EN ISO/IEC 15408-3:2026

• Abstract:

  This document specifies the security assurance requirements of the ISO/IEC 15408 series. It includes the individual assurance components from which the evaluation assurance levels and other packages contained in ISO/IEC 15408-5 are composed, and the criteria for evaluation of Protection Profiles (PPs), PP-Configurations, PP-Modules and Security Targets (STs).

• Status: Published
• Publication Date: 26-May-2026
• ICS: 35.030 - IT Security
• Technical Committee: CEN/CLC/TC 13 - Cybersecurity and Data Protection
• Current Stage: 6060 - Definitive text made available (DAV) - Publishing
• Start Date: 27-May-2026
• Completion Date: 27-May-2026
• Ref Project: SIST EN ISO/IEC 15408-3:2026 - Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection - Evaluation criteria for IT security - Part 3: Security assurance components (ISO/IEC 15408-3:2026)

• Replaces: EN ISO/IEC 15408-3:2023 - Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection - Evaluation criteria for IT security - Part 3: Security assurance components (ISO/IEC 15408-3:2022)
• Effective Date: 22-May-2024
• Refers: ISO/IEC 15408-2:2026 - Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — Evaluation criteria for IT security — Part 2: Security functional components
• Effective Date: 24-Jun-2026
• Refers: ISO/IEC 15408-1:2026 - Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — Evaluation criteria for IT security — Part 1: Introduction and general model
• Effective Date: 24-Jun-2026
• Refers: ISO/IEC 15408-5:2026 - Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — Evaluation criteria for IT security — Part 5: Pre-defined packages of security requirements
• Effective Date: 24-Jun-2026
• Refers: ISO/IEC 15408-4:2022 - Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — Evaluation criteria for IT security — Part 4: Framework for the specification of evaluation methods and activities
• Effective Date: 24-Jun-2026
• Refers: ISO/IEC 18045:2026 - Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — Evaluation criteria for IT security — Requirements and methodology for IT security evaluation
• Effective Date: 24-Jun-2026
• Consolidated By: ISO/IEC 15408-3:2026 - Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection — Evaluation criteria for IT security — Part 3: Security assurance components
• Effective Date: 12-Feb-2026

EN ISO/IEC 15408-3:2026 is the CEN European adoption of ISO/IEC 15408-3:2026 without modification. It defines the security assurance requirements of the ISO/IEC 15408 series, including the assurance components used to build evaluation assurance levels and other packages in ISO/IEC 15408-5. It is the part of the series used when an evaluator, developer or author needs to justify or assess a Protection Profile (PP), PP-Configuration, PP-Module or Security Target (ST).

What does EN ISO/IEC 15408-3:2026 specify?

EN ISO/IEC 15408-3:2026 specifies the assurance side of the ISO/IEC 15408 series. It explains how security assurance requirements are organized, and it provides the criteria used to evaluate PPs, PP-Configurations, PP-Modules and STs.

The document is organized in a clear sequence. Clause 5 sets out the assurance paradigm, Clause 6 explains the structure of classes, families, components and elements, and Clauses 7 to 15 give the detailed assurance classes. Annex A and Annex B are informative and add explanations and examples.

Annex	What it covers
Annex A	Supplementary material and examples for security architectures, functional specification, TSF internals, subsystems and modules, and formal methods
Annex B	Concepts and examples for composition evaluations, including base and dependent components, ST evaluation for composed TOEs, and interface relationships

What are the key requirements of EN ISO/IEC 15408-3:2026?

EN ISO/IEC 15408-3:2026 is built around a simple assurance logic: state the security problem clearly, show that the chosen controls are sufficient, and collect enough evidence to make the result believable in practice. Clause 5 says that assurance grows with scope, depth and rigour, so a higher assurance package asks for broader coverage, more detailed design information, and more structured analysis.

How does the assurance model work?

Clause 5 describes the underlying approach. Security threats and organizational policy commitments need to be articulated, the proposed security controls need to be shown to be sufficient, and the evaluation also needs to address vulnerabilities, their likelihood, their exploitability and the harm they can cause. In practical terms, this means the evaluator is not only checking what the TOE does, but also whether the evidence shows that it can resist realistic attacks and that weaknesses can be found and handled.

What do the core evaluation classes cover?

Clauses 7, 8 and 9 cover the evaluation of a PP, a PP-Configuration and an ST.

• Clause 7, class APE, requires a PP to be sound and internally consistent, and to be a correct instantiation when it is based on other PPs or packages.
• Clause 8, class ACE, requires a PP-Configuration to be sound and consistent, and checks the consistency of the PP-Modules and the combination of all included parts.
• Clause 9, class ASE, requires an ST to be sound and internally consistent, and, when it is based on PPs, PP-Configurations or packages, to be a correct instantiation of them.

In practice, these clauses tell an author what must line up before an ST can be used for TOE evaluation. They also explain why the same security claims must be traceable across the PP, the configuration and the final ST.

What does the development evidence have to show?

Clause 10, class ADV, requires evidence about the TOE itself. It covers security architecture, functional specification, implementation representation, TSF internals, a formal TSF model, TOE design, and composite design compliance. The clause explains that the TSF includes not only the code or logic that directly enforces security functional requirements (SFRs), but also supporting and non-interfering parts that can still affect security.

That matters because design and vulnerability review must include more than the obvious enforcement code. If a supporting routine, privileged subsystem or initialization path can affect security behavior, it belongs in the assurance discussion.

What guidance and life cycle controls are expected?

Clauses 11 and 12 cover guidance documents and life cycle support. Clause 11 splits guidance into preparative procedures and operational user guidance, so the TOE can be brought into its evaluated configuration and then used safely. Clause 12 covers configuration management, delivery, developer environment security, flaw remediation, development life cycle definition, TOE development artefacts, tools and techniques, and composition-related integration.

In practice, this means the evaluator looks for control over configuration items, clear delivery procedures, defined development tools, and a documented way to handle flaws. The life cycle material is there to show that the evaluated TOE is the same TOE that is built, delivered and maintained.

How are testing and vulnerability assessment handled?

Clauses 13 and 14 cover tests and vulnerability assessment. Clause 13 requires evidence of test coverage, test depth, functional tests, independent testing by the evaluator, and composite functional testing where relevant. Clause 14 requires vulnerability analysis for weaknesses introduced during development or operation, including misuse and incorrect configuration.

This is important because assurance is not just a paper exercise. The document expects testing to confirm behavior against the design descriptions, and vulnerability analysis to look for exploitable weaknesses that tests alone may miss.

What does composition add?

Clause 15, class ACO, deals with composition. It applies when one evaluated component depends on another evaluated component for security services, and it is intended for composed TOEs built from previously evaluated software, firmware or hardware. The class covers composition rationale, development evidence, reliance of the dependent component, composed TOE testing, and composition vulnerability analysis.

In practice, this means a composed product can reuse evaluation results, but the evaluator still has to check the interfaces, the dependency on the base component, the combined behavior and any residual vulnerabilities. The class is designed for real integration scenarios where one component relies on another, such as an application using an operating system.

What terms does EN ISO/IEC 15408-3:2026 define?

• Acceptance procedure - The procedure used to accept newly created or modified configuration items into the TOE or move them to the next life cycle step.
• Action - An activity performed by an evaluator or a developer within an assurance component.
• Configuration item - Hardware, software, or both, treated as a single entity under configuration management during TOE development.
• Configuration management (CM) - The discipline used to identify, control, record and verify configuration items and their changes.
• Configuration management plan (CM plan) - The description of how the configuration management system is used for the TOE.
• Expected test result - The correct behavior or output defined before testing, used as the pass/fail reference.
• Actual test result - The behavior or output observed during the test run.
• Residual vulnerability - A weakness that is not exploitable in the TOE’s operational environment, but could be exploited by a stronger attacker.

Who uses EN ISO/IEC 15408-3:2026?

EN ISO/IEC 15408-3:2026 is used by people who prepare, assess or rely on security assurance evidence for IT products and systems. The document names developers, evaluators, evaluation authorities, sponsors and users, and it is also relevant to system integrators.

In practice, developers use it to structure PP, ST, development and life cycle evidence. Evaluators use it to check consistency, testing, vulnerability analysis and composition claims. System integrators use it when a composed TOE depends on evaluated components from different sources.

What changed in EN ISO/IEC 15408-3:2026 from the previous edition?

EN ISO/IEC 15408-3:2026 supersedes EN ISO/IEC 15408-3:2023. The Slovene publication note also states that it replaces SIST EN ISO/IEC 15408-3:2024.

Which standards are used with EN ISO/IEC 15408-3:2026?

• ISO/IEC 15408-1:2026 - Provides the introduction and general model, and its Annexes B and D are cited for PP and ST concepts and examples.
• ISO/IEC 15408-2:2026 - Provides the security functional components and the functional requirement vocabulary used throughout this part.
• ISO/IEC 15408-4 - Provides the framework for specifying evaluation methods and activities.
• ISO/IEC 15408-5:2026 - Provides predefined packages of security requirements, including the evaluation assurance levels and CAPs referenced by this part.
• ISO/IEC 18045:2026 - Provides the requirements and methodology for IT security evaluation.
• ISO/IEC/IEEE 24765:2017 - Provides systems and software engineering vocabulary used for terms such as configuration management and life cycle model.

What does the EN ISO/IEC 15408-3:2026 document contain?

The document contains the assurance classes APE, ACE, ASE, ADV, AGD, ALC, ATE, AVA and ACO, with each class split into families, components and elements. It also includes family hierarchies and dependency tables, which show how the components relate to each other and what has to be in place before a given component can be used.

Each class section follows a repeated pattern of objectives, component levelling, application notes, relationships and component elements. That makes the document useful both for writing evaluation evidence and for checking it during evaluation.

Annex A adds explanatory material and examples for design and representation topics, including security architecture, functional specification, TSF internals, subsystems and modules, and formal methods. Annex B explains composition in detail, including the role of base and dependent components, how their interfaces are analyzed, how composed TOE STs are evaluated, and how composition testing and vulnerability analysis are applied.

SLOVENSKI STANDARD
01-oktober-2026
Nadomešča:
SIST EN ISO/IEC 15408-3:2024
Informacijska varnost, kibernetska varnost in varstvo zasebnosti - Merila za
vrednotenje varnosti IT - 3. del: Komponente za zagotavljanje varnosti (ISO/IEC
15408-3:2026)
Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection - Evaluation criteria for IT
security - Part 3: Security assurance components (ISO/IEC 15408-3:2026)
Informationssicherheit, Cybersicherheit und Schutz der Privatsphäre -
Evaluationskriterien für IT-Sicherheit - Teil 3: Komponenten für die Vertrauenswürdigkeit
der Sicherheit (ISO/IEC 15408-3:2026)
Sécurité de l'information, cybersécurité et protection de la vie privée - Critères
d'évaluation pour la sécurité des technologies de l'information - Partie 3: Composants
d'assurance de sécurité (ISO/IEC 15408-3:2026)
Ta slovenski standard je istoveten z: EN ISO/IEC 15408-3:2026
ICS:
35.030 Informacijska varnost IT Security
2003-01.Slovenski inštitut za standardizacijo. Razmnoževanje celote ali delov tega standarda ni dovoljeno.

EUROPEAN STANDARD EN ISO/IEC 15408-3

NORME EUROPÉENNE
EUROPÄISCHE NORM
May 2026
ICS 35.030
Supersedes EN ISO/IEC 15408-3:2023
English version
Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection
- Evaluation criteria for IT security - Part 3: Security
assurance components (ISO/IEC 15408-3:2026)
Sécurité de l'information, cybersécurité et protection Informationssicherheit, Cybersicherheit und Schutz
de la vie privée - Critères d'évaluation pour la sécurité der Privatsphäre - Evaluationskriterien für IT-
des technologies de l'information - Partie 3: Sicherheit - Teil 3: Komponenten für die
Composants d'assurance de sécurité (ISO/IEC 15408- Vertrauenswürdigkeit der Sicherheit (ISO/IEC 15408-
3:2026) 3:2026)
This European Standard was approved by CEN on 1 May 2026.

CEN and CENELEC members are bound to comply with the CEN/CENELEC Internal Regulations which stipulate the conditions for
giving this European Standard the status of a national standard without any alteration. Up-to-date lists and bibliographical
references concerning such national standards may be obtained on application to the CEN-CENELEC Management Centre or to
any CEN and CENELEC member.
This European Standard exists in three official versions (English, French, German). A version in any other language made by
translation under the responsibility of a CEN and CENELEC member into its own language and notified to the CEN-CENELEC
Management Centre has the same status as the official versions.

CEN and CENELEC members are the national standards bodies and national electrotechnical committees of Austria, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye and United Kingdom.

CEN-CENELEC Management Centre:
Rue de la Science 23, B-1040 Brussels
© 2026 CEN/CENELEC All rights of exploitation in any form and by any means Ref. No. EN ISO/IEC 15408-3:2026 E
reserved worldwide for CEN national Members and for
CENELEC Members.
Contents Page
European foreword . 3

European foreword
This document (EN ISO/IEC 15408-3:2026) has been prepared by Technical Committee ISO/IEC JTC 1
"Information technology" in collaboration with Technical Committee CEN-CENELEC/ JTC 13
“Cybersecurity and Data Protection” the secretariat of which is held by DIN.
This European Standard shall be given the status of a national standard, either by publication of an
identical text or by endorsement, at the latest by November 2026, and conflicting national standards
shall be withdrawn at the latest by November 2026.
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of
patent rights. CEN-CENELEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.
This document supersedes EN ISO/IEC 15408-3:2023.
Any feedback and questions on this document should be directed to the users’ national standards
body/national committee. A complete listing of these bodies can be found on the CEN and CENELEC
websites.
According to the CEN-CENELEC Internal Regulations, the national standards organizations of the
following countries are bound to implement this European Standard: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of
North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye and the
United Kingdom.
Endorsement notice
The text of ISO/IEC 15408-3:2026 has been approved by CEN-CENELEC as EN ISO/IEC 15408-3:2026
without any modification.
International
Standard
ISO/IEC 15408-3
Fifth edition
Information security, cybersecurity
2026-05
and privacy protection —
Evaluation criteria for IT security —
Part 3:
Security assurance components
Sécurité de l'information, cybersécurité et protection de la vie
privée — Critères d'évaluation pour la sécurité des technologies
de l'information —
Partie 3: Composants d'assurance de sécurité
Reference number
ISO/IEC 15408-3:2026(en) © ISO/IEC 2026

ISO/IEC 15408-3:2026(en)
© ISO/IEC 2026
All rights reserved. Unless otherwise specified, or required in the context of its implementation, no part of this publication may
be reproduced or utilized otherwise in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, or posting on
the internet or an intranet, without prior written permission. Permission can be requested from either ISO at the address below
or ISO’s member body in the country of the requester.
ISO copyright office
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Phone: [phone]
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Website: www.iso.org
Published in Switzerland
© ISO/IEC 2026 – All rights reserved
ii
ISO/IEC 15408-3:2026(en)
Contents Page
Foreword .x
Introduction .xi
1 Scope . 1
2 Normative references . 1
3 Terms and definitions . 1
4 Overview . 5
5 Assurance paradigm . 5
5.1 General .5
5.2 CC approach .5
5.3 Assurance approach .5
5.3.1 General .5
5.3.2 Significance of vulnerabilities .5
5.3.3 Cause of vulnerabilities .6
5.3.4 CC assurance .6
5.3.5 Assurance through evaluation .6
5.4 CC evaluation assurance scale .7
6 Security assurance components . 7
6.1 General .7
6.2 Assurance class structure .7
6.2.1 General .7
6.2.2 Class name .8
6.2.3 Class introduction .8
6.2.4 Class application notes .8
6.2.5 Assurance families .8
6.3 Assurance family structure .8
6.3.1 General .8
6.3.2 Family name .8
6.3.3 Family objectives .8
6.3.4 Component levelling .9
6.3.5 Family application notes .9
6.3.6 Assurance components .9
6.4 Assurance component structure .9
6.4.1 General .9
6.4.2 Component name .9
6.4.3 Component objectives . .10
6.4.4 Component application notes .10
6.4.5 Component dependencies .10
6.4.6 Assurance elements .10
6.5 Assurance elements .11
6.6 Component taxonomy .11
7 Class APE Protection Profile (PP) evaluation .11
7.1 General .11
7.2 PP introduction (APE_INT) . 12
7.2.1 Objectives . 12
7.2.2 PP introduction (APE_INT.1) . 13
7.3 Conformance claims (APE_CCL) . 13
7.3.1 Objectives . 13
7.3.2 Conformance claims (APE_CCL.1) . 13
7.4 Security problem definition (APE_SPD) . 15
7.4.1 Objectives . 15
7.4.2 Security problem definition (APE_SPD.1) . 15
7.5 Security objectives (APE_OBJ) . 15

© ISO/IEC 2026 – All rights reserved
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ISO/IEC 15408-3:2026(en)
7.5.1 Objectives . 15
7.5.2 Component levelling . 15
7.5.3 Security objectives for the operational environment (APE_OBJ.1) . 15
7.5.4 Security objectives (APE_OBJ.2) . .16
7.6 Extended components definition (APE_ECD) .17
7.6.1 Objectives .17
7.6.2 Extended components definition (APE_ECD.1) .17
7.7 Security requirements (APE_REQ) .18
7.7.1 Objectives .18
7.7.2 Component levelling .18
7.7.3 Direct rationale security requirements (APE_REQ.1) .18
7.7.4 Derived security requirements (APE_REQ.2) .19
8 Class ACE Protection Profile Configuration evaluation .20
8.1 General . 20
8.2 PP-Module introduction (ACE_INT) . 22
8.2.1 Objectives . 22
8.2.2 PP-Module introduction (ACE_INT.1) . 22
8.3 PP-Module conformance claims (ACE_CCL) . 22
8.3.1 Objectives . 22
8.3.2 PP-Module conformance claims (ACE_CCL.1) . 23
8.4 PP-Module security problem definition (ACE_SPD) .24
8.4.1 Objectives .24
8.4.2 PP-Module security problem definition (ACE_SPD.1) .24
8.5 PP-Module security objectives (ACE_OBJ) .24
8.5.1 Objectives .24
8.5.2 Component levelling .24
8.5.3 PP-Module security objectives for the operational environment (ACE_OBJ.1) .24
8.5.4 PP-Module security objectives (ACE_OBJ.2) . 25
8.6 PP-Module extended components definition (ACE_ECD). 26
8.6.1 Objectives . 26
8.6.2 PP-Module extended components definition (ACE_ECD.1) . 26
8.7 PP-Module security requirements (ACE_REQ) .27
8.7.1 Objectives .27
8.7.2 Component levelling .27
8.7.3 PP-Module direct rationale security requirements (ACE_REQ.1) .27
8.7.4 PP-Module derived security requirements (ACE_REQ.2) . 28
8.8 PP-Module consistency (ACE_MCO) . 29
8.8.1 Objectives . 29
8.8.2 PP-Module consistency (ACE_MCO.1) . 29
8.9 PP-Configuration consistency (ACE_CCO) . 30
8.9.1 Objectives . 30
8.9.2 PP-Configuration consistency (ACE_CCO.1) . 30
9 Class ASE Security Target (ST) evaluation .32
9.1 General .32
9.2 ST introduction (ASE_INT) . 34
9.2.1 Objectives . 34
9.2.2 ST introduction (ASE_INT.1) . 34
9.3 Conformance claims (ASE_CCL) . 34
9.3.1 Objectives . 34
9.3.2 Conformance claims (ASE_CCL.1) . 35
9.4 Security problem definition (ASE_SPD) . 36
9.4.1 Objectives . 36
9.4.2 Security problem definition (ASE_SPD.1) . 36
9.5 Security objectives (ASE_OBJ) . 36
9.5.1 Objectives . 36
9.5.2 Component levelling . 36
9.5.3 Security objectives for the operational environment (ASE_OBJ.1) . 36
9.5.4 Security objectives (ASE_OBJ.2) .37

© ISO/IEC 2026 – All rights reserved
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ISO/IEC 15408-3:2026(en)
9.6 Extended components definition (ASE_ECD) . 38
9.6.1 Objectives . 38
9.6.2 Extended components definition (ASE_ECD.1) . 38
9.7 Security requirements (ASE_REQ). 39
9.7.1 Objectives . 39
9.7.2 Component levelling . 39
9.7.3 Direct rationale security requirements (ASE_REQ.1) . 39
9.7.4 Derived security requirements (ASE_REQ.2). 40
9.8 TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS) .41
9.8.1 Objectives .41
9.8.2 Component levelling .41
9.8.3 TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS.1) .41
9.8.4 TOE summary specification with architectural design summary (ASE_TSS.2) .42
9.9 Consistency of composite product Security Target (ASE_COMP) .42
9.9.1 Objectives .42
9.9.2 Component levelling .43
9.9.3 Application notes .43
9.9.4 Consistency of Security Target (ST) (ASE_COMP.1) . 44
10 Class ADV Development .44
10.1 General . 44
10.2 Security architecture (ADV_ARC) . 50
10.2.1 Objectives . 50
10.2.2 Component levelling . 50
10.2.3 Application notes . 50
10.2.4 Security architecture description (ADV_ARC.1) .51
10.3 Functional specification (ADV_FSP) .52
10.3.1 Objectives .52
10.3.2 Component levelling .52
10.3.3 Application notes .52
10.3.4 Basic functional specification (ADV_FSP.1) . 55
10.3.5 Security-enforcing functional specification (ADV_FSP.2) . 55
10.3.6 Functional specification with complete summary (ADV_FSP.3) . 56
10.3.7 Complete functional specification (ADV_FSP.4) .57
10.3.8 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error
information (ADV_FSP.5).57
10.3.9 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional formal
specification (ADV_FSP.6). 58
10.4 Implementation representation (ADV_IMP) .59
10.4.1 Objectives .59
10.4.2 Component levelling .59
10.4.3 Application notes .59
10.4.4 Implementation representation of the TSF (ADV_IMP.1) . 60
10.4.5 Complete mapping of the implementation representation of the TSF (ADV_IMP.2) .61
10.5 TSF internals (ADV_INT) .62
10.5.1 Objectives .62
10.5.2 Component levelling .62
10.5.3 Application notes .62
10.5.4 Well-structured subset of TSF internals (ADV_INT.1) .62
10.5.5 Well-structured internals (ADV_INT.2) . 63
10.5.6 Minimally complex internals (ADV_INT.3) . 64
10.6 Formal TSF model (ADV_SPM). 65
10.6.1 Objectives . 65
10.6.2 Component levelling . 65
10.6.3 Application notes . 65
10.6.4 Formal TSF model (ADV_SPM.1) . 66
10.7 TOE design (ADV_TDS) .67
10.7.1 Objectives .67
10.7.2 Component levelling .67

© ISO/IEC 2026 – All rights reserved
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ISO/IEC 15408-3:2026(en)
10.7.3 Application notes .67
10.7.4 Basic design (ADV_TDS.1) . 68
10.7.5 Architectural design (ADV_TDS.2) . 69
10.7.6 Basic modular design (ADV_TDS.3) .70
10.7.7 Semi-Formal modular design (ADV_TDS.4) .71
10.7.8 Complete semi-formal modular design (ADV_TDS.5) .71
10.7.9 Complete semi-formal modular design with formal high-level design
presentation (ADV_TDS.6) . 72
10.8 Composite design compliance (ADV_COMP) . 73
10.8.1 Objectives . 73
10.8.2 Component levelling . 73
10.8.3 Application notes . 73
10.8.4 Design compliance with the base component-related user guidance, ETR for
composite evaluation and report of the base component evaluation authority
(ADV_COMP.1) .74
11 Class AGD guidance documents .75
11.1 General . 75
11.2 Operational user guidance (AGD_OPE) . 75
11.2.1 Objectives . 75
11.2.2 Component levelling .76
11.2.3 Application notes .76
11.2.4 Operational user guidance (AGD_OPE.1) .76
11.3 Preparative procedures (AGD_PRE) . 77
11.3.1 Objectives . 77
11.3.2 Component levelling . 77
11.3.3 Application notes . 77
11.3.4 Preparative procedures (AGD_PRE.1) . 78
12 Class ALC life cycle support .78
12.1 General . 78
12.2 CM capabilities (ALC_CMC) . 80
12.2.1 Objectives . 80
12.2.2 Component levelling . 81
12.2.3 Application notes . 81
12.2.4 Labelling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1) . 81
12.2.5 Use of the CM system (ALC_CMC.2) . 82
12.2.6 Authorization controls (ALC_CMC.3) .
...