SIST-TS CEN ISO/TS 19299:2016
(Main)Electronic fee collection - Security framework (ISO/TS 19299:2015)
Electronic fee collection - Security framework (ISO/TS 19299:2015)
Based on the system architecture defined in ISO 17573, the security framework
describes a set of requirements and security measures for stakeholders to
implement and operate their part of an electronic fee collection (EFC) system as
required for a trustworthy environment according to its basic information security
policy. In general the overall scope is an information security framework for all
organisational and technical entities and in detail for the interfaces between
them.
This Technical Specification is based on the assumption of an OBE which is
dedicated to EFC purposes only and does neither consider value added services
based on EFC OBE, nor more generic OBE platforms (called in-vehicle ITS Stations)
used to host the EFC application.
The scope of this security framework comprises the following:
- general information security objectives of the stakeholders;
- threat analysis;
- definition of a trust model;
- security requirements;
- security measures – countermeasures;
- security specifications for interface implementation;
- key management;
- security policies;
- privacy-enabled implementations.
Outside the scope of this Technical Specification is:
- a complete risk assessment for an EFC system;
- security issues rising from an EFC application running on an ITS station;
- entities and interfaces of the interoperability management role;
- the technical trust relation of the model between TSP and User;
- a complete specification and description of all necessary security measures to all
identified threats;
- concrete implementation specifications for implementation of security for EFC
system, e.g. European electronic toll service (EETS);
-detailed specifications required for privacy-friendly EFC implementations.
Elektronische Gebührenerhebung - Sicherheitsgrundstruktur (ISO/TS 19299:2015)
Perception de télépéage - Cadre de sécurité (ISO/TS 19299:2015)
Le domaine d'application général de l'ISO/TS 19299:2015 consiste à fournir un cadre de sécurité de l'information pour l'ensemble des entités organisationnelles et techniques d'un plan de perception du télépéage (EFC), et plus particulièrement pour les interfaces entre elles, sur la base de l'architecture système définie dans l'ISO 17573. Le cadre de sécurité décrit un ensemble d'exigences et de mesures de sécurité associées destinées à être mises en ?uvre par les parties prenantes, garantissant ainsi un fonctionnement sécurisé de leur partie d'un système EFC, tel que l'exige la politique de sécurité d'un environnement de confiance.
Le domaine d'application de l'ISO/TS 19299:2015 inclut:
la définition d'un modèle de confiance;
Principes et hypothèses de base pour l'établissement de relations de confiance entre les parties prenantes.
les exigences de sécurité;
les mesures de sécurité ? contre-mesures;
Exigences de sécurité relatives à la prise en charge des mises en ?uvre du système EFC actuel.
les spécifications de sécurité relatives à la mise en ?uvre de l'interface;
Ces spécifications offrent une extension de sécurité aux normes correspondantes.
la gestion des clés;
Couvre l'instauration (initiale) de l'échange de clés entre les parties prenantes et plusieurs procédures opérationnelles telles que le renouvellement de clés, la révocation de certificats, etc.
les profils de sécurité;
la déclaration de conformité de la mise en ?uvre propose une liste de contrôle devant être utilisée par un fournisseur d'équipement, un chargé de mise en ?uvre d'un système ou l'acteur d'un rôle pour déclarer sa conformité à l'ISO/TS 19299:2015;
les objectifs généraux de sécurité de l'information des parties prenantes qui constituent le principal motif des exigences de sécurité;
l'analyse des menaces inhérentes au modèle de système EFC et à ses actifs en utilisant deux méthodes complémentaires distinctes, une analyse basée sur les attaques et une analyse basée sur les actifs;
des exemples de politiques de sécurité;
les recommandations relatives à une mise en ?uvre axée sur la protection de la vie privée;
une proposition relative aux certificats d'entité finale.
Elektronsko pobiranje pristojbin - Varnostni okvir (ISO/TS 19299:2015)
Ta tehnična specifikacija:
– Opisuje zahteve in priporočene metode, na podlagi katerih lahko zdravniki zbirajo, analizirajo in označujejo klinične kontekste, vsebine ter strukture podrobnih kliničnih modelov.
– Določa podrobne klinične modele (DCM) na podlagi osnovnega logičnega modela. To so logični modeli kliničnih pojmov in jih je mogoče uporabiti za določitev in strukturiranje kliničnih informacij.
– Opisuje zahteve in načela za modele DCM, metapodatke, shranjevanje različic, specifikacijo vsebine in konteksta, specifikacijo podatkovnih elementov in razmerij med njimi ter podaja napotke in primere.
– Določa načela upravljanja modelov DCM za namene zagotavljanja zasnovne celovitosti vseh atributov DCM
in natančnosti logičnega modela.
– Opisuje razvoj modelov DCM in metodološka načela, s katerimi se podpre izdelava
kakovostnih modelov DCM za namene zmanjšanja tveganja in zagotavljanja varnosti pacientov.
Ta tehnična specifikacija se ne uporablja za:
– Podrobno vsebino primerkov podrobnih kliničnih modelov. Primer: ta tehnična specifikacija ne določa konkretnih podatkovnih elementov za Glasgowsko lestvico nezavesti, telesno višino ipd. (razen nekaterih primerov razlag členov). Vključuje pa navodila o tem, kako pravilno določiti klinično znanje po Glasgowski lestvici nezavesti ali telesni višini, kako pravilno prepoznati, poimenovati in modelirati podatkovne elemente za te klinične koncepte ter kako podati enolične kode posameznim podatkovnim elementom in (če je mogoče) naborom vrednosti. Povedano drugače, opisuje način ustvarjanja primerkov, vendar ne vključuje posameznih primerkov.
– Specifikacije dinamičnega modeliranja, npr. poteka dela.
– Specifikacije za modeliranje celotnih domen ali agregatov številnih podrobnih kliničnih modelov, npr. celotne dokumentacije pregledov ali povzetkov odpustnic. Ne določa sestave modelov DCM.
General Information
Relations
Standards Content (Sample)
SLOVENSKI STANDARD
SIST-TS CEN ISO/TS 19299:2016
01-marec-2016
1DGRPHãþD
SIST-TS CEN/TS 16439:2013
Elektronsko pobiranje pristojbin - Varnostni okvir (ISO/TS 19299:2015)
Electronic fee collection - Security framework (ISO/TS 19299:2015)
Elektronische Gebührenerhebung - Sicherheitsgrundstruktur (ISO/TS 19299:2015)
Perception de télépéage - Cadre de sécurité (ISO/TS 19299:2015)
Ta slovenski standard je istoveten z: CEN ISO/TS 19299:2015
ICS:
35.240.60 Uporabniške rešitve IT v IT applications in transport
transportu in trgovini and trade
SIST-TS CEN ISO/TS 19299:2016 en,fr,de
2003-01.Slovenski inštitut za standardizacijo. Razmnoževanje celote ali delov tega standarda ni dovoljeno.
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SIST-TS CEN ISO/TS 19299:2016
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SIST-TS CEN ISO/TS 19299:2016
CEN ISO/TS 19299
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION
SPÉCIFICATION TECHNIQUE
October 2015
TECHNISCHE SPEZIFIKATION
ICS 35.240.60; 03.220.20 Supersedes CEN/TS 16439:2013
English Version
Electronic fee collection - Security framework (ISO/TS
19299:2015)
Perception de télépéage - Cadre de sécurité (ISO/TS Elektronische Gebührenerhebung -
19299:2015) Sicherheitsgrundstruktur (ISO/TS 19299:2015)
This Technical Specification (CEN/TS) was approved by CEN on 26 June 2015 for provisional application.
The period of validity of this CEN/TS is limited initially to three years. After two years the members of CEN will be requested to
submit their comments, particularly on the question whether the CEN/TS can be converted into a European Standard.
CEN members are required to announce the existence of this CEN/TS in the same way as for an EN and to make the CEN/TS
available promptly at national level in an appropriate form. It is permissible to keep conflicting national standards in force (in
parallel to the CEN/TS) until the final decision about the possible conversion of the CEN/TS into an EN is reached.
CEN members are the national standards bodies of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and
United Kingdom.
EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR STANDARDIZATION
COMITÉ EUROPÉEN DE NORMALISATION
EUROPÄISCHES KOMITEE FÜR NORMUNG
CEN-CENELEC Management Centre: Avenue Marnix 17, B-1000 Brussels
© 2015 CEN All rights of exploitation in any form and by any means reserved Ref. No. CEN ISO/TS 19299:2015 E
worldwide for CEN national Members.
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SIST-TS CEN ISO/TS 19299:2016
CEN ISO/TS 19299:2015 (E)
Contents Page
European foreword . 3
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SIST-TS CEN ISO/TS 19299:2016
CEN ISO/TS 19299:2015 (E)
European foreword
This document (CEN ISO/TS 19299:2015) has been prepared by Technical Committee ISO/TC 204
"Intelligent transport systems" in collaboration with Technical Committee CEN/TC 278 “Intelligent
transport systems” the secretariat of which is held by NEN.
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of
patent rights. CEN [and/or CENELEC] shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent
rights.
This document supersedes CEN/TS 16439:2013.
This document has been prepared under a mandate given to CEN by the European Commission and the
European Free Trade Association.
According to the CEN-CENELEC Internal Regulations, the national standards organizations of the
following countries are bound to announce this Technical Specification: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey and the United Kingdom.
Endorsement notice
The text of ISO/TS 19299:2015 has been approved by CEN as CEN ISO/TS 19299:2015 without any
modification.
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SIST-TS CEN ISO/TS 19299:2016
TECHNICAL ISO/TS
SPECIFICATION 19299
First edition
2015-10-01
Electronic fee collection — Security
framework
Perception de télépéage — Cadre de sécurité
Reference number
ISO/TS 19299:2015(E)
©
ISO 2015
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SIST-TS CEN ISO/TS 19299:2016
ISO/TS 19299:2015(E)
COPYRIGHT PROTECTED DOCUMENT
© ISO 2015, Published in Switzerland
All rights reserved. Unless otherwise specified, no part of this publication may be reproduced or utilized otherwise in any form
or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, or posting on the internet or an intranet, without prior
written permission. Permission can be requested from either ISO at the address below or ISO’s member body in the country of
the requester.
ISO copyright office
Ch. de Blandonnet 8 • CP 401
CH-1214 Vernier, Geneva, Switzerland
Tel. +41 22 749 01 11
Fax +41 22 749 09 47
copyright@iso.org
www.iso.org
ii © ISO 2015 – All rights reserved
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SIST-TS CEN ISO/TS 19299:2016
ISO/TS 19299:2015(E)
Contents Page
Foreword .v
Introduction .vi
1 Scope . 1
2 Normative references . 2
3 Terms and definitions . 4
4 Symbols and abbreviated terms . 9
5 Trust model .10
5.1 Overview .10
5.2 Stakeholders trust relations .10
5.3 Technical trust model .11
5.3.1 General.11
5.3.2 Trust model for TC and TSP relations .11
5.3.3 Trust model for TSP and service user relations .13
5.3.4 Trust model for Interoperability Management relations .13
5.4 Implementation .13
5.4.1 Setup of trust relations .13
5.4.2 Trust relation renewal and revocation .14
5.4.3 Issuing and revocation of sub CA and end-entity certificates .14
5.4.4 Certificate and certificate revocation list profile and format .15
5.4.5 Certificate extensions .15
6 Security requirements .17
6.1 General .17
6.2 Information security management system .18
6.3 Communication interfaces .18
6.4 Data storage .19
6.5 Toll charger .19
6.6 Toll service provider .21
6.7 Interoperability Management .23
6.8 Limitation of requirements .23
7 Security measures — countermeasures .24
7.1 Overview .24
7.2 General security measures .24
7.3 Communication interfaces security measures .25
7.3.1 General.25
7.3.2 DSRC-EFC interface . .26
7.3.3 CCC interface .27
7.3.4 LAC interface .28
7.3.5 Front End to TSP back end interface .28
7.3.6 TC to TSP interface .29
7.3.7 ICC interface .30
7.4 End-to-end security measures .30
7.5 Toll service provider security measures .32
7.5.1 Front end security measures .32
7.5.2 Back end security measures .33
7.6 Toll charger security measures .34
7.6.1 RSE security measures . .34
7.6.2 Back end security measures .34
7.6.3 Other TC security measures .35
8 Security specifications for interoperable interface implementation .35
8.1 General .35
8.1.1 Subject.35
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8.1.2 Signature and hash algorithms .35
8.2 Security specifications for DSRC-EFC .36
8.2.1 Subject.36
8.2.2 OBE .36
8.2.3 RSE .36
9 Key management .36
9.1 Overview .36
9.2 Asymmetric keys .36
9.2.1 Key exchange between stakeholders .36
9.2.2 Key generation and certification .37
9.2.3 Protection of keys .37
9.2.4 Application .37
9.3 Symmetric keys .38
9.3.1 General.38
9.3.2 Key exchange between stakeholders .38
9.3.3 Key lifecycle .39
9.3.4 Key storage and protection .40
9.3.5 Session keys .41
Annex A (normative) Security profiles .42
Annex B (normative) Implementation conformance statement (ICS) proforma .46
Annex C (informative) Stakeholder objectives and generic requirements .64
Annex D (informative) Threat analysis .68
Annex E (informative) Security policies .124
Annex F (informative) Example for an EETS security policy .131
Annex G (informative) Recommendations for privacy-focused implementation .133
Annex H (informative) Proposal for end-entity certificates.135
Bibliography .136
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SIST-TS CEN ISO/TS 19299:2016
ISO/TS 19299:2015(E)
Foreword
ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) and IEC (the International Electrotechnical
Commission) form the specialized system for worldwide standardization. National bodies that are
members of ISO or IEC participate in the development of International Standards through technical
committees established by the respective organization to deal with particular fields of technical
activity. ISO and IEC technical committees collaborate in fields of mutual interest. Other international
organizations, governmental and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO and IEC, also take part in the
work. In the field of information technology, ISO and IEC have established a joint technical committee,
ISO/IEC JTC 1.
The procedures used to develop this document and those intended for its further maintenance are
described in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1. In particular the different approval criteria needed for
the different types of document should be noted. This document was drafted in accordance with the
editorial rules of the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2 (see www.iso.org/directives).
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject
of patent rights. ISO and IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent
rights. Details of any patent rights identified during the development of the document will be in the
Introduction and/or on the ISO list of patent declarations received (see www.iso.org/patents).
Any trade name used in this document is information given for the convenience of users and does not
constitute an endorsement.
For an explanation on the meaning of ISO specific terms and expressions related to conformity
assessment, as well as information about ISO’s adherence to the WTO principles in the Technical
Barriers to Trade (TBT) see the following URL: Foreword - Supplementary information
ISO/TS 19299 was prepared by European Committee for Standardization (CEN) in collaboration with
ISO/TC 204, Intelligent transport systems, in accordance with the agreement on technical cooperation
between ISO and CEN (Vienna Agreement).
This first edition of ISO/TS 19299 cancels and replaces CEN/TS 16439:2013.
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ISO/TS 19299:2015(E)
Introduction
Reader’s guide
The development process for a security concept and implementation to protect any existing electronic
fee collection (EFC) system normally includes several steps as follows:
— definition of the security objectives and policy statements in a security policy;
— threat analysis with risk assessment to define the security requirements;
— development of the security measures followed by the development of security test specifications.
Figure 1 — Development path for the security documents
In the second step, each actor in an existing EFC system has to implement the defined security measures
and supervise the effectiveness. Security measures which do not work or work incorrectly need to be
improved. The development of the EFC security framework follows this approach as closely as possible.
The used methodology needs to consider following limitations:
— No security policy exists: The security policy can only be defined by the responsible stakeholders
and its freedom is only limited by laws and regulations. Nonetheless, this Technical Specification
provides basic examples of possible security policies (in Annex E to Annex F).
— No risk assessment possible: The risk assessment compares the possible loss for the stakeholder
and the required resources (e.g. equipment, knowledge, time, etc.) to perform an attack. It is the
trade-off evaluation of the cost and benefit of each countermeasure which is only possible for an
implemented system.
— No specific system design or configuration during the development of this Technical Specification
was considered to keep it universally applicable. Only the available EFC base standards and the
comments received by the CEN/TS 16439:2013 (i.e. the previous edition of the EFC security
framework) were taken as references. Specific technical details of a particular system (e.g.
servers, computer centres, and de-central elements like road side equipment) need to be taken into
consideration during the implementation in addition to the present EFC security framework.
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The selection of requirements and the respective security measures for an existing EFC system is based
on the security policy and the risk assessment of several stakeholders systems. Due to the fact that
there is neither an overall valid security policy, nor the possibility to provide a useful risk assessment,
the EFC security framework provides a toolbox of requirements and security measures covering as
many threats as possible without claiming to provide an exhaustive list.
There is one limitation though to be compliant to this Technical Specification that is, if a requirement is
selected, the associated security measure(s) have to be implemented.
To understand the content of this Technical Specification, the reader should be aware of the
methodological assumptions used to develop it. The security of an (interoperable) EFC scheme depends
on the correct implementation and operation of a number of processes, systems, and interfaces.
Only a reliable end-to-end security ensures the accurate and trustworthy operation of interacting
components of toll charging environments. Therefore, this security framework also covers systems or
interfaces which are not EFC specific like back office connections. The application independent security
framework for such system parts and interfaces, the Information Security Management System (ISMS),
is provided in the ISO 2700x family of standards.
The development process of this Technical Specification is described briefly in the steps below:
a) Definition of the stakeholder objectives and generic requirements as the basic motivation for the
security requirements (Annex C). A possible security policy with a set of policy statements is
provided in Annex E, and an example of an European electronic toll service (EETS) security policy
is given in Annex F.
b) Based on the EFC role model and further definitions from the EFC architecture standard
(ISO 17573), the specification defines an abstract EFC system model as the basis for a threat
analysis, definition of requirements, and security measures.
c) The threats on the EFC system model and its assets are analysed by two different methods: an attack-
based analysis and an asset-based analysis. The first approach considers a number of threat scenarios
from the perspective of various attackers. The second approach looks in depth on threats against the
various identified assets (tangible and intangible entities). This approach, although producing some
redundancy, ensures completeness and coverage of a broader range of risks (see Annex D).
d) The requirements specification (see Clause 6) is based on the threats identified in Annex D. Each
requirement is at least motivated by one threat and at least one requirement covers each threat.
e) The definition of security measures (see Clause 7) provides a high-level description of recommended
possible methods to cover the developed requirements.
f) The security specifications for interoperable interface implementation (Clause 8) provide detailed
definitions, e.g. for message authenticators. These specifications represent an add-on for security
to the corresponding relevant interface standards.
g) Basic key management requirements that support the implementation of the interoperable
interfaces are described in Clause 9. The toll charging environment uses cryptographic elements
(keys, certificates, certificate revocation lists, etc.) to support security services like confidentiality,
integrity, authenticity, and non-repudiation. This section of the specification covers the (initial)
setup of key exchange between stakeholders and several operational procedures like key renewal,
certificate revocation, etc.
h) A general trust model (see Clause 5) is defined to form the basis for the implementation of
cryptographic procedures to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of exchanged
data. In this context, the security framework references approved international standards for the
implementation of cryptographic procedures enhanced by EFC specific details where needed.
A stakeholder of an EFC scheme who wants to use this security framework needs to do the following:
— define a security policy for the EFC scheme (may involve more than one stakeholder in an
interoperable EFC scheme). Some examples for a security policy and its elements are provided (in
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Annex E and Annex F) as an aid for using this Technical Specification to build up a secure system for
a concrete interoperability framework (including the European electronic toll service).
— identify the relevant processes, systems and interfaces, and match them to the EFC security framework;
— select the corresponding security requirements according to the security policy;
— implement the security measures associated to the selected requirements;
— provide evidence of compliance of its systems, processes, and interfaces with the requirements set
forth in this Technical Specification. Evidence can be provided by a self-declaration, an internal or
...
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