SIST-TP IEC/TR 61000-1-3:2004
(Main)Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) - Part 1-3: General - The effects of high-altitude EMP (HEMP) on civil equipment and systems
Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) - Part 1-3: General - The effects of high-altitude EMP (HEMP) on civil equipment and systems
The purpose of this Technical Report is to describe the effects that have occurred during actual and simulated electromagnetic pulse testing throughout the world. These effects include those observed during the high-altitude nuclear tests conducted by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1962, and the HEMP simulator tests conducted by many countries during the years after atmospheric testing ended. In addition to direct effects, this technical report also contains information on HEMP coupling to 'long lines' as it is important to verify that particular levels of currents and voltages can be induced by HEMP on these lines; this provides a basis for direct injection testing of electronic equipment. It should be noted that, in most cases, the electrical equipment tested or exposed did not contain the sensitive electronics in use today. Also it should be emphasized that all tests and exposures did not produce failure of the equipment; factors such as the geometry of the HEMP interaction and the electromagnetic shielding of the equipment are variables that can produce differing results. The description of these effects is intended to illustrate the seriousness of the possible effects of HEMP on modern electronic systems.
Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) - Part 1-3: General - The effects of high-altitude EMP (HEMP) on civil equipment and systems
General Information
Standards Content (Sample)
SLOVENSKI SIST-TP IEC/TR 61000-1-3:2004
STANDARD
april 2004
Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) - Part 1-3: General - The effects of high-
altitude EMP (HEMP) on civil equipment and systems
ICS 33.100.01 Referenčna številka
© Standard je založil in izdal Slovenski inštitut za standardizacijo. Razmnoževanje ali kopiranje celote ali delov tega dokumenta ni dovoljeno
TECHNICAL IEC
REPORT
TR 61000-1-3
First edition
2002-06
PUBLICATION FONDAMENTALE EN CEM
BASIC EMC PUBLICATION
Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) –
Part 1-3:
General – The effects of high-altitude EMP
(HEMP) on civil equipment and systems
Compatibilité électromagnétique (CEM) –
Partie 1-3:
Généralités – Effets des impulsions électromagnétiques
à haute altitude (IEM-HA) sur les matériels et systèmes civils
IEC 2002 Copyright - all rights reserved
No part of this publication may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or
mechanical, including photocopying and microfilm, without permission in writing from the publisher.
International Electrotechnical Commission, 3, rue de Varembé, PO Box 131, CH-1211 Geneva 20, Switzerland
Telephone: +41 22 919 02 11 Telefax: +41 22 919 03 00 E-mail: inmail@iec.ch Web: www.iec.ch
PRICE CODE
Commission Electrotechnique Internationale
X
International Electrotechnical Commission
Международная Электротехническая Комиссия
For price, see current catalogue
– 2 – TR 61000-1-3 IEC:2002(E)
CONTENTS
FOREWORD.4
INTRODUCTION .6
1 Scope .7
2 Reference documents .7
3 Definitions .7
4 General considerations .9
5 Overview of effects experience .10
5.1 Atmospheric testing introduction .10
5.2 Simulator testing introduction.10
6 Atmospheric nuclear testing experience .11
6.1 United States atmospheric test experience – Starfish test .11
6.2 Soviet Union atmospheric test experience .14
7 HEMP simulator testing with radiated transients .21
7.1 Consumer electronics .21
7.2 Communication radios .25
7.3 Commercial power lines.28
7.4 Train power-line coupling experiment .31
7.5 HEMP-induced currents on a three-phase line.34
8 HEMP simulator testing with conducted transients.36
8.1 High-voltage power-line equipment .36
8.2 Testing of distribution transformers to conducted HEMP transients.37
9 Summary .45
Bibliography .46
Figure 1 – Starfish-Honolulu burst geometry, with the X indicating the location of
Johnston Atoll .12
Figure 2 – Front page of New York Tribune, European Edition, 10 July 1962 .13
Figure 3 – Ferdinand Street (Honolulu, Hawaii) series lighting system in 1962.14
Figure 4 – The amplitudes of the computed early-time HEMP E-field components versus
time for the near end of the 500-km telecom line .15
Figure 5 – The amplitudes of the computed early-time HEMP E-field components versus
time for the far end of the 500-km telecom line .16
Figure 6 – Computed transverse late-time HEMP magnetic flux density at the earth's
surface at ground ranges of 433 km and 574 km from the surface zero point .17
Figure 7 – Computed early-time HEMP load voltage versus time for the far end of the
80-km long subline 2 (the top figure shows the earliest time, while the bottom figure
shows a later time view) .18
Figure 8 – Computed early-time HEMP short-circuit current versus time for the near
end of the 80 km long subline 2 (the top figure shows the earliest time, while the bottom
figure shows a later time view) .19
Figure 9 – Computed early-time HEMP short-circuit current versus time for the far end
of the 80 km long subline 2 (the top figure shows the earliest time, while the bottom
figure shows a later time view) .20
Figure 10 – Time response for a typical antenna cable coupled current measured at WRF .23
TR 61000-1-3 IEC:2002(E) – 3 –
Figure 11 – Time response for a typical telephone cable coupled current measured at WRF .23
Figure 12 – Time response for a typical power cable coupled current measured at WRF .24
Figure 13 – Time response for a typical speaker wire coupled current measured at WRF .24
Figure 14 – Time response for a typical computer keyboard coupled current measured
at WRF .25
Figure 15 – Geometry of the medium voltage (MV) power lines with respect to the EMP
simulator.29
Figure 16 – Comparison of measured (left) and calculated (right) HEMP simulator-
induced voltage (line to ground) at position M in figure 15, where the line turns 90°.30
Figure 17 – Comparison of the measured currents in amperes at four different locations:
1 and 2 at 48 m on either side of the simulator centreline (points M and N in figure 15),
and 3 and 4 near the far end of the line (near point Q in figure 15) .31
Figure 18 – Geometry for HEMP simulation test of locomotive with single power line.32
Figure 19 – Measured HEMP-induced current on power line directly above left end of
locomotive .33
Figure 20 – Geometry for three-phase line placed under a hybrid HEMP simulator .34
Figure 21 – Comparison of measured (solid line) and calculated (dashed line) currents
flowing on the shielding wire.35
Figure 22 – HEMP current measured in the centre of one of the open-circuited phase
wires when the grounding wire was removed .36
Figure 23 – Experimental HEMP investigation of high-voltage equipment showing the
importance of testing power lines when they are energized. Note that the lower figure b)
is for a 110-kV power line.39
Figure 24 – Simulation of HEMP effects on a 110 kV power line under operating voltage.40
Figure 25 – Investigation of HEMP effects on high-voltage transformers .41
Figure 26 – Simulation of HEMP effects on a mobile diesel power station under
operating voltage.42
Figure 27 –Types of interference caused by HEMP penetration through the electric
power supply system .43
Figure 28 – HEMP test layout for power systems under operation .44
Table 1 – Data on the arrester firing voltage as a function of the voltage waveform
characteristics (from [6]) .21
Table 2 – The peak pulse currents in kA damaging the fuse SN-1 (from [6]).21
Table 3 – Summary of operational observations at FEMPS [7] .22
Table 4 – Summary of information on radios tested [8].26
Table 5 – Summary of distribution transformer tests [15].38
– 4 – TR 61000-1-3 IEC:2002(E)
INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION
___________
ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY (EMC) –
Part 1-3: General – The effects of high-altitude EMP (HEMP)
on civil equipment and systems
FOREWORD
1) The IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission) is a worldwide organization for standardization comprising
all national electrotechnical committees (IEC National Committees). The object of the IEC is to promote
international co-operation on all questions concerning standardization in the electrical and electronic fields. To
this end and in addition to other activities, the IEC publishes International Standards. Their preparation is
entrusted to technical committees; any IEC National Committee interested in the subject dealt with may
participate in this preparatory work. International, governmental and non-governmental organizations liaising
with the IEC also participate in this preparation. The IEC collaborates closely with the International Organization
for Standardization (ISO) in accordance with conditions determined by agreement between the two
organizations.
2) The formal decisions or agreements of the IEC on technical matters express, as nearly as possible, an
international consensus of opinion on the relevant subjects since each technical committee has representation
from all interested National Committees.
3) The documents produced have the form of recommendations for international use and are published in the form
of standards, technical specifications, technical reports or guides and they are accepted by the National
Committees in that sense.
4) In order to promote international unification, IEC National Committees undertake to apply IEC International
Standards transparently to the maximum extent possible in their national and regional standards. Any
divergence between the IEC Standard and the corresponding national or regional standard shall be clearly
indicated in the latter.
5) The IEC provides no marking procedure to indicate its approval and cannot be rendered responsible for any
equipment declared to be in conformity with one of its standards.
6) Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this International Standard may be the subject
of patent rights. The IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.
The main task of IEC technical committees is to prepare International Standards. However, a
technical committee may propose the publication of a technical report when it has collected
data of a different kind from that which is normally published as an International Standard, for
example “state of the art”.
Technical reports do not necessarily have to be reviewed until the data they provide are
considered to be no longer valid or useful by the maintenance team.
IEC 61000-1-3, which is a technical report, has been prepared by subcommittee 77C: High
power transient phenomena, of IEC technical committee 77: Electromagnetic compatibility. It
has the status of a basic EMC publication in accordance with IEC Guide 107.
The text of this technical report is based on the following documents:
Enquiry draft Report on voting
77C/109/CDV 77C/121/RVC
Full information on the voting for the approval of this technical report can be found in the report
on voting indicated in the above table.
This publication has been drafted in accordance with the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 3.
This document, which is purely informative, is not to be regarded as an International Standard.
TR 61000-1-3 IEC:2002(E) – 5 –
The committee has decided that the contents of this publication will remain unchanged until 2007.
At this date, the publication will be
• reconfirmed;
• withdrawn;
• replaced by a revised edition, or
• amended.
A bilingual version of this publication may be issued at a later date.
– 6 – TR 61000-1-3 IEC:2002(E)
INTRODUCTION
IEC 61000 is published in separate parts according to the following structure:
Part 1: General
General considerations (introduction, fundamental principles)
Definitions, terminology
Part 2: Environment
Description of the environment
Classification of the environment
Compatibility levels
Part 3: Limits
Emission limits
Immunity limits
(in so far as they do not fall under the responsibility of product committees)
Part 4: Testing and measurement techniques
Measurement techniques
Testing techniques
Part 5: Installation and mitigation guidelines
Installation guidelines
Mitigation methods and devices
Part 6: Generic standards
Part 9: Miscellaneous
Each part is further subdivided into several parts published either as International Standards or
as technical specifications or technical reports, some of which have already been published as
sections. Others will be published with the part number followed by a dash and a second
number identifying the subdivision (example: IEC 61000-6-1).
TR 61000-1-3 IEC:2002(E) – 7 –
ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY (EMC) –
Part 1-3: General – The effects of high-altitude EMP (HEMP)
on civil equipment and systems
1 Scope
The purpose of this part of IEC 61000 is to describe the effects that have occurred during
actual and simulated electromagnetic pulse testing throughout the world. These effects include
those observed during the high-altitude nuclear tests conducted by the United States and the
Soviet Union in 1962, and the HEMP simulator tests conducted by many countries during the
years after atmospheric testing ended. In addition to direct effects, this technical report also
contains information on HEMP coupling to “long lines” as it is important to verify that particular
levels of currents and voltages can be induced by HEMP on these lines; this provides a basis
for direct injection testing of electronic equipment. It should be noted that, in most cases, the
electrical equipment tested or exposed did not contain the sensitive electronics in use today.
Also it should be emphasized that all tests and exposures did not produce failure of the
equipment; factors such as the geometry of the HEMP interaction and the electromagnetic
shielding of the equipment are variables that can produce differing results. The description of
these effects is intended to illustrate the seriousness of the possible effects of HEMP on
modern electronic systems.
2 Reference documents
The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document. For
dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of
the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.
IEC 60050-161:1990, International Electrotechnical Vocabulary (IEV) – Chapter 161: Electro-
magnetic compatibility
IEC 61000-2-9, Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) – Part 2: Environment – Section 9:
Description of HEMP environment – Radiated disturbance. Basic EMC publication
IEC 61000-2-10: Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) – Part 2-10: Environment – Description
of HEMP environment – Conducted disturbance
IEC 61000-4-32: Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) – Part 4-32: Testing and measurement
techniques – HEMP simulator compendium. Basic EMC publication
3 Definitions
For the purposes of this part of IEC 61000, the following definitions, together with those in
IEC 60050(161) apply.
3.1
attenuation
reduction in magnitude (as a result of absorption and scattering) of an electric or magnetic field
or a current or voltage; usually expressed in decibels
___________
To be published.
– 8 – TR 61000-1-3 IEC:2002(E)
3.2
aperture point-of-entry
aperture port-of-entry
aperture points-of-entry including intentional or inadvertent holes, cracks, openings or other
discontinuities in a shield surface
NOTE Intentional aperture points of entry are provided for personnel and/or equipment entry and egress and for
ventilation through an electromagnetic barrier.
3.3
common mode voltage
mean of the phasor voltages appearing between each conductor and a specified reference,
usually earth or frame
[IEV 161-04-09]
3.4
conductive point-of-entry
conductive port-of-entry
penetrating conductor, electrical wire, cable or other conductive object, such as a metal rod,
which passes through an electromagnetic barrier
3.5
electromagnetic compatibility
EMC (abbreviation)
ability of an equipment or system to function satisfactorily in its electromagnetic environment
without introducing intolerable electromagnetic disturbances to anything in that environment
[IEV 161-01-07]
3.6
electromagnetic disturbance
any electromagnetic phenomenon which may degrade the performance of a device, equipment
or system
[IEV 161-01-05, modified]
3.7
electromagnetic interference
EMI (abbreviation)
degradation of the performance of a device, transmission channel or system caused by an
electromagnetic disturbance
[IEV 161-01-06, modified]
NOTE Disturbance and interference are respectively cause and effect.
3.8
(electromagnetic) shield
electrically continuous housing for a facility, area, or component used to attenuate incident
electric and magnetic fields by both absorption and reflection
3.9
(electromagnetic) susceptibility
inability of a device, equipment or system to perform without degradation in the presence of an
electromagnetic disturbance
NOTE Susceptibility is a lack of immunity.
[IEV 161-01-21]
3.10
high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP)
electromagnetic pulse produced by a nuclear explosion outside the earth’s atmosphere
NOTE Typically above an altitude of 30 km.
TR 61000-1-3 IEC:2002(E) – 9 –
3.11
medium voltage (MV) power line
power line with a nominal a.c. voltage above 1 kV and not exceeding 35 kV
3.12
point-of-entry (PoE)
port-of-entry (PoE)
physical location (point) on an electromagnetic barrier, where EM energy may enter or exit a
topological volume, unless an adequate PoE protective device is provided. A PoE is not limited
to a geometrical point. PoEs are classified as aperture PoEs or conductive PoEs according to
the type of penetration. They are also classified as architectural, mechanical, structural or
electrical PoEs according to the functions they serve
3.13
power lines
lines originating from the power supply (alternating or direct voltage)
3.14
transient
pertaining to or designating a phenomenon or a quantity which varies between two consecutive
steady states during a time interval short compared with the time-scale of interest
[IEV 161-02-01]
NOTE A transient can be a unidirectional impulse of either polarity or a damped oscillatory wave with the first peak
occurring in either polarity.
3.15
voltage surge
transient voltage wave propagating along a line or a circuit and characterized by a rapid
increase followed by a slower decrease of the voltage
[IEV 161-08-11]NOTE The time parameters of a voltage surge are defined as follows:
• the rise time between 10 % and 90 % of the peak value (10 %/90 % rise time) according to IEV 161-02-05; and
• the duration at 50 % of the peak value between increase and decrease of the wave (50 %/50 % duration).
4 General considerations
A high-altitude (above 30 km) nuclear burst produces three types of electromagnetic pulses
that are observed on the earth's surface:
early-time HEMP (t < 1 μs) (fast);
intermediate-time HEMP (1 μs < t < 1 s) (medium);
late-time HEMP (t > 1 s) (slow).
Historically most interest has been focused on the early-time HEMP that was previously
referred to as simply “HEMP”. Here we will use the term high-altitude EMP or HEMP to include
all three types of waveforms. The term NEMP covers many categories of nuclear EMPs
3 4
including those produced by surface bursts (SREMP) or created on space systems (SGEMP) .
___________
NEMP: Nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse
SREMP: Source Region EMP
SGEMP: System Generated EMP
– 10 – TR 61000-1-3 IEC:2002(E)
5 Overview of effects experience
5.1 Atmospheric testing introduction
During the era of nuclear device testing in the atmosphere, there have been documented cases
where unusual electrical effects have been noted by those involved in the test programmes. In
particular, Enrico Fermi has been credited with being the first person to mention the presence
of electrical effects at large distances where the direct effects of blast and shock were not
effective. While it is noted that different types of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) are created
depending on the height of the burst, the effects of high-altitude EMP (HEMP) are of the
greatest interest due to the substantial distances over which effects may occur. High-altitude
EMP occurs when the nuclear detonation is higher than an approximate altitude of 30 km above
the earth's surface.
While the number of high-altitude tests performed by the United States and the Soviet Union
was not large (in the order of 10), most of the effects noted were from the U.S. Starfish event
above Johnston Island in the Pacific Ocean and the three Soviet Union tests over Kazakhstan
in 1962. In all of the reported cases, the effects that occurred were not the result of planned
experiments but were mainly effects (malfunction and damage) on civil electronics equipment
that were reported and later analysed to confirm that the effects were related to the particular
nuclear test.
In the following clauses, several effects will be reviewed from the US high-altitude test series in
1962. In particular, problems were noted in the input circuits of radio receivers, surge arresters
triggered unexpectedly on an aircraft with a trailing wire antenna, and 30 strings of streetlights
reportedly failed simultaneously during the Starfish experiment [1]. The streetlight case is the
best documented and analysed, and this will be discussed in 6.1.
Regarding the experience of the Soviet Union in the fall of 1962, failures of several long-line
systems, including power and telecommunications, were reported [2]. The failures of the
protection devices on a 500-km-long telecom line are also well documented and are discussed
in 6.2.
5.2 Simulator testing introduction
Beginning in the late 1960s and continuing through the present time, HEMP simulators have
been built by over 10 countries throughout the world. These early-time HEMP simulators are
designed to produce a bounded or radiating transient electromagnetic (EM) field in a defined
test (or “working”) volume (IEC 61000-4-32). The objective of most of these simulator tests was
to evaluate the immunity or susceptibility of equipment and systems to HEMP disturbances.
While the HEMP waveforms that are produced in the various simulators have some variation in
their waveform characteristics, the standardized electric field waveform today is described as a
2,5/25 ns waveform with an amplitude of 50 kV/m (IEC 61000-2-9).
While the HEMP simulators produce reasonable representations of the incident electric and
magnetic field transient pulses in a limited volume, the actual HEMP is a plane wave field with
no significant variation over tens of kilometres in extent. In HEMP simulators, the fields
experience losses as they propagate from the pulser, and the test volumes where the fields
exhibit the correct behaviour typically vary from a few to tens of meters. Because of this fact,
and the fact that no simulator produces the full range of field polarizations and angles of
incidence at the earth's surface, field simulator immunity tests do not provide complete results.
This is especially true in the case of cables, which are attached to systems under test. It is very
difficult to test a system cable PoE properly during a HEMP simulator field test. For this reason,
conducted environment tests, which are applied to conductive PoEs, should be performed (see
IEC 61000-2-10, for example), and results of these types of tests are also described in this
technical report.
___________
Figures in square brackets refer to the bibliography.
TR 61000-1-3 IEC:2002(E) – 11 –
As is well known, most of the system and equipment testing in HEMP field simulators involves
military equipment, which is not the subject of this technical report. On the other hand, civil
electronic and power-line equipment have occasionally been tested, and the results of five well-
documented sets of experiments are reported in 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5.
As indicated above, this technical report will also consider the reported experience of
conducted testing. A review of some recent information concerning high-voltage power-line
equipment testing is discussed in clause 8.
6 Atmospheric nuclear testing experience
6.1 United States atmospheric test experience – Starfish test
The Starfish nuclear device, with a yield of approximately 1 MT, was detonated about 400 km
above Johnston Atoll during the night of 8 July 1962 at approximately 11:00 p.m. Hawaiian local
time (0900 GMT, 9 July 1962). The line-of-sight distance from the event detonation to the
Hawaiian Island of Oahu was approximately 1 400 km. See figure 1 for a more detailed
description of the geometry of the burst.
Figure 2 presents the headline on the front page of the New York Tribune, European Edition --
“U.S. Fires Atomic Blast 200 Miles Over Pacific” [3] The test was described as “probably the
most grandiose military-scientific experiment in history”, and it “triggered spectacular space
fireworks over thousands of miles for six minutes….”. In Hawaii the “dazzling white burst was
followed by surges of most of the colours of the rainbow, from greens and brilliant yellows
through orange and glowing blood reds.” Aurora lights were observed in Somoa, 2 000 miles
south of the test site and in New Zealand, 4 000 miles away. It was thought that these coloured
lights were due to the “dumping of space radiation particles normally held in the Van Allen belts
around the earth”. The article also mentions that the Atomic Energy Commission in the United
States reported that two satellites were in orbit to record the effects of the blast.
In terms of the electromagnetic effects that were reported, the New York Tribune article
mentions the following items:
− Radio communications were blacked out for times up to 30 min due to ionospheric
disruptions.
− The geomagnetic field measured by the Geodetic Survey in Honolulu showed a very sharp
departure at the time of detonation followed by five or six minutes of activity with a gradual
return to normal within about 30 min. The sudden impulse was much greater than expected
by the local scientist.
− In Hawaii, burglar alarms and air-raid sirens went off at the time of the test shot. Some
streetlights were extinguished while others came on. “There was no immediate explanation
for the electrical malfunctions.”
After the test there were also reports in the local Honolulu newspapers that streetlights in
different parts of Oahu had gone out at the time of the test. The Honolulu Star-Bulletin on
9 July 1962 reported on their front page that “the City-County Street Lighting Department said
today shock waves from the Johnston Island nuclear blast blew out fuses in several areas of
the Island last night”. Some reports indicated that 30 strings of lights had failed [4]. The results
described below are from a technical report written by Dr Charles Vittitoe in 1989 in which he
studied one of the specific circuits that failed [5].
A summary of the Vittitoe findings is that the estimated 5,6 kV/m incident peak HEMP
electric field produced sufficient current flow in the lighting circuit (see figure 3) to damage a
disk cut-out in the secondary of an isolation transformer. This transformer is believed to have
a rating of 4 kV with a disk cutout failure level of up to 1 200 V (at 60 Hz). For a HEMP-
induced voltage waveform, the failure level was estimated by Vittitoe to be five times higher.
In terms of current, the operating current was 6,6 A and the failure level was expected to
begin at 14 A, while the calculated HEMP-induced common mode current was 140 A. Vittitoe
concluded that the HEMP fields and induced currents were consistent with the failures
– 12 – TR 61000-1-3 IEC:2002(E)
observed. It is also clear that due to the polarization of the incident HEMP fields and the
many different orientations of lighting circuits, there would be a great variation in the induced
currents in different circuits, thus explaining the fact that only some of the Hawaiian lighting
circuits failed during the Starfish test.
Starfish
68°
r
1 445 km
400 km
50 km
30 km
Johnston atoll
10°
Honolulu
Burst 30 km SW of J.A.
at 16° 28’ N, 169° 38’ W
50° N
30° N
Hawaii
Wake
X
Kingman reef
10° N
Christmas
10° S
30° S
130° E 150° E 170° E 170° W 150° W 130° W 110° W
Longitude
Honolulu 21,3° N, 157,6° W
Johnston atoll 16,6° N, 169,3° W X
IEC 1540/02
Figure 1 – Starfish-Honolulu burst geometry, with the X indicating
the location of Johnston Atoll
Latitude
TR 61000-1-3 IEC:2002(E) – 13 –
From t e Herh ald Tri uneb Bureau
WASHINGTON, July 9 - The
Unit d Setaes, itn probably the
most grandi se moilitary-scien ifi t
experimen in hit story, t day seo t
off a hydrogen exp osi nl 200o
mi es olver Johnst n Isoland in the
mi -Pacdific.
Its energy grea, er thtan that from
1 million tons of TN , triTggered
spect cul ar spaace fireworks over
thousands of mi es fol r 6 minu es
starting at 1100 p: m. l.st naght,i
Hawaian ti me (i 0900 GM
Monday).
Two Satellites in Or b t i
At Hawai, 75i0 mil s noert wesht
of Johnston a ,dazzlng wi hie
burst was f o loweld by surges of
most of het colors of the
raibown, from greens and
brillian yeltows tl roughh orange
and glowin gbl od r oed .
Curtains of uroara li hts wg ere
report d aet Somoa, 2000 mil s
south of t e t ehst si e. t
In New Zealand, 4000 mies
away, a red glow began on the
northern horizon and spread
throughout the sky, bathi g thne
sea in rich co or. l Th s
phenomenon may have been
caused by the dump ng ofi space
rad atoni pai rt cl s ni oermal y helld
in the Van Al en bel lts around t e
Eart . h
IEC 1541/02
Figure 2 – Front page of New York Tribune, European Edition, 10 July 1962
The pictures are of poor quality, but the upper night-time photo of Diamond Head and Waikiki
in Honolulu was taken minutes before the test shot, while the lower picture was taken just
afterwards, showing a bright sky and ocean reflection.
– 14 – TR 61000-1-3 IEC:2002(E)
N
Puuhonua
k
Ferdinand
Disk cutout
6,6 A/6,6 A
Isolation transformer
Lamp
Wire separation 14,5 inches (exaggerated on sketch)
Scale
0 300 600 m
IEC 1542/02
0 100 200 m
Figure 3 – Ferdinand Street (Honolulu, Hawaii) series lighting system in 1962
6.2 Soviet Union atmospheric test experience
In 1962 the Soviet Union conducted a series of high-altitude nuclear tests over Kazakhstan.
During a presentation at the EUROEM Conference in 1994, Prof. Vladimir Loborev, the Director
of the Central Institute of Physics and Technology, reviewed the HEMP effects observed during
a large yield, 300 km height of burst test through the use of several examples [2]:
− a long, radially oriented, above-ground communications line failed;
− a buried communications line more than 600 km away from ground zero failed;
− a power line insulator was damaged, resulting in a short circuit on the electrical line;
− diesel generators failed;
− antenna systems were affected.
Using data obtained during the test series, one particular telecom circuit was analysed in detail
to examine the failure of the line's protective devices during the tests [6]. The above-ground
telecom line extended for a distance of approximately 500 km, beginning at a ground range of
180 km at an azimuth of 90° and ending at a ground range of 650 km at an azimuth of
approximately 50°. At each repeater element on the line, which was spaced at some tens of
kilometres, there were gas-filled surge arresters and fuses. It was ascertained after the test
that all of the surge arresters fired and all of the fuses were damaged, requiring that the line be
repaired.
In the analysis in [6], the HEMP early-time electric fields were computed and are shown in
figures 4 and 5 where the phi component is the transverse horizontal field and the theta
component is the transverse, vertical field. Note that the total transverse electric field does not
vary much over the length of the line. Figure 6 presents the computed late-time (MHD EMP)
magnetic field for ground ranges of 433 km and 574 km. Note that magnetic field variations of
400 nT are typical of geomagnetic storms although the rise time shown in figure 6 is much
more rapid, inducing a more significant late-time electric field. In fact, the maximum derivative
of the incident magnetic field is approximately 1 800 nT/min, which is more than four times as
high as the geomagnetic storm derivative which caused the collapse of the Hydro-Quebec
power system in March 1989.
Ventura
Aleo
Awapuhi
TR 61000-1-3 IEC:2002(E) – 15 –
Eϕ kV/m
0,0
−2,5
−5,0
0 0,5 t μs
IEC 1543/02
Eυ kV/m
5,0
0,0
−5,0
0 0,5
t μs
IEC 1544/02
Figure 4 – The amplitudes of the computed early-time HEMP E-field components versus
time for the near end of the 500-km telecom line
– 16 – TR 61000-1-3 IEC:2002(E)
Eϕ kV/m
0,0
−2,5
−5,0
−7,5
0 0,5
t μs
IEC 1545/02
Eυ kV/m
5,0
2,5
0,0
−2,5
0 0,5
t μs
IEC 1546/02
Figure 5 – The amplitudes of the computed early-time HEMP E-field components versus
time for the far end of the 500-km telecom line
TR 61000-1-3 IEC:2002(E) – 17 –
B nT
−100
−200
−300
−400
−500
−600
0 20 40 60 80 100 t μs
IEC 1547/02
a) R = 433 km
B nT
−100
−200
−300
−400
t s
0 20 40 60 80
IEC 1548/02
b) R = 574 km
Figure 6 – Computed transverse late-time HEMP magnetic flux density at the earth's
surface at ground ranges of 433 km and 574 km from the surface zero point
Using the early-time HEMP fields of approximately 8 kV/m, the common mode load voltages
and short-circuit currents flowing on the telecom line were computed in [6] and are shown for
subline 2 (an 80 km section of line at the far end of the 500 km telecom line) in figures 7 to 9. It
is noted that the induced early-time HEMP voltage of nearly 30 kV is large enough to fire the
surge arresters according to the data presented in table 1. However, the computed early-time
currents are less than 100 A which are not large enough to induce damage according to table
2. Additionally, using the computed late-time electric fields of approximately 10 V/km (only peak
values were computed), calculations of the peak-induced late-time voltage and current on the
lines are approximately 400 V and 4 A, respectively, which are high enough to short the fuses
as indicated in table 2. The authors in [6] concluded that the late-time HEMP fields were
probably responsible for the failures documented on the above-ground communications line.
– 18 – TR 61000-1-3 IEC:2002(E)
U kV
−10
−20
−30
240 245
t μs
IEC 1549/02
U kV
−10
−20
−30
t ms
0,24 0,40 0,56
IEC 1550/02
Figure 7 – Computed early-time HEMP load voltage versus time
for the far end of the 80-km long subline 2
(the top figure shows the earliest time, while the bottom figure shows a later time view)
TR 61000-1-3 IEC:2002(E) – 19 –
I A
−5
−10
−15
−20
−25
0 0,25 0,5 0,75
t μs
IEC 1551/02
I A
−10
−20
−30
0 1 2 3 4
t ms
IEC 1552/02
Figure 8 – Computed early-time HEMP short-circuit current
versus time for the near end of the 80 km long subline 2
(the top figure shows the earliest time, while the bottom figure shows a later time view)
– 20 – TR 61000-1-3 IEC:2002(E)
I A
−25
−50
−75
−100
240 245 t μs
IEC 1553/02
I A
−25
−50
−75
−100
t ms
0 1 2 3 4
IEC 1554/02
Figure 9 – Computed early-time HEMP short-circuit current
versus time for the far end of the 80 km long subline 2
(the top figure shows the earliest time, while the bottom figure shows a later time view)
TR 61000-1-3 IEC:2002(E) – 21 –
Table 1 – Data on the arrester firing voltage as a function of the voltage
waveform characteristics (from [6])
Applied voltage characteristics Arrester firing voltage
V
350 ± 40
1Direct
350 ± 40
2 Alternating voltage (f = 50 Hz)
Surge voltage for various pulse rise times (μs)
a) τ = 100
b) τ =50
c) τ =25
d) τ =20
e) τ =16
f) τ =14
g) τ =12
h) τ =10
i) τ =8
j) τ =6
k) τ =4
l) τ =2
Table 2 – The peak pulse currents in kA damaging the fuse SN-1 (from [6])
Time pulse characteristics ττττ/tf
(rise/fall in μs)
Number of pulses 5/10 15/40 20/40 20/60 25/70
1 3,6 1,4 1,35 1,07 0,92
2 2,0 0,80 0,75 0,60 0,52
3 1,5 0,56 0,54 0,40 0,30
10 0,40 0,12 0,11 0,088 0,075
7 HEMP simulator testing with radiated transients
In this clause, five sets of simulator experiments using radiated fields are reviewed. Several of
these experiments provide direct effects data for commercial equipment while others provide
validations of coupling codes that are needed to verify the correct levels of conducted
environments produced under actual HEMP conditions. These validated coupling codes are
then used to compute the levels required for conducted transient testing using HEMP direct-
injection simulators (see clause 8).
7.1 Consumer electronics
In the late 1980s, 91 different examples of consumer electronics were tested with the FEMPS
HEMP simulator to obtain information concerning the potential effects of consumer electronics
operating near fast-rise HEMP simulators [7]. Three HEMP peak field levels were used
including low (6,7 kV/m), medium (12,4 kV/m) and high (16,6 kV/m). The results are described
in table 3, and it is clear that even for incident fields of 6,7 kV/m, many critical upsets are
observed with damage occurring at the higher level of 16,6 kV/m.
– 22 – TR 61000-1-3 IEC:2002(E)
Table 3 – Summary of operational observations at FEMPS [7]
Effects at various levels of testing
Test item type Test item
Low level Medium level High level
Television Emerson 13 in. Critical upset Critical upset Failure
Portland 13 in. Noncritical upset Critical upset Critical upset
Zenith 19 in., SD1911W — Critical upset Critical upset
JC Penney 13 in. — Noncritical upset Noncritical upset
Montgomery Ward 25 in. — Critical upset Critical upset
Sony 13 in. — Critical upset —
Sharp 25 in. — — Critical upset
VCR Akai VS515U Critical upset Critical upset Critical upset
Sharp Critical upset Critical upset Critical upset
Sears Critical upset Critical upset Critical upset
Symphonic Critical upset Failure Failure
Goldstar Noncritical upset Noncritical upset Noncritical upset
Mitsubishi HS348UR — Critical upset —
Toshiba M4220 — — Noncritical upset
Magnavox VR9525AT — — Noncritical upset
Stereo receiver Kenwood Critical upset Critical upset Critical upset
Onkyo Noncritical upset Noncritical upset Noncritical upset
JVC — Critical upset Critical upset
Pioneer — — Failure
Mobile radio Johnson 7171 uhf — Noncritical upset Noncritical upset
Johnson SDL6085, 16 channel — — Noncritical upset
GE PSX vhf — — Noncritical upset
Computer Leading Edge model D Critical upset Critical upset Failure
IBM PC AT Critical upset Critical upset —
Hayes 1200-baud modem — — Critical upset
CD player Sharp Noncritical upset Critical upset Critical upset
Sony — — Critical upset
Cellular phone GE Critical upset — Critical upset
NEC — — Critical upset
Telephone Realistic cordless Critical upset Critical upset Critical upset
Panasonic — — Failure
Answering machine Phone mate Critical upset Critical upset Critical upset
Garage door opener Genie — Critical upset Critical upset
Medical equipment Kangaroo feeder pump Critical upset Critical upset Critical upset
Infant monitor — Critical upset Failure
Automobile radio Craig AM/FM cassette Noncritical upset Noncritical upset Noncritical upset
Satellite dish Realistic 8,5 ft. Failure (not verified) — —
— Indicates no abnormal observation or the unit was not tested at that level because of a previous failure.
TR 61000-1-3 IEC:2002(E) – 23 –
After the testing was completed at the FEMPS (fast-rise EMP) simulator, some of the
equipment was re-tested at the Woodbridge Research Facility (WRF) for a 4 kV/m pulse with a
slower rise time (approximately 5 ns). Measurements of the induced current on many of the
cables attached to the equipment were made to examine their levels and time behaviours (see
figures 10 to 14). These figures give some indication of the magnitude of currents entering the
equipment. Note that the maximum currents are approximately 10 A for the electric field value
of 4 kV/m, and all waveforms show a damped sine behaviour. If the response is linear, these
currents would be expected to peak at about 130 A for a 50 kV/m HEMP pulse; it should be
noted, however, that arcing could occur in connectors thereby reducing the coupled voltages
and currents. It is always best to test at the expected threat level when possible to determine
immunity levels.
−5
−10
−15
−20
0 0,5 1,0 1,5
Time μs
IEC 1555/02
Figure 10 – Time response for a typical antenna cable coupled current measured at WRF
−2
−4
−6
−8
0 0,5 1,0 1,5
Time μs
IEC 1556/02
Figure 11 – Time response for a typical telephone cable coupled current
measured at WRF
Current A
Current A
– 24 – TR 61000-1-3 IEC:2002(E)
−5
−10
−15
0 0,5 1,0 1,5
Time μs
IEC 1557/02
Figure 12 – Time response for a typical power cable coupled current measured at WRF
−1
−2
−3
0 0,5 1,0 1,5
Time μs
IEC 1558/02
Figure 13 – Time response for a typical speaker wire coupled current measured at WRF
Current A
Current A
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