SIST HD 370 S2:2003
(Main)Modular plug-in unit and standard 19-inch rack mounting unit based on NIM standard (for electronic nuclear instruments)
Modular plug-in unit and standard 19-inch rack mounting unit based on NIM standard (for electronic nuclear instruments)
Dimensions of the standard plug-in unit and rack-mounting unit; connector dimensions and pin arrangements.
Kassetten und Überrahmen zum Einbau in 19-inch-Gestelle nach NIM-Standard (für kernphysikalische elektronische Geräte)
Tiroirs et châssis de 19 pouces basés sur le système NIM (pour appareils d'électronique nucléaire)
Dimensions des tiroirs et châssis; dimensions du connec-teur et affectations des broches.
Modular plug-in unit and standard 19-inch rack mounting unit based on NIM standard (for electronic nuclear instruments)
General Information
Standards Content (Sample)
SLOVENSKI SIST HD 370 S2:2003
STANDARD
april 2003
Modular plug-in unit and standard 19-inch rack mounting unit based on NIM
standard (for electronic nuclear instruments)
ICS 27.120.20 Referenčna številka
SIST HD 3
...
This May Also Interest You
This document specifies minimum nuclear criticality safety training requirements for operations staff, operations supervisors, and management.
This document is applicable to areas, processes or facilities containing quantities of fissile material for which nuclear criticality safety assessment is required as defined in ISO 1709.
This document is not applicable to the transport of fissile materials outside the boundaries of nuclear establishments.
- Standard16 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for×1 day
- Draft13 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for×1 day
This document establishes requirements relevant to the selection and use of wireless devices
in instrumentation and control (I&C) systems important to safety used in nuclear power plants
(NPPs). Those I&C systems may fully consist of wireless devices.
NOTE The word “use” refers to the integration of the device, its qualification, administrative control, and every
other activity that may be necessary to use the device in an important to safety application.
This document applies to the I&C of new NPPs and to backfit of I&C in existing NPPs. Every
wireless device or wireless system that is important to safety is in the scope of this document.
Both fixed and mobile devices and all data types (voice, process data, etc.) are included
within the scope if they provide a safety classified function.
This document restricts the use of wireless devices to systems supporting category C
functions according to IEC 61226, excluding explicitly their use for categories A and B.
Non-safety devices and systems may use this document as guidelines, for example to ensure
that important to safety devices are not disturbed.
– Clause 5 describes the fundamental requirements regarding safety and cybersecurity.
– Clause 6 gives wireless-specific requirements that have to be included in the system
design.
– Clause 7 describes the requirements for the selection and integration of wireless devices.
– Clause 8 deals with electromagnetic compatibility and spectrum management.
– Clause 9 gives wireless-specific requirements regarding cybersecurity.
– Clause 10 describes the requirements for the qualification of wireless devices and their
environment.
- Standard21 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for×1 day
- Draft21 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for×1 day
IEC 60987:2021 provides requirements and recommendations for the hardware aspects of I&C systems whatever the technology and applies for all safety classes in a graded manner (as defined by IEC 61513). The requirements defined within this document guide, in particular, the selection of pre-existing components, hardware aspects of system detailed design and implementation and equipment manufacturing.
This third edition cancels and replaces the second edition published in 2007. This edition includes the following significant technical changes with respect to the previous edition:
a) Title modified;
b) Take account of the fact that hardware requirements apply to all I&C technologies, including conventional hardwired equipment, programmable digital equipment or by using a combination of both types of equipment;
c) Align the standard with the new revisions of IAEA documents SSR-2/1, which include as far as possible an adaptation of the definitions;
d) Replace, as far as possible, the requirements associated with standards published since the edition 2.1, especially IEC 61513, IEC 60880, IEC 62138, IEC 62566 and IEC 62566‑2;
e) Review the existing requirements and update the terminology and definitions;
f) Extend the scope of the standard to all hardware (computerized and non-computerized) and to all safety classes 1, 2 and 3;
g) Complete, update the IEC and IAEA references and vocabulary;
h) Check possible impact of other IAEA requirements and recommendations considering extension of the scope of SC 45A;
i) Highlight the use of IEC 62566 and IEC 62566-2 for HPD development;
j) Introduce specific activities for pre-existing items (selection, acceptability and/or mitigation);
k) Introduce clearer requirements for electronic module-level design, manufacturing and control;
l) Complete reliability assessment methods;
m) Introduce requirements when using automated tests or control activities;
n) Complete description of manufacturing control activities (control process, assessment of manufactured equipment, preservation of products);
o) Define and ensure the inclusion of a graded approach for dealing with the 3 different classes of equipment and related requirements.
- Standard53 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for×1 day
- Draft52 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for×1 day
This document specifies the requirements applicable to the design and use of airborne confinement systems that ensure safety and radioprotection functions in nuclear worksites and in nuclear installations under decommissioning to protect from radioactive contamination produced: aerosol or gas.
The purpose of confinement systems is to protect the workers, members of the public and environment against the spread of radioactive contamination resulting from operations in nuclear worksites and from nuclear installations under decommissioning.
The confinement of nuclear worksites and of nuclear installations under decommissioning is characterized by the temporary and evolving (dynamic) nature of the operations to be performed. These operations often take place in area not specifically designed for this purpose.
This document applies to maintenance or upgrades at worksites which fit the above definition.
- Standard43 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for×1 day
- Draft40 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for×1 day
IEC 62855 provides the electrotechnical engineering guidelines for analysis of AC and DC
electrical power systems in nuclear power plants (NPPs) in order to demonstrate that the
power sources and the distribution systems have the capability for safe operation and shut
down of the NPP, bringing it to a controlled state after an anticipated operational occurrence
or accident conditions and finally reaching a safe state.
The analytical studies discussed in this document provide assurance that the design bases
are satisfied to meet their functional requirements under the conditions produced by the
applicable design basis events. The studies provide assurance that the electrical power
system is capable of supporting safety functions during all required plant conditions.
NOTE The safety functions are described in IAEA Specific Safety Requirements SSR-2/1 related to the design of
the nuclear power plants..
Analytical studies validate the robustness and adequacy of design margins and demonstrate
the capability of electrical power systems to support plant operation for normal, abnormal,
degraded and accident conditions.
The analyses are used to verify that the electrical power system can withstand minor
disturbances and that the consequences of major disturbances or failures do not degrade the
capability of the electrical power systems to support safe shutdown of the plant and maintain
the plant in shutdown condition.
The analyses are performed with one or more of
• simulation tools (software and hardware) that have been verified and validated,
• hand calculations, and
• tests.
This document provides guidance on the types of analyses required to demonstrate that the
plant's auxiliary power system can perform the required safety functions. This document does
not provide specific details on how the analysis should be conducted.
This document does not cover digital controllers (such as controllers for rectifiers, inverters,
sequencers and electrical protection devices) used in electrical power systems. IEC 61513
gives recommendations that apply to the electronic controls and protective elements of the
electrical power systems.
This document does not include environmental conditions (i.e. temperature, humidity, etc.) or
external events (seismic, flooding, fire, high energy electromagnetic pulse, etc.) that may
impact equipment sizing or protection requirements. The external events lightning and
geomagnetic storms are included.
This document does not cover additional or unique requirements for stand-alone power
system, such as power supplies for security measures in NPPs. Pertinent clauses of this
document may be used as a guideline for such systems.
Redundancy in the power system design can increase the availability of electrical power to
critical plant equipment. Performing a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is a method of
assessing system availability and optimizing design for high reliability. This document does
not cover improving the reliability of NPP electrical power systems using statistical or diverse
and redundant schemes.
Requirements for safeguards of personnel involved with installation, maintenance and
operation of electrical systems and general personal safety are outside the scope of this
document. General guidance for lightning protection of equipment is provided in relevant
clauses of this document.
This document is intended to be used:
• for verification of the design of new nuclear power plants,
• for demonstrating the adequacy and impact of major modifications of electrical power
systems in operating nuclear power plants, and
• where there is a requirement to assess and establish operating limits and constraints for
existing plants.
Pertinent parts of this document can be used as guidance for decommissioning stages.
- Standard60 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for×1 day
- Draft60 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for×1 day
This part of IEC/IEEE 62582 contains methods for condition monitoring of organic and
polymeric materials in instrumentation and control cables using insulation resistance
measurements in the detail necessary to produce accurate and reproducible results during
simulated accident conditions. It includes the requirements for the measurement system and
measurement procedure, and the reporting of the measurement results.
NOTE Measurement of insulation resistance during simulated accident conditions with the aim of determining the
lowest value during the accident in order to assess cable performance involves special requirements given in this
document. Methods for measurement under stable (non-accident) conditions are available in other international
standards, e.g. IEC 62631-3-3.
The different parts of the IEC/IEEE 62582 series are measurement standards, primarily for
use in the management of ageing in initial qualification and after installation. IEC/IEEE 62582-
1 includes requirements for the application of the other parts of the IEC/IEEE 62582 series
and some elements which are common to all methods. Information on the role of condition
monitoring in qualification of equipment important to safety is found in IEC/IEEE 60780-323.
- Standard27 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for×1 day
- Draft27 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for×1 day
This document presents the requirements for the on-site emergency response facilities
(referred to hereinafter as the “ERF”) which are to be used in case of incidents or accidents
occurring on the associated Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). The ERF consists of the Emergency
Response Centre (ERC), the Technical Support Centre (TSC) and the Operational Support
Centre (OSC), as shown in Figure 1.
It establishes requirements for the ERF features and ERF I&C equipment to:
• coordinate on-site operational efforts with respect to safety and radioprotection;
• optimize the design in terms of environment control, lighting, power supplies and access
control of the ERF;
• enhance the identification and resolution of potential conflicts between the traditional
operational means and emergency means (MCR/SCR and ERF, operating staff and
emergency teams, operational procedures and emergency procedures);
• aid the identification and the enhancement of the potential synergies between the
traditional operational means and emergency means.
This document is intended for application to new nuclear power plants whose conceptual
design is initiated after the publication of this document, but it may also be used for designing
and implementing ERF in existing nuclear power plants or in any other nuclear facility.
Detailed equipment design is outside the scope of this document.
This document does not define the situations (reactor plant conditions, hazards and
magnitudes of hazards) leading to mobilisation of emergency response teams and activation /
use of the ERF. These aspects are usually addressed in the NPP Emergency Plan. However,
the need for consistency of the ERF design and operation with the NPP Emergency Plan is
within scope.
- Standard29 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for×1 day
- Draft29 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for×1 day
This document establishes, for nuclear power plants2, a method of assignment of the
functions specified for the plant into categories according to their importance to safety.
Subsequent classification of the I&C and electrical power systems performing or supporting
these functions, based on the assigned category, then determines relevant design criteria.
The design criteria, when applied, ensure the achievement of each function in accordance to
its importance to safety. In this document, the criteria are those of functionality, reliability,
performance, environmental qualification (e.g. seismic) and quality assurance (QA).
This document is applicable to:
- the functions important to safety that are performed by I&C systems and supported by
electrical power systems (categorization of I&C functions),
- the I&C systems that enable those functions to be implemented (classification of I&C
systems),
- the electrical power systems that support those functions (classification of electrical power
systems).
The systems under consideration provide automated protection, closed or open loop control,
information to the operating staff, and electrical power supply to systems. These systems
keep the NPP conditions inside the safe operating envelope and provide automatic actions, or
enable manual actions, that prevent or mitigate accidents, or that prevent or minimize
radioactive releases to the site or wider environment. The I&C and electrical power systems
that fulfil these roles safeguard the health and safety of the NPP operators and the public.
This document follows the general principles given in IAEA Safety Requirement SSR-2/1 and
Safety Guides SSG-30, SSG-34 and SSG-39, and it defines a structured method of applying
the guidance contained in those codes and standards to the I&C and electrical power systems
that perform functions important to safety in a NPP. This document is read in association with
the IAEA guides together with IEC 61513 and IEC 63046 in implementing the requirements of
the IEC 61508 series. The overall classification scheme of structures, systems and
components for NPPs can be summarized as follows by Figure 1.
- Standard43 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for×1 day
- Draft43 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for×1 day
This document:
• provides requirements and recommendations for the overall Electrical Power System. In
particular, it covers interruptible and uninterruptible Electrical Power Systems including
the systems supplying the I&C systems;
• is consistent and coherent with IEC 61513. Like IEC 61513, this document also highlights
the need for complete and precise requirements, derived from the plant safety goals.
Those requirements are prerequisites for generating the comprehensive requirements for
the overall Electrical Power System architecture, and for the electrical power supply subsystems;
• has to be considered in conjunction with and at the same level as IEC 61513. These two
standards provide a complete framework establishing general requirements for
instrumentation, control, and Electrical Power System for Nuclear Power Plants.
This document establishes:
• the high level specification and requirement to implement a suitable Electrical Power
System in a NPP that supports reactor systems important to safety. It also enables
electrical energy production providing the transmission grid with active and reactive power
and electro-mechanical inertia;
• the relationships between:
– the plant safety requirements and the architecture of the overall Electrical Power
System and its sub-systems (see Figure 1) including:
a) the contribution to the plant Defence in Depth;
b) the independency and redundancy provisions;
– the electrical requirements and the architecture of the Electrical Power System and its
sub-systems;
– the functional requirements and the architecture of the Electrical Power System and its
sub-systems;
– the requirements associated with the maintenance strategy and the architecture of the
Electrical Power System and its sub-systems;
• the design of Electrical power sub-systems (e.g. interruptible and uninterruptible);
• the requirements for supporting systems of Electrical Power System (HVAC, I&C, etc.);
• the Electrical Power System life-cycle framework.
This document does not cover the specification of:
• I&C systems;
• the transmission lines connecting to substations outside the NPP;
• electrical equipment requirements already defined in the industrial IEC standards;
• electrical power for security systems (e.g., fences, surveillance systems, entrance
control);
• lighting and socket facility.
This document does not consider power production requirements.
- Standard91 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for×1 day
- Draft91 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for×1 day
This International Standard describes methods for establishing seismic qualification procedures
that will yield quantitative data to demonstrate that the equipment can meet its performance
requirements. This document is applicable to electrical, mechanical, instrumentation and control
equipment/components that are used in nuclear facilities. This document provides methods and
documentation requirements for seismic qualification of equipment to verify the equipment’s
ability to perform its specified performance requirements during and/or after specified seismic
demands. This document does not specify seismic demand or performance requirements. Other
aspects, relating to quality assurance, selection of equipment, and design and modification of
systems, are not part of this document. As seismic qualification is only a part of equipment
qualification, this document is used in conjunction with IEC/IEEE 60780-323.
The seismic qualification demonstrates equipment’s ability to perform its safety function(s)
during and/or after the time it is subjected to the forces resulting from at least one safe shutdown
earthquake (SSE/S2). This ability is demonstrated by taking into account, prior to the SSE/S2,
the ageing of equipment and the postulated occurrences of a given number of lower intensity
operating basis earthquake (OBE/S1). Ageing phenomena to be considered, if specified in the
design specification, are those which could increase the vulnerability of equipment to vibrations
caused by an SSE/S2.
- Standard85 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for×1 day
- Draft85 pagesEnglish languagesale 10% offe-Library read for×1 day
Questions, Comments and Discussion
Ask us and Technical Secretary will try to provide an answer. You can facilitate discussion about the standard in here.