SIST EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1:2008

• Abstract:

  To update 392-7 to incorporate CR112v4, CR113v6 and extensions for ISI key management.; The present document defines the Terrestrial Trunked Radio system (TETRA) supporting Voice plus Data (V+D). It specifies the air interface, the inter-working between TETRA systems and to other systems via gateways, the terminal equipment interface on the mobile station, the connection of line stations to the infrastructure, the security aspects in TETRA networks, the management services offered to the operator, the performance objectives, and the supplementary services that come in addition to the basic and teleservices. The present part describes the security mechanisms in TETRA V+D. It provides mechanisms for confidentiality of control signalling and user speech and data at the air interface, authentication and key management mechanisms for the air interface. Clause 4 describes the authentication and key management mechanisms for the TETRA air interface. The following two authentication services have been specified for the air-interface in ETR 086-3 [i.3], based on a threat analysis:; authentication of an MS by the TETRA infrastructure;; authentication of the TETRA infrastructure by an MS.; Clause 5 describes the mechanisms and protocol for enable and disable of both the mobile station equipment and the mobile station user's subscription. Air interface encryption may be provided as an option in TETRA. Where employed, clause 6 describes the confidentiality mechanisms using encryption on the air interface, for circuit mode speech, circuit mode data, packet data and control information. Clause 6 describes both encryption mechanisms and mobility procedures. It also details the protocol concerning control of encryption at the air interface. The present document does not address the detail handling of protocol errors or any protocol mechanisms when TETRA is operating in a degraded mode. These issues are implementation specific and therefore fall outside the scope of the TETRA standardization effort. The detail description of the Authentication Centre is outside the scope of the present document.

• Status: Published
• Public Enquiry End Date: 30-Sep-2007
• Publication Date: 24-Aug-2008
• ICS: 33.070.10 - Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA)
• Technical Committee: MOC - Mobile Communications
• Current Stage: 6060 - National Implementation/Publication (Adopted Project)
• Start Date: 08-Aug-2008
• Due Date: 13-Oct-2008
• Completion Date: 25-Aug-2008
• Ref Project: ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1 (2008-06) - Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA); Voice plus Data (V+D); Part 7: Security

SIST EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1:2008 is the SIST adoption of the TETRA Voice plus Data (V+D) security standard from ETSI. It specifies authentication, key management, enable/disable handling, and air interface encryption for Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA) systems, with a focus on the Mobile Station (MS), the Switching and Management Infrastructure (SwMI), and the radio link between them.

What does SIST EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1:2008 specify?

SIST EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1:2008 defines the security mechanisms for TETRA V+D on the air interface. It is organized around authentication and key management in clause 4, enable and disable procedures in clause 5, and air interface (AI) encryption in clause 6.

The scope covers confidentiality for control signalling and user speech and data, authentication of the MS and the infrastructure, and over the air re-keying (OTAR) for several key types. It also covers how the SwMI controls security class transitions and how security information is signalled to terminals.

The document is structured so that the core procedures appear in the main clauses and the detailed message formats are collected in annexes.

Annex	What it covers
Annex A	Protocol data units (PDUs) and information element coding for authentication, OTAR, key association, key change, security domain procedures, and enable/disable
Annex B	Dimensioning of cryptographic parameters and summaries of the cryptographic processes
Annex C	Timers used by authentication, group key delivery, key forwarding, and enable/disable
Annex D	Bibliography
Annex E	Change request history

What are the key requirements of SIST EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1:2008?

SIST EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1:2008 sets out how TETRA security is built around three security classes, controlled key management, and specific signalling sequences. In practice, implementers need to match the class, keying, and protocol behavior of both the MS and the SwMI.

Security classes and what they allow

Clause 4.0 defines three security classes and ties each class to authentication, OTAR, encryption, and enable/disable behavior. Class 1 does not use encryption but may use authentication; class 2 uses SCK-based encryption; class 3 requires authentication and uses DCK, CCK, and possibly GCK-based encryption.

This matters because the terminal and the network must agree on the class before service starts, and the SwMI controls the AI encryption state. A cell may support class 1 alone, class 2 alone, class 2 with class 1, class 3 alone, or class 3 with class 1, but not class 2 and class 3 together.

Authentication is a challenge-response exchange

Clause 4.1 describes authentication as a confirmed two-pass challenge-response protocol. The standard supports authentication of an MS by the infrastructure and authentication of the infrastructure by an MS, and it also allows mutual authentication.

For implementers, this means the MS and SwMI must maintain the authentication state machine and the relevant timer handling. Clause 4.4.2 and Annex C use timer T354 to bound the authorization exchange, and failed or rejected authentication can trigger cell reselection or rejection handling.

Key management uses several distinct keys

Clause 4.2 manages five key types over the air interface: DCK, CCK, GCK, GSKO, and SCK. DCK is linked to authentication, while the other keys are exchanged through OTAR procedures.

This is important because not all keys are distributed the same way. Some keys are delivered individually, some by group address, and some are sealed using other keys, so the SwMI and MS must handle version numbers, sealing keys, and key status consistently.

DMO group use depends on key association groups

Clause 4.2.4 explains how SCKs can be associated with group identities for Direct Mode Operation (DMO). The document uses the Key Association Group (KAG) concept, where one SCK in the group is current for transmission and any SCK in the group may be used for reception.

In practice, this means operators can load multiple SCKs for a group and organize them into subsets. The grouping rules matter when keys are activated, changed, or deleted, because the MS must apply the same grouping logic as the SwMI.

OTAR delivery has defined request, provide, and result behavior

Clause 4.5 defines OTAR protocol functions for CCK, SCK, GCK, and GSKO. The procedures include both MS-initiated and SwMI-initiated delivery, and they use explicit request and result PDUs so that both sides can confirm whether key provision succeeded.

This matters for network operations because the SwMI may need to send keys to one MS or to a group, and the MS must respond according to the acknowledgement and explicit response rules. Annex C also defines timer T371 for delayed group-addressed delivery and retry behavior tied to OTAR.

Enable and disable can apply to equipment, subscription, or both

Clause 5 defines enable/disable procedures for the MS equipment, the subscription, or both. The standard distinguishes temporary and permanent disable states and links the procedure to authentication when the SwMI requires it.

For practical use, this means a disabled subscription or device cannot simply be re-enabled unless the matching enabling path is used. The document also states that an MS keeps its disabled state when moving between DMO and TMO.

Air interface encryption is built into the MAC layer

Clause 6 places AI encryption in the upper part of the MAC layer, before channel coding on transmit and after channel decoding on receive. The Key Stream Generator (KSG) takes an Initialization Value (IV) and a cipher key and produces a Key Stream Segment (KSS), which is then combined with the protected data.

This matters because encryption is not applied to every bit in the same way. The MAC headers and fill bits are treated differently, and the protocol also signals whether a PDU is encrypted and which key version is in use so that the receiver can detect key changes and decode correctly.

Mobility and key change handling are part of encryption

Clause 6.6 and clause 6.7 cover cipher parameter negotiation, cell reselection, key forwarding, and what data must be encrypted in class 2 and class 3 cells. This is what keeps encryption usable while an MS moves between cells.

In practice, an implementation must keep the ciphering mode consistent across reselection cases and handle key change notifications correctly. If key material changes, the MS needs the right key version and the right encryption state to stay synchronized with the SwMI.

What terms does SIST EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1:2008 define?

• Mobile Station (MS) - the user terminal that connects to the TETRA network and takes part in authentication, key handling, and enable/disable procedures.
• Switching and Management Infrastructure (SwMI) - the network infrastructure that controls access, security class behavior, and key distribution.
• Derived Cipher Key (DCK) - the key created through authentication and used for class 3 air interface encryption.
• Common Cipher Key (CCK) - an infrastructure-generated key used for group addressed signalling and traffic, and also for protecting identities.
• Group Cipher Key (GCK) - a key used with CCK for group addressed signalling and traffic in class 3 systems.
• Static Cipher Key (SCK) - a predetermined cipher key used for class 2 systems and Direct Mode Operation (DMO), and sometimes as a fallback.
• Group Session Key for OTAR (GSKO) - the key used to derive EGSKO for distributing keys to groups of MSs.
• Key Stream Generator (KSG) - the cryptographic algorithm that uses an IV and a cipher key to produce the key stream used for encryption and decryption.

Who uses SIST EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1:2008?

SIST EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1:2008 is used by TETRA network operators, SwMI suppliers, MS manufacturers, and system integrators who need the same security behavior on both the terminal and infrastructure side. It is also relevant to test laboratories and quality teams verifying authentication, OTAR, key association, encryption state handling, and enable/disable procedures.

In day-to-day work, operators use it to plan security classes and key distribution, manufacturers use it to implement the protocol messages and timers, and testers use it to check that message sequences and state transitions match the standard.

What changed in SIST EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1:2008 from the previous edition?

This edition updates Part 7 to incorporate CR112v4, CR113v6, and extensions for ISI key management. The change request history also records earlier incorporated change requests, including updates to security-related information and encryption of π/8 D8PSK and QAM logical channels.

Which standards are used with SIST EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1:2008?

• ETSI EN 300 392-1 - provides the general TETRA V+D network design framework and the main TETRA identities used by this part.
• ETSI EN 300 392-2 - defines the TETRA air interface that this security part protects and extends.
• ISO 7498-2 - supplies the security architecture terminology and model used for cipher text and security concepts.
• ETSI EN 300 812 - covers the SIM-ME interface and supports procedures when an ITSI is stored in a SIM.
• ETSI EN 300 396-6 - provides the DMO security part referenced for SCK use in direct mode.
• ETSI EN 302 109 - covers synchronization for end-to-end encryption, which is separate from air interface encryption.
• ETSI EN 300 392-12-22 - is referenced for SS-DGNA behavior where security-related information carries GCK association data.

The informative references point back to earlier TETRA security and air interface versions, plus ETR 086-3, which is cited for the threat analysis behind the authentication services.

What does the SIST EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1:2008 document contain?

SIST EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1:2008 contains message sequence charts, state transition diagrams, and protocol descriptions for authentication, OTAR, enable/disable, and AI encryption. It also includes annexed PDU definitions and coding rules for the security-related messages used on the air interface.

Annex A is the most detailed part for implementation work because it lists the authentication PDUs, OTAR PDUs, key association PDUs, key change PDUs, security domain PDUs, enable/disable PDUs, and the coded information elements used inside them. Annex B summarizes the cryptographic process relationships and gives parameter sizing, while Annex C gives the operational timers that govern the live protocol behavior.

Final draft ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.0.3 (2008-04)
European Standard (Telecommunications series)

Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA);
Voice plus Data (V+D);
Part 7: Security
2 Final draft ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.0.3 (2008-04)

Reference
REN/TETRA-06173
Keywords
security, TETRA, V+D
ETSI
650 Route des Lucioles
F-06921 Sophia Antipolis Cedex - FRANCE

Tel.: [phone]  Fax: [phone]

Siret N° 348 623 562 00017 - NAF 742 C
Association à but non lucratif enregistrée à la
Sous-Préfecture de Grasse (06) N° 7803/88

Important notice
Individual copies of the present document can be downloaded from:
http://www.etsi.org
The present document may be made available in more than one electronic version or in print. In any case of existing or
perceived difference in contents between such versions, the reference version is the Portable Document Format (PDF).
In case of dispute, the reference shall be the printing on ETSI printers of the PDF version kept on a specific network drive
within ETSI Secretariat.
Users of the present document should be aware that the document may be subject to revision or change of status.
Information on the current status of this and other ETSI documents is available at
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If you find errors in the present document, please send your comment to one of the following services:
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No part may be reproduced except as authorized by written permission.
The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media.

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All rights reserved.
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for the benefit of its Members.
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ETSI
3 Final draft ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.0.3 (2008-04)
Contents
Intellectual Property Rights.9
Foreword.9
1 Scope.11
2 References.11
2.1 Normative references.12
2.2 Informative references.12
3 Definitions and abbreviations.12
3.1 Definitions.12
3.2 Abbreviations.15
4 Air Interface authentication and key management mechanisms .16
4.0 Security classes.17
4.1 Air interface authentication mechanisms .17
4.1.1 Overview.17
4.1.2 Authentication of an MS.18
4.1.3 Authentication of the infrastructure .18
4.1.4 Mutual authentication of MS and infrastructure .19
4.1.5 The authentication key.21
4.1.6 Equipment authentication.21
4.2 Air Interface key management mechanisms.22
4.2.1 The DCK.22
4.2.2 The GCK.23
4.2.3 The CCK.24
4.2.4 The SCK.25
4.2.4.1 SCK association for DMO use.26
4.2.4.1.1 DMO SCK subset grouping.26
4.2.5 The GSKO.29
4.2.5.1 SCK distribution to groups with OTAR.29
4.2.5.2 GCK distribution to groups with OTAR .29
4.2.5.3 Rules for MS response to group key distribution.30
4.2.6 Encrypted Short Identity (ESI) mechanism .30
4.2.7 Encryption Cipher Key.31
4.2.8 Summary of AI key management mechanisms.31
4.3 Service description and primitives .32
4.3.1 Authentication primitives.32
4.3.2 SCK transfer primitives .33
4.3.3 GCK transfer primitives.34
4.3.4 GSKO transfer primitives .35
4.4 Authentication protocol.35
4.4.1 Authentication state transitions.35
4.4.2 Authentication protocol sequences and operations .38
4.4.2.1 MSCs for authentication.39
4.4.2.2 MSCs for authentication Type-3 element .45
4.4.2.3 Control of authentication timer T354 at MS .48
4.5 OTAR protocols.49
4.5.1 CCK delivery - protocol functions.49
4.5.1.1 SwMI-initiated CCK provision .49
4.5.1.2 MS-initiated CCK provision with U-OTAR CCK demand.51
4.5.1.3 MS-initiated CCK provision with announced cell reselection .52
4.5.2 OTAR protocol functions - SCK .52
4.5.2.1 MS requests provision of SCK(s).53
4.5.2.2 SwMI provides SCK(s) to individual MS .54
4.5.2.3 SwMI provides SCK(s) to group of MSs .56
4.5.2.4 SwMI rejects provision of SCK .58
4.5.3 OTAR protocol functions - GCK.58
4.5.3.1 MS requests provision of GCK .58
ETSI
4 Final draft ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.0.3 (2008-04)
4.5.3.2 SwMI provides GCK to an individual MS.61
4.5.3.3 SwMI provides GCK to a group of MSs.63
4.5.3.4 SwMI rejects provision of GCK.65
4.5.4 Cipher key association to group address.65
4.5.4.1 SCK association for DMO .66
4.5.4.2 GCK association.69
4.5.5 Notification of key change over the air.71
4.5.5.1 Change of DCK.73
4.5.5.2 Change of CCK.73
4.5.5.3 Change of GCK.73
4.5.5.4 Change of SCK for TMO.73
4.5.5.5 Change of SCK for DMO .74
4.5.5.6 Synchronization of Cipher Key Change.74
4.5.6 Security class change .74
4.5.6.1 Change of security class to security class 1 .75
4.5.6.2 Change of security class to security class 2 .75
4.5.6.3 Change of security class to security class 3 .75
4.5.6.4 Change of security class to security class 3 with GCK .76
4.5.7 Notification of key in use.76
4.5.8 Notification of GCK Activation/Deactivation .76
4.5.9 Deletion of SCK, GCK and GSKO.76
4.5.10 Air Interface Key Status Enquiry.78
4.5.11 Crypto management group.80
4.5.12 OTAR retry mechanism.81
4.5.13 OTAR protocol functions – GSKO.81
4.5.13.1 MS requests provision of GSKO.81
4.5.13.2 SwMI provides GSKO to an MS.82
4.5.13.3 SwMI rejects provision of GSKO .83
5 Enable and disable mechanism.83
5.1 General relationships.83
5.2 Enable/disable state transitions.84
5.3 Mechanisms.84
5.3.1 Disable of MS equipment .85
5.3.2 Disable of an subscription.85
5.3.3 Disable of subscription and equipment.85
5.3.4 Enable an MS equipment.85
5.3.5 Enable an MS subscription .85
5.3.6 Enable an MS equipment and subscription.85
5.4 Enable/disable protocol.86
5.4.1 General case.86
5.4.2 Status of cipher key material.87
5.4.2.1 Permanently disabled state.87
5.4.2.2 Temporarily disabled state .87
5.4.3 Specific protocol exchanges .88
5.4.3.1 Disabling an MS with mutual authentication .88
5.4.3.2 Enabling an MS with mutual authentication .89
5.4.3.3 Enabling an MS with non-mutual authentication.90
5.4.3.4 Disabling an MS with non-mutual authentication.91
5.4.4 Enabling an MS without authentication.93
5.4.5 Disabling an MS without authentication.94
5.4.6 Rejection of enable or disable command .94
5.4.6a Expiry of Enable/Disable protocol timer .95
5.4.7 MM service primitives.95
5.4.7.1 TNMM-DISABLING primitive.96
5.4.7.2 TNMM-ENABLING primitive.96
6 Air Interface (AI) encryption .96
6.1 General principles.96
6.2 Security class.97
6.2.0 Notification of security class .98
6.2.0.1 Security Class of Neighbouring Cells .98
ETSI
5 Final draft ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.0.3 (2008-04)
6.2.0.2 Identification of MS security capabilities .99
6.2.1 Constraints on LA arising from cell class.99
6.3 Key Stream Generator (KSG) .99
6.3.1 KSG numbering and selection .99
6.3.2 Interface parameters.100
6.3.2.1 Initial Value (IV).100
6.3.2.2 Cipher Key.100
6.4 Encryption mechanism.101
6.4.1 Allocation of KSS to logical channels .101
6.4.2 Allocation of KSS to logical channels with PDU association .103
6.4.2.1 General.103
6.4.2.2 KSS allocation on phase modulation channels.103
6.4.2.3 KSS allocation on QAM channels .105
6.4.2.3.1 Fixed mapping.105
6.4.2.3.2 Offset mapping.106
6.4.3 Synchronization of data calls where data is multi-slot interleaved .107
6.4.4 Recovery of stolen frames from interleaved data .108
6.5 Use of cipher keys .108
6.5.1 Identification of encryption state of downlink MAC PDUs .109
6.5.1.1 Class 1 cells.109
6.5.1.2 Class 2 cells.110
6.5.1.3 Class 3 cells.110
6.5.2 Identification of encryption state of uplink MAC PDUs .110
6.6 Mobility procedures.111
6.6.1 General requirements.111
6.6.1.1 Additional requirements for class 3 systems.111
6.6.2 Protocol description.111
6.6.2.1 Negotiation of cipher parameters .111
6.6.2.1.1 Class 1 cells .112
6.6.2.1.2 Class 2 cells .112
6.6.2.1.3 Class 3 cells .112
6.6.2.2 Initial and undeclared cell re-selection.112
6.6.2.3 Unannounced cell re-selection .113
6.6.2.4 Announced cell re-selection type-3.114
6.6.2.5 Announced cell re-selection type-2.114
6.6.2.6 Announced cell re-selection type-1.114
6.6.2.7 Key forwarding.114
6.7 Encryption control.116
6.7.1 Data to be encrypted .116
6.7.1.1 Downlink control channel requirements .116
6.7.1.2 Encryption of MAC header elements.116
6.7.1.3 Traffic channel encryption control.116
6.7.1.4 Handling of PDUs that do not conform to negotiated ciphering mode .117
6.7.2 Service description and primitives.117
6.7.2.1 Mobility Management (MM) .118
6.7.2.2 Mobile Link Entity (MLE).118
6.7.2.3 Layer 2.120
6.7.3 Protocol functions.120
6.7.3.1 MM.120
6.7.3.2 MLE.120
6.7.3.3 LLC.120
6.7.3.4 MAC.121
6.7.4 PDUs for cipher negotiation .121
Annex A (normative): PDU and element definitions .122
A.1 Authentication PDUs.122
A.1.1 D-AUTHENTICATION demand.122
A.1.2 D-AUTHENTICATION reject.122
A.1.3 D-AUTHENTICATION response.123
A.1.4 D-AUTHENTICATION result.123
A.1.5 U-AUTHENTICATION demand.123
ETSI
6 Final draft ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.0.3 (2008-04)
A.1.6 U-AUTHENTICATION reject.124
A.1.7 U-AUTHENTICATION response.124
A.1.8 U-AUTHENTICATION result.125
A.2 OTAR PDUs .125
A.2.1 D-OTAR CCK Provide .125
A.2.2 U-OTAR CCK Demand .125
A.2.3 U-OTAR CCK Result .126
A.2.4 D-OTAR GCK Provide.126
A.2.5 U-OTAR GCK Demand.127
A.2.6 U-OTAR GCK Result .128
A.2.6a D-OTAR GCK Reject .128
A.2.7 D-OTAR SCK Provide.129
A.2.8 U-OTAR SCK Demand.130
A.2.9 U-OTAR SCK Result.130
A.2.9a D-OTAR SCK Reject.131
A.2.10 D-OTAR GSKO Provide.131
A.2.11 U-OTAR GSKO Demand .132
A.2.12 U-OTAR GSKO Result.132
A.2.12a D-OTAR GSKO Reject.132
A.3 PDUs for key association to GTSI .133
A.3.1 D-OTAR KEY ASSOCIATE demand .133
A.3.2 U-OTAR KEY ASSOCIATE status.134
A.4 PDUs to synchronize key or security class change .134
A.4.1 D-CK CHANGE demand.134
A.4.2 U-CK CHANGE result.135
A.4a PDUs to delete air interface keys in MS .136
A.4a.1 D-OTAR KEY DELETE demand .136
A.4a.2 U-OTAR KEY DELETE result.137
A.4b PDUs to obtain Air Interface Key Status .138
A.4b.1 D-OTAR KEY STATUS demand .138
A.4b.2 U-OTAR KEY STATUS response.139
A.5 Other security domain PDUs.140
A.5.1 U-TEI PROVIDE.140
A.5.2 U-OTAR PREPARE.141
A.5.3 D-OTAR NEWCELL.141
A.5.4 D-OTAR CMG GTSI PROVIDE.141
A.5.5 U-OTAR CMG GTSI RESULT.142
A.6 PDUs for Enable and Disable.142
A.6.1 D-DISABLE.142
A.6.2 D-ENABLE.143
A.6.3 U-DISABLE STATUS.143
A.7 MM PDU type 3 information elements coding .144
A.7.1 Authentication downlink.144
A.7.2 Authentication uplink.144
A.8 PDU Information elements coding.145
A.8.1 Acknowledgement flag.145
A.8.2 Address extension.145
A.8.3 Authentication challenge.145
A.8.4 Authentication reject reason.145
A.8.5 Authentication result.146
A.8.6 Authentication sub-type.146
A.8.7 CCK identifier.146
A.8.8 CCK information.146
A.8.9 CCK Location area information .147
A.8.10 CCK request flag.147
A.8.11 Change of security class .147
A.8.12 Cipher parameters.147
ETSI
7 Final draft ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.0.3 (2008-04)
A.8.13 CK provision flag.148
A.8.14 CK provisioning information .148
A.8.15 CK request flag.148
A.8.16 Class Change flag.149
A.8.17 DCK forwarding result.149
A.8.18 Disabling type.149
A.8.19 Enable/Disable result.149
A.8.20 Encryption mode.150
A.8.20.1 Class 1 cells .150
A.8.20.2 Class 2 cells .150
A.8.20.3 Class 3 cells .150
A.8.21 Equipment disable.150
A.8.22 Equipment enable.151
A.8.23 Equipment status.151
A.8.23a Explicit response.151
A.8.24 Frame number.151
A.8.25 Future key flag .151
A.8.26 GCK data.152
A.8.27 GCK key and identifier .152
A.8.28 GCK Number (GCKN) .152
A.8.28a GCK Provision result .152
A.8.28b GCK rejected.153
A.8.29 GCK select number .153
A.8.29a GCK Supported.153
A.8.30 GCK Version Number (GCK-VN).153
A.8.31 Group association.154
A.8.31a Group Identity Security Related Information.154
A.8.32 GSKO Version Number (GSKO-VN).154
A.8.33 GSSI.154
A.8.34 Hyperframe number .154
A.8.35 Intent/confirm.154
A.8.36 Void.155
A.8.37 Key association status .155
A.8.38 Key association type.155
A.8.39 Key change type .155
A.8.39a Key delete type.156
A.8.39b Key status type .156
A.8.40 Key type flag.156
A.8.41 KSG-number.157
A.8.42 Location area.
...

European Standard (Telecommunications series)

Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA);
Voice plus Data (V+D);
Part 7: Security
2 ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1 (2008-06)

Reference
REN/TETRA-06173
Keywords
security, TETRA, V+D
ETSI
650 Route des Lucioles
F-06921 Sophia Antipolis Cedex - FRANCE

Tel.: [phone]  Fax: [phone]

Siret N° 348 623 562 00017 - NAF 742 C
Association à but non lucratif enregistrée à la
Sous-Préfecture de Grasse (06) N° 7803/88

Important notice
Individual copies of the present document can be downloaded from:
http://www.etsi.org
The present document may be made available in more than one electronic version or in print. In any case of existing or
perceived difference in contents between such versions, the reference version is the Portable Document Format (PDF).
In case of dispute, the reference shall be the printing on ETSI printers of the PDF version kept on a specific network drive
within ETSI Secretariat.
Users of the present document should be aware that the document may be subject to revision or change of status.
Information on the current status of this and other ETSI documents is available at
http://portal.etsi.org/tb/status/status.asp
If you find errors in the present document, please send your comment to one of the following services:
http://portal.etsi.org/chaircor/ETSI_support.asp
Copyright Notification
No part may be reproduced except as authorized by written permission.
The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media.

© European Telecommunications Standards Institute 2008.
All rights reserved.
TM TM TM TM
DECT , PLUGTESTS , UMTS , TIPHON , the TIPHON logo and the ETSI logo are Trade Marks of ETSI registered
for the benefit of its Members.
TM
3GPP is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners.
ETSI
3 ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1 (2008-06)
Contents
Intellectual Property Rights.10
Foreword.10
1 Scope.12
2 References.12
2.1 Normative references.13
2.2 Informative references.13
3 Definitions and abbreviations.13
3.1 Definitions.13
3.2 Abbreviations.16
4 Air Interface authentication and key management mechanisms .17
4.0 Security classes.18
4.1 Air interface authentication mechanisms .18
4.1.1 Overview.18
4.1.2 Authentication of an MS.19
4.1.3 Authentication of the infrastructure .19
4.1.4 Mutual authentication of MS and infrastructure .20
4.1.5 The authentication key.22
4.1.6 Equipment authentication.22
4.2 Air Interface key management mechanisms.23
4.2.1 The DCK.23
4.2.2 The GCK.24
4.2.3 The CCK.25
4.2.4 The SCK.26
4.2.4.1 SCK association for DMO use.27
4.2.4.1.1 DMO SCK subset grouping.27
4.2.5 The GSKO.30
4.2.5.1 SCK distribution to groups with OTAR.30
4.2.5.2 GCK distribution to groups with OTAR .30
4.2.5.3 Rules for MS response to group key distribution.31
4.2.6 Encrypted Short Identity (ESI) mechanism .31
4.2.7 Encryption Cipher Key.32
4.2.8 Summary of AI key management mechanisms.32
4.3 Service description and primitives .33
4.3.1 Authentication primitives.33
4.3.2 SCK transfer primitives .34
4.3.3 GCK transfer primitives.35
4.3.4 GSKO transfer primitives .36
4.4 Authentication protocol.37
4.4.1 Authentication state transitions.37
4.4.2 Authentication protocol sequences and operations .39
4.4.2.1 MSCs for authentication.40
4.4.2.2 MSCs for authentication Type-3 element .46
4.4.2.3 Control of authentication timer T354 at MS .49
4.5 OTAR protocols.50
4.5.1 CCK delivery - protocol functions.50
4.5.1.1 SwMI-initiated CCK provision .51
4.5.1.2 MS-initiated CCK provision with U-OTAR CCK demand.52
4.5.1.3 MS-initiated CCK provision with announced cell reselection .53
4.5.2 OTAR protocol functions - SCK .53
4.5.2.1 MS requests provision of SCK(s).54
4.5.2.2 SwMI provides SCK(s) to individual MS .55
4.5.2.3 SwMI provides SCK(s) to group of MSs .57
4.5.2.4 SwMI rejects provision of SCK .59
4.5.3 OTAR protocol functions - GCK.59
4.5.3.1 MS requests provision of GCK .59
ETSI
4 ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1 (2008-06)
4.5.3.2 SwMI provides GCK to an individual MS.61
4.5.3.3 SwMI provides GCK to a group of MSs.63
4.5.3.4 SwMI rejects provision of GCK.65
4.5.4 Cipher key association to group address.65
4.5.4.1 SCK association for DMO .66
4.5.4.2 GCK association.69
4.5.5 Notification of key change over the air.71
4.5.5.1 Change of DCK.73
4.5.5.2 Change of CCK.73
4.5.5.3 Change of GCK.73
4.5.5.4 Change of SCK for TMO.73
4.5.5.5 Change of SCK for DMO .74
4.5.5.6 Synchronization of Cipher Key Change.74
4.5.6 Security class change .74
4.5.6.1 Change of security class to security class 1 .75
4.5.6.2 Change of security class to security class 2 .75
4.5.6.3 Change of security class to security class 3 .75
4.5.6.4 Change of security class to security class 3 with GCK .76
4.5.7 Notification of key in use.76
4.5.8 Notification of GCK Activation/Deactivation .76
4.5.9 Deletion of SCK, GCK and GSKO.76
4.5.10 Air Interface Key Status Enquiry.78
4.5.11 Crypto management group.80
4.5.12 OTAR retry mechanism.81
4.5.13 OTAR protocol functions – GSKO.81
4.5.13.1 MS requests provision of GSKO.81
4.5.13.2 SwMI provides GSKO to an MS.82
4.5.13.3 SwMI rejects provision of GSKO .83
5 Enable and disable mechanism.83
5.1 General relationships.83
5.2 Enable/disable state transitions.84
5.3 Mechanisms.84
5.3.1 Disable of MS equipment .85
5.3.2 Disable of an subscription.85
5.3.3 Disable of subscription and equipment.85
5.3.4 Enable an MS equipment.85
5.3.5 Enable an MS subscription .85
5.3.6 Enable an MS equipment and subscription.85
5.4 Enable/disable protocol.86
5.4.1 General case.86
5.4.2 Status of cipher key material.87
5.4.2.1 Permanently disabled state.87
5.4.2.2 Temporarily disabled state .87
5.4.3 Specific protocol exchanges .88
5.4.3.1 Disabling an MS with mutual authentication .88
5.4.3.2 Enabling an MS with mutual authentication .90
5.4.3.3 Enabling an MS with non-mutual authentication.91
5.4.3.4 Disabling an MS with non-mutual authentication.92
5.4.4 Enabling an MS without authentication.93
5.4.5 Disabling an MS without authentication.94
5.4.6 Rejection of enable or disable command .94
5.4.6a Expiry of Enable/Disable protocol timer .95
5.4.7 MM service primitives.96
5.4.7.1 TNMM-DISABLING primitive.96
5.4.7.2 TNMM-ENABLING primitive.96
6 Air Interface (AI) encryption .96
6.1 General principles.96
6.2 Security class.97
6.2.0 Notification of security class .98
6.2.0.1 Security Class of Neighbouring Cells .98
ETSI
5 ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1 (2008-06)
6.2.0.2 Identification of MS security capabilities .99
6.2.1 Constraints on LA arising from cell class.99
6.3 Key Stream Generator (KSG) .99
6.3.1 KSG numbering and selection .99
6.3.2 Interface parameters.100
6.3.2.1 Initial Value (IV).100
6.3.2.2 Cipher Key.100
6.4 Encryption mechanism.101
6.4.1 Allocation of KSS to logical channels .101
6.4.2 Allocation of KSS to logical channels with PDU association .103
6.4.2.1 General.103
6.4.2.2 KSS allocation on phase modulation channels.103
6.4.2.3 KSS allocation on QAM channels .105
6.4.2.3.1 Fixed mapping.105
6.4.2.3.2 Offset mapping.106
6.4.3 Synchronization of data calls where data is multi-slot interleaved .107
6.4.4 Recovery of stolen frames from interleaved data .108
6.5 Use of cipher keys .108
6.5.1 Identification of encryption state of downlink MAC PDUs .109
6.5.1.1 Class 1 cells.109
6.5.1.2 Class 2 cells.110
6.5.1.3 Class 3 cells.110
6.5.2 Identification of encryption state of uplink MAC PDUs .110
6.6 Mobility procedures.111
6.6.1 General requirements.111
6.6.1.1 Additional requirements for class 3 systems.111
6.6.2 Protocol description.111
6.6.2.1 Negotiation of cipher parameters .111
6.6.2.1.1 Class 1 cells .112
6.6.2.1.2 Class 2 cells .112
6.6.2.1.3 Class 3 cells .112
6.6.2.2 Initial and undeclared cell re-selection.112
6.6.2.3 Unannounced cell re-selection .113
6.6.2.4 Announced cell re-selection type-3.114
6.6.2.5 Announced cell re-selection type-2.114
6.6.2.6 Announced cell re-selection type-1.114
6.6.2.7 Key forwarding.114
6.7 Encryption control.116
6.7.1 Data to be encrypted .116
6.7.1.1 Downlink control channel requirements .116
6.7.1.2 Encryption of MAC header elements.116
6.7.1.3 Traffic channel encryption control.116
6.7.1.4 Handling of PDUs that do not conform to negotiated ciphering mode .117
6.7.2 Service description and primitives.117
6.7.2.1 Mobility Management (MM) .118
6.7.2.2 Mobile Link Entity (MLE).118
6.7.2.3 Layer 2.120
6.7.3 Protocol functions.120
6.7.3.1 MM.120
6.7.3.2 MLE.120
6.7.3.3 LLC.120
6.7.3.4 MAC.121
6.7.4 PDUs for cipher negotiation .121
Annex A (normative): PDU and element definitions .122
A.1 Authentication PDUs.122
A.1.1 D-AUTHENTICATION demand.122
A.1.2 D-AUTHENTICATION reject.122
A.1.3 D-AUTHENTICATION response.123
A.1.4 D-AUTHENTICATION result.123
A.1.5 U-AUTHENTICATION demand.123
ETSI
6 ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1 (2008-06)
A.1.6 U-AUTHENTICATION reject.124
A.1.7 U-AUTHENTICATION response.124
A.1.8 U-AUTHENTICATION result.125
A.2 OTAR PDUs .125
A.2.1 D-OTAR CCK Provide .125
A.2.2 U-OTAR CCK Demand .125
A.2.3 U-OTAR CCK Result .126
A.2.4 D-OTAR GCK Provide.126
A.2.5 U-OTAR GCK Demand.127
A.2.6 U-OTAR GCK Result .128
A.2.6a D-OTAR GCK Reject .128
A.2.7 D-OTAR SCK Provide.129
A.2.8 U-OTAR SCK Demand.130
A.2.9 U-OTAR SCK Result.130
A.2.9a D-OTAR SCK Reject.131
A.2.10 D-OTAR GSKO Provide.131
A.2.11 U-OTAR GSKO Demand .132
A.2.12 U-OTAR GSKO Result.132
A.2.12a D-OTAR GSKO Reject.132
A.3 PDUs for key association to GTSI .133
A.3.1 D-OTAR KEY ASSOCIATE demand .133
A.3.2 U-OTAR KEY ASSOCIATE status.134
A.4 PDUs to synchronize key or security class change .134
A.4.1 D-CK CHANGE demand.134
A.4.2 U-CK CHANGE result.135
A.4a PDUs to delete air interface keys in MS .136
A.4a.1 D-OTAR KEY DELETE demand .136
A.4a.2 U-OTAR KEY DELETE result.137
A.4b PDUs to obtain Air Interface Key Status .138
A.4b.1 D-OTAR KEY STATUS demand .138
A.4b.2 U-OTAR KEY STATUS response.139
A.5 Other security domain PDUs.140
A.5.1 U-TEI PROVIDE.140
A.5.2 U-OTAR PREPARE.141
A.5.3 D-OTAR NEWCELL.141
A.5.4 D-OTAR CMG GTSI PROVIDE.141
A.5.5 U-OTAR CMG GTSI RESULT.142
A.6 PDUs for Enable and Disable.142
A.6.1 D-DISABLE.142
A.6.2 D-ENABLE.143
A.6.3 U-DISABLE STATUS.143
A.7 MM PDU type 3 information elements coding .144
A.7.1 Authentication downlink.144
A.7.2 Authentication uplink.144
A.8 PDU Information elements coding.145
A.8.1 Acknowledgement flag.145
A.8.2 Address extension.145
A.8.3 Authentication challenge.145
A.8.4 Authentication reject reason.145
A.8.5 Authentication result.146
A.8.6 Authentication sub-type.146
A.8.7 CCK identifier.146
A.8.8 CCK information.146
A.8.9 CCK Location area information .147
A.8.10 CCK request flag.147
A.8.11 Change of security class .147
ETSI
7 ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1 (2008-06)
A.8.12 Cipher parameters.148
A.8.13 CK provision flag.148
A.8.14 CK provisioning information .148
A.8.15 CK request flag.149
A.8.16 Class Change flag.149
A.8.17 DCK forwarding result.149
A.8.18 Disabling type.149
A.8.19 Enable/Disable result.150
A.8.20 Encryption mode.150
A.8.20.1 Class 1 cells .150
A.8.20.2 Class 2 cells .150
A.8.20.3 Class 3 cells .151
A.8.21 Equipment disable.151
A.8.22 Equipment enable.151
A.8.23 Equipment status.151
A.8.23a Explicit response.152
A.8.24 Frame number.152
A.8.25 Future key flag .152
A.8.26 GCK data.152
A.8.27 GCK key and identifier .152
A.8.28 GCK Number (GCKN) .153
A.8.28a GCK Provision result .153
A.8.28b GCK rejected.153
A.8.29 GCK select number .153
A.8.29a GCK Supported.154
A.8.30 GCK Version Number (GCK-VN).154
A.8.31 Group association.154
A.8.31a Group Identity Security Related Information.155
A.8.32 GSKO Version Number (GSKO-VN).155
A.8.33 GSSI.155
A.8.34 Hyperframe number .155
A.8.35 Intent/confirm.155
A.8.36 Void.156
A.8.37 Key association status .156
A.8.38 Key association type.156
A.8.39 Key change type .156
A.8.39a Key delete type.157
A.8.39b Key status type .157
A.8.40 Key type flag.157
A.8.41 KSG-number.158
A.8.42 Location area.158
A.8.43 Location area bit mask .
...

SLOVENSKI STANDARD
01-oktober-2008
Prizemni snopovni radio (TETRA) - Govor in podatki (V+D) - 7. del: Varnost
Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA) - Voice plus Data (V+D) - Part 7: Security
Ta slovenski standard je istoveten z: EN 300 392-7 Version 3.1.1
ICS:
33.070.10 Prizemni snopovni radio Terrestrial Trunked Radio
(TETRA) (TETRA)
2003-01.Slovenski inštitut za standardizacijo. Razmnoževanje celote ali delov tega standarda ni dovoljeno.

European Standard (Telecommunications series)

Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA);
Voice plus Data (V+D);
Part 7: Security
2 ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1 (2008-06)

Reference
REN/TETRA-06173
Keywords
security, TETRA, V+D
ETSI
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F-06921 Sophia Antipolis Cedex - FRANCE

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Siret N° 348 623 562 00017 - NAF 742 C
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Sous-Préfecture de Grasse (06) N° 7803/88

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No part may be reproduced except as authorized by written permission.
The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media.

© European Telecommunications Standards Institute 2008.
All rights reserved.
TM TM TM TM
DECT , PLUGTESTS , UMTS , TIPHON , the TIPHON logo and the ETSI logo are Trade Marks of ETSI registered
for the benefit of its Members.
TM
3GPP is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners.
ETSI
3 ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1 (2008-06)
Contents
Intellectual Property Rights.10
Foreword.10
1 Scope.12
2 References.12
2.1 Normative references.13
2.2 Informative references.13
3 Definitions and abbreviations.13
3.1 Definitions.13
3.2 Abbreviations.16
4 Air Interface authentication and key management mechanisms .17
4.0 Security classes.18
4.1 Air interface authentication mechanisms .18
4.1.1 Overview.18
4.1.2 Authentication of an MS.19
4.1.3 Authentication of the infrastructure .19
4.1.4 Mutual authentication of MS and infrastructure .20
4.1.5 The authentication key.22
4.1.6 Equipment authentication.22
4.2 Air Interface key management mechanisms.23
4.2.1 The DCK.23
4.2.2 The GCK.24
4.2.3 The CCK.25
4.2.4 The SCK.26
4.2.4.1 SCK association for DMO use.27
4.2.4.1.1 DMO SCK subset grouping.27
4.2.5 The GSKO.30
4.2.5.1 SCK distribution to groups with OTAR.30
4.2.5.2 GCK distribution to groups with OTAR .30
4.2.5.3 Rules for MS response to group key distribution.31
4.2.6 Encrypted Short Identity (ESI) mechanism .31
4.2.7 Encryption Cipher Key.32
4.2.8 Summary of AI key management mechanisms.32
4.3 Service description and primitives .33
4.3.1 Authentication primitives.33
4.3.2 SCK transfer primitives .34
4.3.3 GCK transfer primitives.35
4.3.4 GSKO transfer primitives .36
4.4 Authentication protocol.37
4.4.1 Authentication state transitions.37
4.4.2 Authentication protocol sequences and operations .39
4.4.2.1 MSCs for authentication.40
4.4.2.2 MSCs for authentication Type-3 element .46
4.4.2.3 Control of authentication timer T354 at MS .49
4.5 OTAR protocols.50
4.5.1 CCK delivery - protocol functions.50
4.5.1.1 SwMI-initiated CCK provision .51
4.5.1.2 MS-initiated CCK provision with U-OTAR CCK demand.52
4.5.1.3 MS-initiated CCK provision with announced cell reselection .53
4.5.2 OTAR protocol functions - SCK .53
4.5.2.1 MS requests provision of SCK(s).54
4.5.2.2 SwMI provides SCK(s) to individual MS .55
4.5.2.3 SwMI provides SCK(s) to group of MSs .57
4.5.2.4 SwMI rejects provision of SCK .59
4.5.3 OTAR protocol functions - GCK.59
4.5.3.1 MS requests provision of GCK .59
ETSI
4 ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1 (2008-06)
4.5.3.2 SwMI provides GCK to an individual MS.61
4.5.3.3 SwMI provides GCK to a group of MSs.63
4.5.3.4 SwMI rejects provision of GCK.65
4.5.4 Cipher key association to group address.65
4.5.4.1 SCK association for DMO .66
4.5.4.2 GCK association.69
4.5.5 Notification of key change over the air.71
4.5.5.1 Change of DCK.73
4.5.5.2 Change of CCK.73
4.5.5.3 Change of GCK.73
4.5.5.4 Change of SCK for TMO.73
4.5.5.5 Change of SCK for DMO .74
4.5.5.6 Synchronization of Cipher Key Change.74
4.5.6 Security class change .74
4.5.6.1 Change of security class to security class 1 .75
4.5.6.2 Change of security class to security class 2 .75
4.5.6.3 Change of security class to security class 3 .75
4.5.6.4 Change of security class to security class 3 with GCK .76
4.5.7 Notification of key in use.76
4.5.8 Notification of GCK Activation/Deactivation .76
4.5.9 Deletion of SCK, GCK and GSKO.76
4.5.10 Air Interface Key Status Enquiry.78
4.5.11 Crypto management group.80
4.5.12 OTAR retry mechanism.81
4.5.13 OTAR protocol functions – GSKO.81
4.5.13.1 MS requests provision of GSKO.81
4.5.13.2 SwMI provides GSKO to an MS.82
4.5.13.3 SwMI rejects provision of GSKO .83
5 Enable and disable mechanism.83
5.1 General relationships.83
5.2 Enable/disable state transitions.84
5.3 Mechanisms.84
5.3.1 Disable of MS equipment .85
5.3.2 Disable of an subscription.85
5.3.3 Disable of subscription and equipment.85
5.3.4 Enable an MS equipment.85
5.3.5 Enable an MS subscription .85
5.3.6 Enable an MS equipment and subscription.85
5.4 Enable/disable protocol.86
5.4.1 General case.86
5.4.2 Status of cipher key material.87
5.4.2.1 Permanently disabled state.87
5.4.2.2 Temporarily disabled state .87
5.4.3 Specific protocol exchanges .88
5.4.3.1 Disabling an MS with mutual authentication .88
5.4.3.2 Enabling an MS with mutual authentication .90
5.4.3.3 Enabling an MS with non-mutual authentication.91
5.4.3.4 Disabling an MS with non-mutual authentication.92
5.4.4 Enabling an MS without authentication.93
5.4.5 Disabling an MS without authentication.94
5.4.6 Rejection of enable or disable command .94
5.4.6a Expiry of Enable/Disable protocol timer .95
5.4.7 MM service primitives.96
5.4.7.1 TNMM-DISABLING primitive.96
5.4.7.2 TNMM-ENABLING primitive.96
6 Air Interface (AI) encryption .96
6.1 General principles.96
6.2 Security class.97
6.2.0 Notification of security class .98
6.2.0.1 Security Class of Neighbouring Cells .98
ETSI
5 ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1 (2008-06)
6.2.0.2 Identification of MS security capabilities .99
6.2.1 Constraints on LA arising from cell class.99
6.3 Key Stream Generator (KSG) .99
6.3.1 KSG numbering and selection .99
6.3.2 Interface parameters.100
6.3.2.1 Initial Value (IV).100
6.3.2.2 Cipher Key.100
6.4 Encryption mechanism.101
6.4.1 Allocation of KSS to logical channels .101
6.4.2 Allocation of KSS to logical channels with PDU association .103
6.4.2.1 General.103
6.4.2.2 KSS allocation on phase modulation channels.103
6.4.2.3 KSS allocation on QAM channels .105
6.4.2.3.1 Fixed mapping.105
6.4.2.3.2 Offset mapping.106
6.4.3 Synchronization of data calls where data is multi-slot interleaved .107
6.4.4 Recovery of stolen frames from interleaved data .108
6.5 Use of cipher keys .108
6.5.1 Identification of encryption state of downlink MAC PDUs .109
6.5.1.1 Class 1 cells.109
6.5.1.2 Class 2 cells.110
6.5.1.3 Class 3 cells.110
6.5.2 Identification of encryption state of uplink MAC PDUs .110
6.6 Mobility procedures.111
6.6.1 General requirements.111
6.6.1.1 Additional requirements for class 3 systems.111
6.6.2 Protocol description.111
6.6.2.1 Negotiation of cipher parameters .111
6.6.2.1.1 Class 1 cells .112
6.6.2.1.2 Class 2 cells .112
6.6.2.1.3 Class 3 cells .112
6.6.2.2 Initial and undeclared cell re-selection.112
6.6.2.3 Unannounced cell re-selection .113
6.6.2.4 Announced cell re-selection type-3.114
6.6.2.5 Announced cell re-selection type-2.114
6.6.2.6 Announced cell re-selection type-1.114
6.6.2.7 Key forwarding.114
6.7 Encryption control.116
6.7.1 Data to be encrypted .116
6.7.1.1 Downlink control channel requirements .116
6.7.1.2 Encryption of MAC header elements.116
6.7.1.3 Traffic channel encryption control.116
6.7.1.4 Handling of PDUs that do not conform to negotiated ciphering mode .117
6.7.2 Service description and primitives.117
6.7.2.1 Mobility Management (MM) .118
6.7.2.2 Mobile Link Entity (MLE).118
6.7.2.3 Layer 2.120
6.7.3 Protocol functions.120
6.7.3.1 MM.120
6.7.3.2 MLE.120
6.7.3.3 LLC.120
6.7.3.4 MAC.121
6.7.4 PDUs for cipher negotiation .121
Annex A (normative): PDU and element definitions .122
A.1 Authentication PDUs.122
A.1.1 D-AUTHENTICATION demand.122
A.1.2 D-AUTHENTICATION reject.122
A.1.3 D-AUTHENTICATION response.123
A.1.4 D-AUTHENTICATION result.123
A.1.5 U-AUTHENTICATION demand.123
ETSI
6 ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1 (2008-06)
A.1.6 U-AUTHENTICATION reject.124
A.1.7 U-AUTHENTICATION response.124
A.1.8 U-AUTHENTICATION result.125
A.2 OTAR PDUs .125
A.2.1 D-OTAR CCK Provide .125
A.2.2 U-OTAR CCK Demand .125
A.2.3 U-OTAR CCK Result .126
A.2.4 D-OTAR GCK Provide.126
A.2.5 U-OTAR GCK Demand.127
A.2.6 U-OTAR GCK Result .128
A.2.6a D-OTAR GCK Reject .128
A.2.7 D-OTAR SCK Provide.129
A.2.8 U-OTAR SCK Demand.130
A.2.9 U-OTAR SCK Result.130
A.2.9a D-OTAR SCK Reject.131
A.2.10 D-OTAR GSKO Provide.131
A.2.11 U-OTAR GSKO Demand .132
A.2.12 U-OTAR GSKO Result.132
A.2.12a D-OTAR GSKO Reject.132
A.3 PDUs for key association to GTSI .133
A.3.1 D-OTAR KEY ASSOCIATE demand .133
A.3.2 U-OTAR KEY ASSOCIATE status.134
A.4 PDUs to synchronize key or security class change .134
A.4.1 D-CK CHANGE demand.134
A.4.2 U-CK CHANGE result.135
A.4a PDUs to delete air interface keys in MS .136
A.4a.1 D-OTAR KEY DELETE demand .136
A.4a.2 U-OTAR KEY DELETE result.137
A.4b PDUs to obtain Air Interface Key Status .138
A.4b.1 D-OTAR KEY STATUS demand .138
A.4b.2 U-OTAR KEY STATUS response.139
A.5 Other security domain PDUs.140
A.5.1 U-TEI PROVIDE.140
A.5.2 U-OTAR PREPARE.141
A.5.3 D-OTAR NEWCELL.141
A.5.4 D-OTAR CMG GTSI PROVIDE.141
A.5.5 U-OTAR CMG GTSI RESULT.142
A.6 PDUs for Enable and Disable.142
A.6.1 D-DISABLE.142
A.6.2 D-ENABLE.143
A.6.3 U-DISABLE STATUS.143
A.7 MM PDU type 3 information elements coding .144
A.7.1 Authentication downlink.144
A.7.2 Authentication uplink.144
A.8 PDU Information elements coding.145
A.8.1 Acknowledgement flag.145
A.8.2 Address extension.145
A.8.3 Authentication challenge.145
A.8.4 Authentication reject reason.145
A.8.5 Authentication result.146
A.8.6 Authentication sub-type.146
A.8.7 CCK identifier.146
A.8.8 CCK information.146
A.8.9 CCK Location area information .147
A.8.10 CCK request flag.147
A.8.11 Change of security class .147
ETSI
7 ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1 (2008-06)
A.8.12 Cipher parameters.148
A.8.13 CK provision flag.148
A.8.14 CK provisioning information .148
A.8.15 CK request flag.149
A.8.16 Class Change flag.149
A.8.17 DCK forwarding result.149
A.8.18 Disabling type.149
A.8.19 Enable/Disable result.150
A.8.20 Encryption mode.150
A.8.20.1 Class 1 cells .150
A.8.20.2 Class 2 cells .150
A.8.20.3 Class 3 cells .151
A.8.21 Equipment disable.151
A.8.22 Equipment enable.151
A.8.23 Equipment status.151
A.8.23a Explicit response.152
A.8.24 Frame number.152
A.8.25 Future key flag .152
A.8.26 GCK data.152
A.8.27 GCK key and identifier .152
A.8.28 GCK Number (GCKN) .153
A.8.28a GCK Provision result .153
A.8.28b GCK rejected.153
A.8.29 GCK select number .153
A.8.29a GCK Supported.154
A.8.30 GCK Version Number (GCK-VN).154
A.8.31 Group association.154
A.8.31a Group Identity Security Related Information.155
A.8.32 GSKO Version Number (GSKO-VN).155
A.8.33 GSSI.155
A.8.34 Hyperframe number .155
A.8.35 Intent/confirm.155
A.8.36 Void.156
A.8.37 Key association status .156
A.8.38 Key association type.156
A.8.39 Key change type .156
A.8.39a Key delete type.
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