ISO/IEC TR 22216:2022
(Main)Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — New concepts and changes in ISO/IEC 15408:2022 and ISO/IEC 18045:2022
Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — New concepts and changes in ISO/IEC 15408:2022 and ISO/IEC 18045:2022
This document: — introduces the break down between the former ISO/IEC 15408 series (ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009, ISO/IEC 15408-2:2008) and ISO/IEC 15408-3:2008) and ISO/IEC 18045:2008 and the new parts introduced in the ISO/IEC 15408:2022 series and ISO/IEC 18045:2022; — presents the concepts newly introduced as well as the rationale for their inclusion; — proposes an evolution path and information on how to move from CC 3.1 and CEM 3.1 to the ISO/IEC 15408:2022 series and ISO/IEC 18045:2022, respectively; — maps the evolutions between the CC 3.1 and CEM 3.1 and the ISO/IEC 15408:2022 series and ISO/IEC 18045:2022, respectively.
Sécurité de l'information, cybersécurité et protection de la vie privée — Nouveaux concepts et modifications dans l'ISO/IEC 15408:2022 et l'ISO/IEC 18045:2022
General Information
Standards Content (Sample)
TECHNICAL ISO/IEC TR
REPORT 22216
First edition
2022-05
Information security, cybersecurity
and privacy protection — New
concepts and changes in ISO/IEC
15408:2022 and ISO/IEC 18045:2022
Sécurité de l'information, cybersécurité et protection de la vie
privée — Nouveaux concepts et modifications dans l'ISO/IEC
15408:2022 et l'ISO/IEC 18045:2022
Reference number
© ISO/IEC 2022
© ISO/IEC 2022
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© ISO/IEC 2022 – All rights reserved
Contents Page
Foreword . vi
Introduction .vii
1 Scope . 1
2 Normative references . 1
3 Terms, definitions and abbreviated terms . 1
3.1 Terms and definitions . 1
3.2 Abbreviated terms . 2
4 Overview . 2
4.1 General . 2
4.2 Structure of this document . 2
4.3 Impacts of the revision on the structure and partition of the documents . 2
4.4 Using this document for transitional information . 4
4.5 Using the ISO/IEC 15408:2022 series and ISO/IEC 18045:2022 for specific needs . 4
5 Major new concepts introduced in the ISO/IEC 15408:2022 series and ISO/
IEC 18045:2022 . 5
5.1 Approaches to security evaluation . 5
5.1.1 General . 5
5.1.2 The attack-based approach . 6
5.1.3 The specification-based approach . 7
5.2 Modularity . 9
5.2.1 General . 9
5.2.2 Composition mechanisms . 10
5.2.3 Packages . . 11
5.2.4 Modular Protection Profiles .12
5.2.5 Multi-assurance evaluations . 13
5.2.6 Evaluation by composition and multi-assurance . 17
6 Applying the ISO/IEC 15408:2022 series to specific needs .21
6.1 Refining and deriving requirements. 21
6.1.1 General . 21
6.1.2 Refinements . 21
6.1.3 Application Notes . 21
6.1.4 Extended requirements . 21
6.2 Refining and deriving evaluation methods . 22
6.2.1 General .22
6.2.2 Attack-based approach . 22
6.2.3 Specification-based approach . 22
6.3 Practical aspects of supporting documents . 22
7 Evolutions in the ISO/IEC 15408:2022 series and ISO/IEC 18045:2022 .22
7.1 Changes in ISO/IEC 15408-1:2022 . 22
7.2 Changes in ISO/IEC 15408-2:2022 .28
7.3 Changes in ISO/IEC 15408-3:2022 . 31
7.4 Addition of ISO/IEC 15408-4:2022 . 42
7.5 Addition of ISO/IEC 15408-5:2022 .44
7.6 Changes in ISO/IEC 18045:2022 .44
Bibliography .45
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© ISO/IEC 2022 – All rights reserved
List of Figures
Figure 1 — ISO/IEC 15408:2022 series and ISO/IEC 18045:2022 structure and mapping to
former ISO/IEC 15408 series (ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009, ISO/IEC 15408-2:2008, ISO/
IEC 15408-3:2008) and ISO/IEC 18045:2008 . 3
Figure 2 — Specification-based and attack-based approaches . 6
Figure 3 — Smartphone with hardware key store .14
Figure 4 — IoT gateway with personal area network .15
Figure 5 — POI developer .16
Figure 6 — POI risk owner .16
Figure 7 — POI developer vs risk owner.17
Figure 8 — POI assurance requirements .17
Figure 9 — Multi-assurance TOE .18
Figure 10 — Multiple single evaluations .19
Figure 11 — Composite TOE .19
Figure 12 — Composite evaluation . .20
Figure 13 — Multi-assurance evaluation of a composite TOE .20
Figure 14 — Multi-assurance composite evaluation .21
[14]
Figure 15 — Clause structure — ISO/IEC 15408-1:2022 vs. CC v3.1 revision 5 .24
[14]
Figure 16 — Contents of a PP —ISO/IEC 15408-1:2022 vs. CC v3.1 revision 5 .25
[14]
Figure 17 — Contents of an ST — ISO/IEC 15408-1:2022 vs. CC v3.1 revision 5 .26
[14]
Figure 18 — Contents of a PP-Module — ISO/IEC 15408-1:2022 vs. CC v3.1 revision 5 .27
Figure 19 — Contents of a PP-Configuration — ISO/IEC 15408-1:2022 vs. CC v3.1 revision
[14]
5 .28
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© ISO/IEC 2022 – All rights reserved
List of Tables
Table 1 — Overview of newly introduced concepts . 3
Table 2 — Changes in ISO/IEC 15408-1:2022 .23
Table 3 — Changes in ISO/IEC 15408-2:2022 .29
Table 4 — Changes in ISO/IEC 15408-3:2022 .31
Table 5 — Class APE — ISO/IEC 15408-3:2022 vs. CC v3.1 revision 5 .31
Table 6 — Class ACE — ISO/IEC 15408-3:2022 vs. CC v3.1 revision 5 .33
Table 7 — Class ASE — ISO/IEC 15408-3:2022 vs. CC v3.1 revision 5 .36
Table 8 — Class ADV — ISO/IEC 15408-3:2022 vs. CC v3.1 revision 5 .38
Table 9 — Class AGD — ISO/IEC 15408-3:2022 vs. CC v3.1 revision 5 .39
Table 10 — Class ALC — ISO/IEC 15408-3:2022 vs. CC v3.1 revision 5 .40
Table 11 — Class ATE — ISO/IEC 15408-3:2022 vs. CC v3.1 revision 5.41
Table 12 — Class AVA — ISO/IEC 15408-3:2022 vs. CC v3.1 revision 5.41
Table 13 — Class ACO — ISO/IEC 15408-3:2022 vs. CC v3.1 revision 5 .42
Table 14 — ISO/IEC 15408-4:2022 — Summary .42
Table 15 — ISO/IEC 15408-5:2022 — Summary . 44
Table 16 — Changes in ISO/IEC 18045:2022 . 44
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© ISO/IEC 2022 – All rights reserved
Foreword
ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) and IEC (the International Electrotechnical
Commission) form the specialized system for worldwide standardization. National bodies that are
members of ISO or IEC participate in the development of International Standards through technical
committees established by the respective organization to deal with particular fields of technical
activity. ISO and IEC technical committees collaborate in fields of mutual interest. Other international
organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO and IEC, also take part in the
work.
The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance
are described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular, the different approval criteria
needed for the different types of document should be noted. This document was drafted in
accordance with the editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www.iso.org/directives or
www.iec.ch/members_experts/refdocs).
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject
of patent rights. ISO and IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent
rights. Details of any patent rights identified during the development of the document will be in the
Introduction and/or on the ISO list of patent declarations received (see www.iso.org/patents) or the IEC
list of patent declarations received (see https://patents.iec.ch).
Any trade name used in this document is information given for the convenience of users and does not
constitute an endorsement.
For an explanation of the voluntary nature of standards, the meaning of ISO specific terms and
expressions related to conformity assessment, as well as information about ISO's adherence to
the World Trade Organization (WTO) principles in the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) see
www.iso.org/iso/foreword.html. In the IEC, see www.iec.ch/understanding-standards.
This document was prepared by Joint Technical Committee ISO/IEC JTC 1, Information technology,
Subcommittee SC 27, Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection.
Any feedback or questions on this document should be directed to the user’s national standards
body. A complete listing of these bodies can be found at www.iso.org/members.html and
www.iec.ch/national-committees.
vi
© ISO/IEC 2022 – All rights reserved
Introduction
The ISO/IEC 15408:2022 series and ISO/IEC 18045:2022 include substantial changes compared to the
former ISO/IEC 15408 series (ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009, ISO/IEC 15408-2:2008 and ISO/IEC 15408-3:2008)
and ISO/IEC 18045:2008 and subsequent Common Criteria and Common Evaluation Methodology
[14]-[17]
Version 3.1 Revision 5 (also called CC 3.1 and CEM 3.1 in the following). The edition:
— covers complex products and communities’ needs;
— offers compatibility with currently existing processes.
The goal of the revision of the ISO/IEC 15408 series (ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009, ISO/IEC 15408-2:2008 and
ISO/IEC 15408-3:2008) and ISO/IEC 18045:2008 was manifold and intended to support and fluidify the
work of all main groups with a general interest in the evaluation of the security properties of Target
of Evaluations (TOEs) by restructuring the documents, introducing new concepts and updating the
existing ones after rigorous consideration of commonly used approaches for the criteria. Specifically,
the revision aimed to:
— take into consideration Common Criteria users, especially existing Mutual Recognition Agreements
(MRAs), and their stakeholders,
1)
NOTE The only existing recognition arrangements are the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
2)
(CCRA) and Senior Officials Group — Information Systems Security Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-
IS MRA).
— offer continued alignment with the supporting documents developed in the context of the existing
MRAs;
— take into consideration commonly used approaches for the criteria (including but not limited to CC
3.1 and CEM 3.1) and introduce technical changes accordingly.
This document is meant to provide information and support to users of the ISO/IEC 15408:2022 series
and ISO/IEC 18045:2022. The audience for this document includes:
— security assurance consumers;
— IT product developers and those authoring Security Targets;
— technical community subject matter experts (SMEs) developing Packages, Protection Profiles,
evaluation methodologies, and other supportive documents;
— evaluators;
— evaluation schemes, and evaluation authorities;
— consultants, including developers of supportive tools;
— others, including those involved with mutual recognition arrangements and academia.
It is expected that the audience for this document is familiar with CC 3.1 and CEM 3.1.
1) https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/ccra/index.cfm
2) https://sogis.org
vii
© ISO/IEC 2022 – All rights reserved
TECHNICAL REPORT ISO/IEC TR 22216:2022(E)
Information security, cybersecurity and privacy
protection — New concepts and changes in ISO/IEC
15408:2022 and ISO/IEC 18045:2022
1 Scope
This document:
— introduces the break down between the former ISO/IEC 15408 series (ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009,
ISO/IEC 15408-2:2008) and ISO/IEC 15408-3:2008) and ISO/IEC 18045:2008 and the new parts
introduced in the ISO/IEC 15408:2022 series and ISO/IEC 18045:2022;
— presents the concepts newly introduced as well as the rationale for their inclusion;
— proposes an evolution path and information on how to move from CC 3.1 and CEM 3.1 to the
ISO/IEC 15408:2022 series and ISO/IEC 18045:2022, respectively;
— maps the evolutions between the CC 3.1 and CEM 3.1 and the ISO/IEC 15408:2022 series and
ISO/IEC 18045:2022, respectively.
2 Normative references
The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content
constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For
undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
ISO/IEC 15408-1:2022, Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — Evaluation criteria
for IT security — Part 1: Introduction and general model
ISO/IEC 15408-2:2022, Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — Evaluation criteria
for IT security — Part 2: Security functional components
ISO/IEC 15408-3:2022, Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — Evaluation criteria
for IT security — Part 3: Security assurance components
ISO/IEC 18045:2022, Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — Evaluation criteria for
IT security — Methodology for IT security evaluation
3 Terms, definitions and abbreviated terms
3.1 Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in ISO/IEC 15408-1:2022,
ISO/IEC 15408-2:2022, ISO/IEC 15408-3:2022, and ISO/IEC 18045:2022 apply.
ISO and IEC maintain terminology databases for use in standardization at the following addresses:
— ISO Online browsing platform: available at https:// www .iso .org/ obp;
— IEC Electropedia: available at https:// www .electropedia .org/ .
© ISO/IEC 2022 – All rights reserved
3.2 Abbreviated terms
For the purposes of this document, the abbreviated terms given in ISO/IEC 15408-1:2022,
ISO/IEC 15408-2:2022, ISO/IEC 15408-3:2022, and ISO/IEC 18045:2022 and the following apply.
CC Common Criteria
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology
4 Overview
4.1 General
This document is meant to help users of the ISO/IEC 15408:2022 series and ISO/IEC 18045:2022 to
understand how they can adapt the use of the standards to their needs by defining:
— supporting documents;
— refinements or application notes;
— extended requirements in an ST or PP;
and how they can use the concepts newly introduced or modified in the ISO/IEC 15408:2022 series and
ISO/IEC 18045:2022.
4.2 Structure of this document
This document has the following structure:
— subclauses 4.3 to 4.5 give an overview of the new structure of the documents in the ISO/IEC 15408:2022
series with the newly introduced technical concepts (in 4.3), usage information of this document
for transitional information (in 4.4) and usage information of the ISO/IEC 15408:2022 series for
specific needs, respectively (in 4.5);
— in Clause 5, the major new concepts introduced in the ISO/IEC 15408:2022 series are presented,
classified and discussed;
— Clause 6 focuses on concrete guidelines for applying the ISO/IEC 15408:2022 series and
ISO/IEC 18045:2022 for specific needs;
— finally, in Clause 7 the changes introduced and that are specific to each document in the
ISO/IEC 15408:2022 series and ISO/IEC 18045:2022 are mapped and intuitively presented.
4.3 Impacts of the revision on the structure and partition of the documents
The ISO/IEC 15408:2022 series now include five parts.
The ISO/IEC 15408:2022 series has been modified to include two additional parts, namely
ISO/IEC 15408-4:2022 and ISO/IEC 15408-5:2022.
ISO/IEC 15408-4:2022 is a new part that defines a framework for deriving evaluation methods and
activities from the evaluation methodology given in ISO/IEC 18045:2022. These derived evaluation
methods and activities can potentially be included in PPs, PP-Modules, packages, STs and any documents
supporting them.
ISO/IEC 15408-5:2022 is a new part that provides pre-defined security requirements that have been
identified as useful in support of common usage by stakeholders. It contains the text in regard to EALs
(evaluation assurance levels) and CAPs (composed assurance packages) that was previously given in
ISO/IEC 15408-3:2008 and CC 3.1.
© ISO/IEC 2022 – All rights reserved
Figure 1 illustrates the structure and partition of the ISO/IEC 15408:2022 series and ISO/IEC 18045:2022
documents as well as their relationship to the previous editions.
Figure 1 — ISO/IEC 15408:2022 series and ISO/IEC 18045:2022 structure and mapping
to former ISO/IEC 15408 series (ISO/IEC 15408-1:2009, ISO/IEC 15408-2:2008,
ISO/IEC 15408-3:2008) and ISO/IEC 18045:2008
Table 1 presents the concepts newly introduced in the ISO/IEC 15408:2022 series and
ISO/IEC 18045:2022 and provides a brief, descriptive overview for each.
Table 1 — Overview of newly introduced concepts
ISO/IEC 15408
Newly intro-
Description Impact
duced concept
Document
ISO/IEC 15408- Exact Conform- A new hierarchical relationship between a PP or a PP-Configuration and ISO/
1:2022 ance an ST whereby all the requirements in the ST are drawn from the PP or the IEC 15408-
PP-Configuration, respectively. An ST is allowed to claim exact conformance 3:2022
to exactly one PP-Configuration; it is allowed to claim exact conformance
ISO/IEC
to one or more PPs.
18045:2022
If a PP states that exact conformance is required, the ST will conform to it
in an exact manner, i.e. it will contain SPD and objectives identical to the
ones in the PP, and the same set of SFRs as the PP with all the assignments
and selections resolved.
Direct Rationale A construct allowing for an alternative method to derive the SFRs. The ISO/
SFRs are specified by direct mapping from the SPD; security objectives for IEC 15408-
the TOE are not included, although security objectives for the operational 3:2022
environment can be specified.
ISO/
This approach can be used with PPs, PP-Modules, STs and/or functional IEC 18045:2022
packages, allowing for a PP-Configuration that adopts a Direct Rationale
approach to be specified.
PP-Modules PP-Modules constitute internally consistent sets of SPD-elements, security ISO/
objectives for the TOE and the operational environment, security functional IEC 15408-
requirements and security assurance requirements, defined in the context 3:2022
of one or more specific PPs and potentially of other PP-Modules.
ISO/
They are meant for addressing specific security features of a given TOE type IEC 18045:2022
that cannot be imposed uniformly for all products of that particular type.
They are used only in conjunction with PP-Configurations.
Multi-assurance A new evaluation paradigm which: ISO/
Evaluation IEC 15408-
— allows evaluating heterogeneous products or systems in a
3:2022
unique and coherent manner;
ISO/
— offers the possibility of adapting the assurance level for a
IEC 18045:2022
product in terms of the different assurance levels of its parts.
© ISO/IEC 2022 – All rights reserved
Table 1 (continued)
ISO/IEC 15408
Newly intro-
Description Impact
duced concept
Document
ISO/IEC 15408- Exact Conform- A new hierarchical relationship between a PP or a PP-Configuration and ISO/
1:2022 ance an ST whereby all the requirements in the ST are drawn from the PP or the IEC 15408-
PP-Configuration, respectively. An ST is allowed to claim exact conformance 3:2022
to exactly one PP-Configuration; it is allowed to claim exact conformance
ISO/IEC
to one or more PPs.
18045:2022
If a PP states that exact conformance is required, the ST will conform to it
in an exact manner, i.e. it will contain SPD and objectives identical to the
ones in the PP, and the same set of SFRs as the PP with all the assignments
and selections resolved.
Composite eval- Real life products have complex supply chains and are most frequently ISO/
uation built by composition. IEC 15408-
3:2022
The composite evaluation method allows and facilitates the evaluation by
each actor involved in the supply chain. In the absence of the composite ISO/
evaluation method, the evaluation of such products would require devel- IEC 18045:2022
opers to provide evidence that they are not in possession of.
ISO/IEC 15408- Complete Formal Inadequacies in a TOE are frequently a consequence of misunderstanding the ISO/
3:2022 TSF model security requirements which, in turn leads to their flawed implementation. IEC 18045:2022
A complete formal TSF model is a formal security model encapsulating the
important aspects of security and their relationship to the behaviour of the
TOE. Specifically, it is a formal representation of the TSF as defined by the
complete set of SFRs described in the ST and the set of its formal properties
covers all the security objectives for the TOE.
The formal TSF model can provide support and precise information through-
out the design, implementation and review processes, thereby providing
an increased level of assurance that the SFRs and the security objectives
of the ST are satisfied by the TOE.
4.4 Using this document for transitional information
Risk owners rely on PPs to express their specific security requirements in an unambiguous,
implementation-independent manner. For new PPs, it is noted for risk owners that two evaluation
approaches as well as new features such as composite evaluation and Direct Rationale PPs have been
introduced. These have been briefly presented in Table 1 and are further discussed in Clause 5. For
existing PPs, Figure 16 in Clause 7 illustrates the changes in mandatory content with respect to CC 3.1.
For developers it is noted that by default, requirements contained in existing STs are fully compatible.
The transition to the ISO/IEC 15408:2022 series and ISO/IEC 18045:2022 has no impact for developers
unless new features of the ISO/IEC 15408:2022 series were used by the risk owners. In the latter case,
the information and references provided for risk owners are to be consulted by developers as well.
Evaluators are not the main target of this document which provides only an introduction and cannot
replace the reading of the ISO/IEC 15408:2022 series and ISO/IEC 18045:2022 in their entirety. However,
Clause 7 can serve as an overview for identifying relevant information. In particular, 7.3 provides tables
identifying and illustrating work units that have been newly introduced in the ISO/IEC 15408:2022
series for the APE, ACE, ASE, ALC, ATE and AVA components.
4.5 Using the ISO/IEC 15408:2022 series and ISO/IEC 18045:2022 for specific needs
The details concerning evaluation methods and security components are described in Clause 5 and
Clause 6. From the point of view of risk owners, three main categories of needs are addressed:
— making sure that suppliers strictly adhere to a test plan defined or validated by the risk owner,
instead of letting Certification Bodies (CBs) and evaluators devise the test plan: this translates into
exact conformance and specific evaluation methods;
— allowing the evaluation of more complex products: this translates into composite and multi-
assurance evaluation;
© ISO/IEC 2022 – All rights reserved
— modular specification of security requirements: this translates into PP-Configurations and PP-
Modules.
5 Major new concepts introduced in the ISO/IEC 15408:2022 series and ISO/
IEC 18045:2022
5.1 Approaches to security evaluation
5.1.1 General
The ISO/IEC 15408:2022 series and ISO/IEC 18045:2022 now support two different approaches to
evaluation, as shown in Figure 2: the attack-based approach and the specification-based approach.
The ISO/IEC 15408:2022 series and ISO/IEC 18045:2022 still support the evaluation approach used
in previous versions, which is called hereafter the “attack-based approach”, which is an investigative
approach. Notably, this approach:
— still mostly uses demonstrable or strict conformance;
— still uses EALs, the AVA_VAN components and the notions of refinement and extended component to
define TOE-specific evaluation methodologies;
— still uses standard PPs and STs.
This approach is best used in contexts where state-of the-art and agility with regard to new attacks
is demanded by certificate users or consumers and constitutes a requirement for both evaluators and
developers, even if this means that the developer cannot anticipate all and each of the tests that will be
considered or performed by the evaluator. This approach also favours penetration testing, due to the
use of AVA_VAN components. Penetration testing implies the use of a flaw hypothesis methodology:
the evaluator identifies potential flaws based on what is observed during conformity testing and
documentation analysis, academic research, and more largely, any source “deemed appropriate”.
Eventually, the evaluator defines a test plan to ascertain the presence and exploitability of these
potential flaws.
A new approach, which is called hereafter the “specification-based approach”, consists in defining, at
the PP level, the requirements, and the corresponding evaluation activities. This approach:
— uses exact conformance to PPs;
— often does not use EALs;
— can potentially use Direct Rationale PPs and STs.
This approach is best used when the main expected benefit is to confirm that a TOE meets a set of
tests that is known in advance, even if this means that newly relevant attack scenarios that were not
considered by the risk owner in the PP are not tested. It also aims to suppress the need to define a
tailored test plan during the evaluation: the evaluator works exclusively based on a predefined list of
tests instead of performing TOE-specific penetration testing.
© ISO/IEC 2022 – All rights reserved
Figure 2 — Specification-based and attack-based approaches
5.1.2 The attack-based approach
5.1.2.1 General
As in previous versions, the ISO/IEC 15408:2022 series supports the evaluation methodology defined in
ISO/IEC 18405:2022.
This approach is based on evaluations carried out in situations where the implemented security
functionality can vary, e.g. according to technology choices or IP constraints, provided they enforce
the protection of the assets as expected. Such evaluations can be carried out without reference to a
PP or can be based on PPs that do not define the details of their intended TOE type or deployment
context. This maximizes the number of different realizations of the requirements that can be accepted
as conformant. The EALs and generic evaluator actions, given in ISO/IEC 18045:2022, are interpreted
for each TOE type and specialized to the characteristics of each actual TOE to confirm the assurance
level. This assurance is derived from a sound and well-defined hierarchy of assurance requirements
and evaluation work units by using TOE-related evidence, which allows the evaluator to specialize
the generic evaluation work units and thereby to define the most suitable set of tests for this specific
product.
This approach is commonly deployed where there is an advantage in having flexibility in the application
of the assurance requirements.
5.1.2.2 Conformance
The “attack-based” approach uses demonstrable or strict conformance, which results in the possibility
to add SFRs and SARs to an individual ST (such additions can be organized in a package). However, the
approach does not forbid the use of the exact conformance concept whenever appropriate.
© ISO/IEC 2022 – All rights reserved
5.1.2.3 Edition of Protection Profiles and Security Targets
The “attack-based” approach uses standard or Direct Rationale PPs and STs. In particular, this aims at
allowing the use of PPs that are specified independent of detailed assumptions about the TOE context
(or use of STs without conformance to PPs, such as for TOEs that are developer-specific or that need to
allow for new solution types in areas of disruptive technologies or technology evolution). This:
— allows customization and adaptation of SPDs, objectives, and SFRs at the ST stage; this differentiation
can be of benefit to innovation by allowing vendors to complete their own requirements, as opposed
to unified PPs;
EXAMPLE Open-ended assignments in PPs’ SFRs allow to make the most suitable instantiations within
the STs.
— implies a limited use of extended SFRs, but does not prevent it;
— favours approaches where evaluators define test plans based on ISO/IEC 18045:2022 activities;
whenever a technical domain is mature enough, ISO/IEC 15408-4:2022 or refinement and extended
components techniques can also be used to derive dedicated evaluation methods.
5.1.2.4 Evaluation methodology
The “attack-based” approach uses the EALs, which are characterized by increasing amounts of
developer and evaluator activity aimed at describing internal details of the TOE and interpreting
generic assurance requirements within the context of a particular TOE type and product. This notably
includes AVA_VAN components. This approach claims the following properties.
— Reproducibility, repeatability, and availability of tests are ensured on one hand by ISO/IEC 18405:2022
(which provides common notions such as the attack potential), and on the other hand by the
evaluation schemes that use the ISO/IEC 15408:2022 series and ISO/IEC 18405:2022 (which are in
charge of ensuring that evaluators have similar approaches, and that developers are appropriately
informed). For mature technologies, dedicated evaluation methods can also be defined.
— All product types can be evaluated, as long as the evaluator is deemed competent for the assurance
level and/or the type of technology considered. As a consequence, the evaluator has to consider the
state-of-the-art of attacks for the selected AVA_VAN, regardless of the functional features described
in the underlying PPs.
— Tests are not defined in advance, so that evaluators are allowed to introduce independent and
reasoned analysis in the process, which leads to:
— fine-tuning tests depending on the TOE itself (e.g. language-specific tests: Python and C do not
lead to the same type of vulnerabilities);
— fine-tuning tests depending on evaluation findings: the evaluator is typically simulating an
attacker in a limited timeframe; in this context, based on their knowledge of the TOE, evaluators
define a suitable set of tests;
— fine-tuning tests depending on the evolution of the state-of-the-art (e.g. if new attacks have
been discovered in the field or in the academic literature).
5.1.3 The specification-based approach
5.1.3.1 General
This approach corresponds to the initiative taken within the CCRA and resulting in international
Technical Communities (iTCs) and collaborative Protection Profiles (cPPs).
The “specification-based” approach implies the specification of detailed product-type-specific SFRs, as
well as evaluation activities derived from ISO/IEC 15408-3:2022. The details added to SFRs and SARs
are meaningful in particular contexts, for a particular TOE type, or in a given industry sector.
© ISO/IEC 2022 – All rights reserved
This approach is intended to define minutely, at the PP level, the requirements to be met and the
corresponding evaluation activities. This approach relies on a requirement-setting body to define
the detailed evaluation activities and clear pass/fail criteria ahead of actual evaluations, which
allows to achieve a high degree of consistency in the application of the assurance requirements.
ISO/IEC 15408-3:2022 and ISO/IEC 18045:2022 are fundamental to the newly introduced framework
for the specification of evaluation methods and activities.
5.1.3.2 Exact conformance
The “specification-based” approach uses exact conformance PPs, which ensures that the conformant
ST does not change or even add anything to the PP’s requirements. This concept is intended to support
procurement processes, since it ensures that products will not claim additional features that are not
relevant to the interests of the PP owner. The approach also aims at making it easier for potential
customers to compare products and ensuring that the assurance consumers can see the details of the
evaluation activities that have been successfully carried out.
It is noted that “optional features” are addressed by optional security functional requirements (SFRs).
A given type of TOE can provide a selection-based alternative for some of its SFRs. However, such
selections can require the inclusion of different dependencies. For example, keys used in an IPSec tunnel
can either be distributed or created by the equipment itself, after a negotiation. In the first case, a single
cryptographic SFR is needed. In the second case, a PP editor might want to define requirements on the
whole negotiation protocol. In both cases, the ST writer using the PP needs to be able to select only one
of those two sets of SFRs. In this case, these sets can be described as optional requirements.
The notion of exact conformance aims at completely defining requirements and tests before an
evaluation begins. These requirements and tests are approved within a community (this community
can be a set of suppliers for a given customer, a national certification scheme, an MRA, etc.) and are
typically supplied in the form factor of a PP and some supporting documents. Note that a PP can
directly contain evaluation methods and activities associated to its SFRs. Examples of this can be found
in currently used collaborative PPs and their corresponding supporting documents (see References [6]
to [13]).
In this context, ISO/IEC 15408-4:2022 is to be used to define the exact set of tests derived from
ISO/IEC 18045:2022 work units. The objective of such a derivation process is:
— to adapt ISO/IEC 18045:2022 to a given technology;
— whenever possible, to ensure that the evaluator’s verdict is completely free of any interpretation.
For this reason, evaluation methods are meant to be based on detailed, and easily reproducible, test
steps. The results of these steps are expected to be clear, so that no ambiguity is left to be managed at
the evaluator’s level.
5.1.3.3 Edition of Protection Profiles and Security Targets
The “specification-based” approach can use standard or Direct Rationale PPs and STs. Direct Rationale
PPs and STs do not use security objectives for the TOE; they include instead a direct mapping from
threats and organizational security policies to SFRs underpinned by a rationale on the mapping
appropriateness.
Direct Rationale PPs and STs were previously called “low assurance” PPs and STs because they were
only allowed for EAL1 evaluations. These simplified PPs and STs are appropriate for the “specification-
based” approach, which usually does not use EALs.
The general philosophy of PPs in the “specification-based” approach implies:
— less emphasis on the analysis of the security problem, which has a limited impact on the evaluations
since there is no need to perform TOE-specific vulnerability analysis;
— maximizing the use of selection-based SFRs, and minimizing the use of open-ended assignmen
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