Nuclear power plants - Control rooms - Requirements for emergency response facilities

This document presents the requirements for the on-site emergency response facilities (referred to hereinafter as the “ERF”) which are to be used in case of incidents or accidents occurring on the associated Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). The ERF consists of the Emergency Response Centre (ERC), the Technical Support Centre (TSC) and the Operational Support Centre (OSC), as shown in Figure 1. It establishes requirements for the ERF features and ERF I&C equipment to: • coordinate on-site operational efforts with respect to safety and radioprotection; • optimize the design in terms of environment control, lighting, power supplies and access control of the ERF; • enhance the identification and resolution of potential conflicts between the traditional operational means and emergency means (MCR/SCR and ERF, operating staff and emergency teams, operational procedures and emergency procedures); • aid the identification and the enhancement of the potential synergies between the traditional operational means and emergency means. This document is intended for application to new nuclear power plants whose conceptual design is initiated after the publication of this document, but it may also be used for designing and implementing ERF in existing nuclear power plants or in any other nuclear facility. Detailed equipment design is outside the scope of this document. This document does not define the situations (reactor plant conditions, hazards and magnitudes of hazards) leading to mobilisation of emergency response teams and activation / use of the ERF. These aspects are usually addressed in the NPP Emergency Plan. However, the need for consistency of the ERF design and operation with the NPP Emergency Plan is within scope.

Kernkraftwerke - Warten - Anforderungen für Notfallschutzeinrichtungen

Centrales nucléaires de puissance - Salles de commande - Exigences pour les moyens de réaction d'urgence

l'IEC 62954:2019 expose les exigences pour les moyens de réaction d'urgence (ci-après dénommés "ERF") utilisées en cas d'incidents ou d'accidents qui surviennent sur la centrale nucléaire associée. L'ERF comprend l'ERC (Emergency Response Centre, centre de réaction d'urgence), le TSC (Technical Support Centre, centre de soutien technique) et l'OSC (Operational Support Centre, centre de soutien opérationnel). Il établit les exigences pour les fonctionnalités de l'ERF ainsi que pour les équipements I&C de l'ERF pour: · coordonner les efforts opérationnels sur site pour ce qui concerne la sûreté et la radioprotection; · optimiser la conception en termes de contrôle environnemental, d'éclairages, d'alimentations électriques et de contrôle d'accès de l'ERF; · améliorer l'identification et la résolution de conflits potentiels entre les moyens opérationnels traditionnels et les moyens d'urgence (MCR/SCR et ERF, personnel d'exploitation et équipes d'urgence, procédures opérationnelles et procédures d'urgence); · faciliter l'identification et l'amélioration des synergies potentielles entre les moyens opérationnels traditionnels et les moyens d'urgence.

Jedrske elektrarne - Nadzorne sobe - Zahteve za objekte za odzivanje v izrednih razmerah (IEC 62954:2019)

General Information

Status
Published
Publication Date
15-Jul-2021
Current Stage
6060 - Document made available - Publishing
Start Date
16-Jul-2021
Completion Date
16-Jul-2021
Standard
EN IEC 62954:2021 - BARVE
English language
29 pages
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SLOVENSKI STANDARD
01-september-2021
Jedrske elektrarne - Nadzorne sobe - Zahteve za objekte za odzivanje v izrednih
razmerah (IEC 62954:2019)
Nuclear power plants - Control rooms - Requirements for emergency response facilities
(IEC 62954:2019)
Kernkraftwerke - Warten - Anforderungen für Notfall-Reaktionseinrichtungen (IEC
62954:2019)
Centrales nucléaires de puissance - Salles de commande - Exigences pour les moyens
de réaction d'urgence (IEC 62954:2019)
Ta slovenski standard je istoveten z: EN IEC 62954:2021
ICS:
27.120.20 Jedrske elektrarne. Varnost Nuclear power plants. Safety
2003-01.Slovenski inštitut za standardizacijo. Razmnoževanje celote ali delov tega standarda ni dovoljeno.

EUROPEAN STANDARD EN IEC 62954

NORME EUROPÉENNE
EUROPÄISCHE NORM
July 2021
ICS 27.120.20
English Version
Nuclear power plants - Control rooms - Requirements for
emergency response facilities
(IEC 62954:2019)
Centrales nucléaires de puissance - Salles de commande - Kernkraftwerke - Warten - Anforderungen für Notfall-
Exigences pour les moyens de réaction d'urgence Reaktionseinrichtungen
(IEC 62954:2019) (IEC 62954:2019)
This European Standard was approved by CENELEC on 2021-07-05. CENELEC members are bound to comply with the CEN/CENELEC
Internal Regulations which stipulate the conditions for giving this European Standard the status of a national standard without any alteration.
Up-to-date lists and bibliographical references concerning such national standards may be obtained on application to the CEN-CENELEC
Management Centre or to any CENELEC member.
This European Standard exists in three official versions (English, French, German). A version in any other language made by translation
under the responsibility of a CENELEC member into its own language and notified to the CEN-CENELEC Management Centre has the
same status as the official versions.
CENELEC members are the national electrotechnical committees of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey and the United Kingdom.

European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization
Comité Européen de Normalisation Electrotechnique
Europäisches Komitee für Elektrotechnische Normung
CEN-CENELEC Management Centre: Rue de la Science 23, B-1040 Brussels
© 2021 CENELEC All rights of exploitation in any form and by any means reserved worldwide for CENELEC Members.
Ref. No. EN IEC 62954:2021 E
European foreword
This document (EN IEC 62954:2021) consists of the text of IEC 62954:2019 prepared by IEC/TC 45
"Nuclear instrumentation".
The following dates are fixed:
• latest date by which the document has to be implemented at national (dop) 2022-07-05
level by publication of an identical national standard or by endorsement
• latest date by which the national standards conflicting with the (dow) 2024-07-05
document have to be withdrawn
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of
patent rights. CENELEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.
As stated in the nuclear safety directive 2009/71/EURATOM, Chapter 1, Article 2, item 2, Member
States are not prevented from taking more stringent safety measures in the subject-matter covered by
the Directive, in compliance with Community law.
In a similar manner, this European standard does not prevent Member States from taking more
stringent nuclear safety and/or security measures in the subject-matter covered by this standard.
Any feedback and questions on this document should be directed to the users’ national standards
body/national committee. A complete listing of these bodies can be found on the CEN and CENELEC
websites.
Endorsement notice
The text of the International Standard IEC 62954:2019 was approved by CENELEC as a European
Standard without any modification.
In the official version, for Bibliography, the following notes have to be added for the standards
indicated:
IEC 60709 NOTE Harmonized as EN IEC 60709
IEC 60964 NOTE Harmonized as EN IEC 60964
IEC 60965 NOTE Harmonized as EN 60965
IEC 61227 NOTE Harmonized as EN 61227
IEC 61772 NOTE Harmonized as EN 61772
IEC 61839 NOTE Harmonized as EN 61839
IEC 62645 NOTE Harmonized as EN IEC 62645

Annex ZA
(normative)
Normative references to international publications
with their corresponding European publications
The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their content
constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For
undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including any amendments)
applies.
NOTE 1  Where an International Publication has been modified by common modifications, indicated by (mod), the relevant
EN/HD applies.
NOTE 2  Up-to-date information on the latest versions of the European Standards listed in this annex is available here:
www.cenelec.eu.
Publication Year Title EN/HD Year
IEC 61226 2009 Nuclear power plants - Instrumentation and EN 61226 2010
control important to safety - Classification
of instrumentation and control functions
IEC 61513 -  Nuclear power plants - Instrumentation and EN 61513 -
control important to safety - General
requirements for systems
IEC/IEEE 60780--  Nuclear facilities – Electrical equipment EN 60780-323 -
323 important to safety - Qualification

IEC 62954 ®
Edition 1.0 2019-01
INTERNATIONAL
STANDARD
NORME
INTERNATIONALE
colour
inside
Nuclear power plants – Control rooms – Requirements for emergency response

facilities
Centrales nucléaires de puissance – Salles de commande – Exigences pour les

moyens de réaction d'urgence
INTERNATIONAL
ELECTROTECHNICAL
COMMISSION
COMMISSION
ELECTROTECHNIQUE
INTERNATIONALE
ICS 27.120.20 ISBN 978-2-8322-6384-6

– 2 – IEC 62954:2019 © IEC 2019
CONTENTS
FOREWORD . 4
INTRODUCTION . 6
1 Scope . 9
2 Normative references . 9
3 Terms and definitions . 10
4 Symbols and abbreviated terms . 12
5 ERF basis for design . 12
5.1 General . 12
5.2 Role and main features . 12
5.2.1 General . 12
5.2.2 Emergency Response Centre (ERC) . 13
5.2.3 Technical Support Centre (TSC) . 13
5.2.4 Operational Support Centre (OSC) . 14
5.3 Availability and hazard withstand . 14
5.4 Information to be available in ERF . 15
6 ERF location and physical features . 15
6.1 Location . 15
6.2 Access routes . 16
6.3 Access control . 16
6.4 Environmental design. 16
6.5 Other habitability aspects . 16
6.6 Power supplies . 17
6.7 Documentation . 17
7 Principles of operation . 18
7.1 Organisational aspects . 18
7.2 Staffing . 18
8 Human Machine Interface (HMI) . 18
8.1 Room layout and workspace design . 18
8.2 Hardware and software HMI design . 18
9 Human Factors Engineering (HFE) . 19
9.1 General . 19
9.2 Operational experience . 19
9.3 Functional analysis and assignment . 19
9.4 Task analysis . 19
9.5 Style guide . 20
9.6 HFE verification and validation . 20
10 Instrumentation and control equipment . 20
10.1 Safety classification . 20
10.2 Design of I&C equipment for ERF . 20
10.3 I&C functions of the ERF . 21
10.4 Testability . 21
11 Equipment qualification . 21
12 Communications . 21
12.1 Communication principles . 21
12.2 Nature of communications . 21

IEC 62954:2019 © IEC 2019 – 3 –
12.3 Data communications . 22
12.4 Verbal communications . 22
12.5 Non-verbal communications . 22
12.6 Communication confidentiality . 22
13 Maintenance and training . 23
13.1 Maintainability . 23
13.2 Repairs . 23
13.3 Periodic verification of equipment and perishable goods . 23
13.4 Training and exercises . 23
Annex A (informative) Extracts from IAEA Safety Guides relevant to ERF . 24
Bibliography . 26

Figure 1 – On-site and off-site ERFs and communicating entities . 6

– 4 – IEC 62954:2019 © IEC 2019
INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION
____________
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS – CONTROL ROOMS –
REQUIREMENTS FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES

FOREWORD
1) The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) is a worldwide organization for standardization comprising
all national electrotechnical committees (IEC National Committees). The object of IEC is to promote
international co-operation on all questions concerning standardization in the electrical and electronic fields. To
this end and in addition to other activities, IEC publishes International Standards, Technical Specifications,
Technical Reports, Publicly Available Specifications (PAS) and Guides (hereafter referred to as “IEC
Publication(s)”). Their preparation is entrusted to technical committees; any IEC National Committee interested
in the subject dealt with may participate in this preparatory work. International, governmental and non-
governmental organizations liaising with the IEC also participate in this preparation. IEC collaborates closely
with the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) in accordance with conditions determined by
agreement between the two organizations.
2) The formal decisions or agreements of IEC on technical matters express, as nearly as possible, an international
consensus of opinion on the relevant subjects since each technical committee has representation from all
interested IEC National Committees.
3) IEC Publications have the form of recommendations for international use and are accepted by IEC National
Committees in that sense. While all reasonable efforts are made to ensure that the technical content of IEC
Publications is accurate, IEC cannot be held responsible for the way in which they are used or for any
misinterpretation by any end user.
4) In order to promote international uniformity, IEC National Committees undertake to apply IEC Publications
transparently to the maximum extent possible in their national and regional publications. Any divergence
between any IEC Publication and the corresponding national or regional publication shall be clearly indicated in
the latter.
5) IEC itself does not provide any attestation of conformity. Independent certification bodies provide conformity
assessment services and, in some areas, access to IEC marks of conformity. IEC is not responsible for any
services carried out by independent certification bodies.
6) All users should ensure that they have the latest edition of this publication.
7) No liability shall attach to IEC or its directors, employees, servants or agents including individual experts and
members of its technical committees and IEC National Committees for any personal injury, property damage or
other damage of any nature whatsoever, whether direct or indirect, or for costs (including legal fees) and
expenses arising out of the publication, use of, or reliance upon, this IEC Publication or any other IEC
Publications.
8) Attention is drawn to the Normative references cited in this publication. Use of the referenced publications is
indispensable for the correct application of this publication.
9) Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this IEC Publication may be the subject of
patent rights. IEC shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.
International Standard IEC 62954 has been prepared by subcommittee 45A: Instrumentation,
control and electrical power systems of nuclear facilities, of IEC technical committee 45:
Nuclear instrumentation.
The text of this International Standard is based on the following documents:
FDIS Report on voting
45A/1236/FDIS 45A/1251/RVD
Full information on the voting for the approval of this International Standard can be found in
the report on voting indicated in the above table.
This document has been drafted in accordance with the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.

IEC 62954:2019 © IEC 2019 – 5 –
The committee has decided that the contents of this document will remain unchanged until the
stability date indicated on the IEC website under "http://webstore.iec.ch" in the data related to
the specific document. At this date, the document will be
• reconfirmed,
• withdrawn,
• replaced by a revised edition, or
• amended.
IMPORTANT – The 'colour inside' logo on the cover page of this publication indicates
that it contains colours which are considered to be useful for the correct
understanding of its contents. Users should therefore print this document using a
colour printer.
– 6 – IEC 62954:2019 © IEC 2019
INTRODUCTION
a) Technical background, main issues and organisation of the Standard
The Fukushima-Daiichi accident has shown that extremely severe hazards can occur for
which a nuclear power plant has not been designed to resist. In such situations, the plant has
possibly to cope with one or several damaged reactors, and associated radioactive releases,
but also has to cope with the loss of a major part of the electrical sources, cooling functions
and I&C, possibly including the Main Control Room (MCR), as well as with difficulties in
accessing the site. Providing safe on-site facilities for managing such an emergency is hence
a major issue.
An international consensus has emerged to promote the design and installation of a specific
set of facilities aiming at coordinating the efforts of personnel charged with controlling the
emergency activities and those of authorities external to the site charged with protecting the
population and the environment. These facilities are called the Emergency Response
Facilities (ERF).
Different countries, utilities and nuclear power plants have different geographical and
infrastructure characteristics and different requirements under emergency situations.
However, the same fundamentals apply in terms of both on-site and off-site requirements.
The IAEA requirements for emergency response are addressed in SSR-2/1 and GSR Part 7.
Informative Annex A provides the more relevant extracts from these two IAEA publications.
Figure 1 below illustrates the most important control locations, emergency response facilities
and other associated facilities on-site and off-site. Some of the on-site facilities could be
combined to support close-communication or their functions could be dispersed across other
on-site facilities. The level of hardening and autonomy of the individual on-site facilities could
vary considerably.
Figure 1 – On-site and off-site ERFs and communicating entities
NOTE 1 No internationally standardized terminology has been established for the various on-site and off-site
emergency response facilities. The terms used in Figure 1 indicate the ones that have been adopted in this
document.
NOTE 2 Depending on local contexts, the “on-site” ERFs could be implemented close to the NPP and not inside it.
NOTE 3 The role and composition of the off-site civil authorities and emergency infrastructure are known to vary
widely. These entries in Figure 1 are therefore considered as illustrative only.
As indicated in Figure 1 some functional services are already dealt with in IEC standards.

IEC 62954:2019 © IEC 2019 – 7 –
This standard was proposed after the Fukushima-Daiichi accident to take into account the
lessons learned from those dramatic events. Several reports prepared after the accident, at
national level (Japanese Government report) as well as at international level (IAEA fact
finding mission) highlighted the role played by the Emergency Response Centre (ERC) during
those events and identified the need to take into account the experience gained to strengthen
the requirements for such a facility.
This led to the development of this standard, with the following principles:
• The scope should align with that of the relevant IAEA guidance, as given in SSR-2/1,
Rev. 1 and GSR Part 7;
• The scope should address the three functional facilities related to Emergency Response
that are addressed by the IAEA guidance (i.e. the ERC, TSC and OSC);
• The scope should be limited to such facilities that are on or near the NPP site. The scope
should exclude activities in the scope of local response authorities;
• The requirements should be defined in terms of the functions that are to be performed;
• The standard should address the way in which the functions are invoked in response to
different severities of incident / accident and any responsibilities that would be transferred
from the MCR to the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs);
• The scope should include consideration of the requirements for environment control,
lighting, power supplies, access control of the ERFs, etc., as needed to enable the
Emergency Response functions to be performed;
• The only “controls” that should be provided are those that relate to the services that
provide the above mentioned environment control, lighting, power supplies, access control
of the ERFs, etc.;
• The standard should recognize that a wide range of national or regional situations exist
regarding the structure and arrangements for the off-site Emergency Response support.
This IEC standard specifically focuses on the issue of requirements relevant for the
Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs).
It is intended that the Standard be used by designers and operators of NPPs (utilities),
systems evaluators, vendors and subcontractors, and by licensors.
b) Situation of the current Standard in the structure of the IEC SC 45A standard series
IEC 62954 is at the third level of the IEC SC 45A standard series. It is to be considered as
affiliated to IEC 60964, the top document on control rooms in the SC 45A standard series.
For a generic description of the structure of the IEC SC 45A standard series, see item d) of
this introduction.
c) Recommendations and limitations regarding the application of the Standard
This standard establishes functional requirements for Emergency Response Facilities and
clarifies the design and operation of the ERF systems to be used in case of incidents or
accidents occurring on nuclear power plants (NPPs) and/or nuclear facilities.
It is recognized that this is an evolving area of regulatory requirements, due to ongoing
analysis of the Fukushima lessons learned. Therefore, the goal of this project is to provide a
standard, which defines the framework within which the evolving country or plant specific
requirements may be developed and applied.

– 8 – IEC 62954:2019 © IEC 2019
d) Description of the structure of the IEC SC 45A standard series and relationships
with other IEC documents and other bodies documents (IAEA, ISO)
The top-level documents of the IEC SC 45A standard series are IEC 61513 and IEC 63046.
IEC 61513 provides general requirements for I&C systems and equipment that are used to
perform functions important to safety in NPPs. IEC 63046 provides general requirements for
electrical power systems of NPPs; it covers power supply systems including the supply
systems of the I&C systems. IEC 61513 and IEC 63046 are to be considered in conjunction
and at the same level. IEC 61513 and IEC 63046 structure the IEC SC 45A standard series
and shape a complete framework establishing general requirements for instrumentation,
control and electrical systems for nuclear power plants.
IEC 61513 and IEC 63046 refer directly to other IEC SC 45A standards for general topics
related to categorization of functions and classification of systems, qualification, separation,
defence against common cause failure, control room design, electromagnetic compatibility,
cybersecurity, software and hardware aspects for programmable digital systems, coordination
of safety and security requirements and management of ageing. The standards referenced
directly at this second level should be considered together with IEC 61513 and IEC 63046 as
a consistent document set.
At a third level, IEC SC 45A standards not directly referenced by IEC 61513 or by IEC 63046
are standards related to specific equipment, technical methods, or specific activities. Usually
these documents, which make reference to second-level documents for general topics, can be
used on their own.
A fourth level extending the IEC SC 45 standard series, corresponds to the Technical Reports
which are not normative.
The IEC SC 45A standards series consistently implements and details the safety and security
principles and basic aspects provided in the relevant IAEA safety standards and in the
relevant documents of the IAEA nuclear security series (NSS). In particular this includes the
IAEA requirements SSR-2/1, establishing safety requirements related to the design of nuclear
power plants (NPPs), the IAEA safety guide SSG-30 dealing with the safety classification of
structures, systems and components in NPPs, the IAEA safety guide SSG-39 dealing with the
design of instrumentation and control systems for NPPs, the IAEA safety guide SSG-34
dealing with the design of electrical power systems for NPPs and the implementing guide
NSS17 for computer security at nuclear facilities. The safety and security terminology and
definitions used by SC 45A standards are consistent with those used by the IAEA.
IEC 61513 and IEC 63046 have adopted a presentation format similar to the basic safety
publication IEC 61508 with an overall life-cycle framework and a system life-cycle framework.
Regarding nuclear safety, IEC 61513 and IEC 63046 provide the interpretation of the general
requirements of IEC 61508-1, IEC 61508-2 and IEC 61508-4, for the nuclear application
sector. In this framework IEC 60880, IEC 62138 and IEC 62566 correspond to IEC 61508-3
for the nuclear application sector. IEC 61513 and IEC 63046 refer to ISO as well as to
IAEA GSR Part 2 and IAEA GS-G-3.1 and IAEA GS-G-3.5 for topics related to quality
assurance (QA). At level 2, regarding nuclear security, IEC 62645 is the entry document for
the IEC/SC 45A security standards. It builds upon the valid high level principles and main
concepts of the generic security standards, in particular ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO/IEC 27002; it
adapts them and completes them to fit the nuclear context and coordinates with the
IEC 62443 series. At level 2, IEC 60964 is the entry document for the IEC/SC 45A control
rooms standards and IEC 62342 is the entry document for the ageing management standards.
NOTE 1 It is assumed that for the design of I&C systems in NPPs that implement conventional safety functions
(e.g. to address worker safety, asset protection, chemical hazards, process energy hazards) international or
national standards would be applied.
NOTE 2 IEC/SC 45A domain was extended in 2013 to cover electrical systems. In 2014 and 2015 discussions
were held in IEC/SC 45A to decide how and where general requirements for the design of electrical systems were
to be considered. IEC/SC 45A experts recommended that an independent standard be developed at the same level
as IEC 61513 to establish general requirements for electrical systems. Project IEC 63046 is now launched to cover
this objective. When IEC 63046 is published this NOTE 2 of the introduction of IEC/SC 45A standards will be
suppressed.
IEC 62954:2019 © IEC 2019 – 9 –
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS – CONTROL ROOMS –
REQUIREMENTS FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES

1 Scope
This document presents the requirements for the on-site emergency response facilities
(referred to hereinafter as the “ERF”) which are to be used in case of incidents or accidents
occurring on the associated Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). The ERF consists of the Emergency
Response Centre (ERC), the Technical Support Centre (TSC) and the Operational Support
Centre (OSC), as shown in Figure 1.
It establishes requirements for the ERF features and ERF I&C equipment to:
• coordinate on-site operational efforts with respect to safety and radioprotection;
• optimize the design in terms of environment control, lighting, power supplies and access
control of the ERF;
• enhance the identification and resolution of potential conflicts between the traditional
operational means and emergency means (MCR/SCR and ERF, operating staff and
emergency teams, operational procedures and emergency procedures);
• aid the identification and the enhancement of the potential synergies between the
traditional operational means and emergency means.
This document is intended for application to new nuclear power plants whose conceptual
design is initiated after the publication of this document, but it may also be used for designing
and implementing ERF in existing nuclear power plants or in any other nuclear facility.
Detailed equipment design is outside the scope of this document.
This document does not define the situations (reactor plant conditions, hazards and
magnitudes of hazards) leading to mobilisation of emergency response teams and activation /
use of the ERF. These aspects are usually addressed in the NPP Emergency Plan. However,
the need for consistency of the ERF design and operation with the NPP Emergency Plan is
within scope.
2 Normative references
The following documents are referred to in the text in such a way that some or all of their
content constitutes requirements of this document. For dated references, only the edition
cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced document (including
any amendments) applies.
IEC/IEEE 60780-323, Nuclear facilities – Electrical equipment important to safety –
Qualification
IEC 61226:2009, Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control important to safety –
Classification of instrumentation and control functions
IEC 61513, Nuclear power plants – Instrumentation and control important to safety – General
requirements for systems
– 10 – IEC 62954:2019 © IEC 2019
3 Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.
ISO and IEC maintain terminological databases for use in standardization at the following
addresses:
• IEC Electropedia: available at http://www.electropedia.org/
• ISO Online browsing platform: available at http://www.iso.org/obp
3.1
Access Control Point
ACP
area (one or more) within the facility security boundary to control the entry and exit of off-site
personnel, in particular emergency teams
3.2
assembly point
location (one or more) where non-essential personnel at the facility are assembled, accounted
for and sheltered or evacuated
3.3
emergency
non-routine situation or event that necessitates prompt action, primarily to mitigate a hazard
or adverse consequences for human life, health, property or the environment
Note 1 to entry: This includes nuclear and radiological emergencies and conventional emergencies such as fires,
release of hazardous chemicals, storms or earthquakes.
Note 2 to entry: This includes situations for which prompt action is warranted to mitigate the effects of a
perceived hazard.
[SOURCE: IAEA GSR Part 7, 2015]
3.4
emergency plan
description of the objectives, policy and concept of operations for the response to an
emergency and of the structure, authorities and responsibilities for a systematic, coordinated
and effective response
Note 1 to entry: The emergency plan serves as the basis for the development of other plans, procedures and
checklists.
[SOURCE: IAEA GSR Part 7, 2015]
3.5
emergency response
performance of actions to mitigate the consequences of an emergency for human life, health,
property and the environment
[SOURCE: IAEA GSR Part 7, 2015]
3.6
Emergency Response Centre
ERC
area set aside on or near to the NPP site for staff to manage the overall response to the
emergency and to handle the off-site interfaces

IEC 62954:2019 © IEC 2019 – 11 –
3.7
Emergency Response Facility
ERF
facility or location needed for supporting an emergency response, for which specific functions
are to be assigned at the preparedness stage, and which need to be usable under emergency
conditions
[SOURCE: IAEA GSR Part 7, 2015]
3.8
function
specific purpose or objective to be accomplished, that can be specified or described without
reference to the physical means of achieving it
3.9
functional analysis
examination of the functional goals of a system with respect to available manpower,
technology, and other resources, to provide the basis for determining how the function may be
assigned and executed
[SOURCE: IEC 60964:2018, 3.12]
3.10
functional goal
performance objectives that shall be satisfied to achieve the corresponding function
[SOURCE: IEC 60964: 2018, 3.13]
3.11
Nuclear Power Plant site
NPP site
geographical area that contains the NPP, circumscribed by the security perimeter fence or
other designated property marker
[SOURCE: IAEA GSR Part 7, 2015]
3.12
Operational Support Centre
OSC
area separate from the main control room where NPP operations support staff will assemble
in an emergency situation to be assigned to various duties (e.g. environmental monitoring,
health physics, damage control and fire fighting)
3.13
task analysis
identification and description of an operator’s task, in terms of its components, to specify the
detailed human activities involved, and their functional and temporal relationships
Note 1 to entry: Frequently, task analysis in understood to also include the evaluation of the operator’s tasks. In
the frame of IEC 60964, this evaluation is described in terms of verification and validation of function assignment
and verification and validation of the integrated control room system (which also covers the operator tasks).
[SOURCE: IEC 60964: 2018, 3.31]

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3.14
tasks
actions performed by humans for the accomplishment of a functional goal
[SOURCE: IEC 60964: 2018, 3.32]
3.15
Technical Support Centre
TSC
area separate from the main control room where NPP operations support staff can assemble
in the event of a reactor incident or accident to provide technical support to the control room
operators
4 Symbols and abbreviated terms
ACP Access Control Point
ERC Emergency Response Centre
ERF Emergency Response Facility (or Facilities)
HFE Human Factors Engineering
HMI Human Machine Interface
I&C Instrumentation and Control
MCR Main Control Room
NPP Nuclear Power Plant
OSC Operational Support Centre
SCR Supplementary Control Room
TSC Technical Support Centre
5 ERF basis for design
5.1 General
An overarching principle of this document is that the emergency plan for the nuclear power
plant site (assumed to comprise one or more reactor units and associated spent fuel storage
facilities) imposes overall requirements for the ERF which are further detailed in this
document. This includes criteria for the time of activation of the ERF and the responsibilities
that are to be transferred from other NPP locations to the ERF.
In some cases the specification and the design of the ERF and the ERF I&C systems will be
done many years after the specification and design of the NPP to which the ERF relates.
There will be technical interaction through interfaces between ERF individual systems and the
NPP existing I&C systems, so that consistent provisions for the exchange of data and
interoperability of the ERF with the NPP are established.
The ERF buildings and equipment that are difficult to be replaced should be designed with the
same life duration as the NPP to which they relate. This duration may include some of the
decommissioning period if this is necessary for the plant safety.
5.2 Role and main features
5.2.1 General
The role of the ERF is to provide adequate means, including organization and human expertise,
when a plant has experienced a reactor incident, accident or other emergency situation,
including a severe reactor accident or severe external hazard, in order:

IEC 62954:2019 © IEC 2019 – 13 –
• to manage the situation and mitigate its consequences;
• to bring relief and assistance to the operating staff on duty;
• to inform official authorities.
The ERF shall be able to cope simultaneously with all units of the NPP in which it is
implemented.
As it is impossible to specify all scenarios for which ERF operation may be required, it is
necessary to incorporate flexibility and intelligence into the design and operational
arrangements in order to maximise the potential for adapting to the actual situation.
Each facility listed below (i.e. ERC, TSC and OSC) may be a building, part of a building or a
room.
The organizational relationship between the parts of ERF shall be defined early in the design.
This definition shall comprise clarification of:
• leadership and hierarchy between the parts;
• scope and role of internal and external communication;
• principles for sharing of responsibilities between the three parts and the MCR / SCR.
5.2.2 Emergency Response Centre (ERC)
The ERC is a facility, separate from the MCR, which leads and manages the overall
emergency response. This includes coordination with the OSC for the field operations
(see 5.2.4) and with the TSC for the technical advice to the operators (see 5.2.3). It also
includes managing the flow of information to and from external bodies, including requests for
external assistance and any necessary briefings to relevant off-site organizations.
The ERC should have the following operational features:
• a layout that promotes a “command and control” organisational structure, with facilities for
regular briefing sessions, etc., and separate areas for teams performing independent
tasks;
• secure and reliable communications with other parts of the ERF, with the MCR (or SCR,
as applicable), with off-site authorities and with other parts of the off-site emergency
response organisation;
• a monitoring capability similar to that available in the MCR, including monitoring of
radiation levels throughout the NPP and in the immediate locality of the site, and including
parameters assigned to severe accidents; the monitored elements should be defined
based on a task analysis;
• access to the emergency plans, NPP design information, operating procedures, etc.;
• suitable space / working surfaces for reading documents, writing, etc.
5.2.3 Technical Support Centre (TSC)
The TSC is a facility separate from the MCR from where NPP operations support staff can
provide technical support to the control room operators in the event of a reactor incident or
accident.
The TSC should have the following operational features:
• secure and reliable communications with other parts of the ERF, with the MCR (or SCR,
as applicable) and with off-site technical support organisations (e.g. NPP designer);

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• a monitoring capability similar to that available in the MCR. The monitored elements shall
include at least the radiation monitoring devices and important to safety parameters of the
plant that have been deemed relevant;
• access to NPP as-built drawings and to complete and updated sets of design
documentation, operating procedures etc.;
• suitable space / working surfaces for reading documents, writing, presenting onscreen
information to a larger audience, etc.
5.2.4 Operational Support Centre (OSC)
The OSC is a facility, separate from the MCR, where NPP operations support staff will
assemble in an emergency situation to be assigned to, briefed and suitably equipped for
performing various duties (e.g. environmental monitoring, health physics, damage control and
fire fighting) at different locations throughout the NPP.
The OSC should have the following operational features:
• secure and reliable communications with other parts of the ERF, with the MCR (or SCR,
as applicable), with teams in the facility and with off-site responders (e.g. fire services,
police, medical teams);
• sufficient room to assemble, equip and prepare teams;
• continuous monitoring of the environmental conditions (e.g. temperatures, humidity levels)
throughout the NPP;
• continuous monitoring of radiation levels throughout the NPP;
NOTE 1 The IEC 60951 series provide requirements regarding radiation monitoring systems used for accident
and post-accident operations.
• continuous monitoring of the status of the fire fighting systems;
• ready access to equipment, instruments and protective clothing needed by response
teams, including access to mobile detectors for essential information related to radiation
protection and personnel safety;
• real time information, live videos and tools to prepare and brief staff before acting in the
plant;
• storage areas for mobile equipment deployable on site.
NOTE 2 Depending on the equipment, it may be relevant to use storage areas adjacent to the reactor units and
not inside the OSC.
Consideration may also be given to the provision of on-site facilities for the radiological
analysis of environmental samples.
5.3 Availability and hazard withstand
The ERF shall be ready for use at any time. Possible maintenance activities shall not disable
them. Nonetheless, alternative arrangements should be defined to cater for possible
unavailability of any part of the ERF.
Collective and individual protective equipment shall be available in the ERF, as well as
emergency items, for example first aid kits and flashlights, batteries, individual oxygen masks.
In addition, daily provisions for normal human life, e.g. food and beverages, rest spaces and
commodities, etc., shall be available.
Appropriate measures shall be t
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