ISO/IEC 29167-14:2015
(Main)Information technology — Automatic identification and data capture techniques — Part 14: Crypto suite AES OFB security services for air interface communications
Information technology — Automatic identification and data capture techniques — Part 14: Crypto suite AES OFB security services for air interface communications
ISO/IEC 29167-14:2015 defines the cryptographic suite for AES using OFB mode (AES OFB) for the ISO/IEC 18000‑63 air interface standard for radio frequency identification (RFID) devices. Its purpose is to provide a common cryptographic suite for security for RFID devices that can be referenced by ISO committees for air interface standards and application standards. ISO/IEC 29167-14:2015 specifies a cryptographic suite for AES OFB for air interface for RFID systems. The cryptographic suite is defined in alignment with existing air interfaces. ISO/IEC 29167-14:2015 defines various authentication methods and methods of use for the cipher. A tag and an interrogator can support one, a subset, or all of the specified options, clearly stating what is supported.
Technologies de l'information — Techniques automatiques d'identification et de capture de données — Partie 14: Services de sécurité par suite cryptographique AES-OFB pour communications d'interface radio
General Information
Standards Content (Sample)
INTERNATIONAL ISO/IEC
STANDARD 29167-14
First edition
2015-10-15
Information technology — Automatic
identification and data capture
techniques —
Part 14:
Crypto suite AES OFB security services
for air interface communications
Technologies de l’information — Techniques automatiques
d’identification et de capture de données —
Partie 14: Services de sécurité par suite cryptographique AES-OFB
pour communications d’interface radio
Reference number
ISO/IEC 29167-14:2015(E)
©
ISO/IEC 2015
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ISO/IEC 29167-14:2015(E)
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ISO/IEC 29167-14:2015(E)
Contents Page
Foreword .iv
Introduction .v
1 Scope . 1
2 Conformance . 1
2.1 Claiming conformance . 1
2.2 Interrogator conformance and obligations . 1
2.3 Tag conformance and obligations . 1
3 Normative references . 2
4 Terms and definitions . 2
5 Symbols and abbreviated terms . 2
5.1 Symbols . 2
5.2 Abbreviated terms . 2
6 Cipher introduction . 3
6.1 General . 3
6.2 Encryption in AES OFB mode . 3
6.3 Decryption in AES OFB mode . 3
7 Parameter definitions . 4
8 State diagram . 5
9 Initialization and resetting . 5
10 Authentication . 5
10.1 General . 5
10.1.1 Authentication types . 5
10.1.2 CS_Initialization (Authentication type: AuthMethod “111”, Mandatory) . 6
10.2 Tag authentication (Authentication type: AuthMethod = “000”, Mandatory) . 7
10.2.1 Tag authentication . 7
10.2.2 Commands and responses for tag authentication. 8
10.3 Interrogator authentication (Authentication type: AuthMethod = “001”, Optional) . 9
10.3.1 Interrogator authentication . 9
10.3.2 Commands and responses for interrogator authentication .10
10.4 Mutual authentication (Authentication type: AuthMethod = “010”, Mandatory) .12
10.4.1 Mutual authentication .12
10.4.2 Commands and responses for mutual authentication .13
11 Communication .15
12 Key management and key update .15
12.1 Master key selection .15
12.2 Keystream generation .16
12.3 Key update .17
12.3.1 General.17
12.3.2 Command .17
Annex A (normative) Crypto suite state transition tables .20
Annex B (normative) Error Codes .21
Annex C (normative) Cipher description .22
Annex D (informative) AES OFB test vectors .23
Annex E (normative) Protocol specific operation .26
Annex F (informative) Tag authentication via server .32
Bibliography .35
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ISO/IEC 29167-14:2015(E)
Foreword
ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) and IEC (the International Electrotechnical
Commission) form the specialized system for worldwide standardization. National bodies that are
members of ISO or IEC participate in the development of International Standards through technical
committees established by the respective organization to deal with particular fields of technical
activity. ISO and IEC technical committees collaborate in fields of mutual interest. Other international
organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO and IEC, also take part in the
work. In the field of information technology, ISO and IEC have established a joint technical committee,
ISO/IEC JTC 1.
The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are
described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular the different approval criteria needed for
the different types of document should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the
editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www.iso.org/directives).
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject
of patent rights. ISO and IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent
rights. Details of any patent rights identified during the development of the document will be in the
Introduction and/or on the ISO list of patent declarations received (see www.iso.org/patents).
Any trade name used in this document is information given for the convenience of users and does not
constitute an endorsement.
For an explanation on the meaning of ISO specific terms and expressions related to conformity
assessment, as well as information about ISO’s adherence to the WTO principles in the Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT) see the following URL: Foreword - Supplementary information
The committee responsible for this document is ISO/IEC JTC 1, Information technology, Subcommittee
SC 31, Automatic identification and data capture techniques.
ISO/IEC 29167 consists of the following parts, under the general title Information technology —
Automatic identification and data capture techniques:
— Part 1: Security services for RFID air interfaces
— Part 10: Crypto suite AES-128 security services for air interface communications
— Part 11: Crypto suite PRESENT-80 security services for air interface communications
— Part 12: Crypto suite ECC-DH security services for air interface communications
— Part 13: Crypto suite Grain-128A security services for air interface communications
— Part 14: Crypto suite AES OFB security services for air interface communications
— Part 16: Crypto suite ECDSA-ECDH security services for air interface communications
— Part 17: Crypto suite cryptoGPS security services for air interface communications
— Part 19: Crypto suite RAMON security services for air interface communications
The following parts are under preparation:
— Part 15: Crypto suite XOR security services for air interface communications
— Part 20: Air interface for security services — Cryptographic Suite Algebraic Eraser
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ISO/IEC 29167-14:2015(E)
Introduction
This part of ISO/IEC 29167 describes a cryptographic suite that is applicable to the ISO/IEC 18000
standard. The ISO/IEC 18000 series of standards on RFID for item management do not contain any
strong cryptographic security. The unique item identifier (UII) of tags is transmitted during the
identification/singulation process to every reader that is able to communicate according to the
standard. Sensitive data that are communicated from the interrogator, such as passwords and certain
data written to memory, could be cover-coded with a one-time pad obtained from the tag. The tag sends
this one-time pad over the air in plain text allowing an attacker to easily intercept all communications.
Additionally, passwords are limited in length, providing limited security for the system. This part of
ISO/IEC 29167 will fill this security gap for applications requiring a high level of security. Furthermore,
it is applicable to applications requiring a large amount of data to be communicated between
interrogators and tags.
This part of ISO/IEC 29167 covers the air interface for RFID tags that have a security module on board
and its corresponding interrogators. Any other means of security is not addressed in this part of
ISO/IEC 29167. A security module according to this part of ISO/IEC 29167 is either a means to provide
read or write access limitations, password protection or a crypto engine. The use of a crypto engine is
the typical case and all others are less likely.
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC) draw attention to the fact that it is claimed that compliance with this part of
ISO/IEC 29167 can involve the use of patents concerning radio-frequency identification technology
given in the clauses identified below.
ISO and IEC take no position concerning the evidence, validity and scope of these patent rights.
The holders of these patent rights have assured the ISO and IEC that they are willing to negotiate licences
under reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions with applicants throughout the world.
In this respect, the statements of the holders of these patent rights are registered with ISO and IEC.
Information on the declared patents may be obtained from:
Contact details
Patent holder:
Electronics Telecommunication Reseach Institute
Contact for license application:
Name & Department: Ickchan, Lee, Intellectual Property Management Team
Address: 138 Gajeongno, Yuseong-gu
Address: Daejeon, 305-700, Korea
Tel. +82-42-860-6904
Fax +82-42-860-3831
E-mail ickchanlee@etri.re.kr
URL (optional) www.etri.re.kr
Patent Holder:
Legal Name Impinj, Inc.
Contact for license application:
Name & Department Stacy Jones
Address 701 N. 34th Street, Suite 300
Address Seattle, WA 98103, USA
Tel. +1.206 834 1032
Fax +1.206 517 5262
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ISO/IEC 29167-14:2015(E)
E-mail stacy.jones@impinj.com
URL (optional) www.impinj.com
The latest information on IP that might be applicable to this part of ISO/IEC 29167 can be found at
www.iso.org/patents.
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INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ISO/IEC 29167-14:2015(E)
Information technology — Automatic identification and
data capture techniques —
Part 14:
Crypto suite AES OFB security services for air interface
communications
1 Scope
This part of ISO/IEC 29167 defines the cryptographic suite for AES using OFB mode (AES OFB) for the
ISO/IEC 18000-63 air interface standard for radio frequency identification (RFID) devices. Its purpose
is to provide a common cryptographic suite for security for RFID devices that can be referenced by ISO
committees for air interface standards and application standards.
This part of ISO/IEC 29167 specifies a cryptographic suite for AES OFB for air interface for RFID
systems. The cryptographic suite is defined in alignment with existing air interfaces.
This part of ISO/IEC 29167 defines various authentication methods and methods of use for the cipher.
A tag and an interrogator can support one, a subset, or all of the specified options, clearly stating what
is supported.
2 Conformance
2.1 Claiming conformance
To claim conformance with this part of ISO/IEC 29167, an interrogator or tag shall comply with all
relevant clauses of this part of ISO/IEC 29167, except those marked as “optional”.
2.2 Interrogator conformance and obligations
To conform to this part of ISO/IEC 29167, an interrogator shall implement the mandatory commands
defined in this part of ISO/IEC 29167, and conform to ISO/IEC 18000.
To conform to this part of ISO/IEC 29167, an interrogator may implement any subset of the optional
commands defined in this part of ISO/IEC 29167.
To conform to this part of ISO/IEC 29167, the interrogator shall not implement any command that
conflicts with this part of ISO/IEC 29167, or require the use of an optional, proprietary, or custom
command to meet the requirements of this part of ISO/IEC 29167.
2.3 Tag conformance and obligations
To conform to this part of ISO/IEC 29167, a tag shall implement the mandatory commands defined in
this part of ISO/IEC 29167 for the supported types, and conform to ISO/IEC 18000.
To conform to this part of ISO/IEC 29167, a tag may implement any subset of the optional commands
defined in this part of ISO/IEC 29167.
To conform to this part of ISO/IEC 29167, a tag shall not implement any command that conflicts with
this part of ISO/IEC 29167, or require the use of an optional, proprietary, or custom command to meet
the requirements of this part of ISO/IEC 29167.
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ISO/IEC 29167-14:2015(E)
3 Normative references
The following documents, in whole or in part, are normatively referenced in this document and are
indispensable for its application. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated
references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
ISO/IEC 18000-63, Information technology — Radio frequency identification for item management — Part
63: Parameters for air interface communications at 860 MHz to 960 MHz Type C
ISO/IEC 19762 (all parts), Information technology — Automatic identification and data capture (AIDC)
techniques — Harmonized vocabulary
4 Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in ISO/IEC 19762 (all parts) and the
following apply.
4.1
AES OFB mode
output feedback mode using a block cipher AES
Note 1 to entry: It makes a synchronous stream cipher of a block cipher. In this part of ISO/IEC 29167, the key
stream generated by AES OFB mode is described as the keystream in order to emphasize the key hierarchy
consisting of master key and keystream.
4.2
ciphertext
usable data that are formatted as output from a mode
4.3
plaintext
usable data that are formatted as input to a mode
5 Symbols and abbreviated terms
5.1 Symbols
C j-th ciphertext block
j
DEC (X) decryption function under the key K applied to the data block X
K
ENC (X) encryption function under the key K applied to the data block X
K
j index to a sequence of data blocks or data segments ordered from left to right
K secret key
n number of data blocks or data segments in the plaintext
P j-th plaintext block
j
|| concatenation of syntax elements, transmitted in the order written
5.2 Abbreviated terms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CSI Cryptographic Suite Identifier
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ISO/IEC 29167-14:2015(E)
IV Initialization Vector
MK Master Key
OFB Output FeedBack
UII Unique Item Identifier
XOR eXclusive OR
6 Cipher introduction
6.1 General
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm is a symmetric block cipher standardized as
ISO/IEC 18033-3. The Output Feedback (OFB) mode is a confidentiality mode that features the iteration
of the forward cipher on an Initialization Vector (IV) to generate a sequence of output blocks that are
exclusive-ORed with the plaintext to produce the ciphertext, and vice versa.
6.2 Encryption in AES OFB mode
Figure 1 shows the AES OFB encryption process. The encryption process shall be implemented as the
XOR operation between the plaintext and the keystream. For a given tuple of n plaintext messages P , …,
1
P and a keystream K, the encryption process is defined by ENC (P , …, P ) = (P XOR K , …, P XOR K ),
n K 1 n 1 1 n n
where K is the j-th block of the keystream K and has the same bit-length as P . The decryption process is
j j
exactly the same with the encryption process.
The operation mode is the AES OFB mode. The encryption process shown in Figure 1 operates as if it is
a synchronous stream cipher. In addition, encryption process and decryption process are exactly the
same because of the symmetry of the XOR operation. Therefore, a tag can perform both of encryption
and decryption with only one encryption module. This OFB mode has an advantage of decreasing the
burden of security operations of the tag.
— Keystream: generated through the AES encryption module initiated by an Initialization Vector (IV)
and the master key. Keystream generation in the AES OFB mode is based on the iterative operation
of AES encryption module (refer to Clause 12 for keystream generation).
— ChInt, ChTag or AuthData is a Challenge data used by the Authenticate command.
Clause
Figure 1 — Encryption of Authentication messages in AES OFB mode
6.3 Decryption in AES OFB mode
Figure 2 shows the AES OFB decryption process. The decryption process shall be implemented as the
XOR operation between the ciphertext and the keystream. For a given tuple of n ciphertext messages
C , …, C and a keystream K, the decryption process is defined by DEC (C , …, C ) = (C XOR K , …, C XOR
1 n K 1 n 1 1 n
K ), where K is the j-th block of the keystream K and has the same bit-length as C .
n j j
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ISO/IEC 29167-14:2015(E)
Clause
Figure 2 — Decryption of Authentication messages in AES OFB mode
7 Parameter definitions
The security parameters used in this part of ISO/IEC 29167 are described in Table 1.
Table 1 — Security parameters and descriptions
Parameter Description
Challenge of tag for challenge-response protocol (variable length, minimum length=16 bits,
ChTag
maximum length=128 bits)
Challenge of interrogator for challenge-response protocol (variable length, minimum length=16
ChInt
bits, maximum length=128 bits)
Length of the challenge number in words. The minimum value of the ChLen is 1 and the maxi-
mum value of the ChLen is 15. The default value of the ChLen is 4.
ChLen
NOTE Length of a word is 16 bits.
AuthData Challenge used in challenge-response protocol of Tag authentication via the server
64-bit random number (nonce) of tag (prevention of replay and other attacks)
(The safe methods to avoid random number inference shall be used for implementation of this
part of ISO/IEC 29167. That is, this part of ISO/IEC 29167 requires the Tag to generate a random
RnTag[63:0]
number. The random number should contain sufficient entropy. However, this part of ISO/
IEC 29167 does not specify a minimum. This part of ISO/IEC 29167 recommends that a random
number complies with the random bit generator concepts and requirements of NIST Special
Publication 800-90A.)
64-bit random number (nonce) of interrogator (prevention of replay and other attacks)
(The safe methods to avoid random number inference shall be used for implementation of this
part of ISO/IEC 29167. That is, this part of ISO/IEC 29167 requires the Interrogator to generate
RnInt[63:0]
a random number. The random number should contain sufficient entropy. However this part
of ISO/IEC 29167 does not specify a minimum. This part of ISO/IEC 29167 recommends that a
random number complies with the random bit generator concepts and requirements of NIST
Special Publication 800-90A.)
IV Initialization Vector for keystream refreshment
Key[KeyID] 128-bit AES key with the ID number=KeyID
AES OFB ENC AES OFB encryption
AES OFB DEC AES OFB decryption
Command Interrogator command
Response Tag response
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ISO/IEC 29167-14:2015(E)
8 State diagram
After power-up or reset, the crypto suite transitions to its Ready state. Figure 3 shows the state diagram
for the crypto engine. During the authentication procedure, a Tag does not reply to a command having
an invalid handle or invalid CRC; the next Tag state is maintaining the current state.
Figure 3 — State diagram for the crypto engine
9 Initialization and resetting
This cryptographic suite is initiated by the interrogator according to the authentication procedure. The
crypto engine is reset by the CS_Initialization of Authenticate command.
10 Authentication
10.1 General
10.1.1 Authentication types
Authentication message format shall be implemented as shown in Table 2. This part of ISO/IEC 29167
describes the Message field of the Authenticate command and the Response field of the Tag reply.
Table 2 — Contents of Message field
AuthMethod Step Flags RnLen or ChLen RnInt or ChInt
# of bits 3 2 3 4 16 ~ 128
This part of ISO/IEC 29167 defines the message format as follows.
— AuthMethod: defines the Authentication types (see Table 3).
— Step: orders the authenticate command.
— Flag: reserved for use.
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ISO/IEC 29167-14:2015(E)
— RnLen: defines the length of RnInt/RnTag in words.
— ChLen: defines the length of ChInt/ChTag in words.
Table 3 — Authentication types
AuthMethod Value Action Remark
000 Tag Authentication
Interrogator
001
Authentication
3 Bits
010 Mutual Authentication
(Authentication
Methods) 011 Proprietary use Refer to Annex F
100-110 RFU Reserved for Future Use
111 CS Initialization Initialization Vector
10.1.2 CS_Initialization (Authentication type: AuthMethod “111”, Mandatory)
10.1.2.1 General
The cryptographic suite shall be initiated by a fresh Initialization Vector (IV) and the master key. The
first 128-bit IV results from the concatenation of the RnInt and the RnTag. The RnInt is immediately
followed by the RnTag. RnLen is the length of RnInt/RnTag in words and its value is 4. In other words,
the length of RnInt/RnTag is fixed to the 4 words (64 bits). If the value of RnLen field is not 4, the tag
ignores the command.
10.1.2.2 Use of ‘Authenticate’ command
The source of Authentication command format is shown in Table 4.
Table 4 — Contents of Message field
AuthMethod Step Flags RnLen RnInt
111 00 000 0100 64-bit random number
10.1.2.3 Tag response
The Tag response format is shown in Table 5.
The response of CS_Initialization includes the Secure Parameter related to the key, KeyIndex and RnTag.
Secure Parameter (Table 6) includes the Key information, Length of KeyIndex and the method using
secure channel. Length of KeyIndex is the KeyIndex size in words. If this value is zero, KeyIndex does
not exist. KeyIndex is the information related with the key pool of the tag and the interrogator.
Table 5 — Contents of Response field
Secure Parameter Message
KeyIndex
16 bits 64 bits
variable
Information related to the key and KeyIn- Random number (RnTag, the same
KeyIndex
dex length length of RnInt)
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ISO/IEC 29167-14:2015(E)
Table 6 — Secure Parameter format
KeyID[7:0] RFU Flag[2:0] Length of KI(KeyIndex)
8 1 3 4
KeyID 0 [2:0] [4:0]
— KeyID: it specifies the key.
— RFU: Reserved for future use.
— Flag: it shows the method supporting the secure channel by the tag (Table 7).
— Length of KI: it shows the length of KeyIndex in words.
Table 7 — Secure Channel Information
Name Value Description
Flag[2:0] 000 Do not support the Secure Channel
Flag[2:0] 001 Support Secure Channel
Flag[2:0] 010~111 Reserved for Future Use
10.2 Tag authentication (Authentication type: AuthMethod = “000”, Mandatory)
10.2.1 Tag authentication
Tag authentication is performed after an Inventory process.
Tag authentication is the process where an interrogator authenticates a tag. For this process, the
interrogator generates randomly the challenge interrogator (ChInt), and encrypts the challenge
interrogator (ChInt), and transmits the encrypte
...
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