ISO/IEC 29167-19:2016
(Main)Information technology — Automatic identification and data capture techniques — Part 19: Crypto suite RAMON security services for air interface communications
Information technology — Automatic identification and data capture techniques — Part 19: Crypto suite RAMON security services for air interface communications
ISO/IEC 29167-19:2016 defines the Rabin-Montgomery (RAMON) crypto suite for the ISO/IEC 18000 air interfaces standards for radio frequency identification (RFID) devices. Its purpose is to provide a common crypto suite for security for RFID devices that may be referred by ISO committees for air interface standards and application standards. ISO/IEC 29167-19:2016 specifies a crypto suite for Rabin-Montgomery (RAMON) for air interface for RFID systems. The crypto suite is defined in alignment with existing air interfaces. ISO/IEC 29167-19:2016 defines various authentication methods and methods of use for the cipher. A Tag and an Interrogator may support one, a subset, or all of the specified options, clearly stating what is supported.
Technologie informative — Identification automatique et technique capturé data — Partie 19: Air interface pour les services de sécurité suite de crypto RAMON
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INTERNATIONAL ISO/IEC
STANDARD 29167-19
First edition
2016-05-15
Information technology — Automatic
identification and data capture
techniques —
Part 19:
Crypto suite RAMON security services
for air interface communications
Technologie informative — Identification automatique et technique
capturé data —
Partie 19: Air interface pour les services de sécurité suite de crypto
RAMON
Reference number
ISO/IEC 29167-19:2016(E)
©
ISO/IEC 2016
---------------------- Page: 1 ----------------------
ISO/IEC 29167-19:2016(E)
COPYRIGHT PROTECTED DOCUMENT
© ISO/IEC 2016, Published in Switzerland
All rights reserved. Unless otherwise specified, no part of this publication may be reproduced or utilized otherwise in any form
or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, or posting on the internet or an intranet, without prior
written permission. Permission can be requested from either ISO at the address below or ISO’s member body in the country of
the requester.
ISO copyright office
Ch. de Blandonnet 8 • CP 401
CH-1214 Vernier, Geneva, Switzerland
Tel. +41 22 749 01 11
Fax +41 22 749 09 47
copyright@iso.org
www.iso.org
ii © ISO/IEC 2016 – All rights reserved
---------------------- Page: 2 ----------------------
ISO/IEC 29167-19:2016(E)
Contents Page
Foreword .v
Introduction .vi
1 Scope . 1
2 Conformance . 1
2.1 Claiming conformance . 1
2.2 Interrogator conformance and obligations . 1
2.3 Tag conformance and obligations . 1
3 Normative references . 2
4 Terms and definitions . 2
5 Symbols and abbreviated terms . 3
5.1 Symbols . 3
5.2 Abbreviated terms . 3
5.3 Notation . 4
6 Crypto suite introduction . 5
6.1 Overview . 5
6.2 Authentication protocols . 6
6.2.1 Tag Identification . 6
6.2.2 Symmetric mutual authentication . 7
6.3 Send Sequence Counter . 8
6.4 Session key derivation . 9
6.4.1 KDF in counter mode . 9
6.4.2 Key Derivation Scheme .10
6.5 IID, SID, Used Keys and Their Personalisation.11
6.6 Key table .13
7 Parameter definitions .14
8 State diagrams.14
8.1 General .14
8.2 State diagram and transitions for Tag identification .15
8.2.1 Partial Result Mode.15
8.2.2 Complete Result Mode .16
8.3 State diagram and transitions for mutual authentication .17
8.3.1 Partial Result Mode.17
8.3.2 Complete Result Mode .18
8.3.3 Combination of complete and partial result mode . .19
9 Initialization and resetting .20
10 Identification and authentication.20
10.1 Tag identification .20
10.1.1 Partial Result Mode.20
10.1.2 Complete Result Mode .20
10.2 Mutual authentication .21
10.2.1 Partial Result Mode.21
10.2.2 Complete Result Mode .22
10.3 The Authenticate command.23
10.3.1 Message formats for Tag identification .23
10.3.2 Message formats for Mutual Authentication .24
10.4 Authentication response .25
10.4.1 Response formats for Tag identification .25
10.4.2 Response formats for mutual authentication .26
10.4.3 Authentication error response .28
10.5 Determination of Result Modes .29
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ISO/IEC 29167-19:2016(E)
11 Secure communication .30
11.1 Secure communication command .30
11.2 Secure Communication response .31
11.2.1 Secure communication error response .31
11.3 Encoding of Read and Write commands for secure communication .31
11.4 Application of secure messaging primitives .32
11.4.1 Secure Communication command messages .32
11.4.2 Secure Communication response messages .34
11.4.3 Explanation of cipher block chaining mode .37
Annex A (normative) State transition tables .39
Annex B (normative) Error codes and error handling.42
Annex C (normative) Cipher description .43
Annex D (informative) Test Vectors .58
Annex E (normative) Protocol specific .61
Annex F (informative) Non-traceable and integrity-protected Tag identification .68
Annex G (informative) Memory Organization for Secure UHF Tags (Proposal) .71
Bibliography .75
iv © ISO/IEC 2016 – All rights reserved
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ISO/IEC 29167-19:2016(E)
Foreword
ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) and IEC (the International Electrotechnical
Commission) form the specialized system for worldwide standardization. National bodies that are
members of ISO or IEC participate in the development of International Standards through technical
committees established by the respective organization to deal with particular fields of technical
activity. ISO and IEC technical committees collaborate in fields of mutual interest. Other international
organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO and IEC, also take part in the
work. In the field of information technology, ISO and IEC have established a joint technical committee,
ISO/IEC JTC 1.
The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are
described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular the different approval criteria needed for
the different types of document should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the
editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www.iso.org/directives).
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject
of patent rights. ISO and IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent
rights. Details of any patent rights identified during the development of the document will be in the
Introduction and/or on the ISO list of patent declarations received (see www.iso.org/patents).
Any trade name used in this document is information given for the convenience of users and does not
constitute an endorsement.
For an explanation on the meaning of ISO specific terms and expressions related to conformity
assessment, as well as information about ISO’s adherence to the WTO principles in the Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT), see the following URL: Foreword — Supplementary information.
The committee responsible for this document is ISO/IEC JTC 1, Information technology, Subcommittee
SC 31, Automatic identification and data capture.
ISO/IEC 29167 consists of the following parts, under the general title Information technology —
Automatic identification and data capture techniques:
— Part 1: Security services for RFID air interfaces
— Part 10: Crypto suite AES-128 security services for air interface communications
— Part 11: Crypto suite PRESENT-80 security services for air interface communications
— Part 12: Crypto suite ECC-DH security services for air interface communications
— Part 13: Crypto suite Grain-128A security services for air interface communications
— Part 14: Crypto suite AES OFB security services for air interface communications
— Part 16: Crypto suite ECDSA-ECDH security services for air interface communications
— Part 17: Crypto suite cryptoGPS security services for air interface communications
— Part 19: Crypto suite RAMON security services for air interface communications
— Part 20: Crypto suite Algebraic Eraser security services for air interface communications
The following part is under preparation:
— Part 15: Crypto suite XOR security services for air interface communications
© ISO/IEC 2016 – All rights reserved v
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ISO/IEC 29167-19:2016(E)
Introduction
This part of ISO/IEC 29167 specifies the security services of a Rabin-Montgomery (RAMON) crypto
suite. It is important to know that all security services are optional. The crypto suite provides Tag
authentication security service.
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC) draw attention to the fact that it is claimed that compliance with this International
Standard may involve the use of patents concerning radio-frequency identification technology given in
the clauses identified below.
ISO and IEC take no position concerning the evidence, validity and scope of these patent rights.
The holders of these patent rights have ensured the ISO and IEC that they are willing to negotiate
licences under reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions with applicants throughout
the world. In this respect, the statements of the holders of these patent rights are registered with ISO
and IEC.
Information on the declared patents may be obtained from:
NXP B.V.
411 East Plumeria, San Jose,
CA 95134-1924 USA
The latest information on IP that may be applicable to this part of ISO/IEC 29167 can be found at www.
iso.org/patents.
vi © ISO/IEC 2016 – All rights reserved
---------------------- Page: 6 ----------------------
INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ISO/IEC 29167-19:2016(E)
Information technology — Automatic identification and
data capture techniques —
Part 19:
Crypto suite RAMON security services for air interface
communications
1 Scope
This part of ISO/IEC 29167 defines the Rabin-Montgomery (RAMON) crypto suite for the ISO/IEC 18000
air interfaces standards for radio frequency identification (RFID) devices. Its purpose is to provide
a common crypto suite for security for RFID devices that may be referred by ISO committees for air
interface standards and application standards.
This part of ISO/IEC 29167 specifies a crypto suite for Rabin-Montgomery (RAMON) for air interface
for RFID systems. The crypto suite is defined in alignment with existing air interfaces.
This part of ISO/IEC 29167 defines various authentication methods and methods of use for the cipher.
A Tag and an Interrogator may support one, a subset, or all of the specified options, clearly stating what
is supported.
2 Conformance
2.1 Claiming conformance
To claim conformance with this part of ISO/IEC 29167, an Interrogator or Tag shall comply with all
relevant clauses of this part of ISO/IEC 29167, except those marked as “optional”.
2.2 Interrogator conformance and obligations
To conform to this part of ISO/IEC 29167, an Interrogator shall implement the mandatory commands
defined in this part of ISO/IEC 29167, and conform to the relevant part of ISO/IEC 18000.
To conform to this part of ISO/IEC 29167, an Interrogator may implement any subset of the optional
commands defined in this part of ISO/IEC 29167.
To conform to this part of ISO/IEC 29167, the Interrogator shall not
— implement any command that conflicts with this part of ISO/IEC 29167, or
— require the use of an optional, proprietary, or custom command to meet the requirements of this
part of ISO/IEC 29167.
2.3 Tag conformance and obligations
To conform to this part of ISO/IEC 29167, a Tag shall implement the mandatory commands defined in
this part of ISO/IEC 29167 for the supported types, and conform to the relevant part of ISO/IEC 18000.
To conform to this part of ISO/IEC 29167, a Tag may implement any subset of the optional commands
defined in this part of ISO/IEC 29167.
© ISO/IEC 2016 – All rights reserved 1
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ISO/IEC 29167-19:2016(E)
To conform to this part of ISO/IEC 29167, a Tag shall not
— implement any command that conflicts with this part of ISO/IEC 29167, or
— require the use of an optional, proprietary, or custom command to meet the requirements of this
part of ISO/IEC 29167.
3 Normative references
The following documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document and are
indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated
references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
ISO/IEC 18000-3, Information technology — Radio frequency identification for item management —
Part 3: Parameters for air interface communications at 13,56 MHz
ISO/IEC 18000-4, Information technology — Radio frequency identification for item management — Part
4: Parameters for air interface communications at 2,45 GHz
ISO/IEC 18000-63, Information technology — Radio frequency identification for item management —
Part 63: Parameters for air interface communications at 860 MHz to 960 MHz Type C
ISO/IEC 19762 (all parts), Information technology — Automatic identification and data capture (AIDC)
techniques — Harmonized vocabulary
ISO/IEC 29167-1, Information technology — Automatic identification and data capture techniques —
Part 1: Security services for RFID air interfaces
4 Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in ISO/IEC 19762 (all parts) and the
following apply.
4.1
authentication
service that is used to establish the origin of information
4.2
confidentiality
property whereby information is not disclosed to unauthorized parties
4.3
integrity
property whereby data has not been altered in an unauthorized manner since it was created,
transmitted or stored
4.4
non-traceability
protection ensuring that an unauthorized interrogator is not able to track the Tag location by using the
information sent in the Tag response
4.5
secure communication
communication between the tag and the interrogator by use of the Authenticate command, assuring
authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of exchanged messages
2 © ISO/IEC 2016 – All rights reserved
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ISO/IEC 29167-19:2016(E)
5 Symbols and abbreviated terms
5.1 Symbols
xx binary notation
2
xxh hexadecimal notation
|| concatenation of syntax elements in the order written
5.2 Abbreviated terms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CH Challenge
CH , CH Interrogator random challenge, 16 bytes
I1 I2
CH Tag random challenge, 16 bytes
T
CG Cryptogram
CMAC Ciphered Message Authentication Code
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CRC–16 16-bit CRC
CS Crypto Suite
CSI Crypto Suite Identifier
DEC(key, data) AES decryption of enciphered “data” with secret “key”
ENC(key, data) AES encryption of plain “data” with secret “key”
EPC™ Electronic Product Code
IID Interrogator Identifier, 8 bytes
IV Initialization Vector for CBC-encryption, 16 bytes
KDF Key Derivation Function
K Public key for encryption stored on Tag
E
K Private decryption key stored on Interrogator
D
K Public signature verification key stored on Interrogator
V
K Private signature generation key stored in the tag issuer facility
S
K Shared secret message encryption key
ENC
K Shared secret message authentication key
MAC
KESel Key select (determines which KE will be used)
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ISO/IEC 29167-19:2016(E)
KSel Key select (determines which pair of KENC, KMAC will be used)
MAC(key, data) Calculation of a MAC of (enciphered) “data”’ with secret “key”; internal state of
the tag’s state machine
MAMx,y Mutual Authentication Method x.y
MCV MAC Chaining Value
MIX(CH, RN, SID) RAMON mix function
PRF Pseudorandom Function
R Tag response
RAMON Rabin-Montgomery
RFU Reserved for Future Use
RM_ENC(key, data) RAMON encryption of plain “data” with public “key”
RM_DEC(key, data) RAMON decryption of enciphered “data” with private “key”
RN Random Number
RNT Tag Random Number, 16 bytes
S Message encryption session key
ENC
S Message authentication session key
MAC
SID Secret IDentifier, 8 bytes, identifying the tag
SSC Send Sequence Counter for replay protection, 16 bytes
TAMx,y Tag Authentication Method x.y; internal state of the tag’s state machine
TLV Tag Length Value
UHF Ultra High Frequency
UII Unique Item Identifier
WORM Write once, read many
5.3 Notation
This crypto suite uses the notation of ISO/IEC 18000-63.
The following notation for key derivation corresponds to Reference [7] and Clause 5.
PRF(s,x) A pseudo-random function with seed s and input data x.
K Key derivation key used as input to the KDF to derive keying material. K is used as the block
I I
cipher key, and the other input data are used as the message defined in
Reference [5].
K Keying material output from a key derivation function, a binary string of the required length,
O
which is derived using a key derivation key.
Label A string that identifies the purpose for the derived keying material, which is encoded as a bina-
ry string.
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ISO/IEC 29167-19:2016(E)
Context A binary string containing the information related to the derived keying material. It may include
identities of parties who are deriving and/or using the derived keying material and, optionally, a
nonce known by the parties who derive the keys.
L An integer specifying the length (in bits) of the derived keying material K . L is represented as a
O
binary string when it is an input to a key derivation function. The length of the binary string is
specified by the encoding method for the input data.
h An integer that indicates the length (in bits) of the output of the PRF.
i A counter that is input to each iteration of the PRF.
r An integer, smaller or equal to 32, that indicates the length of the binary representation of the
counter i. in bits.
00h An all zero octet. An optional data field used to indicate a separation of different variable length
data fields.
The smallest integer that is larger than or equal to X. The ceiling of X.
X
{X} Indicates that data X is an optional input to the key derivation function.
[T] An integer T represented as a binary string (denoted by the “2”) with a length specified by the
2
function, an algorithm, or a protocol which uses T as an input.
∅ The empty binary string.
6 Crypto suite introduction
6.1 Overview
The RAMON Crypto Suite permits two levels of implementation. The first level provides secure
identification and tag authentication, while the second level extends the functionality by mutual
authentication to securely communicate between Interrogator and Tag, e.g. for secure reading and
writing non-volatile memory.
Basic RAMON Tags may provide only the first level of implementation, while more sophisticated Tags
also provide the second level. See Figure 1 for the different implementation levels for the RAMON
crypto suite.
© ISO/IEC 2016 – All rights reserved 5
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ISO/IEC 29167-19:2016(E)
Figure 1 — Overview of the different implementation levels for the RAMON crypto suite
6.2 Authentication protocols
6.2.1 Tag Identification
The Rabin-Montgomery crypto suite provides non-traceable and confidential Tag identification.
Confidentiality and privacy for the Tag’s identifier are provided without requiring the Tag to store a
private key.
[3]
The crypto suite is based on the asymmetric cryptosystem developed by Michael O. Rabin . The
[2]
original algorithm is augmented by a method detected by Peter Montgomery , which avoids the
division of long numbers in modular arithmetic. Combining Rabin encryption with the concept of
Montgomery multiplication advantage is taken of the fact that no “costly” division is required.
The Tag performs only public key operations. The Interrogator performs the “expensive” private
key operation. The steps necessary to carry out RAMON are outlined in Table 1. RAMON encryption
performed by the Tag and decryption performed by the Interrogator are specified in C.3 and C.4. The
cryptographic keys are specified in 6.6.
This specification also includes in C.1 the structure of the clear text record used for authentication of
the Tag, comprising the Tag identity record and random data originating in part from the Tag and from
the Interrogator for the other part.
6 © ISO/IEC 2016 – All rights reserved
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ISO/IEC 29167-19:2016(E)
Table 1 — Protocol steps for Tag identification
Interrogator Tag
(K , K ) (SID, K )
D V E
Generate random challenge CH and send it to (CH )
I1 I1
the Tag. → Generate random number RN .
T
Generate response cryptogram:
(R) R = RM_ENC(K , MIX(CH , RN , TLV record)).
E I1 T
Decrypt Tag response and apply the inverse of ←
the MIX function to get the plaintext P:
−1
P = MIX (RM_DEC (K , R)).
D
Obtain CH , RN and SID from plaintext P.
I1 T
Compare previously generated Interrogator
challenge with the value received from Tag. If
successful, Tag is identified.
If a signature is provided along with the SID,
use K to validate the signature. If successful,
V
Tag is authenticated.
6.2.2 Symmetric mutual
...
FINAL
INTERNATIONAL ISO/IEC
DRAFT
STANDARD FDIS
29167-19
ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 31
Information technology — Automatic
Secretariat: ANSI
identification and data capture
Voting begins on:
2015-10-07 techniques —
Voting terminates on:
Part 19:
2015-12-07
Crypto suite RAMON security services
for air interface communications
Technologie informative — Identification automatique et technique
capturé data —
Partie 19: Air interface pour les services de sécurité suite de crypto
RAMON
RECIPIENTS OF THIS DRAFT ARE INVITED TO
SUBMIT, WITH THEIR COMMENTS, NOTIFICATION
OF ANY RELEVANT PATENT RIGHTS OF WHICH
THEY ARE AWARE AND TO PROVIDE SUPPOR TING
DOCUMENTATION.
IN ADDITION TO THEIR EVALUATION AS
Reference number
BEING ACCEPTABLE FOR INDUSTRIAL, TECHNO-
ISO/IEC FDIS 29167-19:2015(E)
LOGICAL, COMMERCIAL AND USER PURPOSES,
DRAFT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS MAY ON
OCCASION HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE
LIGHT OF THEIR POTENTIAL TO BECOME STAN-
DARDS TO WHICH REFERENCE MAY BE MADE IN
©
NATIONAL REGULATIONS. ISO/IEC 2015
---------------------- Page: 1 ----------------------
ISO/IEC FDIS 29167-19:2015(E)
COPYRIGHT PROTECTED DOCUMENT
© ISO/IEC 2015, Published in Switzerland
All rights reserved. Unless otherwise specified, no part of this publication may be reproduced or utilized otherwise in any form
or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, or posting on the internet or an intranet, without prior
written permission. Permission can be requested from either ISO at the address below or ISO’s member body in the country of
the requester.
ISO copyright office
Ch. de Blandonnet 8 • CP 401
CH-1214 Vernier, Geneva, Switzerland
Tel. +41 22 749 01 11
Fax +41 22 749 09 47
copyright@iso.org
www.iso.org
ii © ISO/IEC 2015 – All rights reserved
---------------------- Page: 2 ----------------------
ISO/IEC FDIS 29167-19:2015(E)
Contents Page
Foreword .v
Introduction .vi
1 Scope . 1
2 Conformance . 1
2.1 Claiming conformance . 1
2.2 Interrogator conformance and obligations . 1
2.3 Tag conformance and obligations . 1
3 Normative references . 2
4 Terms and definitions . 2
5 Symbols and abbreviated terms . 3
5.1 Symbols . 3
5.2 Abbreviated terms . 3
5.3 Notation . 4
6 Crypto suite introduction . 5
6.1 Overview . 5
6.2 Authentication protocols . 6
6.2.1 Tag Identification . 6
6.2.2 Symmetric mutual authentication . 7
6.3 Send Sequence Counter . 8
6.4 Session key derivation . 9
6.4.1 KDF in counter mode . 9
6.4.2 Key Derivation Scheme .10
6.5 IID, SID, Used Keys and Their Personalisation.11
6.6 Key table .12
7 Parameter definitions .13
8 State diagrams.14
8.1 General .14
8.2 State diagram and transitions for Tag identification .15
8.2.1 Partial Result Mode.15
8.2.2 Complete Result Mode .16
8.3 State diagram and transitions for mutual authentication .16
8.3.1 Partial Result Mode.17
8.3.2 Complete Result Mode .18
8.3.3 Combination of complete and partial result mode . .19
9 Initialization and resetting .20
10 Identification and authentication.20
10.1 Tag identification .20
10.1.1 Partial Result Mode.20
10.1.2 Complete Result Mode .20
10.2 Mutual authentication .21
10.2.1 Partial Result Mode.21
10.2.2 Complete Result Mode .22
10.3 The Authenticate command.23
10.3.1 Message formats for Tag identification .23
10.3.2 Message formats for Mutual Authentication .24
10.4 Authentication response .25
10.4.1 Response formats for Tag identification .25
10.4.2 Response formats for mutual authentication .26
10.4.3 Authentication error response .28
10.5 Determination of Result Modes .29
© ISO/IEC 2015 – All rights reserved iii
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ISO/IEC FDIS 29167-19:2015(E)
11 Secure communication .30
11.1 Secure communication command .30
11.2 Secure Communication response .31
11.2.1 Secure communication error response .31
11.3 Encoding of Read and Write commands for secure communication .31
11.4 Application of secure messaging primitives .32
11.4.1 Secure Communication command messages .32
11.4.2 Secure Communication response messages .34
11.4.3 Explanation of cipher block chaining mode .37
Annex A (normative) State transition tables .39
Annex B (normative) Error codes and error handling.42
Annex C (normative) Cipher description .43
Annex D (informative) Test Vectors .59
Annex E (normative) Protocol specific .62
Annex F (informative) Non-traceable and integrity-protected Tag identification .69
Annex G (informative) Memory Organization for Secure UHF Tags (Proposal) .72
Bibliography .76
iv © ISO/IEC 2015 – All rights reserved
---------------------- Page: 4 ----------------------
ISO/IEC FDIS 29167-19:2015(E)
Foreword
ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) and IEC (the International Electrotechnical
Commission) form the specialized system for worldwide standardization. National bodies that are
members of ISO or IEC participate in the development of International Standards through technical
committees established by the respective organization to deal with particular fields of technical
activity. ISO and IEC technical committees collaborate in fields of mutual interest. Other international
organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO and IEC, also take part in the
work. In the field of information technology, ISO and IEC have established a joint technical committee,
ISO/IEC JTC 1.
The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are
described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular the different approval criteria needed for
the different types of document should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the
editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www.iso.org/directives).
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject
of patent rights. ISO and IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent
rights. Details of any patent rights identified during the development of the document will be in the
Introduction and/or on the ISO list of patent declarations received (see www.iso.org/patents).
Any trade name used in this document is information given for the convenience of users and does not
constitute an endorsement.
For an explanation on the meaning of ISO specific terms and expressions related to conformity
assessment, as well as information about ISO’s adherence to the WTO principles in the Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT), see the following URL: Foreword — Supplementary information.
The committee responsible for this document is ISO/IEC JTC 1, Information technology, Subcommittee
SC 31, Automatic identification and data capture.
ISO/IEC 29167 consists of the following parts, under the general title Information technology —
Automatic identification and data capture techniques:
— Part 1: Security services for RFID air interfaces
— Part 10: Crypto suite AES-128 security services for air interface communications
— Part 11: Crypto suite PRESENT-80 security services for air interface communications
— Part 12: Crypto suite ECC-DH security services for air interface communications
— Part 13: Crypto suite Grain-128A security services for air interface communications
— Part 14: Crypto suite AES OFB security services for air interface communications
— Part 16: Crypto suite ECDSA-ECDH security services for air interface communications
— Part 17: Crypto suite cryptoGPS security services for air interface communications
— Part 19: Crypto suite RAMON security services for air interface communications
— Part 20: Crypto suite Algebraic Eraser security services for air interface communications
The following part is under preparation:
— Part 15: Crypto suite XOR security services for air interface communications
© ISO/IEC 2015 – All rights reserved v
---------------------- Page: 5 ----------------------
ISO/IEC FDIS 29167-19:2015(E)
Introduction
This part of ISO/IEC 29167 specifies the security services of a Rabin-Montgomery (RAMON) crypto
suite. It is important to know that all security services are optional. The crypto suite provides Tag
authentication security service.
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC) draw attention to the fact that it is claimed that compliance with this International
Standard may involve the use of patents concerning radio-frequency identification technology given in
the clauses identified below.
ISO and IEC take no position concerning the evidence, validity and scope of these patent rights.
The holders of these patent rights have ensured the ISO and IEC that they are willing to negotiate licences
under reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions with applicants throughout the world.
In this respect, the statements of the holders of these patent rights are registered with ISO and IEC.
Information on the declared patents may be obtained from:
NXP B.V.
411 East Plumeria, San Jose,
CA 95134-1924 USA
The latest information on IP that may be applicable to this part of ISO/IEC 29167 can be found at www.
iso.org/patents.
vi © ISO/IEC 2015 – All rights reserved
---------------------- Page: 6 ----------------------
FINAL DRAFT INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ISO/IEC FDIS 29167-19:2015(E)
Information technology — Automatic identification and
data capture techniques —
Part 19:
Crypto suite RAMON security services for air interface
communications
1 Scope
This part of ISO/IEC 29167 defines the Rabin-Montgomery (RAMON) crypto suite for the ISO/IEC 18000
air interfaces standards for radio frequency identification (RFID) devices. Its purpose is to provide
a common crypto suite for security for RFID devices that may be referred by ISO committees for air
interface standards and application standards.
This part of ISO/IEC 29167 specifies a crypto suite for Rabin-Montgomery (RAMON) for air interface
for RFID systems. The crypto suite is defined in alignment with existing air interfaces.
This part of ISO/IEC 29167 defines various authentication methods and methods of use for the cipher.
A Tag and an Interrogator may support one, a subset, or all of the specified options, clearly stating what
is supported.
2 Conformance
2.1 Claiming conformance
To claim conformance with this part of ISO/IEC 29167, an Interrogator or Tag shall comply with all
relevant clauses of this part of ISO/IEC 29167, except those marked as “optional”.
2.2 Interrogator conformance and obligations
To conform to this part of ISO/IEC 29167, an Interrogator shall implement the mandatory commands
defined in this part of ISO/IEC 29167, and conform to the relevant part of ISO/IEC 18000.
To conform to this part of ISO/IEC 29167, an Interrogator may implement any subset of the optional
commands defined in this part of ISO/IEC 29167.
To conform to this part of ISO/IEC 29167, the Interrogator shall not
— implement any command that conflicts with this part of ISO/IEC 29167, or
— require the use of an optional, proprietary, or custom command to meet the requirements of this
part of ISO/IEC 29167.
2.3 Tag conformance and obligations
To conform to this part of ISO/IEC 29167, a Tag shall implement the mandatory commands defined in
this part of ISO/IEC 29167 for the supported types, and conform to the relevant part of ISO/IEC 18000.
To conform to this part of ISO/IEC 29167, a Tag may implement any subset of the optional commands
defined in this part of ISO/IEC 29167.
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To conform to this part of ISO/IEC 29167, a Tag shall not
— implement any command that conflicts with this part of ISO/IEC 29167, or
— require the use of an optional, proprietary, or custom command to meet the requirements of this
part of ISO/IEC 29167.
3 Normative references
The following documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document and are
indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated
references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
ISO/IEC 18000-3, Information technology — Radio frequency identification for item management —
Part 3: Parameters for air interface communications at 13,56 MHz
ISO/IEC 18000-4, Information technology — Radio frequency identification for item management — Part
4: Parameters for air interface communications at 2,45 GHz
ISO/IEC 18000-63, Information technology — Radio frequency identification for item management —
Part 63: Parameters for air interface communications at 860 MHz to 960 MHz Type C
ISO/IEC 19762 (all parts), Information technology — Automatic identification and data capture (AIDC)
techniques — Harmonized vocabulary
ISO/IEC 29167-1, Information technology — Automatic identification and data capture techniques —
Part 1: Security services for RFID air interfaces
4 Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in ISO/IEC 19762 (all parts) and the
following apply.
4.1
authentication
service that is used to establish the origin of information
4.2
confidentiality
property whereby information is not disclosed to unauthorized parties
4.3
integrity
property whereby data has not been altered in an unauthorized manner since it was created,
transmitted or stored
4.4
non-traceability
protection ensuring that an unauthorized interrogator is not able to track the Tag location by using the
information sent in the Tag response
4.5
secure communication
communication between the tag and the interrogator by use of the Authenticate command, assuring
authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of exchanged messages
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5 Symbols and abbreviated terms
5.1 Symbols
xx binary notation
2
xxh hexadecimal notation
|| concatenation of syntax elements in the order written
5.2 Abbreviated terms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CH Challenge
CH , CH Interrogator random challenge, 16 bytes
I1 I2
CH Tag random challenge, 16 bytes
T
CG Cryptogram
CMAC Ciphered Message Authentication Code
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CRC–16 16-bit CRC
CS Crypto Suite
CSI Crypto Suite Identifier
DEC(key, data) AES decryption of enciphered “data” with secret “key”
ENC(key, data) AES encryption of plain “data” with secret “key”
EPC™ Electronic Product Code
IID Interrogator Identifier, 8 bytes
IV Initialization Vector for CBC-encryption, 16 bytes
KDF Key Derivation Function
K Public key for encryption stored on Tag
E
K Private decryption key stored on Interrogator
D
K Public signature verification key stored on Interrogator
V
K Private signature generation key stored in the tag issuer facility
S
K Shared secret message encryption key
ENC
K Shared secret message authentication key
MAC
KESel Key select (determines which KE will be used)
KSel Key select (determines which pair of KENC, KMAC will be used)
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MAC(key, data) Calculation of a MAC of (enciphered) “data”’ with secret “key”; internal state of
the tag’s state machine
MAMx,y Mutual Authentication Method x.y
MCV MAC Chaining Value
MIX(CH, RN, SID) RAMON mix function
PRF Pseudorandom Function
R Tag response
RAMON Rabin-Montgomery
RFU Reserved for Future Use
RM_ENC(key, data) RAMON encryption of plain “data” with public “key”
RM_DEC(key, data) RAMON decryption of enciphered “data” with private “key”
RN Random Number
RNT Tag Random Number, 16 bytes
S Message encryption session key
ENC
S Message authentication session key
MAC
SID Secret IDentifier, 8 bytes, identifying the tag
SSC Send Sequence Counter for replay protection, 16 bytes
TAMx,y Tag Authentication Method x.y; internal state of the tag’s state machine
TLV Tag Length Value
UHF Ultra High Frequency
UII Unique Item Identifier
WORM Write once, read many
5.3 Notation
This crypto suite uses the notation of ISO/IEC 18000-63.
The following notation for key derivation corresponds to Reference [7] and Clause 5.
PRF(s,x) A pseudo-random function with seed s and input data x.
K Key derivation key used as input to the KDF to derive keying material. K is used as the
I I
block cipher key, and the other input data are used as the message defined in
Reference [5].
K Keying material output from a key derivation function, a binary string of the required
O
length, which is derived using a key derivation key.
Label A string that identifies the purpose for the derived keying material, which is encoded as a
binary string.
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Context A binary string containing the information related to the derived keying material. It may
include identities of parties who are deriving and/or using the derived keying material
and, optionally, a nonce known by the parties who derive the keys.
L An integer specifying the length (in bits) of the derived keying material K . L is repre-
O
sented as a binary string when it is an input to a key derivation function. The length of
the binary string is specified by the encoding method for the input data.
h An integer that indicates the length (in bits) of the output of the PRF.
i A counter that is input to each iteration of the PRF.
r An integer, smaller or equal to 32, that indicates the length of the binary representation
of the counter i. in bits.
00h An all zero octet. An optional data field used to indicate a separation of different variable
length data fields.
The smallest integer that is larger than or equal to X. The ceiling of X.
X
{X} Indicates that data X is an optional input to the key derivation function.
[T] An integer T represented as a binary string (denoted by the “2”) with a length specified
2
by the function, an algorithm, or a protocol which uses T as an input.
∅ The empty binary string.
6 Crypto suite introduction
6.1 Overview
The RAMON Crypto Suite permits two levels of implementation. The first level provides secure
identification and tag authentication, while the second level extends the functionality by mutual
authentication to securely communicate between Interrogator and Tag, e.g. for secure reading and
writing non-volatile memory.
Basic RAMON Tags may provide only the first level of implementation, while more sophisticated Tags
also provide the second level. See Figure 1 for the different implementation levels for the RAMON
crypto suite.
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Figure 1 — Overview of the different implementation levels for the RAMON crypto suite
6.2 Authentication protocols
6.2.1 Tag Identification
The Rabin-Montgomery crypto suite provides non-traceable and confidential Tag identification.
Confidentiality and privacy for the Tag’s identifier are provided without requiring the Tag to store
a private key.
[3]
The crypto suite is based on the asymmetric cryptosystem developed by Michael O. Rabin . The
[2]
original algorithm is augmented by a method detected by Peter Montgomery , which avoids the
division of long numbers in modular arithmetic. Combining Rabin encryption with the concept of
Montgomery multiplication advantage is taken of the fact that no “costly” division is required.
The Tag performs only public key operations. The Interrogator performs the “expensive” private
key operation. The steps necessary to carry out RAMON are outlined in Table 1. RAMON encryption
performed by the Tag and decryption performed by the Interrogator are specified in C.3 and C.4. The
cryptographic keys are specified in 6.6.
This specification also includes in C.1 the structure of the clear text record used for authentication of
the Tag, comprising the Tag identity record and random data originating in part from the Tag and from
the Interrogator for the other part.
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Table 1 — Protocol steps for Tag identification
Interrogato
...
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