
ItThis document is not intended to specify acceptable levels of risk; however, examples of tolerable levels
of risk are referenced.
This Technical Specification is not intended to be used retrospectively.
It is recognised that national and/or local laws, regulations, and guidelines take precedence where they
are in conflict with this Technical Specification.
Reference is made toSee IEC 31010 and ISO 17776 with regard to general risk assessment methods, while
this Technical Specificationdocument focuses on the specific needs scenarios and practices within the
LNG industry.
2 Normative references
The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content
constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For
undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
ISO/IEC Guide 73, Risk management — Vocabulary
ISO 17776:2016, Petroleum and natural gas industries — Offshore production installations — Guidelines
on tools and techniques for hazard identification and risk assessment
© ISO 2022 – All rights reserved 1
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ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
3 Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in ISO/IEC Guide 73 and the following
apply.
ISO and IEC maintain terminology databases for use in standardization at the following addresses:
— ISO Online browsing platform: available at https://www.iso.org/obp
— IEC Electropedia: available at https://www.electropedia.org/
3.1
as low as reasonably practicable
ALARP
reducing a risk (3.28) to a level that represents the point, objectively assessed, at which the time, trouble,
difficulty, and cost of further reduction measures become unreasonably disproportionate to the
additional risk reduction obtained
3.2
boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion
BLEVE
sudden release of the content of a vessel containing a pressurisedpressurized flammable liquid followed
by a fireball
Note 1 to entry: This hazard is not applicable to atmospheric LNG tanks, but to pressurized forms of hydrocarbon
storage.
[SOURCE: ISO/TS 18683, 3.1.2], modified — Note to entry added.]
3.3
bow-tie
pictorial representation of how a hazard can be hypothetically released and further developed into a
number of consequences (3.6)
Note 1 to entry: The left-hand side of the diagram is constructed from the fault tree (causal) analysis and involves
those threats associated with the hazard, the controls associated with each threat, and any factors that escalate
likelihood. The right-hand side of the diagram is constructed from the hazard event tree (consequence) analysis and
involves escalation factors and recovery preparedness measures. The centre of the bow-tie is commonly referred
to as the “top event”.
3.4
cost to avert a fatality
CAF
value calculated by dividing the costs to install and operate the protection/mitigation (3.20) by the
reduction in potential loss (3.22) of life (PLL)
Note 1 to entry: It is a measure of effectiveness of the protection/mitigation.
3.5
computational fluid dynamics
CFD
numerical methods and algorithms to solve and analyse problems that involve fluid flows
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ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
3.6
consequence
outcome of an event
3.7
cost benefit analysis
CBA
means used to assess the relative cost and benefit of a number of risk (3.28) reduction alternatives
Note 1 to entry: The ranking of the risk reduction alternatives evaluated is usually shown graphically.
3.8
design accidental load
DAL
most severe accidental load that the function or system shall beis able to withstand during a required
period of time, in order to meet the defined risk (3.28) acceptance criteria
3.9
explosion barrier
structural barrier installed to prevent explosion damage in adjacent areas
Note 1 to entry: A wall is an example of an explosion barrier.
EXAMPLE A wall.
3.10
F/N curve
FN
plot of cumulative frequency versus N or more persons that sustain a given level of harm from defined
sources of hazards
3.11
failure mode and effect analysis
FMEA
analytically derived identification of the conceivable equipment failure modes and the potential adverse
effects of those modes on the system and mission
Note 1 to entry: It is primarily used as a design tool for review of critical components.
3.12
fatal accident rate
FAR
number of fatalities per 100 million hours exposure for a certain activity
3.13
harm
physical injury or damage to the health of people or damage to property or the environment
3.14
hazard
potential source of harm (3.13)
Error! Reference source not found. 3
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ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
3.15
hazard identification
HAZID
brainstorming exercise using checklists the hazards in a project are identified and gathered in a risk
register (3.39) for follow up in the project
3.16
hazard and operability study
HAZOP
systematic approach by an interdisciplinary team to identify hazards and operability problems occurring
as a result of deviations from the intended range of process conditions
Note 1 to entry: It consists of four steps: definition, preparation, documentation/follow up and examination to
manage a hazard completely.
3.17
health, safety and environmental critical activity
HSE critical activity
activity or task whichthat provides or maintains barriers
3.18
health, safety and environmental critical element
HSE critical element
component or system whose failure could cause or substantially contribute to the loss of integrity and
safety of a system and whose purpose is to prevent or mitigate from the effects of hazards
3.19
impact assessment
assessment of how consequences (3.6) (fires, explosions, etc.) do affect people, structures the
environment, etc.
3.20
mitigation
limitation of any negative consequence (3.6) of a particular event
3.21
Monte Carlo simulation
simulation having many repeats, each time with a different starting value, to obtain distribution function
3.22
potential loss
product of frequency and harm (3.13) summed over all the outcomes of a number of top events
3.23
probability
extent to which an event is likely to occur
3.24
probit
inverse cumulative distribution function associated with the standard normal distribution
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ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
Note 1 to entry: Probit is used in QRA to describe the relation between exposure, e.g. to radiation or toxics, and
fraction fatalities.
3.25
protective measure
means used to reduce risk
3.26
quantitative risk assessment
QRA
techniques whichthat allow the risk (3.28) associated with a particular activity to be estimated in absolute
quantitative terms rather than in relative terms such as high or low
Note 1 to entry: QRA may be used to determine all risk dimensions, including risk to personnel, risk to the
environment, risk to the installation, and/or the assets and financial interests of the company. Reference is made
toSee ISO 17776:2016, B.12.
3.27
residual risk
risk (3.28) remaining after protective measures (3.25) have been taken
3.28
risk
combination of the probability (3.23) of occurrence of harm (3.13) and the severity of that harm
3.29
risk analysis
systematic use of information to identify sources and to estimate the risk (3.28)
3.30
risk assessment
overall process of risk analysis (3.29) and risk evaluation (3.33)
3.31
risk contour
RC
two-dimensional representation of risk (3.28) on a map
Note 1 to entry: Also called individual risk contours (IRC) or location-specific risk (LSR).
3.32
risk criteria
terms of reference by which the significance of risk (3.28) is assessed
3.33
risk evaluation
procedure based on the risk analysis (3.29) to determine whether the tolerable risk (3.47) has been
achieved
3.34
risk management
coordinated activities to direct and control an organization with regard to risk (3.28)
Error! Reference source not found. 5
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ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
3.35
risk management system
set of elements of an organization’s management system concerned with managing risk (3.28)
3.36
risk matrix
matrix portraying risk (3.28) as the product of probability (3.23) and consequence (3.6), used as the basis
for risk determination
Note 1 to entry: Considerations for the assessment of probability are shown on the horizontal axis. Considerations
for the assessment of consequence are shown on the vertical axis. Multiple consequence categories are included:
impact on people, environment, assets, and reputation. Plotting the intersection of the two considerations on the
matrix provides an estimate of the risk.
3.37
risk perception
way in which a stakeholder (3.46) views a risk (3.28) based on a set of values or concerns
3.38
risk ranking
outcome of a qualitative risk analysis (3.29) with a numerical annotation of risk (3.28)
Note 1 to entry: It allows accident scenarios and their risk to be ranked numerically so that the most severe risks
are evident and can be addressed.
3.39
risk register
hazard management communication document that demonstrates that hazards have been identified,
assessed, are being properly controlled, and that recovery preparedness measures are in place in the
event control is ever lost
3.40
risk transect
RT
representation of risk (3.28) as a function of distance from the hazard
3.41
rollover
sudden mixing of two layers in a tank resulting to a massive vapour generation
3.42
rapid phase transition
RPT
explosive change from liquid into vapour phase
Note 1 to entry: When two liquids at two different temperatures come into contact, explosive forces can occur, given
certain circumstances. This phenomenon, called rapid phase transition (RPT), can occur when LNG and water come
into contact. Although no combustion occurs, this phenomenon has all the other characteristics of an explosion.
RPTs resulting from an LNG spill on water have been both rare and with relatively limited consequences (3.6).
3.43
safety
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ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
freedom from unacceptable risk (3.28)
3.44
SIMOPS
concatenation of simultaneous operations
Note 1 to entry: SIMOPS often refers to events such as maintenance or construction work in an existing plant when
there are more personnel near a live operating plant and who are exposed to a higher level of risk (3.28) than
normal.
3.45
showstopper
event or consequence (3.6) that produces an unacceptable level of risk (3.28) such that the project cannot
proceed and where the level of risk cannot be mitigated to an acceptable level
3.46
stakeholder
any individual, group, or organization that can affect, be affected by, or perceive itself to be affected by a
risk (3.28)
3.47
tolerable risk
risk (3.28) whichthat is accepted in a given context based on the current values of society
Error! Reference source not found. 7
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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
4 Abbreviations
For the purposes of this Technical Specification, the following abbreviations apply:
3.48
individual risk
probability of being killed (or harmed at certain level) on an annual basis from all hazards (3.13)
3.49
potential loss of life
expected value of the number of fatalities per year (or over the life time of a project)
4 Abbreviated terms
ALARP as low as reasonably practicable;
BLEVE boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion;
CAF cost to avert a fatality;
CFD computational fluid dynamics;
CBA cost benefit analysis;
DAL design accidental load;
EDP emergency depressuring;
ERC emergency release coupling;
ESD emergency shutdown;
ETA event tree analysis;
FAR fatal accident rate;
FEED front-end engineering design;
FEM finite element method;
FN frequency vs number (of affected individuals);)
FMEA failure mode and effect analysis;
FMECA failure, modes, effects, and criticality analysis;
HAZID hazard identification;
HAZOP hazard and operability study;
HEMP hazards and effects management process;
HSE health, safety and environmental
IR individual risk contour;
LSR location-specific risk;
LOPA layers of protection analysis;
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ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
MTTF mean time to failure;
MTTR mean time to repair;
OBE operating basis earthquake;
PERC power emergency release coupler;
P&IDs process and instrument diagrams;
PIMS pipeline integrity management system;
PLL potential loss of life;
QRA quantitative risk
...
TECHNICAL ISO/TS
SPECIFICATION 16901
Second edition
2022-11
Guidance on performing risk
assessment in the design of onshore
LNG installations including the ship/
shore interface
Recommandations sur l’évaluation des risques dans la conception
d’installations terrestres pour le GNL en incluant l’interface terre/
navire
PROOF/ÉPREUVE
Reference number
ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
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ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
COPYRIGHT PROTECTED DOCUMENT
© ISO 2022
All rights reserved. Unless otherwise specified, or required in the context of its implementation, no part of this publication may
be reproduced or utilized otherwise in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, or posting on
the internet or an intranet, without prior written permission. Permission can be requested from either ISO at the address below
or ISO’s member body in the country of the requester.
ISO copyright office
CP 401 • Ch. de Blandonnet 8
CH-1214 Vernier, Geneva
Phone: +41 22 749 01 11
Email: copyright@iso.org
Website: www.iso.org
Published in Switzerland
ii
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ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
Contents Page
Foreword .v
1 Scope . 1
2 Normative references . 1
3 Terms and definitions . 1
4 Abbreviated terms . 6
5 Safety Risk Management . 8
5.1 Decision support framework for risk management . 8
5.2 Prescriptive safety or risk performance . 8
5.3 Risk assessment in relation to project development . 9
6 Risk .11
6.1 What is risk . 11
6.2 Safety philosophy and risk criteria .12
6.3 Risk control strategy . .12
6.4 ALARP .12
6.5 Ways to express risk to people . 13
6.5.1 General .13
6.5.2 Risk contours (RC) . 14
6.5.3 Risk transects (RT) . 14
6.5.4 Individual risk (IR) . 14
6.5.5 Potential loss of life (PLL). 15
6.5.6 Fatal accident rate (FAR) . 15
6.5.7 Cost to avert a fatality (CAF) . 15
6.5.8 F/N curves (FN) . .15
6.5.9 Uncertainties in QRA .15
7 Methodologies.16
7.1 Main steps of risk assessment . . 16
7.2 Qualitative risk analysis . 16
7.2.1 HAZID . 16
7.2.2 Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) . 18
7.2.3 Risk matrix . 18
7.2.4 Bow-tie . 18
7.2.5 HAZOP . 20
7.2.6 SIL analysis . 21
7.3 Quantitative analysis: consequence and impact assessment . 21
7.3.1 General . 21
7.3.2 Consequence assessment . 22
7.3.3 Impact assessment. 24
7.4 Quantitative analysis: frequency assessment . 25
7.4.1 General . 25
7.4.2 Failure data . 25
7.4.3 Consensus data . 25
7.4.4 FAULT tree . 26
7.4.5 Event tree analysis (ETA) . 26
7.4.6 Exceedance curves based on probabilistic simulations .26
7.5 Risk assessments (consequence*frequency) . 27
7.5.1 Risk assessment tools . 27
7.5.2 Ad hoc developed risk assessment tools . 27
7.5.3 Proprietary risk assessment tools .28
8 Accident scenarios .29
8.1 Overview accident scenarios .29
8.2 LNG import facilities including SIMOPS .29
8.3 LNG export facilities . 31
iii
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ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
9 Standard presentation of risk.33
Annex A (informative) Impact criteria .34
Annex B (informative) Chain of events following release scenarios .53
Bibliography .57
iv
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ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
Foreword
ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) is a worldwide federation of national standards
bodies (ISO member bodies). The work of preparing International Standards is normally carried out
through ISO technical committees. Each member body interested in a subject for which a technical
committee has been established has the right to be represented on that committee. International
organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO, also take part in the work.
ISO collaborates closely with the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) on all matters of
electrotechnical standardization.
The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are
described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular, the different approval criteria needed for the
different types of ISO documents should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the
editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www.iso.org/directives).
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of
patent rights. ISO shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights. Details of
any patent rights identified during the development of the document will be in the Introduction and/or
on the ISO list of patent declarations received (see www.iso.org/patents).
Any trade name used in this document is information given for the convenience of users and does not
constitute an endorsement.
For an explanation of the voluntary nature of standards, the meaning of ISO specific terms and
expressions related to conformity assessment, as well as information about ISO's adherence to
the World Trade Organization (WTO) principles in the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), see
www.iso.org/iso/foreword.html.
This document was prepared by Technical Committee ISO/TC 67, Oil and gas industries including lower
carbon energy, Subcommittee SC 9, Liquefied natural gas installations and equipment.
This second edition cancels and replaces the first edition (ISO/TS 16901:2015), which has been
technically revised.
The main changes are as follows:
— reference to IGF code added to the scope;
— references updated in Clause 2 and the bibliography;
— definitions added for HSE critical activity and HSE critical element.
Any feedback or questions on this document should be directed to the user’s national standards body. A
complete listing of these bodies can be found at www.iso.org/members.html.
v
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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
Guidance on performing risk assessment in the design
of onshore LNG installations including the ship/shore
interface
1 Scope
This document provides a common approach and guidance to those undertaking assessment of the
major safety hazards as part of the planning, design, and operation of LNG facilities onshore and at
shoreline using risk-based methods and standards, to enable a safe design and operation of LNG
facilities. The environmental risks associated with an LNG release are not addressed in this document.
This document is applicable both to export and import terminals but can be applicable to other facilities
such as satellite and peak shaving plants.
This document is applicable to all facilities inside the perimeter of the terminal and all hazardous
materials including LNG and associated products: LPG, pressurized natural gas, odorizers, and other
flammable or hazardous products handled within the terminal.
The navigation risks and LNG tanker intrinsic operation risks are recognised, but they are not in
the scope of this document. Hazards arising from interfaces between port and facility and ship are
addressed and requirements are normally given by port authorities. It is assumed that LNG carriers
are designed according to the IGC code, and that LNG fuelled vessels receiving bunker fuel are designed
according to IGF code.
Border between port operation and LNG facility is when the ship/shore link (SSL) is established.
This document is not intended to specify acceptable levels of risk; however, examples of tolerable levels
of risk are referenced.
See IEC 31010 and ISO 17776 with regard to general risk assessment methods, while this document
focuses on the specific needs scenarios and practices within the LNG industry.
2 Normative references
The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content
constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For
undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
ISO Guide 73, Risk management — Vocabulary
3 Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in ISO Guide 73 and the following
apply.
ISO and IEC maintain terminology databases for use in standardization at the following addresses:
— ISO Online browsing platform: available at https:// www .iso .org/ obp
— IEC Electropedia: available at https:// www .electropedia .org/
1
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ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
3.1
as low as reasonably practicable
ALARP
reducing a risk (3.28) to a level that represents the point, objectively assessed, at which the time,
trouble, difficulty, and cost of further reduction measures become unreasonably disproportionate to
the additional risk reduction obtained
3.2
boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion
BLEVE
sudden release of the content of a vessel containing a pressurized flammable liquid followed by a fireball
Note 1 to entry: This hazard is not applicable to atmospheric LNG tanks, but to pressurized forms of hydrocarbon
storage.
[SOURCE: ISO/TS 18683, 3.1.2, modified — Note to entry added.]
3.3
bow-tie
pictorial representation of how a hazard can be hypothetically released and further developed into a
number of consequences (3.6)
Note 1 to entry: The left-hand side of the diagram is constructed from the fault tree (causal) analysis and involves
those threats associated with the hazard, the controls associated with each threat, and any factors that escalate
likelihood. The right-hand side of the diagram is constructed from the hazard event tree (consequence) analysis
and involves escalation factors and recovery preparedness measures. The centre of the bow-tie is commonly
referred to as the “top event”.
3.4
cost to avert a fatality
CAF
value calculated by dividing the costs to install and operate the protection/mitigation (3.20) by the
reduction in potential loss (3.22) of life (PLL)
Note 1 to entry: It is a measure of effectiveness of the protection/mitigation.
3.5
computational fluid dynamics
CFD
numerical methods and algorithms to solve and analyse problems that involve fluid flows
3.6
consequence
outcome of an event
3.7
cost benefit analysis
CBA
means used to assess the relative cost and benefit of a number of risk (3.28) reduction alternatives
Note 1 to entry: The ranking of the risk reduction alternatives evaluated is usually shown graphically.
3.8
design accidental load
DAL
most severe accidental load that the function or system is able to withstand during a required period of
time, in order to meet the defined risk (3.28) acceptance criteria
2
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ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
3.9
explosion barrier
structural barrier installed to prevent explosion damage in adjacent areas
EXAMPLE A wall.
3.10
F/N curve
FN
plot of cumulative frequency versus N or more persons that sustain a given level of harm from defined
sources of hazards
3.11
failure mode and effect analysis
FMEA
analytically derived identification of the conceivable equipment failure modes and the potential adverse
effects of those modes on the system and mission
Note 1 to entry: It is primarily used as a design tool for review of critical components.
3.12
fatal accident rate
FAR
number of fatalities per 100 million hours exposure for a certain activity
3.13
harm
physical injury or damage to the health of people or damage to property or the environment
3.14
hazard
potential source of harm (3.13)
3.15
hazard identification
HAZID
brainstorming exercise using checklists the hazards in a project are identified and gathered in a risk
register (3.39) for follow up in the project
3.16
hazard and operability study
HAZOP
systematic approach by an interdisciplinary team to identify hazards and operability problems
occurring as a result of deviations from the intended range of process conditions
Note 1 to entry: It consists of four steps: definition, preparation, documentation/follow up and examination to
manage a hazard completely.
3.17
health, safety and environmental critical activity
HSE critical activity
activity or task that provides or maintains barriers
3.18
health, safety and environmental critical element
HSE critical element
component or system whose failure could cause or substantially contribute to the loss of integrity and
safety of a system and whose purpose is to prevent or mitigate from the effects of hazards
3
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ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
3.19
impact assessment
assessment of how consequences (3.6) (fires, explosions, etc.) do affect people, structures the
environment, etc.
3.20
mitigation
limitation of any negative consequence (3.6) of a particular event
3.21
Monte Carlo simulation
simulation having many repeats, each time with a different starting value, to obtain distribution
function
3.22
potential loss
product of frequency and harm (3.13) summed over all the outcomes of a number of top events
3.23
probability
extent to which an event is likely to occur
3.24
probit
inverse cumulative distribution function associated with the standard normal distribution
Note 1 to entry: Probit is used in QRA to describe the relation between exposure, e.g. to radiation or toxics, and
fraction fatalities.
3.25
protective measure
means used to reduce risk
3.26
quantitative risk assessment
QRA
techniques that allow the risk (3.28) associated with a particular activity to be estimated in absolute
quantitative terms rather than in relative terms such as high or low
Note 1 to entry: QRA may be used to determine all risk dimensions, including risk to personnel, risk to the
environment, risk to the installation, and/or the assets and financial interests of the company. See ISO 17776:2016,
B.12.
3.27
residual risk
risk (3.28) remaining after protective measures (3.25) have been taken
3.28
risk
combination of the probability (3.23) of occurrence of harm (3.13) and the severity of that harm
3.29
risk analysis
systematic use of information to identify sources and to estimate the risk (3.28)
3.30
risk assessment
overall process of risk analysis (3.29) and risk evaluation (3.33)
4
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ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
3.31
risk contour
RC
two-dimensional representation of risk (3.28) on a map
Note 1 to entry: Also called individual risk contours (IRC) or location-specific risk (LSR).
3.32
risk criteria
terms of reference by which the significance of risk (3.28) is assessed
3.33
risk evaluation
procedure based on the risk analysis (3.29) to determine whether the tolerable risk (3.47) has been
achieved
3.34
risk management
coordinated activities to direct and control an organization with regard to risk (3.28)
3.35
risk management system
set of elements of an organization’s management system concerned with managing risk (3.28)
3.36
risk matrix
matrix portraying risk (3.28) as the product of probability (3.23) and consequence (3.6), used as the
basis for risk determination
Note 1 to entry: Considerations for the assessment of probability are shown on the horizontal axis. Considerations
for the assessment of consequence are shown on the vertical axis. Multiple consequence categories are included:
impact on people, environment, assets, and reputation. Plotting the intersection of the two considerations on the
matrix provides an estimate of the risk.
3.37
risk perception
way in which a stakeholder (3.46) views a risk (3.28) based on a set of values or concerns
3.38
risk ranking
outcome of a qualitative risk analysis (3.29) with a numerical annotation of risk (3.28)
Note 1 to entry: It allows accident scenarios and their risk to be ranked numerically so that the most severe risks
are evident and can be addressed.
3.39
risk register
hazard management communication document that demonstrates that hazards have been identified,
assessed, are being properly controlled, and that recovery preparedness measures are in place in the
event control is ever lost
3.40
risk transect
RT
representation of risk (3.28) as a function of distance from the hazard
3.41
rollover
sudden mixing of two layers in a tank resulting to a massive vapour generation
5
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ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
3.42
rapid phase transition
RPT
explosive change from liquid into vapour phase
Note 1 to entry: When two liquids at two different temperatures come into contact, explosive forces can occur,
given certain circumstances. This phenomenon, called rapid phase transition (RPT), can occur when LNG and
water come into contact. Although no combustion occurs, this phenomenon has all the other characteristics
of an explosion. RPTs resulting from an LNG spill on water have been both rare and with relatively limited
consequences (3.6).
3.43
safety
freedom from unacceptable risk (3.28)
3.44
SIMOPS
concatenation of simultaneous operations
Note 1 to entry: SIMOPS often refers to events such as maintenance or construction work in an existing plant
when there are more personnel near a live operating plant and who are exposed to a higher level of risk (3.28)
than normal.
3.45
showstopper
event or consequence (3.6) that produces an unacceptable level of risk (3.28) such that the project cannot
proceed and where the level of risk cannot be mitigated to an acceptable level
3.46
stakeholder
individual, group, or organization that can affect, be affected by, or perceive itself to be affected by a
risk (3.28)
3.47
tolerable risk
risk (3.28) that is accepted in a given context based on the current values of society
3.48
individual risk
probability of being killed (or harmed at certain level) on an annual basis from all hazards (3.13)
3.49
potential loss of life
expected value of the number of fatalities per year (or over the life time of a project)
4 Abbreviated terms
ALARP as low as reasonably practicable
BLEVE boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion
CAF cost to avert a fatality
CFD computational fluid dynamics
CBA cost benefit analysis
DAL design accidental load
EDP emergency depressuring
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ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
ERC emergency release coupling
ESD emergency shutdown
ETA event tree analysis
FAR fatal accident rate
FEED front-end engineering design
FEM finite element method
FN frequency vs number (of affected individuals)
FMEA failure mode and effect analysis
FMECA failure, modes, effects, and criticality analysis
HAZID hazard identification
HAZOP hazard and operability study
HEMP hazards and effects management process
HSE health, safety and environmental
IR individual risk contour
LSR location-specific risk
LOPA layers of protection analysis
MTTF mean time to failure
MTTR mean time to repair
OBE operating basis earthquake
PERC power emergency release coupler
P&IDs process and instrument diagrams
PIMS pipeline integrity management system
PLL potential loss of life
QRA quantitative risk assessment
RC risk contour
RPT rapid phase transition
RT risk transect
SIL safety integrity level
SMS safety management system
SSE safe shutdown earthquake
SSL ship/shore link
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ISO/TS 16901:2022(E)
5 Safety Risk Management
5.1 Decision support framework for risk management
Safety risk management is integrated in the project development and decision-making processes and
need as consistent support for decisions in all phases of an LNG development but does not include the
full operational lifecycle.
The approach to risk management should address the project-specific requirements as agreed between
the different parties and stakeholders and also establish an agreed format to communicate risk and
ensure that decisions are made in a consistent and agreed format through the life of the project.
The acceptance criteria including the format should be defined in conformity with company standards.
The format of the acceptance criteria prescribes thereby the approach as discussed below.
There is a wide range of tools and approaches that can be used to support decisions related to risk
management. UK Offshore Operators Association (UKOOA) presented a framework for decision
support reflecting the significance of the decision as well decision context. The framework as shown
for information in Figure 1 illustrates the balancing between use of codes and standards, QRA, and
decision processes reflecting company and societal values.
Figure 1 — Decision support framework for risk management
5.2 Prescriptive safety or risk performance
Both prescriptive and risk-based approaches are used in the planning, design, and operation of LNG
facilities.
Prescriptive approaches represent industry experience and practices.
The main advantages with prescriptive approaches are predictability and effective decision processes
in the design.
The main objections to the use of prescriptive approaches are that they do not
...
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