ISO/IEC 18014-2:2021
(Main)Information security — Time-stamping services — Part 2: Mechanisms producing independent tokens
Information security — Time-stamping services — Part 2: Mechanisms producing independent tokens
This document specifies mechanisms that generate, renew, and verify independent time-stamps. In order to verify an independent time-stamp token, time-stamp verifiers do not need access to any other time-stamp tokens. That is, such time-stamp tokens are not linked.
Sécurité de l'information — Services d'horodatage — Partie 2: Mécanismes produisant des jetons indépendants
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INTERNATIONAL ISO/IEC
STANDARD 18014-2
Third edition
2021-09
Information security — Time-
stamping services —
Part 2:
Mechanisms producing independent
tokens
Sécurité de l'information — Services d'horodatage —
Partie 2: Mécanismes produisant des jetons indépendants
Reference number
©
ISO/IEC 2021
© ISO/IEC 2021
All rights reserved. Unless otherwise specified, or required in the context of its implementation, no part of this publication may
be reproduced or utilized otherwise in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, or posting
on the internet or an intranet, without prior written permission. Permission can be requested from either ISO at the address
below or ISO’s member body in the country of the requester.
ISO copyright office
CP 401 • Ch. de Blandonnet 8
CH-1214 Vernier, Geneva
Phone: +41 22 749 01 11
Email: copyright@iso.org
Website: www.iso.org
Published in Switzerland
ii © ISO/IEC 2021 – All rights reserved
Contents Page
Foreword .iv
1 Scope . 1
2 Normative references . 1
3 Terms and definitions . 1
4 Notation, symbols and abbreviated terms . 4
5 Time-stamp tokens . 5
5.1 Contents . 5
5.2 Generation . 5
5.3 Verification . 5
5.4 Renewal . 6
5.5 Renewal verification. 6
6 Protection mechanisms . 7
7 Independent time-stamp tokens . 8
7.1 Core structure . 8
7.2 Extensions . 8
7.3 Protection mechanisms . 9
7.3.1 Digital signatures using SignedData .9
7.3.2 Message authentication codes using AuthenticatedData .9
7.3.3 Archival .10
7.3.4 Digital signatures using SignerInfo .11
7.4 Protocols .12
Annex A (normative) ASN.1 Module for time-stamping .13
Annex B (informative) Cryptographic syntax .19
Bibliography .22
© ISO/IEC 2021 – All rights reserved iii
Foreword
ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) and IEC (the International Electrotechnical
Commission) form the specialized system for worldwide standardization. National bodies that are
members of ISO or IEC participate in the development of International Standards through technical
committees established by the respective organization to deal with particular fields of technical
activity. ISO and IEC technical committees collaborate in fields of mutual interest. Other international
organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO and IEC, also take part in the
work.
The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are
described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular, the different approval criteria needed for
the different types of document should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the
editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www .iso .org/ directives or www .iec .ch/ members
_experts/ refdocs).
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject
of patent rights. ISO and IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent
rights. Details of any patent rights identified during the development of the document will be in the
Introduction and/or on the ISO list of patent declarations received (see www .iso .org/ patents) or the IEC
list of patent declarations received (see patents.iec.ch).
Any trade name used in this document is information given for the convenience of users and does not
constitute an endorsement.
For an explanation of the voluntary nature of standards, the meaning of ISO specific terms and
expressions related to conformity assessment, as well as information about ISO's adherence to the
World Trade Organization (WTO) principles in the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) see www .iso .org/
iso/ foreword .html. In the IEC, see www .iec .ch/ understanding -standards.
This document was prepared by Joint Technical Committee ISO/IEC JTC 1, Information technology,
Subcommittee SC 27, Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection.
This third edition cancels and replaces the second edition (ISO/IEC 18014-2:2009), which has been
technically revised.
The main changes compared to the previous edition are as follows:
— updated the definition of a hash function to a collision-resistant hash-function;
— application of style and editorial changes.
A list of all parts in the ISO/IEC 18014 series can be found on the ISO and IEC websites.
Any feedback or questions on this document should be directed to the user’s national standards body. A
complete listing of these bodies can be found at www .iso .org/ members .html and www .iec .ch/ national
-committees.
iv © ISO/IEC 2021 – All rights reserved
INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ISO/IEC 18014-2:2021(E)
Information security — Time-stamping services —
Part 2:
Mechanisms producing independent tokens
1 Scope
This document specifies mechanisms that generate, renew, and verify independent time-stamps. In
order to verify an independent time-stamp token, time-stamp verifiers do not need access to any other
time-stamp tokens. That is, such time-stamp tokens are not linked.
2 Normative references
The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content
constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For
undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
ISO/IEC 18014-1, Information technology — Security techniques — Time-stamping services — Part 1:
Framework
3 Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.
ISO and IEC maintain terminological databases for use in standardization at the following addresses:
— ISO Online browsing platform: available at https:// www .iso .org/ obp
— IEC Electropedia: available at http:// www .electropedia .org/
3.1
time-stamp token
TST
data structure containing a verifiable binding between a data items’ representation and a time-value
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 18014-1:2008, 3.15, modified – Note to entry has been removed.]
3.2
time-stamping service
TSS
service providing evidence that a data item existed before a certain point in time
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 18014-1:2008, 3.18]
3.3
time-stamping policy
set of rules that indicates the applicability of a time-stamp token (3.1) to a particular community and/or
class of application with common security requirements
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 18014-1:2008, 3.23]
© ISO/IEC 2021 – All rights reserved 1
3.4
time-stamp requester
entity which possesses data it wants to be time-stamped
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 18014-1:2008, 3.14, modified – Note to entry has been removed.]
3.5
time-stamp verifier
entity which possesses data and wants to verify that it has a valid time-stamp bound to it
Note 1 to entry: The verification process can be performed by the verifier itself or by a trusted third party.
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 18014-1:2008, 3.16]
3.6
time-stamping authority
TSA
trusted third party trusted to provide a time-stamping service (3.2)
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 18014-1:2008, 3.17]
3.7
time-stamping unit
TSU
set of hardware and software which is managed as a unit and generates time-stamp tokens (3.1)
3.8
data origin authentication
corroboration that the source of data received is as claimed
Note 1 to entry: Data origin is sometimes called data source.
[SOURCE: ISO 7498-2:1989, 3.3.22, modified — In the definition, the initial article "the" has been
removed. Note 1 to entry has been added.]
3.9
data integrity
property that data has not been altered or destroyed in an unauthorized manner
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011, 3.4]
3.10
asymmetric key pair
pair of related keys where the private key (3.11) defines the private transformation and the public key
(3.12) defines the public transformation
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 9798-1:2010, 3.3]
3.11
private key
key of an entity's asymmetric key pair (3.10) that is kept private
Note 1 to entry: The security of an asymmetric signature system (3.15) depends on the privacy of this key.
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 11770-1:2010, 2.35, modified — The definition was restricted to asymmetric
signature system.]
3.12
public key
key of an entity's asymmetric key pair (3.10) which can usually be made public without compromising
security
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 11770-1:2010, 2.36]
2 © ISO/IEC 2021 – All rights reserved
3.13
public key certificate
public key (3.12) information of an entity signed by the certification authority
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 11770-1:2010, 2.37]
3.14
public-key infrastructure
PKI
infrastructure able to support the management of public keys able to support authentication,
encryption, integrity or non-repudiation services
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 9594-8:2020, 3.5.60, modified — In the definition, the initial article "the" has been
removed.]
3.15
asymmetric signature system
system based on asymmetric cryptographic techniques whose private transformation is used for
signing and whose public transformation is used for verification
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 9798-1:2010, 3.4]
3.16
digital signature
data appended to, or a cryptographic transformation of, a data unit that allows a recipient of the data
unit to prove the source (3.8) and integrity (3.9) of the data unit and protect against forgery, e.g. by the
recipient
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 9798-1:2010, 3.11]
3.17
collision-resistant hash-function
hash-function satisfying the following property: it is computationally infeasible to find any two distinct
inputs which map to the same output
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 10118-1:2016, 3.1, modified — Note 1 to entry has been removed.]
3.18
hash-code
string of bits which is the output of a collision-resistant hash-function (3.17)
Note 1 to entry: The definition in ISO/IEC 10118-1 does not require collision-resistance. In this document, all
hash functions are collision-resistant hash functions.
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 10118-1:2016, 3.3, modified — In the definition, "collision-resistant" has been added.
Note 1 to entry has been replaced.]
3.19
message authentication code algorithm
MAC algorithm
algorithm for computing a function which maps strings of bits and a MAC algorithm key (3.20) to fixed-
length strings of bits, satisfying the following two properties:
— for any MAC algorithm key (3.20) and any input string, the function can be computed efficiently;
— for any fixed MAC algorithm key (3.20), and given no prior knowledge of the MAC algorithm key
(3.20), it is computationally infeasible to compute the function value on any new input string, even
given knowledge of a
...
INTERNATIONAL ISO/IEC
STANDARD 18014-2
Third edition
2021-09
Information security — Time-
stamping services —
Part 2:
Mechanisms producing independent
tokens
Sécurité de l'information — Services d'horodatage —
Partie 2: Mécanismes produisant des jetons indépendants
Reference number
©
ISO/IEC 2021
© ISO/IEC 2021
All rights reserved. Unless otherwise specified, or required in the context of its implementation, no part of this publication may
be reproduced or utilized otherwise in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, or posting
on the internet or an intranet, without prior written permission. Permission can be requested from either ISO at the address
below or ISO’s member body in the country of the requester.
ISO copyright office
CP 401 • Ch. de Blandonnet 8
CH-1214 Vernier, Geneva
Phone: +41 22 749 01 11
Email: copyright@iso.org
Website: www.iso.org
Published in Switzerland
ii © ISO/IEC 2021 – All rights reserved
Contents Page
Foreword .iv
1 Scope . 1
2 Normative references . 1
3 Terms and definitions . 1
4 Notation, symbols and abbreviated terms . 4
5 Time-stamp tokens . 5
5.1 Contents . 5
5.2 Generation . 5
5.3 Verification . 5
5.4 Renewal . 6
5.5 Renewal verification. 6
6 Protection mechanisms . 7
7 Independent time-stamp tokens . 8
7.1 Core structure . 8
7.2 Extensions . 8
7.3 Protection mechanisms . 9
7.3.1 Digital signatures using SignedData .9
7.3.2 Message authentication codes using AuthenticatedData .9
7.3.3 Archival .10
7.3.4 Digital signatures using SignerInfo .11
7.4 Protocols .12
Annex A (normative) ASN.1 Module for time-stamping .13
Annex B (informative) Cryptographic syntax .19
Bibliography .22
© ISO/IEC 2021 – All rights reserved iii
Foreword
ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) and IEC (the International Electrotechnical
Commission) form the specialized system for worldwide standardization. National bodies that are
members of ISO or IEC participate in the development of International Standards through technical
committees established by the respective organization to deal with particular fields of technical
activity. ISO and IEC technical committees collaborate in fields of mutual interest. Other international
organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO and IEC, also take part in the
work.
The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are
described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular, the different approval criteria needed for
the different types of document should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the
editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www .iso .org/ directives or www .iec .ch/ members
_experts/ refdocs).
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject
of patent rights. ISO and IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent
rights. Details of any patent rights identified during the development of the document will be in the
Introduction and/or on the ISO list of patent declarations received (see www .iso .org/ patents) or the IEC
list of patent declarations received (see patents.iec.ch).
Any trade name used in this document is information given for the convenience of users and does not
constitute an endorsement.
For an explanation of the voluntary nature of standards, the meaning of ISO specific terms and
expressions related to conformity assessment, as well as information about ISO's adherence to the
World Trade Organization (WTO) principles in the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) see www .iso .org/
iso/ foreword .html. In the IEC, see www .iec .ch/ understanding -standards.
This document was prepared by Joint Technical Committee ISO/IEC JTC 1, Information technology,
Subcommittee SC 27, Information security, cybersecurity and privacy protection.
This third edition cancels and replaces the second edition (ISO/IEC 18014-2:2009), which has been
technically revised.
The main changes compared to the previous edition are as follows:
— updated the definition of a hash function to a collision-resistant hash-function;
— application of style and editorial changes.
A list of all parts in the ISO/IEC 18014 series can be found on the ISO and IEC websites.
Any feedback or questions on this document should be directed to the user’s national standards body. A
complete listing of these bodies can be found at www .iso .org/ members .html and www .iec .ch/ national
-committees.
iv © ISO/IEC 2021 – All rights reserved
INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ISO/IEC 18014-2:2021(E)
Information security — Time-stamping services —
Part 2:
Mechanisms producing independent tokens
1 Scope
This document specifies mechanisms that generate, renew, and verify independent time-stamps. In
order to verify an independent time-stamp token, time-stamp verifiers do not need access to any other
time-stamp tokens. That is, such time-stamp tokens are not linked.
2 Normative references
The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content
constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For
undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
ISO/IEC 18014-1, Information technology — Security techniques — Time-stamping services — Part 1:
Framework
3 Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.
ISO and IEC maintain terminological databases for use in standardization at the following addresses:
— ISO Online browsing platform: available at https:// www .iso .org/ obp
— IEC Electropedia: available at http:// www .electropedia .org/
3.1
time-stamp token
TST
data structure containing a verifiable binding between a data items’ representation and a time-value
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 18014-1:2008, 3.15, modified – Note to entry has been removed.]
3.2
time-stamping service
TSS
service providing evidence that a data item existed before a certain point in time
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 18014-1:2008, 3.18]
3.3
time-stamping policy
set of rules that indicates the applicability of a time-stamp token (3.1) to a particular community and/or
class of application with common security requirements
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 18014-1:2008, 3.23]
© ISO/IEC 2021 – All rights reserved 1
3.4
time-stamp requester
entity which possesses data it wants to be time-stamped
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 18014-1:2008, 3.14, modified – Note to entry has been removed.]
3.5
time-stamp verifier
entity which possesses data and wants to verify that it has a valid time-stamp bound to it
Note 1 to entry: The verification process can be performed by the verifier itself or by a trusted third party.
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 18014-1:2008, 3.16]
3.6
time-stamping authority
TSA
trusted third party trusted to provide a time-stamping service (3.2)
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 18014-1:2008, 3.17]
3.7
time-stamping unit
TSU
set of hardware and software which is managed as a unit and generates time-stamp tokens (3.1)
3.8
data origin authentication
corroboration that the source of data received is as claimed
Note 1 to entry: Data origin is sometimes called data source.
[SOURCE: ISO 7498-2:1989, 3.3.22, modified — In the definition, the initial article "the" has been
removed. Note 1 to entry has been added.]
3.9
data integrity
property that data has not been altered or destroyed in an unauthorized manner
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011, 3.4]
3.10
asymmetric key pair
pair of related keys where the private key (3.11) defines the private transformation and the public key
(3.12) defines the public transformation
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 9798-1:2010, 3.3]
3.11
private key
key of an entity's asymmetric key pair (3.10) that is kept private
Note 1 to entry: The security of an asymmetric signature system (3.15) depends on the privacy of this key.
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 11770-1:2010, 2.35, modified — The definition was restricted to asymmetric
signature system.]
3.12
public key
key of an entity's asymmetric key pair (3.10) which can usually be made public without compromising
security
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 11770-1:2010, 2.36]
2 © ISO/IEC 2021 – All rights reserved
3.13
public key certificate
public key (3.12) information of an entity signed by the certification authority
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 11770-1:2010, 2.37]
3.14
public-key infrastructure
PKI
infrastructure able to support the management of public keys able to support authentication,
encryption, integrity or non-repudiation services
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 9594-8:2020, 3.5.60, modified — In the definition, the initial article "the" has been
removed.]
3.15
asymmetric signature system
system based on asymmetric cryptographic techniques whose private transformation is used for
signing and whose public transformation is used for verification
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 9798-1:2010, 3.4]
3.16
digital signature
data appended to, or a cryptographic transformation of, a data unit that allows a recipient of the data
unit to prove the source (3.8) and integrity (3.9) of the data unit and protect against forgery, e.g. by the
recipient
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 9798-1:2010, 3.11]
3.17
collision-resistant hash-function
hash-function satisfying the following property: it is computationally infeasible to find any two distinct
inputs which map to the same output
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 10118-1:2016, 3.1, modified — Note 1 to entry has been removed.]
3.18
hash-code
string of bits which is the output of a collision-resistant hash-function (3.17)
Note 1 to entry: The definition in ISO/IEC 10118-1 does not require collision-resistance. In this document, all
hash functions are collision-resistant hash functions.
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 10118-1:2016, 3.3, modified — In the definition, "collision-resistant" has been added.
Note 1 to entry has been replaced.]
3.19
message authentication code algorithm
MAC algorithm
algorithm for computing a function which maps strings of bits and a MAC algorithm key (3.20) to fixed-
length strings of bits, satisfying the following two properties:
— for any MAC algorithm key (3.20) and any input string, the function can be computed efficiently;
— for any fixed MAC algorithm key (3.20), and given no prior knowledge of the MAC algorithm key
(3.20), it is computationally infeasible to compute the function value on any new input string, even
given knowledge of a
...
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