SIST EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1:2008

• Abstract:

  To update 392-7 to incorporate CR112v4, CR113v6 and extensions for ISI key management.; The present document defines the Terrestrial Trunked Radio system (TETRA) supporting Voice plus Data (V+D). It specifies the air interface, the inter-working between TETRA systems and to other systems via gateways, the terminal equipment interface on the mobile station, the connection of line stations to the infrastructure, the security aspects in TETRA networks, the management services offered to the operator, the performance objectives, and the supplementary services that come in addition to the basic and teleservices. The present part describes the security mechanisms in TETRA V+D. It provides mechanisms for confidentiality of control signalling and user speech and data at the air interface, authentication and key management mechanisms for the air interface. Clause 4 describes the authentication and key management mechanisms for the TETRA air interface. The following two authentication services have been specified for the air-interface in ETR 086-3 [i.3], based on a threat analysis:; authentication of an MS by the TETRA infrastructure;; authentication of the TETRA infrastructure by an MS.; Clause 5 describes the mechanisms and protocol for enable and disable of both the mobile station equipment and the mobile station user's subscription. Air interface encryption may be provided as an option in TETRA. Where employed, clause 6 describes the confidentiality mechanisms using encryption on the air interface, for circuit mode speech, circuit mode data, packet data and control information. Clause 6 describes both encryption mechanisms and mobility procedures. It also details the protocol concerning control of encryption at the air interface. The present document does not address the detail handling of protocol errors or any protocol mechanisms when TETRA is operating in a degraded mode. These issues are implementation specific and therefore fall outside the scope of the TETRA standardization effort. The detail description of the Authentication Centre is outside the scope of the present document.

• Status: Published
• Public Enquiry End Date: 30-Sep-2007
• Publication Date: 24-Aug-2008
• ICS: 33.070.10 - Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA)
• Technical Committee: MOC - Mobile Communications
• Current Stage: 6060 - National Implementation/Publication (Adopted Project)
• Start Date: 08-Aug-2008
• Due Date: 13-Oct-2008
• Completion Date: 25-Aug-2008
• Ref Project: ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1 (2008-06) - Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA); Voice plus Data (V+D); Part 7: Security

Overview

SIST EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1:2008 is a crucial European standard focusing on the security aspects of the Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA) system supporting Voice plus Data (V+D). Developed under the SIST framework, this standard details the mechanisms that ensure secure communication in TETRA networks, specifically addressing the confidentiality, authentication, and key management required for operational safety and privacy. The document incorporates updates from CR112v4, CR113v6, and introduces extensions for Inter-System Interface (ISI) key management, ensuring that TETRA systems are equipped to handle modern security challenges in critical communications.

Key Topics

• TETRA Security Mechanisms: Describes comprehensive security solutions for TETRA air interfaces, enabling secure voice and data transmission.
• Authentication Services:
  • Authentication of a Mobile Station (MS) by the TETRA infrastructure
  • Authentication of the infrastructure by a Mobile Station
• Key Management: Specifies the management of multiple keys for different security requirements and their distribution over the air interface.
• Enable/Disable Protocols: Mechanisms for enabling or disabling both mobile equipment and user subscriptions are described, addressing device control for operational and security needs.
• Air Interface Encryption: Optional encryption features covering circuit mode speech, circuit mode data, packet data, and control information across the TETRA air interface.
• Security Classes: Defines different security classes and their application within TETRA systems, ensuring flexible and graded security adoption.
• Mobility and Security: Explores encryption and key management procedures during mobility events to guarantee seamless security.

Applications

SIST EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1:2008 is essential across industries and sectors that rely on TETRA networks for mission-critical communication:

• Public Safety: Securely connects police, fire, and rescue teams, ensuring confidentiality of sensitive communications.
• Transport and Utilities: Reliable and secure radio communications for railway, airport, and utility operators, safeguarding operational data.
• Industry and Enterprises: Protects information exchange in sectors using TETRA for operational coordination, such as oil and gas or event management.
• Cross-border Emergency Response: The standard's specifications for ISI key management facilitate secure interoperability between different TETRA systems.

By implementing the security requirements of this standard, organizations can effectively guard against unauthorized access, interception, and manipulation within TETRA communication networks.

Related Standards

Organizations looking to achieve full compliance and system interoperability alongside SIST EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1:2008 should consider the following related standards:

• ETSI EN 300 392-2: TETRA Voice plus Data (V+D) Part 2, covering the air interface.
• ETSI EN 300 392-6: TETRA V+D Part 6, specifying Inter-System Interface.
• ETSI EN 300 392-1: General introduction and structure of TETRA.
• ETR 086-3: Defines additional authentication services referenced in this part of the standard.

These standards collectively form the basis for secure, reliable, and interoperable TETRA systems in diverse operational environments.

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Keywords: TETRA, security, voice plus data, encryption, authentication, key management, air interface, enable disable protocol, critical communications, SIST EN 300 392-7, public safety radio, secure radio communications.

Final draft ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.0.3 (2008-04)
European Standard (Telecommunications series)

Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA);
Voice plus Data (V+D);
Part 7: Security
2 Final draft ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.0.3 (2008-04)

Reference
REN/TETRA-06173
Keywords
security, TETRA, V+D
ETSI
650 Route des Lucioles
F-06921 Sophia Antipolis Cedex - FRANCE

Tel.: [phone]  Fax: [phone]

Siret N° 348 623 562 00017 - NAF 742 C
Association à but non lucratif enregistrée à la
Sous-Préfecture de Grasse (06) N° 7803/88

Important notice
Individual copies of the present document can be downloaded from:
http://www.etsi.org
The present document may be made available in more than one electronic version or in print. In any case of existing or
perceived difference in contents between such versions, the reference version is the Portable Document Format (PDF).
In case of dispute, the reference shall be the printing on ETSI printers of the PDF version kept on a specific network drive
within ETSI Secretariat.
Users of the present document should be aware that the document may be subject to revision or change of status.
Information on the current status of this and other ETSI documents is available at
http://portal.etsi.org/tb/status/status.asp
If you find errors in the present document, please send your comment to one of the following services:
http://portal.etsi.org/chaircor/ETSI_support.asp
Copyright Notification
No part may be reproduced except as authorized by written permission.
The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media.

© European Telecommunications Standards Institute 2008.
All rights reserved.
TM TM TM TM
DECT , PLUGTESTS , UMTS , TIPHON , the TIPHON logo and the ETSI logo are Trade Marks of ETSI registered
for the benefit of its Members.
TM
3GPP is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners.
ETSI
3 Final draft ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.0.3 (2008-04)
Contents
Intellectual Property Rights.9
Foreword.9
1 Scope.11
2 References.11
2.1 Normative references.12
2.2 Informative references.12
3 Definitions and abbreviations.12
3.1 Definitions.12
3.2 Abbreviations.15
4 Air Interface authentication and key management mechanisms .16
4.0 Security classes.17
4.1 Air interface authentication mechanisms .17
4.1.1 Overview.17
4.1.2 Authentication of an MS.18
4.1.3 Authentication of the infrastructure .18
4.1.4 Mutual authentication of MS and infrastructure .19
4.1.5 The authentication key.21
4.1.6 Equipment authentication.21
4.2 Air Interface key management mechanisms.22
4.2.1 The DCK.22
4.2.2 The GCK.23
4.2.3 The CCK.24
4.2.4 The SCK.25
4.2.4.1 SCK association for DMO use.26
4.2.4.1.1 DMO SCK subset grouping.26
4.2.5 The GSKO.29
4.2.5.1 SCK distribution to groups with OTAR.29
4.2.5.2 GCK distribution to groups with OTAR .29
4.2.5.3 Rules for MS response to group key distribution.30
4.2.6 Encrypted Short Identity (ESI) mechanism .30
4.2.7 Encryption Cipher Key.31
4.2.8 Summary of AI key management mechanisms.31
4.3 Service description and primitives .32
4.3.1 Authentication primitives.32
4.3.2 SCK transfer primitives .33
4.3.3 GCK transfer primitives.34
4.3.4 GSKO transfer primitives .35
4.4 Authentication protocol.35
4.4.1 Authentication state transitions.35
4.4.2 Authentication protocol sequences and operations .38
4.4.2.1 MSCs for authentication.39
4.4.2.2 MSCs for authentication Type-3 element .45
4.4.2.3 Control of authentication timer T354 at MS .48
4.5 OTAR protocols.49
4.5.1 CCK delivery - protocol functions.49
4.5.1.1 SwMI-initiated CCK provision .49
4.5.1.2 MS-initiated CCK provision with U-OTAR CCK demand.51
4.5.1.3 MS-initiated CCK provision with announced cell reselection .52
4.5.2 OTAR protocol functions - SCK .52
4.5.2.1 MS requests provision of SCK(s).53
4.5.2.2 SwMI provides SCK(s) to individual MS .54
4.5.2.3 SwMI provides SCK(s) to group of MSs .56
4.5.2.4 SwMI rejects provision of SCK .58
4.5.3 OTAR protocol functions - GCK.58
4.5.3.1 MS requests provision of GCK .58
ETSI
4 Final draft ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.0.3 (2008-04)
4.5.3.2 SwMI provides GCK to an individual MS.61
4.5.3.3 SwMI provides GCK to a group of MSs.63
4.5.3.4 SwMI rejects provision of GCK.65
4.5.4 Cipher key association to group address.65
4.5.4.1 SCK association for DMO .66
4.5.4.2 GCK association.69
4.5.5 Notification of key change over the air.71
4.5.5.1 Change of DCK.73
4.5.5.2 Change of CCK.73
4.5.5.3 Change of GCK.73
4.5.5.4 Change of SCK for TMO.73
4.5.5.5 Change of SCK for DMO .74
4.5.5.6 Synchronization of Cipher Key Change.74
4.5.6 Security class change .74
4.5.6.1 Change of security class to security class 1 .75
4.5.6.2 Change of security class to security class 2 .75
4.5.6.3 Change of security class to security class 3 .75
4.5.6.4 Change of security class to security class 3 with GCK .76
4.5.7 Notification of key in use.76
4.5.8 Notification of GCK Activation/Deactivation .76
4.5.9 Deletion of SCK, GCK and GSKO.76
4.5.10 Air Interface Key Status Enquiry.78
4.5.11 Crypto management group.80
4.5.12 OTAR retry mechanism.81
4.5.13 OTAR protocol functions – GSKO.81
4.5.13.1 MS requests provision of GSKO.81
4.5.13.2 SwMI provides GSKO to an MS.82
4.5.13.3 SwMI rejects provision of GSKO .83
5 Enable and disable mechanism.83
5.1 General relationships.83
5.2 Enable/disable state transitions.84
5.3 Mechanisms.84
5.3.1 Disable of MS equipment .85
5.3.2 Disable of an subscription.85
5.3.3 Disable of subscription and equipment.85
5.3.4 Enable an MS equipment.85
5.3.5 Enable an MS subscription .85
5.3.6 Enable an MS equipment and subscription.85
5.4 Enable/disable protocol.86
5.4.1 General case.86
5.4.2 Status of cipher key material.87
5.4.2.1 Permanently disabled state.87
5.4.2.2 Temporarily disabled state .87
5.4.3 Specific protocol exchanges .88
5.4.3.1 Disabling an MS with mutual authentication .88
5.4.3.2 Enabling an MS with mutual authentication .89
5.4.3.3 Enabling an MS with non-mutual authentication.90
5.4.3.4 Disabling an MS with non-mutual authentication.91
5.4.4 Enabling an MS without authentication.93
5.4.5 Disabling an MS without authentication.94
5.4.6 Rejection of enable or disable command .94
5.4.6a Expiry of Enable/Disable protocol timer .95
5.4.7 MM service primitives.95
5.4.7.1 TNMM-DISABLING primitive.96
5.4.7.2 TNMM-ENABLING primitive.96
6 Air Interface (AI) encryption .96
6.1 General principles.96
6.2 Security class.97
6.2.0 Notification of security class .98
6.2.0.1 Security Class of Neighbouring Cells .98
ETSI
5 Final draft ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.0.3 (2008-04)
6.2.0.2 Identification of MS security capabilities .99
6.2.1 Constraints on LA arising from cell class.99
6.3 Key Stream Generator (KSG) .99
6.3.1 KSG numbering and selection .99
6.3.2 Interface parameters.100
6.3.2.1 Initial Value (IV).100
6.3.2.2 Cipher Key.100
6.4 Encryption mechanism.101
6.4.1 Allocation of KSS to logical channels .101
6.4.2 Allocation of KSS to logical channels with PDU association .103
6.4.2.1 General.103
6.4.2.2 KSS allocation on phase modulation channels.103
6.4.2.3 KSS allocation on QAM channels .105
6.4.2.3.1 Fixed mapping.105
6.4.2.3.2 Offset mapping.106
6.4.3 Synchronization of data calls where data is multi-slot interleaved .107
6.4.4 Recovery of stolen frames from interleaved data .108
6.5 Use of cipher keys .108
6.5.1 Identification of encryption state of downlink MAC PDUs .109
6.5.1.1 Class 1 cells.109
6.5.1.2 Class 2 cells.110
6.5.1.3 Class 3 cells.110
6.5.2 Identification of encryption state of uplink MAC PDUs .110
6.6 Mobility procedures.111
6.6.1 General requirements.111
6.6.1.1 Additional requirements for class 3 systems.111
6.6.2 Protocol description.111
6.6.2.1 Negotiation of cipher parameters .111
6.6.2.1.1 Class 1 cells .112
6.6.2.1.2 Class 2 cells .112
6.6.2.1.3 Class 3 cells .112
6.6.2.2 Initial and undeclared cell re-selection.112
6.6.2.3 Unannounced cell re-selection .113
6.6.2.4 Announced cell re-selection type-3.114
6.6.2.5 Announced cell re-selection type-2.114
6.6.2.6 Announced cell re-selection type-1.114
6.6.2.7 Key forwarding.114
6.7 Encryption control.116
6.7.1 Data to be encrypted .116
6.7.1.1 Downlink control channel requirements .116
6.7.1.2 Encryption of MAC header elements.116
6.7.1.3 Traffic channel encryption control.116
6.7.1.4 Handling of PDUs that do not conform to negotiated ciphering mode .117
6.7.2 Service description and primitives.117
6.7.2.1 Mobility Management (MM) .118
6.7.2.2 Mobile Link Entity (MLE).118
6.7.2.3 Layer 2.120
6.7.3 Protocol functions.120
6.7.3.1 MM.120
6.7.3.2 MLE.120
6.7.3.3 LLC.120
6.7.3.4 MAC.121
6.7.4 PDUs for cipher negotiation .121
Annex A (normative): PDU and element definitions .122
A.1 Authentication PDUs.122
A.1.1 D-AUTHENTICATION demand.122
A.1.2 D-AUTHENTICATION reject.122
A.1.3 D-AUTHENTICATION response.123
A.1.4 D-AUTHENTICATION result.123
A.1.5 U-AUTHENTICATION demand.123
ETSI
6 Final draft ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.0.3 (2008-04)
A.1.6 U-AUTHENTICATION reject.124
A.1.7 U-AUTHENTICATION response.124
A.1.8 U-AUTHENTICATION result.125
A.2 OTAR PDUs .125
A.2.1 D-OTAR CCK Provide .125
A.2.2 U-OTAR CCK Demand .125
A.2.3 U-OTAR CCK Result .126
A.2.4 D-OTAR GCK Provide.126
A.2.5 U-OTAR GCK Demand.127
A.2.6 U-OTAR GCK Result .128
A.2.6a D-OTAR GCK Reject .128
A.2.7 D-OTAR SCK Provide.129
A.2.8 U-OTAR SCK Demand.130
A.2.9 U-OTAR SCK Result.130
A.2.9a D-OTAR SCK Reject.131
A.2.10 D-OTAR GSKO Provide.131
A.2.11 U-OTAR GSKO Demand .132
A.2.12 U-OTAR GSKO Result.132
A.2.12a D-OTAR GSKO Reject.132
A.3 PDUs for key association to GTSI .133
A.3.1 D-OTAR KEY ASSOCIATE demand .133
A.3.2 U-OTAR KEY ASSOCIATE status.134
A.4 PDUs to synchronize key or security class change .134
A.4.1 D-CK CHANGE demand.134
A.4.2 U-CK CHANGE result.135
A.4a PDUs to delete air interface keys in MS .136
A.4a.1 D-OTAR KEY DELETE demand .136
A.4a.2 U-OTAR KEY DELETE result.137
A.4b PDUs to obtain Air Interface Key Status .138
A.4b.1 D-OTAR KEY STATUS demand .138
A.4b.2 U-OTAR KEY STATUS response.139
A.5 Other security domain PDUs.140
A.5.1 U-TEI PROVIDE.140
A.5.2 U-OTAR PREPARE.141
A.5.3 D-OTAR NEWCELL.141
A.5.4 D-OTAR CMG GTSI PROVIDE.141
A.5.5 U-OTAR CMG GTSI RESULT.142
A.6 PDUs for Enable and Disable.142
A.6.1 D-DISABLE.142
A.6.2 D-ENABLE.143
A.6.3 U-DISABLE STATUS.143
A.7 MM PDU type 3 information elements coding .144
A.7.1 Authentication downlink.144
A.7.2 Authentication uplink.144
A.8 PDU Information elements coding.145
A.8.1 Acknowledgement flag.145
A.8.2 Address extension.145
A.8.3 Authentication challenge.145
A.8.4 Authentication reject reason.145
A.8.5 Authentication result.146
A.8.6 Authentication sub-type.146
A.8.7 CCK identifier.146
A.8.8 CCK information.146
A.8.9 CCK Location area information .147
A.8.10 CCK request flag.147
A.8.11 Change of security class .147
A.8.12 Cipher parameters.147
ETSI
7 Final draft ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.0.3 (2008-04)
A.8.13 CK provision flag.148
A.8.14 CK provisioning information .148
A.8.15 CK request flag.148
A.8.16 Class Change flag.149
A.8.17 DCK forwarding result.149
A.8.18 Disabling type.149
A.8.19 Enable/Disable result.149
A.8.20 Encryption mode.150
A.8.20.1 Class 1 cells .150
A.8.20.2 Class 2 cells .150
A.8.20.3 Class 3 cells .150
A.8.21 Equipment disable.150
A.8.22 Equipment enable.151
A.8.23 Equipment status.151
A.8.23a Explicit response.151
A.8.24 Frame number.151
A.8.25 Future key flag .151
A.8.26 GCK data.152
A.8.27 GCK key and identifier .152
A.8.28 GCK Number (GCKN) .152
A.8.28a GCK Provision result .152
A.8.28b GCK rejected.153
A.8.29 GCK select number .153
A.8.29a GCK Supported.153
A.8.30 GCK Version Number (GCK-VN).153
A.8.31 Group association.154
A.8.31a Group Identity Security Related Information.154
A.8.32 GSKO Version Number (GSKO-VN).154
A.8.33 GSSI.154
A.8.34 Hyperframe number .154
A.8.35 Intent/confirm.154
A.8.36 Void.155
A.8.37 Key association status .155
A.8.38 Key association type.155
A.8.39 Key change type .155
A.8.39a Key delete type.156
A.8.39b Key status type .156
A.8.40 Key type flag.156
A.8.41 KSG-number.157
A.8.42 Location area.
...

European Standard (Telecommunications series)

Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA);
Voice plus Data (V+D);
Part 7: Security
2 ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1 (2008-06)

Reference
REN/TETRA-06173
Keywords
security, TETRA, V+D
ETSI
650 Route des Lucioles
F-06921 Sophia Antipolis Cedex - FRANCE

Tel.: [phone]  Fax: [phone]

Siret N° 348 623 562 00017 - NAF 742 C
Association à but non lucratif enregistrée à la
Sous-Préfecture de Grasse (06) N° 7803/88

Important notice
Individual copies of the present document can be downloaded from:
http://www.etsi.org
The present document may be made available in more than one electronic version or in print. In any case of existing or
perceived difference in contents between such versions, the reference version is the Portable Document Format (PDF).
In case of dispute, the reference shall be the printing on ETSI printers of the PDF version kept on a specific network drive
within ETSI Secretariat.
Users of the present document should be aware that the document may be subject to revision or change of status.
Information on the current status of this and other ETSI documents is available at
http://portal.etsi.org/tb/status/status.asp
If you find errors in the present document, please send your comment to one of the following services:
http://portal.etsi.org/chaircor/ETSI_support.asp
Copyright Notification
No part may be reproduced except as authorized by written permission.
The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media.

© European Telecommunications Standards Institute 2008.
All rights reserved.
TM TM TM TM
DECT , PLUGTESTS , UMTS , TIPHON , the TIPHON logo and the ETSI logo are Trade Marks of ETSI registered
for the benefit of its Members.
TM
3GPP is a Trade Mark of ETSI registered for the benefit of its Members and of the 3GPP Organizational Partners.
ETSI
3 ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1 (2008-06)
Contents
Intellectual Property Rights.10
Foreword.10
1 Scope.12
2 References.12
2.1 Normative references.13
2.2 Informative references.13
3 Definitions and abbreviations.13
3.1 Definitions.13
3.2 Abbreviations.16
4 Air Interface authentication and key management mechanisms .17
4.0 Security classes.18
4.1 Air interface authentication mechanisms .18
4.1.1 Overview.18
4.1.2 Authentication of an MS.19
4.1.3 Authentication of the infrastructure .19
4.1.4 Mutual authentication of MS and infrastructure .20
4.1.5 The authentication key.22
4.1.6 Equipment authentication.22
4.2 Air Interface key management mechanisms.23
4.2.1 The DCK.23
4.2.2 The GCK.24
4.2.3 The CCK.25
4.2.4 The SCK.26
4.2.4.1 SCK association for DMO use.27
4.2.4.1.1 DMO SCK subset grouping.27
4.2.5 The GSKO.30
4.2.5.1 SCK distribution to groups with OTAR.30
4.2.5.2 GCK distribution to groups with OTAR .30
4.2.5.3 Rules for MS response to group key distribution.31
4.2.6 Encrypted Short Identity (ESI) mechanism .31
4.2.7 Encryption Cipher Key.32
4.2.8 Summary of AI key management mechanisms.32
4.3 Service description and primitives .33
4.3.1 Authentication primitives.33
4.3.2 SCK transfer primitives .34
4.3.3 GCK transfer primitives.35
4.3.4 GSKO transfer primitives .36
4.4 Authentication protocol.37
4.4.1 Authentication state transitions.37
4.4.2 Authentication protocol sequences and operations .39
4.4.2.1 MSCs for authentication.40
4.4.2.2 MSCs for authentication Type-3 element .46
4.4.2.3 Control of authentication timer T354 at MS .49
4.5 OTAR protocols.50
4.5.1 CCK delivery - protocol functions.50
4.5.1.1 SwMI-initiated CCK provision .51
4.5.1.2 MS-initiated CCK provision with U-OTAR CCK demand.52
4.5.1.3 MS-initiated CCK provision with announced cell reselection .53
4.5.2 OTAR protocol functions - SCK .53
4.5.2.1 MS requests provision of SCK(s).54
4.5.2.2 SwMI provides SCK(s) to individual MS .55
4.5.2.3 SwMI provides SCK(s) to group of MSs .57
4.5.2.4 SwMI rejects provision of SCK .59
4.5.3 OTAR protocol functions - GCK.59
4.5.3.1 MS requests provision of GCK .59
ETSI
4 ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1 (2008-06)
4.5.3.2 SwMI provides GCK to an individual MS.61
4.5.3.3 SwMI provides GCK to a group of MSs.63
4.5.3.4 SwMI rejects provision of GCK.65
4.5.4 Cipher key association to group address.65
4.5.4.1 SCK association for DMO .66
4.5.4.2 GCK association.69
4.5.5 Notification of key change over the air.71
4.5.5.1 Change of DCK.73
4.5.5.2 Change of CCK.73
4.5.5.3 Change of GCK.73
4.5.5.4 Change of SCK for TMO.73
4.5.5.5 Change of SCK for DMO .74
4.5.5.6 Synchronization of Cipher Key Change.74
4.5.6 Security class change .74
4.5.6.1 Change of security class to security class 1 .75
4.5.6.2 Change of security class to security class 2 .75
4.5.6.3 Change of security class to security class 3 .75
4.5.6.4 Change of security class to security class 3 with GCK .76
4.5.7 Notification of key in use.76
4.5.8 Notification of GCK Activation/Deactivation .76
4.5.9 Deletion of SCK, GCK and GSKO.76
4.5.10 Air Interface Key Status Enquiry.78
4.5.11 Crypto management group.80
4.5.12 OTAR retry mechanism.81
4.5.13 OTAR protocol functions – GSKO.81
4.5.13.1 MS requests provision of GSKO.81
4.5.13.2 SwMI provides GSKO to an MS.82
4.5.13.3 SwMI rejects provision of GSKO .83
5 Enable and disable mechanism.83
5.1 General relationships.83
5.2 Enable/disable state transitions.84
5.3 Mechanisms.84
5.3.1 Disable of MS equipment .85
5.3.2 Disable of an subscription.85
5.3.3 Disable of subscription and equipment.85
5.3.4 Enable an MS equipment.85
5.3.5 Enable an MS subscription .85
5.3.6 Enable an MS equipment and subscription.85
5.4 Enable/disable protocol.86
5.4.1 General case.86
5.4.2 Status of cipher key material.87
5.4.2.1 Permanently disabled state.87
5.4.2.2 Temporarily disabled state .87
5.4.3 Specific protocol exchanges .88
5.4.3.1 Disabling an MS with mutual authentication .88
5.4.3.2 Enabling an MS with mutual authentication .90
5.4.3.3 Enabling an MS with non-mutual authentication.91
5.4.3.4 Disabling an MS with non-mutual authentication.92
5.4.4 Enabling an MS without authentication.93
5.4.5 Disabling an MS without authentication.94
5.4.6 Rejection of enable or disable command .94
5.4.6a Expiry of Enable/Disable protocol timer .95
5.4.7 MM service primitives.96
5.4.7.1 TNMM-DISABLING primitive.96
5.4.7.2 TNMM-ENABLING primitive.96
6 Air Interface (AI) encryption .96
6.1 General principles.96
6.2 Security class.97
6.2.0 Notification of security class .98
6.2.0.1 Security Class of Neighbouring Cells .98
ETSI
5 ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1 (2008-06)
6.2.0.2 Identification of MS security capabilities .99
6.2.1 Constraints on LA arising from cell class.99
6.3 Key Stream Generator (KSG) .99
6.3.1 KSG numbering and selection .99
6.3.2 Interface parameters.100
6.3.2.1 Initial Value (IV).100
6.3.2.2 Cipher Key.100
6.4 Encryption mechanism.101
6.4.1 Allocation of KSS to logical channels .101
6.4.2 Allocation of KSS to logical channels with PDU association .103
6.4.2.1 General.103
6.4.2.2 KSS allocation on phase modulation channels.103
6.4.2.3 KSS allocation on QAM channels .105
6.4.2.3.1 Fixed mapping.105
6.4.2.3.2 Offset mapping.106
6.4.3 Synchronization of data calls where data is multi-slot interleaved .107
6.4.4 Recovery of stolen frames from interleaved data .108
6.5 Use of cipher keys .108
6.5.1 Identification of encryption state of downlink MAC PDUs .109
6.5.1.1 Class 1 cells.109
6.5.1.2 Class 2 cells.110
6.5.1.3 Class 3 cells.110
6.5.2 Identification of encryption state of uplink MAC PDUs .110
6.6 Mobility procedures.111
6.6.1 General requirements.111
6.6.1.1 Additional requirements for class 3 systems.111
6.6.2 Protocol description.111
6.6.2.1 Negotiation of cipher parameters .111
6.6.2.1.1 Class 1 cells .112
6.6.2.1.2 Class 2 cells .112
6.6.2.1.3 Class 3 cells .112
6.6.2.2 Initial and undeclared cell re-selection.112
6.6.2.3 Unannounced cell re-selection .113
6.6.2.4 Announced cell re-selection type-3.114
6.6.2.5 Announced cell re-selection type-2.114
6.6.2.6 Announced cell re-selection type-1.114
6.6.2.7 Key forwarding.114
6.7 Encryption control.116
6.7.1 Data to be encrypted .116
6.7.1.1 Downlink control channel requirements .116
6.7.1.2 Encryption of MAC header elements.116
6.7.1.3 Traffic channel encryption control.116
6.7.1.4 Handling of PDUs that do not conform to negotiated ciphering mode .117
6.7.2 Service description and primitives.117
6.7.2.1 Mobility Management (MM) .118
6.7.2.2 Mobile Link Entity (MLE).118
6.7.2.3 Layer 2.120
6.7.3 Protocol functions.120
6.7.3.1 MM.120
6.7.3.2 MLE.120
6.7.3.3 LLC.120
6.7.3.4 MAC.121
6.7.4 PDUs for cipher negotiation .121
Annex A (normative): PDU and element definitions .122
A.1 Authentication PDUs.122
A.1.1 D-AUTHENTICATION demand.122
A.1.2 D-AUTHENTICATION reject.122
A.1.3 D-AUTHENTICATION response.123
A.1.4 D-AUTHENTICATION result.123
A.1.5 U-AUTHENTICATION demand.123
ETSI
6 ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1 (2008-06)
A.1.6 U-AUTHENTICATION reject.124
A.1.7 U-AUTHENTICATION response.124
A.1.8 U-AUTHENTICATION result.125
A.2 OTAR PDUs .125
A.2.1 D-OTAR CCK Provide .125
A.2.2 U-OTAR CCK Demand .125
A.2.3 U-OTAR CCK Result .126
A.2.4 D-OTAR GCK Provide.126
A.2.5 U-OTAR GCK Demand.127
A.2.6 U-OTAR GCK Result .128
A.2.6a D-OTAR GCK Reject .128
A.2.7 D-OTAR SCK Provide.129
A.2.8 U-OTAR SCK Demand.130
A.2.9 U-OTAR SCK Result.130
A.2.9a D-OTAR SCK Reject.131
A.2.10 D-OTAR GSKO Provide.131
A.2.11 U-OTAR GSKO Demand .132
A.2.12 U-OTAR GSKO Result.132
A.2.12a D-OTAR GSKO Reject.132
A.3 PDUs for key association to GTSI .133
A.3.1 D-OTAR KEY ASSOCIATE demand .133
A.3.2 U-OTAR KEY ASSOCIATE status.134
A.4 PDUs to synchronize key or security class change .134
A.4.1 D-CK CHANGE demand.134
A.4.2 U-CK CHANGE result.135
A.4a PDUs to delete air interface keys in MS .136
A.4a.1 D-OTAR KEY DELETE demand .136
A.4a.2 U-OTAR KEY DELETE result.137
A.4b PDUs to obtain Air Interface Key Status .138
A.4b.1 D-OTAR KEY STATUS demand .138
A.4b.2 U-OTAR KEY STATUS response.139
A.5 Other security domain PDUs.140
A.5.1 U-TEI PROVIDE.140
A.5.2 U-OTAR PREPARE.141
A.5.3 D-OTAR NEWCELL.141
A.5.4 D-OTAR CMG GTSI PROVIDE.141
A.5.5 U-OTAR CMG GTSI RESULT.142
A.6 PDUs for Enable and Disable.142
A.6.1 D-DISABLE.142
A.6.2 D-ENABLE.143
A.6.3 U-DISABLE STATUS.143
A.7 MM PDU type 3 information elements coding .144
A.7.1 Authentication downlink.144
A.7.2 Authentication uplink.144
A.8 PDU Information elements coding.145
A.8.1 Acknowledgement flag.145
A.8.2 Address extension.145
A.8.3 Authentication challenge.145
A.8.4 Authentication reject reason.145
A.8.5 Authentication result.146
A.8.6 Authentication sub-type.146
A.8.7 CCK identifier.146
A.8.8 CCK information.146
A.8.9 CCK Location area information .147
A.8.10 CCK request flag.147
A.8.11 Change of security class .147
ETSI
7 ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1 (2008-06)
A.8.12 Cipher parameters.148
A.8.13 CK provision flag.148
A.8.14 CK provisioning information .148
A.8.15 CK request flag.149
A.8.16 Class Change flag.149
A.8.17 DCK forwarding result.149
A.8.18 Disabling type.149
A.8.19 Enable/Disable result.150
A.8.20 Encryption mode.150
A.8.20.1 Class 1 cells .150
A.8.20.2 Class 2 cells .150
A.8.20.3 Class 3 cells .151
A.8.21 Equipment disable.151
A.8.22 Equipment enable.151
A.8.23 Equipment status.151
A.8.23a Explicit response.152
A.8.24 Frame number.152
A.8.25 Future key flag .152
A.8.26 GCK data.152
A.8.27 GCK key and identifier .152
A.8.28 GCK Number (GCKN) .153
A.8.28a GCK Provision result .153
A.8.28b GCK rejected.153
A.8.29 GCK select number .153
A.8.29a GCK Supported.154
A.8.30 GCK Version Number (GCK-VN).154
A.8.31 Group association.154
A.8.31a Group Identity Security Related Information.155
A.8.32 GSKO Version Number (GSKO-VN).155
A.8.33 GSSI.155
A.8.34 Hyperframe number .155
A.8.35 Intent/confirm.155
A.8.36 Void.156
A.8.37 Key association status .156
A.8.38 Key association type.156
A.8.39 Key change type .156
A.8.39a Key delete type.157
A.8.39b Key status type .157
A.8.40 Key type flag.157
A.8.41 KSG-number.158
A.8.42 Location area.158
A.8.43 Location area bit mask .
...

SLOVENSKI STANDARD
01-oktober-2008
Prizemni snopovni radio (TETRA) - Govor in podatki (V+D) - 7. del: Varnost
Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA) - Voice plus Data (V+D) - Part 7: Security
Ta slovenski standard je istoveten z: EN 300 392-7 Version 3.1.1
ICS:
33.070.10 Prizemni snopovni radio Terrestrial Trunked Radio
(TETRA) (TETRA)
2003-01.Slovenski inštitut za standardizacijo. Razmnoževanje celote ali delov tega standarda ni dovoljeno.

European Standard (Telecommunications series)

Terrestrial Trunked Radio (TETRA);
Voice plus Data (V+D);
Part 7: Security
2 ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1 (2008-06)

Reference
REN/TETRA-06173
Keywords
security, TETRA, V+D
ETSI
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Sous-Préfecture de Grasse (06) N° 7803/88

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The copyright and the foregoing restriction extend to reproduction in all media.

© European Telecommunications Standards Institute 2008.
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ETSI
3 ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1 (2008-06)
Contents
Intellectual Property Rights.10
Foreword.10
1 Scope.12
2 References.12
2.1 Normative references.13
2.2 Informative references.13
3 Definitions and abbreviations.13
3.1 Definitions.13
3.2 Abbreviations.16
4 Air Interface authentication and key management mechanisms .17
4.0 Security classes.18
4.1 Air interface authentication mechanisms .18
4.1.1 Overview.18
4.1.2 Authentication of an MS.19
4.1.3 Authentication of the infrastructure .19
4.1.4 Mutual authentication of MS and infrastructure .20
4.1.5 The authentication key.22
4.1.6 Equipment authentication.22
4.2 Air Interface key management mechanisms.23
4.2.1 The DCK.23
4.2.2 The GCK.24
4.2.3 The CCK.25
4.2.4 The SCK.26
4.2.4.1 SCK association for DMO use.27
4.2.4.1.1 DMO SCK subset grouping.27
4.2.5 The GSKO.30
4.2.5.1 SCK distribution to groups with OTAR.30
4.2.5.2 GCK distribution to groups with OTAR .30
4.2.5.3 Rules for MS response to group key distribution.31
4.2.6 Encrypted Short Identity (ESI) mechanism .31
4.2.7 Encryption Cipher Key.32
4.2.8 Summary of AI key management mechanisms.32
4.3 Service description and primitives .33
4.3.1 Authentication primitives.33
4.3.2 SCK transfer primitives .34
4.3.3 GCK transfer primitives.35
4.3.4 GSKO transfer primitives .36
4.4 Authentication protocol.37
4.4.1 Authentication state transitions.37
4.4.2 Authentication protocol sequences and operations .39
4.4.2.1 MSCs for authentication.40
4.4.2.2 MSCs for authentication Type-3 element .46
4.4.2.3 Control of authentication timer T354 at MS .49
4.5 OTAR protocols.50
4.5.1 CCK delivery - protocol functions.50
4.5.1.1 SwMI-initiated CCK provision .51
4.5.1.2 MS-initiated CCK provision with U-OTAR CCK demand.52
4.5.1.3 MS-initiated CCK provision with announced cell reselection .53
4.5.2 OTAR protocol functions - SCK .53
4.5.2.1 MS requests provision of SCK(s).54
4.5.2.2 SwMI provides SCK(s) to individual MS .55
4.5.2.3 SwMI provides SCK(s) to group of MSs .57
4.5.2.4 SwMI rejects provision of SCK .59
4.5.3 OTAR protocol functions - GCK.59
4.5.3.1 MS requests provision of GCK .59
ETSI
4 ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1 (2008-06)
4.5.3.2 SwMI provides GCK to an individual MS.61
4.5.3.3 SwMI provides GCK to a group of MSs.63
4.5.3.4 SwMI rejects provision of GCK.65
4.5.4 Cipher key association to group address.65
4.5.4.1 SCK association for DMO .66
4.5.4.2 GCK association.69
4.5.5 Notification of key change over the air.71
4.5.5.1 Change of DCK.73
4.5.5.2 Change of CCK.73
4.5.5.3 Change of GCK.73
4.5.5.4 Change of SCK for TMO.73
4.5.5.5 Change of SCK for DMO .74
4.5.5.6 Synchronization of Cipher Key Change.74
4.5.6 Security class change .74
4.5.6.1 Change of security class to security class 1 .75
4.5.6.2 Change of security class to security class 2 .75
4.5.6.3 Change of security class to security class 3 .75
4.5.6.4 Change of security class to security class 3 with GCK .76
4.5.7 Notification of key in use.76
4.5.8 Notification of GCK Activation/Deactivation .76
4.5.9 Deletion of SCK, GCK and GSKO.76
4.5.10 Air Interface Key Status Enquiry.78
4.5.11 Crypto management group.80
4.5.12 OTAR retry mechanism.81
4.5.13 OTAR protocol functions – GSKO.81
4.5.13.1 MS requests provision of GSKO.81
4.5.13.2 SwMI provides GSKO to an MS.82
4.5.13.3 SwMI rejects provision of GSKO .83
5 Enable and disable mechanism.83
5.1 General relationships.83
5.2 Enable/disable state transitions.84
5.3 Mechanisms.84
5.3.1 Disable of MS equipment .85
5.3.2 Disable of an subscription.85
5.3.3 Disable of subscription and equipment.85
5.3.4 Enable an MS equipment.85
5.3.5 Enable an MS subscription .85
5.3.6 Enable an MS equipment and subscription.85
5.4 Enable/disable protocol.86
5.4.1 General case.86
5.4.2 Status of cipher key material.87
5.4.2.1 Permanently disabled state.87
5.4.2.2 Temporarily disabled state .87
5.4.3 Specific protocol exchanges .88
5.4.3.1 Disabling an MS with mutual authentication .88
5.4.3.2 Enabling an MS with mutual authentication .90
5.4.3.3 Enabling an MS with non-mutual authentication.91
5.4.3.4 Disabling an MS with non-mutual authentication.92
5.4.4 Enabling an MS without authentication.93
5.4.5 Disabling an MS without authentication.94
5.4.6 Rejection of enable or disable command .94
5.4.6a Expiry of Enable/Disable protocol timer .95
5.4.7 MM service primitives.96
5.4.7.1 TNMM-DISABLING primitive.96
5.4.7.2 TNMM-ENABLING primitive.96
6 Air Interface (AI) encryption .96
6.1 General principles.96
6.2 Security class.97
6.2.0 Notification of security class .98
6.2.0.1 Security Class of Neighbouring Cells .98
ETSI
5 ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1 (2008-06)
6.2.0.2 Identification of MS security capabilities .99
6.2.1 Constraints on LA arising from cell class.99
6.3 Key Stream Generator (KSG) .99
6.3.1 KSG numbering and selection .99
6.3.2 Interface parameters.100
6.3.2.1 Initial Value (IV).100
6.3.2.2 Cipher Key.100
6.4 Encryption mechanism.101
6.4.1 Allocation of KSS to logical channels .101
6.4.2 Allocation of KSS to logical channels with PDU association .103
6.4.2.1 General.103
6.4.2.2 KSS allocation on phase modulation channels.103
6.4.2.3 KSS allocation on QAM channels .105
6.4.2.3.1 Fixed mapping.105
6.4.2.3.2 Offset mapping.106
6.4.3 Synchronization of data calls where data is multi-slot interleaved .107
6.4.4 Recovery of stolen frames from interleaved data .108
6.5 Use of cipher keys .108
6.5.1 Identification of encryption state of downlink MAC PDUs .109
6.5.1.1 Class 1 cells.109
6.5.1.2 Class 2 cells.110
6.5.1.3 Class 3 cells.110
6.5.2 Identification of encryption state of uplink MAC PDUs .110
6.6 Mobility procedures.111
6.6.1 General requirements.111
6.6.1.1 Additional requirements for class 3 systems.111
6.6.2 Protocol description.111
6.6.2.1 Negotiation of cipher parameters .111
6.6.2.1.1 Class 1 cells .112
6.6.2.1.2 Class 2 cells .112
6.6.2.1.3 Class 3 cells .112
6.6.2.2 Initial and undeclared cell re-selection.112
6.6.2.3 Unannounced cell re-selection .113
6.6.2.4 Announced cell re-selection type-3.114
6.6.2.5 Announced cell re-selection type-2.114
6.6.2.6 Announced cell re-selection type-1.114
6.6.2.7 Key forwarding.114
6.7 Encryption control.116
6.7.1 Data to be encrypted .116
6.7.1.1 Downlink control channel requirements .116
6.7.1.2 Encryption of MAC header elements.116
6.7.1.3 Traffic channel encryption control.116
6.7.1.4 Handling of PDUs that do not conform to negotiated ciphering mode .117
6.7.2 Service description and primitives.117
6.7.2.1 Mobility Management (MM) .118
6.7.2.2 Mobile Link Entity (MLE).118
6.7.2.3 Layer 2.120
6.7.3 Protocol functions.120
6.7.3.1 MM.120
6.7.3.2 MLE.120
6.7.3.3 LLC.120
6.7.3.4 MAC.121
6.7.4 PDUs for cipher negotiation .121
Annex A (normative): PDU and element definitions .122
A.1 Authentication PDUs.122
A.1.1 D-AUTHENTICATION demand.122
A.1.2 D-AUTHENTICATION reject.122
A.1.3 D-AUTHENTICATION response.123
A.1.4 D-AUTHENTICATION result.123
A.1.5 U-AUTHENTICATION demand.123
ETSI
6 ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1 (2008-06)
A.1.6 U-AUTHENTICATION reject.124
A.1.7 U-AUTHENTICATION response.124
A.1.8 U-AUTHENTICATION result.125
A.2 OTAR PDUs .125
A.2.1 D-OTAR CCK Provide .125
A.2.2 U-OTAR CCK Demand .125
A.2.3 U-OTAR CCK Result .126
A.2.4 D-OTAR GCK Provide.126
A.2.5 U-OTAR GCK Demand.127
A.2.6 U-OTAR GCK Result .128
A.2.6a D-OTAR GCK Reject .128
A.2.7 D-OTAR SCK Provide.129
A.2.8 U-OTAR SCK Demand.130
A.2.9 U-OTAR SCK Result.130
A.2.9a D-OTAR SCK Reject.131
A.2.10 D-OTAR GSKO Provide.131
A.2.11 U-OTAR GSKO Demand .132
A.2.12 U-OTAR GSKO Result.132
A.2.12a D-OTAR GSKO Reject.132
A.3 PDUs for key association to GTSI .133
A.3.1 D-OTAR KEY ASSOCIATE demand .133
A.3.2 U-OTAR KEY ASSOCIATE status.134
A.4 PDUs to synchronize key or security class change .134
A.4.1 D-CK CHANGE demand.134
A.4.2 U-CK CHANGE result.135
A.4a PDUs to delete air interface keys in MS .136
A.4a.1 D-OTAR KEY DELETE demand .136
A.4a.2 U-OTAR KEY DELETE result.137
A.4b PDUs to obtain Air Interface Key Status .138
A.4b.1 D-OTAR KEY STATUS demand .138
A.4b.2 U-OTAR KEY STATUS response.139
A.5 Other security domain PDUs.140
A.5.1 U-TEI PROVIDE.140
A.5.2 U-OTAR PREPARE.141
A.5.3 D-OTAR NEWCELL.141
A.5.4 D-OTAR CMG GTSI PROVIDE.141
A.5.5 U-OTAR CMG GTSI RESULT.142
A.6 PDUs for Enable and Disable.142
A.6.1 D-DISABLE.142
A.6.2 D-ENABLE.143
A.6.3 U-DISABLE STATUS.143
A.7 MM PDU type 3 information elements coding .144
A.7.1 Authentication downlink.144
A.7.2 Authentication uplink.144
A.8 PDU Information elements coding.145
A.8.1 Acknowledgement flag.145
A.8.2 Address extension.145
A.8.3 Authentication challenge.145
A.8.4 Authentication reject reason.145
A.8.5 Authentication result.146
A.8.6 Authentication sub-type.146
A.8.7 CCK identifier.146
A.8.8 CCK information.146
A.8.9 CCK Location area information .147
A.8.10 CCK request flag.147
A.8.11 Change of security class .147
ETSI
7 ETSI EN 300 392-7 V3.1.1 (2008-06)
A.8.12 Cipher parameters.148
A.8.13 CK provision flag.148
A.8.14 CK provisioning information .148
A.8.15 CK request flag.149
A.8.16 Class Change flag.149
A.8.17 DCK forwarding result.149
A.8.18 Disabling type.149
A.8.19 Enable/Disable result.150
A.8.20 Encryption mode.150
A.8.20.1 Class 1 cells .150
A.8.20.2 Class 2 cells .150
A.8.20.3 Class 3 cells .151
A.8.21 Equipment disable.151
A.8.22 Equipment enable.151
A.8.23 Equipment status.151
A.8.23a Explicit response.152
A.8.24 Frame number.152
A.8.25 Future key flag .152
A.8.26 GCK data.152
A.8.27 GCK key and identifier .152
A.8.28 GCK Number (GCKN) .153
A.8.28a GCK Provision result .153
A.8.28b GCK rejected.153
A.8.29 GCK select number .153
A.8.29a GCK Supported.154
A.8.30 GCK Version Number (GCK-VN).154
A.8.31 Group association.154
A.8.31a Group Identity Security Related Information.155
A.8.32 GSKO Version Number (GSKO-VN).155
A.8.33 GSSI.155
A.8.34 Hyperframe number .155
A.8.35 Intent/confirm.155
A.8.36 Void.156
A.8.37 Key association status .156
A.8.38 Key association type.156
A.8.39 Key change type .156
A.8.39a Key delete type.
...