EN 419211-3:2013
(Main)Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 3: Device with key import
Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 3: Device with key import
This European Standard specifies a protection profile for a secure signature creation device with signing keys import possibility: SSCD with key import (SSCD KI).
Schutzprofile für sichere Signaturerstellungseinheiten - Teil 3: Einheiten mit Schlüsselimport
Diese Europäische Norm legt ein Schutzprofil für eine sichere Signaturerstellungseinheit, mit der Möglichkeit Signaturschlüssel zu importieren, fest: SSCD mit Schlüsselimport.
Profils de protection des dispositifs sécurisés de création de signature - Partie 3: Dispositif avec import de clé
La présente Norme européenne spécifie un profil de protection pour un dispositif sécurisé de création de signature avec possibilité d'import de clés de signature : SSCD avec import de clé (SSCD KI).
Profil zaščite sredstva za varno elektronsko podpisovanje - 3. del: Sredstvo z vnosom ključa
General Information
Standards Content (Sample)
2003-01.Slovenski inštitut za standardizacijo. Razmnoževanje celote ali delov tega standarda ni dovoljeno.Schutzprofile für Sichere Signaturerstellungseinheiten - Teil 3: Einheiten mit SchlüsselimportProfils de protection pour dispositif sécurisé de création de signature électronique - Partie 3: Dispositif avec import de cléProtection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 3: Device with key import35.100.05UHãLWYHMultilayer applications35.040Nabori znakov in kodiranje informacijCharacter sets and information coding03.160Pravo. UpravaLaw. AdministrationICS:Ta slovenski standard je istoveten z:EN 419211-3:2013SIST EN 419211-3:2014en,de01-marec-2014SIST EN 419211-3:2014SLOVENSKI
STANDARD
EUROPEAN STANDARD NORME EUROPÉENNE EUROPÄISCHE NORM
EN 419211-3
October 2013 ICS 03.160; 35.040; 35.240.15 Supersedes CWA 14169:2004English Version
Protection profiles for secure signature creation device - Part 3: Device with key import
Profils de protection des dispositifs sécurisés de création de signature - Partie 3: Dispositif avec import de clé
Schutzprofile für sichere Signaturerstellungseinheiten - Teil 3: Einheiten mit Schlüsselimport This European Standard was approved by CEN on 14 September 2013.
CEN members are bound to comply with the CEN/CENELEC Internal Regulations which stipulate the conditions for giving this European Standard the status of a national standard without any alteration. Up-to-date lists and bibliographical references concerning such national standards may be obtained on application to the CEN-CENELEC Management Centre or to any CEN member.
This European Standard exists in three official versions (English, French, German). A version in any other language made by translation under the responsibility of a CEN member into its own language and notified to the CEN-CENELEC Management Centre has the same status as the official versions.
CEN members are the national standards bodies of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and United Kingdom.
EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR STANDARDIZATION
COMITÉ EUROPÉEN DE NORMALISATION EUROPÄISCHES KOMITEE FÜR NORMUNG
CEN-CENELEC Management Centre:
Avenue Marnix 17,
B-1000 Brussels © 2013 CEN All rights of exploitation in any form and by any means reserved worldwide for CEN national Members. Ref. No. EN 419211-3:2013 ESIST EN 419211-3:2014
Introduction This series of European Standards specifies Common Criteria protection profiles for secure signature creation devices and is issued by the European Committee for Standardization, Information Society Standardization System (CEN/ISSS) as update of the Electronic Signatures (E-SIGN) CEN/ISSS workshop agreement (CWA) 14169:2004, Annex B and Annex C on the protection profile secure signature creation devices, "EAL 4+". This series of European Standards consists of the following parts: − Protection profiles for secure signature creation device — Part 1: Overview; − Protection profiles for secure signature creation device — Part 2: Device with key generation; − Protection profiles for secure signature creation device — Part 3: Device with key import; − Protection profiles for secure signature creation device — Part 4: Extension for device with key
generation and trusted channel to certificate generation application; − Protection profiles for secure signature creation device — Part 5: Extension for device with key
generation and trusted channel to signature creation application; − Protection profiles for secure signature creation device — Part 6: Extension for device with key
import and trusted channel to signature creation application.
Preparation of this document as a protection profile (PP) follows the rules of the Common Criteria version 3.1 [2], [3] and [4]. SIST EN 419211-3:2014
prEN 14169-1:2011, Protection profiles for secure signature creation device — Part 1: Overview 3 Terms and definitions For the purposes of this document, the acronyms, terms and definitions given in prEN 14169-1:2011 apply. 4 PP introduction 4.1 PP reference Title: Protection profiles for secure signature creation device — Part 3: Device with key import Version: 1.0.2 Author: CEN / CENELEC (TC224/WG17) Publication date:
2012-07-24 Registration: BSI-CC-PP-0075 CC version: 3.1 Revision 3 Editor: Arnold Abromeit, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH General status:
final Keywords: secure signature creation device, electronic signature, digital signature, key import 4.2 PP overview This Protection Profile is established by CEN as a European Standard for products to create electronic signatures. It fulfils requirements of Directive1 1999/93/ec of the European parliament and of the council of 13 December 1999 on a community framework for electronic signatures. In accordance with article 9 of this European Directive this standard can be indicated by the European commission in the Official Journal of the European Communities as generally recognised standard for electronic signature products. This protection profile defines security functional requirements and security assurance requirements that comply with those defined in Annex III of the Directive for a secure signature creation device (SSCD). This secure signature creation device is the target of evaluation (TOE) for this protection profile.
1 This European Directive is referred to in this PP as “the directive”. SIST EN 419211-3:2014
An SSCD that can import SCD/SVD was defined in the previous version of this PP (CWA 14169) as a Type 2 SSCD. The notion of types does not exist anymore in this series of ENs. In order to refer to the same functionality, a reference to EN 419211-3 (i.e. Part 3) should be used. SIST EN 419211-3:2014
3 At a pure functional level the SSCD creates a digital signature; for an implementation of the SSCD, in that meeting the requirements of this PP and with the key certificate created as specified in the Directive, Annex I, the result of the signing process can be used as to create a qualified electronic signature. SIST EN 419211-3:2014
Figure 1 - Example of TOE lifecycle4 The development phase comprises the development and production of the TOE. The development phase is subject of the evaluation according to the assurance lifecycle (ALC) class. The development phase ends with the delivery of the TOE to the SSCD-provisioning service. The operational usage of the TOE comprises the preparation stage and the operational use stage. The TOE operational use stage begins when the signatory has obtained both the VAD and the TOE. Enabling the TOE for signing requires at least one set of SCD stored in its memory. Figure 1 shows an example of the lifecycle where an SCD or SCD/SVD pair is imported from SSCD-provisioning service before delivery to the signatory. The lifecycle may allow import of SCD or SCD/SVD key pairs after delivery to the signatory as well.
4 The asterisks * mark the optional import of the SVD and certificate info during TOE preparation and certificate info deletion when SCD is destroyed. SIST EN 419211-3:2014
Please take note that verifying whether the claimed identity of the signer originates from that given SSCD has to be done by the CSP operating the CGA. If the TOE is used for creation of advanced electronic signatures, the certificate links the signature verification data to the person (i.e. the signatory) and confirms the identity of that person (cf. [1], article 2, Clause 9).
This PP requires the TOE to provide mechanisms for import of SCD, implementation of the SCD and personalisation. The environment is assumed to protect all other processes for TOE preparation like SCD transfer between the SCD/SVD generation device and the TOE, and SVD transfer between the SCD/SVD generation device and the CGA. The CSP may export the SVD to the TOE for internal use by the TOE (e.g., self-test). Before generating a (qualified) certificate, the CSP is expected to first store the SCD in a SSCD. A secure channel with the TOE may be used to support this, by ensuring integrity of the SCD during transmission to the TOE. 4.3.3.3 Operational use stage In this lifecycle stage the signatory can use the TOE to create advanced electronic signatures. The operational phase of the TOE starts when at least one SCD/SVD pair is generated by the CSP and the SCD is imported into the SSCD and when the signatory takes control over the TOE and makes the SCD operational. The signatory uses the TOE with a trustworthy SCA in a secured environment only. The SCA is assumed to protect the DTBS/R during the transmission to the TOE. SIST EN 419211-3:2014
5 The certificate request in this case will contain the name of the signatory as the requester, as for instance it may be signed by the signatory’s existing SCD. SIST EN 419211-3:2014
Storing, copying and releasing of the signature creation data An attacker stores or copies the SCD outside the TOE. An attacker can obtain the SCD during generation, storage and use for signature creation in the TOE. 6.2.2 T.SCD_Derive
Derive the signature creation data An attacker derives the SCD from publicly known data, such as SVD corresponding to the SCD or signatures created by means of the SCD or any other data exported outside the TOE, which is a threat against the secrecy of the SCD. 6.2.3 T.Hack_Phys
Physical attacks through the TOE interfaces SIST EN 419211-3:2014
Misuse of the signature creation function of the TOE An attacker misuses the signature creation function of the TOE to create SDO for data the signatory has not decided to sign. The TOE is subject to deliberate attacks by experts possessing a high attack potential with advanced knowledge of security principles and concepts employed by the TOE. 6.2.6 T.DTBS_Forgery Forgery of the DTBS/R An attacker modifies the DTBS/R sent by the SCA. Thus the DTBS/R used by the TOE for signing does not match the DTBS the signatory intended to sign. 6.2.7 T.Sig_Forgery
Forgery of the electronic signature An attacker forges a signed data object, maybe using an electronic signature which has been created by the TOE, and the violation of the integrity of the signed data object is not detectable by the signatory or by third parties. The signature created by the TOE is subject to deliberate attacks by experts possessing a high attack potential with advanced knowledge of security principles and concepts employed by the TOE. 6.3 Organisational security policies 6.3.1 P.CSP_QCert
Qualified certificate The CSP uses a trustworthy CGA to generate a qualified certificate or non-qualified certificate (cf. the Directive, article 2, Clause 9, and Annex I) for the SVD. The certificates contain at least the name of the signatory and the SVD matching the SCD implemented in the TOE under sole control of the signatory. The CSP ensures that the use of the TOE as SSCD is evident with signatures through the certificate or other publicly available information. 6.3.2 P.QSign
Qualified electronic signatures The signatory uses a signature creation system to sign data with an advanced electronic signature (cf. the Directive, article 1, Clause 2), which is a qualified electronic signature if it is based on a valid qualified certificate (according to the Directive Annex I)6. The DTBS are presented to the signatory and sent by the SCA as DTBS/R to the SSCD. The SSCD creates the electronic signature created with a SCD implemented in the SSCD that the signatory maintain under their sole control and is linked to the DTBS/R in such a manner that any subsequent change of the data is detectable. 6.3.3 P.Sigy_SSCD
TOE as secure signature creation device The TOE meets the requirements for an SSCD laid down in Annex III of the Directive [1]. This implies the SCD is used for digital signature creation under sole control of the signatory and the SCD can practically occur only once.
It is a non-qualified advanced electronic signature if it is based on a non-qualified certificate for the SVD. SIST EN 419211-3:2014
Trustworthy certificate generation application The CGA protects the authenticity of the signatory’s name or pseudonym and the SVD in the (qualified) certificate by an advanced electronic signature of the CSP. 6.4.2 A.SCA
Trustworthy signature creation application The signatory uses only a trustworthy SCA. The SCA generates and sends the DTBS/R of the data the signatory wishes to sign in a form appropriate for signing by the TOE. 6.4.3 A.CSP
Secure SCD/SVD management by CSP The CSP uses only a trustworthy SCD/SVD generation device and ensures that this device can be used by authorised user only. The CSP ensures that the SCD generated practically occurs only once, that generated SCD and SVD actually correspond to each other and that SCD cannot be derived from the SVD. The CSP ensures the confidentiality of the SCD during generation and export to the TOE, does not use the SCD for creation of any signature and irreversibly deletes the SCD in the operational environment after export to the TOE. 7 Security objectives 7.1 Security objectives for the TOE 7.1.1 Relation to PP SSCD KG Security objectives for the TOE in this PP, which are identically stated in the PP SSCD KG, are OT.Lifecycle_Security, OT.SCD_Secrecy, OT.Sig_Secure, OT.Sigy_SigF, OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE, OT.EMSEC_Design, OT.Tamper_ID and OT.Tamper_Resistance (these are independent from the fact whether SCD are imported from the operational environment or generated by the TOE itself). The remaining security objective for the TOE OT.SCD_Auth_Imp is related to SCD import only and is therefore not present in PP SSCD KG. The following security objectives for the TOE of the PP SSCD KG, OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen, OT.SCD_Unique and OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp are not needed for the TOE in this PP because the SCD/SVD generation takes place outside of the TOE (see also 7.2.1). 7.1.2 OT.Lifecycle_Security
Lifecycle security The TOE shall detect flaws during the initialisation, personalisation and operational usage. The TOE shall securely destroy the SCD on demand of the signatory. SIST EN 419211-3:2014
Authorised SCD import The TOE shall provide security features to ensure that authorised users only may invoke the import of the SCD. 7.1.4 OT.SCD_Secrecy
Secrecy of the signature creation data The secrecy of the SCD (used for signature creation) shall be reasonably assured against attacks with a high attack potential. Application note 2: The TOE shall keep the confidentiality of the SCD at all times, in particular during SCD import, signature creation operation, storage and secure destruction. 7.1.5 OT.Sig_Secure
Cryptographic security of the electronic signature The TOE shall create digital signatures that cannot be forged without knowledge of the SCD through robust encryption techniques. The SCD shall not be reconstructable using the digital signatures or any other data exportable from the TOE. The digital signatures shall be resistant against these attacks, even when executed with a high attack potential. 7.1.6 OT.Sigy_SigF
Signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only The TOE shall provide the digital signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only and protects the SCD against the use of others. The TOE shall resist attacks with high attack potential. 7.1.7 OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE DTBS/R integrity inside the TOE The TOE shall not alter the DTBS/R. As by definition of the DTBS/R this may consist of the DTBS themselves, this objective does not conflict with a signature creation process where the TOE hashes the provided DTBS (in part or entirely) for signature creation. 7.1.8 OT.EMSEC_Design
Provide physical emanations security The TOE shall be designed and built in such a way as to control the production of intelligible emanations within specified limits. 7.1.9 OT.Tamper_ID
Tamper detection The TOE shall provide system features that detect physical tampering of its components, and uses those features to limit security breaches. 7.1.10 OT.Tamper_Resistance Tamper resistance The TOE shall prevent or resist physical tampering with specified system devices and components. SIST EN 419211-3:2014
SCD Secrecy The CSP shall protect the confidentiality of the SCD during generation and export to the TOE. The CSP shall not use the SCD for creation of any signature and shall irreversibly delete the SCD in the operational environment after export to the TOE. 7.2.4 OE.SCD_Unique
Uniqueness of the signature creation data The CSP shall ensure the cryptographic quality of the SCD/SVD pair, which is generated in the environment, for the qualified or advanced electronic signature. The SCD used for signature creation shall practically occur only once, i.e. the probability of equal SCDs shall be negligible, and the SCD shall not be reconstructable from the SVD. 7.2.5 OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp
Correspondence between SVD and SCD The CSP shall ensure the correspondence between the SVD and the SCD generated by the CSP. This includes the correspondence between the SVD send to the CGA and the SCD exported to the TOE of the signatory identified in the SVD certificate. 7.2.6 OE.SVD_Auth
Authenticity of the SVD The operational environment shall ensure the authenticity of the SVD sent to the CGA of the CSP. The CGA verifies the correspondence between the SCD in the SSCD of the signatory and the SVD in the qualified certificate. 7.2.7 OE.CGA_Qcert
Generation of qualified certificates The CGA shall generate a qualified certificate that includes (amongst others) (a) the name of the signatory controlling the TOE, (b) the SVD matching the SCD stored in the TOE and being under sole control of the signatory, (c) the advanced signature of the CSP. The CGA shall confirm with the generated qualified certificate that the SCD corresponding to the SVD is stored in a SSCD. SIST EN 419211-3:2014
Protection of the VAD If an external device provides the human interface for user authentication, this device shall ensure confidentiality and integrity of the VAD as needed by the authentication method employed from import through its human interface until import through the TOE interface. In particular, if the TOE requires a trusted channel for import of the VAD, the HID shall support usage of this trusted channel. 7.2.10 OE.DTBS_Intend
SCA sends data intended to be signed The signatory shall use a trustworthy SCA that (a) generates the DTBS/R of the data that has been presented as DTBS and which the signatory intends to sign in a form which is appropriate for signing by the TOE, (b) sends the DTBS/R to the TOE and enables verification of the integrity of the DTBS/R by the TOE, (c) attaches the signature produced by the TOE to the data or provides it separately. Application note 3: The SCA should be able to support advanced electronic signatures. Currently, there exist three formats defined by ETSI recognised as meeting the requirements needed by advanced electronic signatures: CadES, XadES and PadES. These three formats mandate to include the hash of the signer’s public key certificate in the data to be signed. In order to support for the mobility of the signer, it is recommended to store the certificate info on the SSCD for use by SCA and identification of the corresponding SCD if more than one SCD is stored on the SSCD. 7.2.11 OE.DTBS_Protect
SCA protects the data intended to be signed The operational environment shall ensure that the DTBS/R cannot be altered in transit between the SCA and the TOE. In particular, if the TOE requires a trusted channel for import of the DTBS/R, the SCA shall support usage of this trusted channel. 7.2.12 OE.Signatory
Security obligation of the signatory The signatory shall check that the SCD stored in the SSCD received from SSCD-provisioning service is in non-operational state. The signatory shall keep their VAD confidential. SIST EN 419211-3:2014
OT.Lifecycle_Security OT.SCD_Auth_Imp OT.SCD_Secrecy OT.Sig_Secure OT.Sigy_SigF OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE OT.EMSEC_Design OT.Tamper_ID OT.Tamper_Resistance OE.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen OE.SCD_Secrecy OE.SCD_Unique OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp OE.CGA_Qcert OE.SVD_Auth OE.SSCD_Prov_Service OE.HID_VAD OE.DTBS_Intend OE.DTBS_Protect OE.Signatory T.SCD_Divulg
X X
X X
T.SCD_Derive
X
X
T.Hack_Phys
X
X X X
T.SVD_Forgery
X
X
T.SigF_Misuse X
X X
X X X X T.DTBS_Forgery
X
X X
T.Sig_Forgery
X
X
X
P.CSP_Qcert X X
X
X X
P.Qsign
X X
X
X
P.Sigy_SSCD X X X X X X X
X X X X
X
P.Sig_Non-Repud X
X X X X X X X
X X X X X X
X X X A.CGA
X X
A.SCA
X
A.CSP
X X X X
...
Questions, Comments and Discussion
Ask us and Technical Secretary will try to provide an answer. You can facilitate discussion about the standard in here.
Loading comments...