SIST-TP CLC/TR 50515:2009
List of interpretations on published standards on Alarm Systems
List of interpretations on published standards on Alarm Systems
This is a list of interpretations to currently published standards.
Liste von Interpretationen auf herausgegebenen Standards auf Alarmanlagen
Liste d'interprétations sur les normes publiées sur les Systèmes d'alarme
Seznam interpretacij izdanih standardov za alarmne sisteme
General Information
Standards Content (Sample)
SLOVENSKI STANDARD
SIST-TP CLC/TR 50515:2009
01-marec-2009
Seznam interpretacij izdanih standardov za alarmne sisteme
List of interpretations on published standards on Alarm Systems
Liste von Interpretationen auf herausgegebenen Standards auf Alarmanlagen
Liste d'interprétations sur les normes publiées sur les Systèmes d'alarme
Ta slovenski standard je istoveten z: CLC/TR 50515:2008
ICS:
13.320 Alarmni in opozorilni sistemi Alarm and warning systems
SIST-TP CLC/TR 50515:2009 en
2003-01.Slovenski inštitut za standardizacijo. Razmnoževanje celote ali delov tega standarda ni dovoljeno.
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SIST-TP CLC/TR 50515:2009
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SIST-TP CLC/TR 50515:2009
TECHNICAL REPORT
CLC/TR 50515
RAPPORT TECHNIQUE
December 2008
TECHNISCHER BERICHT
ICS 11.040.40
English version
List of interpretations on published standards
on "Alarm Systems"
Liste d'interprétations Liste von Interpretationen
sur les normes publiées auf herausgegebenen Standards
sur les "Systèmes d'alarme" auf "Alarmanlagen"
This Technical Report was approved by CENELEC on 2008-07-04.
CENELEC members are the national electrotechnical committees of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
CENELEC
European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization
Comité Européen de Normalisation Electrotechnique
Europäisches Komitee für Elektrotechnische Normung
Central Secretariat: rue de Stassart 35, B - 1050 Brussels
© 2008 CENELEC - All rights of exploitation in any form and by any means reserved worldwide for CENELEC members.
Ref. No. CLC/TR 50515:2008 E
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CLC/TR 50515:2008 – 2 –
Foreword
This Technical Report was prepared by the Technical Committee CENELEC TC 79, Alarm systems.
The text of the draft was submitted to vote in accordance with the Internal Regulations, Part 2,
Subclause 11.4.3.3 (simple majority) and was approved by CENELEC as CLC/TR 50515 on
2008-07-24.
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Contents
1 Sc op e . . 4
2 List of interpretations . 4
2.1 EN 50131-1:1997 “Alarm systems – Intrusion systems – Part 1: General
r e q u i r e m ents ” . 4
2.1.1 Subclause 8.7.1 . 4
2.1.2 Subclause 8.7.2, Table 7 . 4
2.1.3 Subclause 8.3.1, level 3 . 4
2.1.4 Subclause 8.3.1, level 4 . 5
2.1.5 Subclause 8.3.1 contradict with Clause 6 . 5
2.2 EN 50131-6:1997 inconsistencies with EN 50131-1:1997 . 6
2.2.1 Subclause 4.2.1 . 6
2.2.2 Table 2 and Note on page 9 . 6
2.2.3 Table 2 and Note on page 9 . 6
2.2.4 Table 4 . 7
2.2.5 Subclause 8.2.14 . 7
2.2.6 Table 11 . 8
2.2.7 Subclause 8.4.6 a) . 8
2.2.8 Table 19 . 9
2.2.9 Subclause 8.4.10 c) . 9
2.3 EN 50131-6:1997 “Alarm systems – Intrusion systems – Part 6: Power supplies” . 10
2.3.1 Subclauses 3.1.16, 5.4 and 8.2.10 . 10
2.3.2 Subclause 8.2.12 . 10
2.4 EN 50131-1:1997 “Alarm systems – Intrusion systems – Part 1: General
r e q u i r e m ents ” . 10
2.4.1 Subclause 8.1.1 . 10
2.5 CLC/TS 50131-7:2003 “Alarm systems – Intrusion systems – Part 7: Application
guidelines” . 11
2.6 EN 50131-6:1997 + Corrigendum 1998 “Alarm systems – Intrusion systems –
Part 6: Power supplies” . 11
2.6.1 Table 1 . 11
2.6.2 Table 2 . 12
2.7 EN 50130-4:1995 “Alarm systems – Part 4: Electromagnetic compatibility –
Product family standard: Immunity requirements for components of fire, intruder
and social alarm systems” . 12
2.8 EN 50136-1-2:1998 “Alarm systems – Alarm transmission systems and
equipment – Part 1-2: Requirements for systems using dedicated alarm paths” . 13
st
2.8.1 Subclause 5.1, 1 paragraph . 13
2.9 CLC/TS 50131-7:2003 “Alarm systems – Intrusion systems – Part 7: Application
guidelines” . 14
2.9.1 Subclauses 7.3.4.1 and 7.3.4.2 . 14
2.9.2 Subclauses 7.3.4.1 and 7.3.4.2 . 14
2.9.3 Subclauses 7.3.4.1 and 7.3.4.2 . 15
2.9.4 Subclauses 7.3.4.1 and 7.3.4.2 . 15
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CLC/TR 50515:2008 – 4 –
1 Scope
This is a list of interpretations to currently published standards.
2 List of interpretations
2.1 EN 50131-1:1997 “Alarm systems – Intrusion systems – Part 1: General
requirements”
2.1.1 Subclause 8.7.1
2.1.1.1 Question
st
In the 1 paragraph of 8.7.1, it is expressed that the system components shall provide means to
prevent access to internal elements in general and that tamper protection depends on the grade of
IAS and whether the system components are located within or outside the supervised area.
nd
In the 2 paragraph of 8.7.1, it is stated that system components of IAS located external to the
supervised premises shall have means of tamper protection and detection. The question is, if (all) the
system components within the supervised area need a certain tamper protection?
2.1.1.2 CLC/TC 79 response
th
The 4 paragraph of 8.7.1 requires housings (of all systems components as no limitations or grading
requirements are included) to be “sufficiently to prevent undetected access without visible damage”.
Individual component standards should include requirements appropriate to the type of equipment.
2.1.2 Subclause 8.7.2, Table 7
2.1.2.1 Question
nd
In contradiction to the requirements of the 2 paragraph of 8.7.1, in Table 7 in all grades tamper
protection is required mandatory without any dependability on the situation of the components.
2.1.2.2 CLC/TC 79 response
nd
The reference to “detection” in the 2 paragraph of 8.7.1 is an error. The reference should be deleted
as requirements for “Tamper detection” are specified in 8.7.2.
2.1.3 Subclause 8.3.1, level 3
2.1.3.1 Question
Not only devices, which are generally, termed control and indicating equipment (CIE) but also
detectors contain configurable elements, which are matched to the system (Table 1, penultimate row).
It can be concluded that, at the least, all movements detectors with configurable sensitivity or a
variable angle of detection must be provided with access restrictions. Is this correct ?
2.1.3.2 CLC/TC 79 response
The requirements included in 8.3.1, level 3 were intended to apply to access to functions/controls as
specified in Table 1. When a system component includes the facilities described in Table 1 the
requirements of 8.3.1 shall be achieved. Access to configurable adjustable elements of system
components e.g. detectors, are addressed by the requirements relating to tamper security
(EN 50131-1, 8.7). Normal access to these elements would require the tamper detection function to be
inhibited/isolated, which would require authorisation as specified in 8.3.6 and 8.3.7.
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2.1.4 Subclause 8.3.1, level 4
2.1.4.1 Question
In conjunction with 8.3.2 it is required that an alteration to or a substitution of the main program is
subject to a logical or physical access restriction exceeding level 3.
The operating program of control panels in common use is typically located in a socketed PROM or a
PROM which is able to be programmed in situ. Either way it is easy to manipulate as far as access
level 3 is concerned. A socketed PROM can simply be exchanged. A fixed PROM can be easily
reprogrammed, with commercially available equipment by directly connecting to the hardware.
The conclusion in the future will be that all devices with PROMs must have a further level of security.
This could be for example padlocks protecting the socketed PROMs. For consistency soldered
PROMs must be secured against desoldering so as to comply with the requirements of Table 2. One
must not forget that a soldering iron is normally a usual tool whereas a key, even a simple one,
represents a higher level of security. Is this correct?
2.1.4.2 CLC/TC 79 response
The requirements included in 8.3.1, level 4 were intended to apply to access to functions/controls as
specified in Table 1 only when changes to equipment design are possible without access to the
internal elements of the system components, i.e. without accessing the equipment by normal means.
NOTE The requirements included in EN 50131-1 apply to “installed systems”. When the requirements were developed it was
assumed that a manufacturer wishing to “change equipment design” would have two choices:
a) change/replace hardware;
b) change/replace software.
In the event of hardware being replaced it would be necessary for the manufacturer to be authorised
to access the CIE to isolate/inhibit the system component tamper detection function.
When the hardware being replaced was the CIE (or part of a CIE) authorisation, at access level 4,
would be required to isolate/inhibit the tamper detection function of the CIE.
In the event of software being replaced, if access to the internal elements of the systems component
were required, the same requirements apply as for replacing hardware.
When software can be replaced without accessing the internal elements of a system component, e.g.
remotely by a modem or a local external connection, authorisation would be required at access level 4
to permit such changes.
Any attempt to change hardware or software without authorisation at access level 4 to isolate/inhibit
the tamper detection function or permit software changes would result in the generation of a tamper
signal or message.
In the event of a change to equipment design by either hardware or software means the system would
require re-commissioning and that issue will be addressed in CLC/TS 50131-7 “Alarm systems –
Intrusion systems – Part 7: Application guidelines”.
2.1.5 Subclause 8.3.1 contradict with Clause 6
Classes 1 and 2 are based upon an intruder who has very little or no technical knowledge (Clause 6).
From the operator's point of view it is therefore incomprehensible that locks are required on class 1
and 2 housings. It is out of question that in these classes the owner/user would be the intruder.
This ambiguity in the standard may be a source for very differing conformance statements made by
the various testing laboratories all over Europe, which cannot be accepted.
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Subclause 8.3.1 specifies that access, to the functions specified in Table 1, at levels 2, 3 and 4 must
be restricted by “means of a key or code operated switch or lock or other equivalent means”.
Requirements for authorisation are included in 8.3.2, which makes reference to Table 2, which uses
the terms “logical or physical key”. Therefore “access” may be restricted by logical or physical key or
any equivalent means.
Requirements relating to “housings” are included in 8.7.1 “Tamper Protection” which specifies
requirements relating to access to internal elements of system components.
2.2 EN 50131-6:1997 inconsistencies with EN 50131-1:1997
2.2.1 Subclause 4.2.1
2.2.1.1 Question
The text under Table 1 about fault signal within 10 s is an unnecessary requirement. Vds regulations
require 1 h. We will quote national remark about its non necessity.
2.2.1.2 CLC/TC 79 response
10 s is adequate for the generation of an EPS fault signal, delays in the annunciation of this signal
would then be a “System requirement”. However, we agree that, depending on how the document is
interpreted, 10 s for the generation of an APS fault signal could be regarded as incorrect.
CLC/TC 79/WG 3 recommends that the two paragraphs under Table 1 in EN 50131-6 are changed to:
An APS fault signal shall be generated within 10 s of the completion of the internal APS test, if one of
the following conditions occurs (according Table 1):
2.2.2 Table 2 and Note on page 9
2.2.2.1 Question
Compliance with the relevant chapters of EN 50131-1: is there meant Table 16 and why are multiple
differences ?
2.2.2.2 CLC/TC 79 response
Agree. Table 2 in EN 50131-6 should be changed to be the same as Table 16 of EN 50131-1 and the
subsequent note should be deleted.
2.2.3 Table 2 and Note on page 9
2.2.3.1 Question
Instead of i, ii, iii, iv, it should be I, II, III, IV. Will it be changed ?
2.2.3.2 CLC/TC 79 response
CLC/TC 79 agrees with the comment and recommends that the document is checked to ensure that it
complies with PNE rules.
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2.2.4 Table 4
2.2.4.1 Question
Severity level in grade 3: do not correspond to EN 50103.
2.2.4.2 CLC/TC 79 response
In order to correct the mistake, Table 4 in EN 50131-6 should be updated as follows:
Table 4 – Tamper protection
Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4
Severity level (IK code) 07 07 07 08
Impact energy (Joule) 2 2 2 5
However, reviewing the document, CLC/TC 79 recommends modifying Table 4 in EN 50131-6 to be
the same as Table 14 in CLC/TS 50131-3:
Table 4 – Tamper protection
Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4
Int Ext Int Ext Int Ext Int Ext
Severity level (IK code) 04 06 04 06 04 06 04 06
Impact energy (Joule) 0,5 1 0,5 1 0,5 1 0,5 1
NOTE Int = inside the supervised premises
Ext = outside the supervised premises (indoor or outdoor).
2.2.5 Subclause 8.2.14
2.2.5.1 Question
Items b) and c) are mutually contraindicating disconnecting of EPS. Will it be changed ?
2.2.5.2 CLC/TC 79 response
Accept the comment: Subclause 8.2.14 is to be modified as follows:
8.2.14 Low output voltage
a) Object
To demonstrate the ability of the PS to generate a power output fault signal, when the voltage at
any or all of the PS outputs falls below the minimum power output voltage level with the EPS
disconnected and SD connected.
b) Principle
The test consists of applying a load of 100 % of the maximum rating of the PS with the EPS
disconnected and monitoring the voltage until a low voltage output signal is generated.
c) Test conditions
For types A and B PS the EPS shall be disconnected and a charged storage device shall be
connected. For type C PS a charged SD shall be connected.
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d) Test procedure
Apply an increasing load to the PS output whilst monitoring the status of the low power output
fault signal.
e) Measurement
Record the status of the low power output fault signal.
f) Pass/fail criteria
A low power output fault signal shall be generated when the PS output voltage falls below the
minimum power output voltage (see 3.1.8) by more than 10 %.
2.2.6 Table 11
2.2.6.1 Question
There is a missing ‘M: mandatory’.
2.2.6.2 CLC/TC 79 response
Add at the bottom of the Table 11, the definition: ‘M = mandatory’.
2.2.7 Subclause 8.4.6 a)
2.2.7.1 Question
Damp heat cyclic is only for class III, but Table 17 is for classes II, III, IV. Will it be changed ?
2.2.7.2 CLC/TC 79 response
The object of the test is to be modified as follows:
a) Object
To demonstrate the immunity of the equipment
...
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