ASTM C1309-97(2021)
(Practice)Standard Practice for Performance Evaluation of In-Plant Walk-Through Metal Detectors (Withdrawn 2023)
Standard Practice for Performance Evaluation of In-Plant Walk-Through Metal Detectors (Withdrawn 2023)
SIGNIFICANCE AND USE
7.1 Walk-through metal detectors are an effective and unobtrusive means for searching for concealed metallic weapons and SNM (special nuclear material) shielding material. The detectors are generally applied to prevent the unauthorized entry of weapons into facilities, and theft or unauthorized removal of SNM. Daily functional testing of metal detectors shows that they are operating and will produce the correct alarm signal; the significant use of less frequent in-plant evaluations provides data from which to determine if detectors are operating at expected performance levels.
7.2 This practice provides a system of procedures for evaluating the detection performance of walk-through metal detectors.
7.3 The procedures specify data to be recorded and used for establishing, tracking, and auditing metal detector performance and operation.
7.4 This practice suggests documentation for maintaining performance records. Appendix X4 provides examples of forms for recording and tracking detector operation and performance testing.
SCOPE
1.1 This practice is one of several (see Appendix X1) developed to assist operators of nuclear facilities with meeting the metal detection performance requirements set by regulatory authorities.
1.2 This practice consists of four procedures useful for evaluating the in-plant performance of walk-through metal detectors (see Fig. 1).
FIG. 1 Walk-through Metal Detector Evaluation Testing Program
Note 1: The number of detection sensitivity verification tests in a series, the number of passes per test, the acceptance criteria, and the frequency may be established by regulatory authority or set by the security organization based on threat scenarios or vulnerability assessments; the numbers should be sufficient to provide a degree of assurance commensurate with the detector application.
Note 2: If the detector fails to meet the acceptance criteria, the verification series is terminated. The detector then must be tested to reestablish the probability of detection. If the probability of detection requirement cannot be met (repairs may be necessary), the detector must be mapped and the operational sensitivity setting reestablished. Performance testing can then be resumed starting with a new detection sensitivity test.
Note 3: If the detector fails the functional test, the detector must be immediately removed from service (see Appendix X1).
1.2.1 Two of the procedures provide data for evaluating probability of detection. These procedures use binomial data (alarm/not alarm).
1.2.1.1 The detection sensitivity test (DST; see Note 1) is the initial procedure in the detection probability evaluation series. It is used to establish the probability of detection immediately after the detector has been adjusted to its operational sensitivity setting.
Note 1: The DST is one of two procedures used to evaluate detection rate. The Detection Sensitivity Verification Test (DSVT) is the other. In the evaluation test strategy, the DST is used to initially determine and document the detection rate and then the DSVT is used to periodically check that the detection rate continues to meet the requirements.
1.2.1.2 The detection sensitivity verification test (DSVT; see Note 1) procedure periodically provides data for evaluation of continuing detection performance.
1.2.2 The third procedure is a “functional test.” It is used routinely to verify that a metal detector is operating and responds with the correct audio and visual signals when subjected to a condition that should cause an alarm.
1.2.3 The fourth procedure is used to verify that alarms generated during detection sensitivity testing were likely the result of the detection of metal and not caused by outside interferences or the perturbation of the detection field by the tester's body mass.
1.2.3.1 This procedure also can be used to establish a probability of occurrence for false alarms, for example, 20 test ...
General Information
Standards Content (Sample)
NOTICE: This standard has either been superseded and replaced by a new version or withdrawn.
Contact ASTM International (www.astm.org) for the latest information
Designation: C1309 − 97 (Reapproved 2021)
Standard Practice for
Performance Evaluation of In-Plant Walk-Through Metal
Detectors
This standard is issued under the fixed designation C1309; the number immediately following the designation indicates the year of
original adoption or, in the case of revision, the year of last revision. A number in parentheses indicates the year of last reapproval. A
superscript epsilon (´) indicates an editorial change since the last revision or reapproval.
INTRODUCTION
Nuclear regulatory authorities require personnel entering designated security areas to be screened
for concealed weapons and personnel exiting areas containing specified quantities of special nuclear
material to be screened for metallic nuclear shielding materials. Portal-type walk-through metal
detectors are widely used to implement these requirements. This practice provides guidelines for
evaluating the in-plant performance of walk-through metal detectors.
1. Scope 1.2.3 The fourth procedure is used to verify that alarms
generated during detection sensitivity testing were likely the
1.1 This practice is one of several (see Appendix X1)
result of the detection of metal and not caused by outside
developed to assist operators of nuclear facilities with meeting
interferences or the perturbation of the detection field by the
the metal detection performance requirements set by regulatory
tester’s body mass.
authorities.
1.2.3.1 This procedure also can be used to establish a
1.2 This practice consists of four procedures useful for
probability of occurrence for false alarms, for example, 20 test
evaluating the in-plant performance of walk-through metal
passes by a clean-tester resulting in no alarms indicates a false
detectors (see Fig. 1).
alarm probability of less than 0.15 at 95 % confidence. This
1.2.1 Two of the procedures provide data for evaluating
procedure is optional unless required by the regulatory author-
probability of detection. These procedures use binomial data
ity.
(alarm/not alarm).
1.3 This practice does not set test object specifications. The
1.2.1.1 The detection sensitivity test (DST; see Note 1) is
specifications should be issued by the regulatory authority.
the initial procedure in the detection probability evaluation
series. It is used to establish the probability of detection 1.4 This practice is intended neither to set performance
immediately after the detector has been adjusted to its opera- levels nor to limit or constrain technologies.
tional sensitivity setting.
1.5 This practice does not address safety or operational
issues associated with the use of walk-through metal detectors.
NOTE 1—The DST is one of two procedures used to evaluate detection
rate. The Detection Sensitivity Verification Test (DSVT) is the other. In the
1.6 This international standard was developed in accor-
evaluation test strategy, the DST is used to initially determine and
dance with internationally recognized principles on standard-
document the detection rate and then the DSVT is used to periodically
ization established in the Decision on Principles for the
check that the detection rate continues to meet the requirements.
Development of International Standards, Guides and Recom-
1.2.1.2 The detection sensitivity verification test (DSVT;
mendations issued by the World Trade Organization Technical
see Note 1) procedure periodically provides data for evaluation
Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee.
of continuing detection performance.
1.2.2 The third procedure is a “functional test.” It is used
2. Referenced Documents
routinely to verify that a metal detector is operating and
2.1 ASTM Standards:
responds with the correct audio and visual signals when
C1238 Guide for Installation of Walk-Through Metal Detec-
subjected to a condition that should cause an alarm.
tors
This practice is under the jurisdiction of ASTM Committee F12 on Security
Systems and Equipment and is the direct responsibility of Subcommittee F12.60 on
Controlled Access Security, Search, and Screening Equipment. For referenced ASTM standards, visit the ASTM website, www.astm.org, or
Current edition approved Jan. 1, 2021. Published February 2021. Originally contact ASTM Customer Service at service@astm.org. For Annual Book of ASTM
approved in 1995. Last previous edition approved in 2012 as C1309 – 97 (2012). Standards volume information, refer to the standard’s Document Summary page on
DOI: 10.1520/C1309-97R21. the ASTM website.
Copyright © ASTM International, 100 Barr Harbor Drive, PO Box C700, West Conshohocken, PA 19428-2959. United States
C1309 − 97 (2021)
NOTE 1—The number of detection sensitivity verification tests in a series, the number of passes per test, the acceptance criteria, and the frequency may
be established by regulatory authority or set by the security organization based on threat scenarios or vulnerability assessments; the numbers should be
sufficient to provide a degree of assurance commensurate with the detector application.
NOTE 2—If the detector fails to meet the acceptance criteria, the verification series is terminated. The detector then must be tested to reestablish the
probability of detection. If the probability of detection requirement cannot be met (repairs may be necessary), the detector must be mapped and the
operational sensitivity setting reestablished. Performance testing can then be resumed starting with a new detection sensitivity test.
NOTE 3—If the detector fails the functional test, the detector must be immediately removed from service (see Appendix X1).
FIG. 1 Walk-through Metal Detector Evaluation Testing Program
C1309 − 97 (2021)
C1269 Practice for Adjusting Operational Sensitivity Setting
of In-Plant Walk-Through Metal Detectors
C1270 Practice for Detection Sensitivity Mapping of In-
Plant Walk-Through Metal Detectors
F1468 Practice for Evaluation of Metallic Weapons Detec-
tors for Controlled Access Search and Screening
3. Terminology
3.1 Definitions of Terms Specific to This Standard:
3.1.1 clean-tester, n—a person who does not carry any
extraneous metallic objects that would significantly alter the
signal produced when the person carries a test object.
3.1.1.1 Discussion—By example but not limitation, such
extraneous metallic objects may include: metallic belt buckles,
metal buttons, cardiac pacemakers, coins, metal frame
eyeglasses, hearing aids, jewelry, keys, mechanical pens and
pencils, shoes with metal shanks or arch supports, metallic
surgical implants, undergarment support metal, metal zippers,
etc. In the absence of other criteria, a clean-tester passing
through a metal detector shall not cause a disturbance signal NOTE 1—Numbers are sensitivity setting values for a hypothetical
detector. The numbers represent the lowest sensitivity setting at which the
greater than 10 % of that produced when carrying the critical
object was detected ten out of ten consecutive test passes through the
test object through the detector. Test objects requiring very
indicated test path.
high sensitivity settings for detection require more complete
FIG. 3 Example of Detection Sensitivity Map
elimination of extraneous metal to obtain less than 10 % signal
disturbance. The tester shall have a weight between 50 and 104
kg and a height between 1.44 and 1.93 m. Should a given
detector be sensitive to body size because of design or desired
3.1.2.2 Discussion—The term critical orientation can be
sensitivity, the physical size of testers should be smaller and
applied in two ways. Critical orientation can refer to the worst
within a narrower range. It is recommended that the clean-
case orthogonal orientation in a single test path or the worst
tester be surveyed with a high sensitivity hand-held metal
case orthogonal orientation for all the test paths (the entire
detector to ensure that no metal is present.
detection zone). The two are coincident in the critical test path.
3.1.2 critical orientation, n—the orthogonal orientation of a
3.1.3 critical sensitivity setting, n—the lowest sensitivity
test object that produces the smallest detection signal or
setting of a detector at which the critical test object in its
weakest detection anywhere in the detection zone; the orthogo-
critical orientation is consistently detected (ten alarms out of
nal orientation of a test object that requires a higher sensitivity
ten passages) when passed through the detection zone on the
setting to be detected compared to the sensitivity settings
critical test path.
required to detect the object in all other orthogonal orienta-
3.1.4 critical test element, n—see test element.
tions; see Fig. 2 for handgun orientations.
3.1.2.1 Discussion—Critical orientations are determined by 3.1.5 critical test object, n—the one test object out of any
testing using a mapping procedure such as described in given group of test objects that, in its critical orientation,
produces the weakest detection signal anywhere in the detec-
Practice C1270(see 3.1.21 and Fig. 3).
tion zone.
3.1.5.1 Discussion—The group referred to consists of one or
more objects that are to be detected at the same detector
setting.
3.1.5.2 Discussion—Depending on the particular detector,
some orientation-sensitive test objects may have different
critical orientations through different test paths in the detection
zone. Hence, care must be taken in determining the critical test
object, its critical orientation, and the critical test path.
3.1.6 critical test path, n—the straight-line shortest-course
path through the portal aperture, as defined by an element on
the detection sensitivity map, that produces the smallest
detection signal or weakest detection for a test object in its
critical orientation (see Fig. 4 and Fig. 2).
3.1.7 detection sensitivity map, n—a depiction of the grid
used to define test paths through the detection zone, with each
FIG. 2 Six Standard Orthogonal Orientations for a Handgun element of the grid containing a value, usually the sensitivity
C1309 − 97 (2021)
3.1.16.2 Discussion—A functional test object will consis-
tently cause metal detection alarms when a detector is adjusted
to detect the critical test object in its critical orientation passing
through the critical test path. Detection of the functional test
object does not provide assurance that the detector is operating
properly or adjusted to detect anything other than the func-
tional test object.
3.1.16.3 Discussion—Functional test objects may be items
such as large handguns or rifles, metal tools, metal blocks, a
person wearing many metallic items, etc. Active devices such
as radios and pagers must not be used as functional test objects
and must not be carried when performing tests. The functional
test object must be at least as detectable as the critical test
object in its critical orientation.
3.1.17 grid, n—see test grid
3.1.18 grid element, n—(1) a single block on a detection
sensitivity map, (2) the rectilinear volume through the detec-
tion zone defined by coincident elements of identical grid
works placed on either side of the portal aperture; see Figs. 3
and 4.
3.1.18.1 Discussion—Grid elements define the bounds of
FIG. 4 3-D View of Detection Zones and Test Grid
repeatable straight-line shortest-course paths through the de-
tection zone (see Fig. 4).
3.1.19 in-plant, adj—installed in the location, position, and
setting of the detector, that is indicative of the detectability of operating environment where the device will be routinely used.
the test object (see Fig. 3 and Appendix X2).
3.1.20 normal screening method, n—the usual method of
3.1.7.1 Discussion—These values are relative and describe
passage through a walk-through metal detector during normal
the detection sensitivity pattern within the detection zone for
operations. For example, the two basic screening methods are
the specific test object. The values are derived by identically
“continuous walk” and “pausing in the portal.”
testing each defined test path using a specific test object in a
3.1.20.1 Discussion—The normal screening method is usu-
single orthogonal orientation. The value is usually the mini-
ally based on the operating characteristics of the detector. A
mum sensitivity setting of the detector that will cause a
basic rule for metal detector testing is “use it like you test it and
consistent alarm. (Ten out of ten test passes when the test
test it like you use it.”
object is passed through the detection field. Appendix X2 is a
sample form for a potential detection sensitivity map configu- 3.1.21 orthogonal orientation, n—as used in this practice,
ration). orthogonal orientation refers to alignment of the longitudinal
(long) axis of a test object along the XYZ axes of the Cartesian
3.1.8 detection sensitivity test, n—see 6.2.
coordinate system; X is horizontal and across the portal; Y is
3.1.9 detection sensitivity verification test, n—see 6.3.
vertical; and Z is in the direction of travel through the portal;
3.1.10 detection zone, n—the volume within the portal
see Fig. 2 for handgun orientations)
aperture.
3.1.21.1 In the case of firearms, the barrel is always treated
3.1.11 detector, n—see walk-through metal detector.
as the longitudinal axis. Fig. 2 illustrates the six standard
orthogonal orientations for a handgun.
3.1.12 element, n—see test element.
3.1.22 performance test log, n—a record of the operation,
3.1.13 event false alarm, n—an alarm occurring when a
testing, and maintenance history of a metal detector.
clean-tester, while not carrying a test object, passes through the
3.1.22.1 Discussion—Appendix X4, Performance Test Log,
detection zone of a detector operating at the operational
suggests examples for log content and format.
sensitivity setting.
3.1.14 event false alarm test, n—see 6.4. 3.1.23 portal, n—see walk-through metal detector.
3.1.15 functional test, n—see 6.1.
3.1.24 shielding test object, n—a test object representing
special nuclear material shielding that might be used in a theft
3.1.16 functional test object, n—a metallic item that does
scenario.
not necessarily have strict criteria defining its size, form,
weight, or composition. 3.1.24.1 Discussion—It is usually a metallic container or
3.1.16.1 Discussion—Functional test objects do not test metallic material configured as a credible gamma radiation
sensitivity; they are gross stimuli used frequently to quickly shield for a specific type and quantity of special nuclear
verify that the aural and visual indicators and alarm circuits are material. The object is specified by a regulatory authority or is
operable. based on the facility threat/risk assessment, or both
C130
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