SIST-TP CEN/TR 16670:2014
(Main)Information technology - RFID threat and vulnerability analysis
Information technology - RFID threat and vulnerability analysis
The scope of the Technical Report is to consider the threats and vulnerabilities associated with specific characteristics of RFID technology in a system comprising: - the air interface protocol covering all the common frequencies; - the tag including model variants within a technology; - the interrogator features for processing the air interface; - the interrogator interface to the application. The Technical Report addresses specific RFID technologies as defined by their air interface specifications. The threats, vulnerabilities, and mitigating methods are presented as a toolkit, enabling the specific characteristics of the RFID technology being used in an application to be taken into consideration. While the focus is on specifications that are standardized, the feature analysis can also be applied to proprietary RFID technologies. This should be possible because some features are common to more than one standardized technology, and it should be possible to map these to proprietary technologies. Although this Technical Report may be used by any operator, even for a small system, the technical details are better considered by others. In particular the document should be a tool used by RFID system integrators, to improve security aspects using a privacy by design approach. As such it is also highly relevant to operators that are not SME’s, and to industry bodies representing SME members.
Informationstechnik - Analyse zur Bedrohung und Verletzlichkeit durch beziehungsweise von RFID
Technologie de l’information - RFID, Analyse de vulnérabilité et de menace
Informacijska tehnologija - RFID, analiza groženj in ranljivosti
Področje uporabe tega tehničnega poročila je obravnavanje groženj in ranljivosti, povezanih z določenimi lastnostmi tehnologije RFID v sistemu, vključno s: - protokolom radijskega vmesnika, ki obsega vse skupne frekvence; - označevanjem, vključno z različicami modelov v tehnologiji; - lastnostmi bralnikov za obdelavo radijskega vmesnika; - vmesnikom bralnika aplikacije. Tehnično poročilo obravnava določene tehnologije RFID, kot jih določajo njihove specifikacije radijskega vmesnika. Grožnje, ranljivosti in metode za njihovo ublažitev so predstavljene kot orodje, kar omogoča upoštevanje določenih lastnosti tehnologije RFID, ki so uporabljene v aplikaciji. Analiza lastnosti se osredotoča na standardizirane specifikacije, lahko pa se uporablja tudi za lastniške tehnologije RFID. To naj bi bilo mogoče, ker so nekatere lastnosti skupne več kot eni standardizirani tehnologiji in naj bi jih bilo mogoče povezati z lastniškimi tehnologijami. Čeprav lahko to tehnično poročilo uporablja kateri koli izvajalec, je bolje, če tehnične podrobnosti tudi v majhnem sistemu obravnavajo drugi izvajalci. Dokument naj bi bil zlasti orodje, ki ga uporabljajo integratorji sistema RFID za izboljšanje vidikov varnosti z uporabo pristopa vgrajene zasebnosti. Tako je tudi zelo uporaben za izvajalce, ki niso mala in srednje velika podjetja, in industrijska združenja, ki predstavljajo člane malih in srednje velikih podjetij.
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SLOVENSKI STANDARD
SIST-TP CEN/TR 16670:2014
01-september-2014
Informacijska tehnologija - RFID, analiza groženj in ranljivosti
Information technology - RFID threat and vulnerability analysis
Informationstechnik - Analyse zur Bedrohung und Verletzlichkeit durch beziehungsweise
von RFID
Technologie de l’information - RFID, Analyse de vulnérabilité et de menace
Ta slovenski standard je istoveten z: CEN/TR 16670:2014
ICS:
35.040.50 Tehnike za samodejno Automatic identification and
razpoznavanje in zajem data capture techniques
podatkov
SIST-TP CEN/TR 16670:2014 en,fr,de
2003-01.Slovenski inštitut za standardizacijo. Razmnoževanje celote ali delov tega standarda ni dovoljeno.
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SIST-TP CEN/TR 16670:2014
TECHNICAL REPORT
CEN/TR 16670
RAPPORT TECHNIQUE
TECHNISCHER BERICHT
June 2014
ICS 35.240.60
English Version
Information technology - RFID threat and vulnerability analysis
Technologies de l'information - RFID, analyse vulnérabilité Informationstechnik - Analyse zur Bedrohung und
et de menace Verletzlichkeit durch beziehungsweise von RFID
This Technical Report was approved by CEN on 20 January 2014. It has been drawn up by the Technical Committee CEN/TC 225.
CEN members are the national standards bodies of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and United
Kingdom.
EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR STANDARDIZATION
COMITÉ EUROPÉEN DE NORMALISATION
EUROPÄISCHES KOMITEE FÜR NORMUNG
CEN-CENELEC Management Centre: Avenue Marnix 17, B-1000 Brussels
© 2014 CEN All rights of exploitation in any form and by any means reserved Ref. No. CEN/TR 16670:2014 E
worldwide for CEN national Members.
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CEN/TR 16670:2014 (E)
Contents Page
Foreword .4
Introduction .5
1 Scope .6
2 Terms and definitions .6
3 Symbols and abbreviations .9
4 Threats and Attack scenarios . 10
4.1 Introduction . 10
4.2 Attacks to an RFID System with a Fake Reader . 11
4.3 Attacks to a RFID system with a Fake Tag . 12
4.4 Attacks to a RFID system with a Fake Reader and a Fake Tag . 12
4.5 Attack to a Real Tag with a Fake Reader and a Fake Tag . 13
4.6 Attack to a Real Tag with a Fake Reader . 13
4.7 Attack to a Real Reader with a Fake Tag . 13
5 Vulnerabilities . 14
5.1 Introduction . 14
5.2 Denial of service . 14
5.3 Eavesdropping . 14
5.4 Man in the Middle . 15
6 Mitigation measures . 15
6.1 Introduction . 15
6.2 Mitigation measures for secured RFID Devices . 15
6.2.1 Mitigation measures for tags . 15
6.2.2 Mitigation measures for readers . 15
6.2.3 Mitigation measures for the Air Interface Protocol . 15
6.3 Mitigation measures against attacks . 15
6.3.1 Introduction . 15
6.3.2 Eavesdropping . 15
6.3.3 Skimming . 15
6.3.4 Relay attack . 16
6.3.5 Denial of Service . 16
7 Conclusions . 16
Annex A (informative) Attack scenarios . 18
A.1 Amusement parks takes visitors to RFID-land . 18
A.1.1 Introduction . 18
A.1.2 Threat scenarios . 18
A.1.3 DPP objectives of relevance . 19
A.1.4 Security objectives of relevance . 19
A.1.5 Privacy objectives of relevance . 20
A.2 Purpose of Use and Consent . 20
A.2.1 Purpose 1 . 20
A.2.2 Purpose 2 (with explicit consent) . 21
A.2.3 Purpose 3 (with no explicit consent . 21
A.3 Multi-tag and purpose RFID environment for Healthcare . 22
A.3.1 Scenario description - Emergency. 22
A.3.2 The hospital RFID environment . 22
A.3.3 Arrival at the hospital . 23
A.3.4 Treatment at the hospital . 24
A.3.5 The value of the drug prescribed . 24
A.3.6 Returning home . 24
A.3.7 The home RFID environment . 24
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A.3.8 Drug repeat prescription and out of date drug recycling . 25
Annex B Original Test Set ups and Results . 26
B.1 Test Area . 26
B.2 Equipment . 26
B.3 Overview of the Tests . 27
B.3.1 Introduction . 27
B.3.2 Range tests . 27
B.3.3 Write Tests . 27
B.3.4 Illicit Reading . 27
B.3.5 Eavesdropping . 28
B.3.6 Detection inside buildings . 28
B.3.7 Combined EAS/RFID systems . 28
B.4 Test procedures and results . 28
B.4.1 General . 28
B.4.2 Reading range . 30
B.4.3 Write range . 37
B.4.4 Illicit reading . 41
B.4.5 Eavesdropping . 46
B.4.6 Detection inside buildings . 47
B.4.7 Combined EAS/RFID system . 48
B.5 Analysis of results . 48
B.6 Conclusions . 49
Annex C Additional Test Set ups and Results . 50
C.1 Introduction . 50
C.2 Scope of tests . 50
C.3 Documenting the results . 50
C.4 Equipment required for additional tests . 50
C.5 Description of tests . 51
C.5.1 Activation distance for HF system . 51
C.5.2 Activation distance for UHF system . 52
C.5.3 Eavesdropping tests for HF system . 53
C.5.4 Eavesdropping tests for UHF system . 55
C.6 Test results . 56
C.6.1 Equipment utilised during the tests . 56
C.6.2 Description of Tests . 56
Bibliography . 70
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Foreword
This document (CEN/TR 16670:2014) has been prepared by Technical Committee CEN/TC 225 “AIDC
Technologies”, the secretariat of which is held by NEN.
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent
rights. CEN [and/or CENELEC] shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.
This Technical Report is one of a series of related deliverables, which comprise mandate 436 Phase 2. The
other deliverables are:
— EN 16570, Information technology — Notification of RFID — The information sign and additional
information to be provided by operators of RFID application systems
— EN 16571, Information technology — RFID privacy impact assessment process
— EN 16656, Information technology - Radio frequency identification for item management - RFID Emblem
(ISO/IEC 29160:2012, modified)
— CEN/TR 16684, Information technology — Notification of RFID — Additional information to be provided
by operators
— CEN/TS 16685, Information technology — Notification of RFID — The information sign to be displayed in
areas where RFID interrogators are deployed
— CEN/TR 16669, Information technology — Device interface to support ISO/IEC 18000-3
— CEN/TR 16671, Information technology — Authorisation of mobile phones when used as RFID
interrogators
— CEN/TR 16672, Information technology — Privacy capability features of current RFID technologies
— CEN/TR 16673, Information technology — RFID privacy impact assessment analysis for specific sectors
— CEN/TR 16674, Information technology — Analysis of privacy impact assessment methodologies relevant
to RFID
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Introduction
In response to the growing deployment of RFID systems in Europe, the European Commission published in
2007 the Communication COM(2007) 96 ‘RFID in Europesteps towards a policy framework’. This
Communication proposed steps which needed to be taken to reduce barriers to adoption of RFID whilst
respecting the basic legal framework safeguarding fundamental values such as health, environment, data
protection, privacy and security.
In December 2008, the European Commission addressed Mandate M/436 to CEN, CENELEC and ETSI in the
field of ICT as applied to RFID systems. The Mandate M/436 was accepted by the ESOs in the first months of
2009. The Mandate addresses the data protection, privacy and information aspects of RFID, and is being
executed in two phases. Phase 1, completed in May 2011, identified the work needed to produce a complete
framework of future RFID standards. The Phase 1 results are contained in the ETSI Technical Report TR 187
020, which was published in May 2011.
Phase 2 is concerned with the execution of the standardization work programme identified in the first phase.
This document will provide the additional information of the RFID application that will need to be provided to a
citizen by accessing the source identified on the sign where the RFID application is operating. This information
will be aligned with the details set out in the Recommendation, but some of this might not be available at the
outset, a Technical Report is the preferred form of initial delivery to establish basic requirements.
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1 Scope
The scope of the Technical Report is to consider the threats and vulnerabilities associated with specific
characteristics of RFID technology in a system comprising:
— the air interface protocol covering all the common frequencies;
— the tag including model variants within a technology;
— the interrogator features for processing the air interface;
— the interrogator interface to the application.
The Technical Report addresses specific RFID technologies as defined by their air interface specifications.
The threats, vulnerabilities, and mitigating methods are presented as a toolkit, enabling the specific
characteristics of the RFID technology being used in an application to be taken into consideration. While the
focus is on specifications that are standardized, the feature analysis can also be applied to proprietary RFID
technologies. This should be possible because some features are common to more than one standardized
technology, and it should be possible to map these to proprietary technologies.
Although this Technical Report may be used by any operator, even for a small system, the technical details
are better considered by others. In particular the document should be a tool used by RFID system integrators,
to improve security aspects using a privacy by design approach. As such it is also highly relevant to operators
that are not SME’s, and to industry bodies representing SME members.
2 Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.
2.1
blocker tag
tag forcing the reader to enter in its singulation algorithm
Note 1 to entry: The idea of the blocker tag that looks like a tag that we can have in our pocket, is to emit both ‘0’ and
‘1’ creating a collision and forcing the reader to enter in its singulation algorithm. If the blocker tag emits simultaneously ‘0’
and ‘1’ (that requires two antennas), the reader may never complete its algorithm. The blocker tag should be seen as a
hacker device that is able to generate a denial of service in a legitimate system. We can even assess that a blocker tag
has always a malicious behaviour since it cannot be selective and forbids the reading of one tag whereas it authorises the
reading of the others. Moreover, the blocker tag works like a tag in a passive mode. So, it requires being in the reader field
and it will protect only a small volume around itself. So a blocker tag can be considered as a malicious tag, which prevents
a legal system to read legal tags or as a mitigation technique preventing an illegal reader to read a legal tag.
2.2
blocking
another way to produce a denial of service is to interfere during the anti-collision sequence
Note 1 to entry: Different devices have been developed.
2.3
cloning
impersonation technique that is used to duplicate data from one tag to another
Note 1 to entry: Data acquired from the tag by whatever means is written to another tag. Unless the technology and
application require the interrogator to authenticate the RFID tag, cloning is possible. Cloning the unique chip ID presents a
significantly bigger challenge for the attacker, but some researchers claim that this is possible. There is also a special
case of cloning that needs to be considered where the application accepts multiple AIDC technologies. Cloning data from
an RFID-enabled card can be replicated in magnetic stripe. In some payment card systems, information that might be
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cloned from an AIDC card could be used in payment situations known as 'cardholder not present' for purchases made on
the Internet or by telephone. In this case, the clone is virtual and requires no encoding on another RFID tag.
2.4
denial of service
preventing communication between the interrogator and the tags
Note 1 to entry: There are two main ways to accomplish a "denial of service". The first one is to create electromagnetic
interferences, the second one is to insert a blocker tag in the communication.
2.5
destruction
making the tag definitively unusable without using a logical kill function whenever such a function exist in the
rfid protocol
Note 1 to entry: Destruction may refer to the reader too. Although this attack threats RFID system availability, it’s
different from deny of service because it can’t reactivate and repair it. Destruction is considered as an attack when it’s
practiced without holder’s knowledge. Two destruction types can be distinguished1) Hardware-and 2) Software
destruction. While this can be seen as a security threat to the RFID operator, there are also situations where it might affect
the individual. For example, if a public transport tag is accidentally damaged, then the individual's rights associated with it
can be lost. In a similar manner as for tag removal, tag destruction can be used as a control to protect the privacy
2.6
eavesdropping
passive attack, which consists in remotely listening to transactions between a Real Reader and a Real Tag
2.7
guardian
special device developed by Melanie Rieback from a Dutch University to help citizens to communicate with
their own contactless smartcards
Note 1 to entry: As an active device it can be turned into a blocking tag preventing an attacker to access such
contactless cards. Thus, it can blur any pervasive reading by actively emitting a jamming signal in the sidebands of a
typical RFID tag. Such a mechanism enables multiple functionalities:
— information can be sent to the reader or to the tag for secret key management, authentication, access control;
— monitoring of the RFID environment to warn of possible unsolicited reading;
— creation of collisions to prevent from the possible inquisitive reading.
As a consequence, the RFID guardian is a useful tool to ensure the privacy but it is also an efficient device to create
denials of service. Whereas the blocker tag is designed to carry out a simple load modulation, the RFID guardian is an
active device that requires batteries and that is able to emit is own signal. As a consequence, the distance of use is much
larger.
2.8
jamming
creating a signal in the same range as used by the reader in order to prevent tags from communicating with
the reader
Note 1 to entry: Because the RFID air interface protocol depends on radio signals, an attacker can exploit any such
signals within the range of the communication between interrogator and tag
2.9
man in the middle
object or person interfering in the communication between a real reader and a real tag
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Note 1 to entry: "Man in the middle" attack is often mistaken for relay attack. These are indeed similar but with the
distinctive feature that in this attack the bit stream can be modified in the relay. Since the relay implies the adaptation of
the modulation and of the bit coding by the Fake Reader or the Fake Tag for its use, it is not a problem to change some
bits. This additional feature may take time but it will always be shorter than the timeout of the Real Reader.
2.10
RFlD (1)
radio frequency identification
use of electromagnetic or inductive coupling in the radio frequency portion of the spectrum to communicate to
or from a tag through a variety of modulation and encoding schemes to uniquely read the identity of an RF
Tag
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 19762-3]
2.11
RFlD (2)
radio frequency identification
use of electromagnetic radiating waves or reactive field coupling in the radio frequency portion of the spectrum
to communicate to or from a tag through a variety of modulation and encoding schemes to uniquely read the
identity of a radio frequency tag or other data stored on it
[SOURCE: RFID Recommendation C(2009) 3200 final]
2.12
relay attack
kind of Man in the Middle attack where fake reader and fake tag are used
Note 1 to entry: The relay attack is based on a specific weakness of the RFID tags that has the possibility to activate
the device without the consent of the user. Indeed, a user is not able to switch off his tag. Thus an attacker can, therefore,
access the tag discreetly, without knowledge of its owner, and relay information through a communication link between the
tag and a remote Fake Reader. The reader will assume that the tag, and by implication the user, is in close vicinity and
provides access to the attacker. Using this attack on cryptographic authentication schemes, the attacker would be able to
convince both Real Reader and Real Tag to share a common secret key. The attacker would not be able to view in
plaintext any subsequent communications. This is not needed as long as it can continue relaying the respective
messages. The attack can be given an active twist by relaying the initial authentication sequence after which subsequent
data is modified and relayed. Relay attacks involve two different devices and as a consequence two attackers that should
coordinate each other except if the relay is really short (an arm’s length for example). The device that will skim the data of
the attacked person is the Fake Reader. The Fake Reader is linked via the relay to the Fake Tag, a Fake Tag that will
reproduce the data of the Real Tag.
2.13
side channel analysis
analysis which allows to find secret information by using the analysis of the RF field during the processes
made by the tag processor
2.14
side channel attack
attack which uses a Side Channel Analysis
Note 1 to entry: In a side channel attack, the information that is usually exploited includes timing information, power
consumption or even electro-magnetic fields. This type of attack requires sufficient time, specialist equipment, and deep
knowledge of the internal systems on which the cryptographic and other algorithms are implemented.
2.15
singulation
identifying an individual tag in a multiple-tag environment
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2.16
skimming
active attack which consists in reading a tag
Note 1 to entry: It includes powering and modulation. It implies distance tag activation without consent of the operator
of the application.
2.17
substitution
action of changing a real reader or tag by a fake one
Note 1 to entry: There are two kinds of substitution:
— Reader substitution: Reader substitution is a kind of smart jamming. During such an attack a Fake Reader radiates a
RF magnetic field in order to perturb a communication between a Real Reader and a Real Tag. The goal of this
perturbation is not to entirely block the communication but to transform the initial reader’s message to access
forbidden zones of the tag memory or to induce misusing of the tag. Depending of the goal of the attacker, all Real
Reader’s messages can be transformed or some messages can be kept unchanged (during initialisation protocol or
Real Tag’s authentication for example). A way of setting up such an attack is to make the Fake Read
...
SLOVENSKI STANDARD
SIST-TP CEN/TR 16670:2014
01-september-2014
Informacijska tehnologija - RFID, analiza groženj in ranljivosti
Information technology - RFID threat and vulnerability analysis
Informationstechnik - Analyse zur Bedrohung und Verletzlichkeit durch beziehungsweise
von RFID
Technologie de l’information - RFID, Analyse de vulnérabilité et de menace
Ta slovenski standard je istoveten z: CEN/TR 16670:2014
ICS:
35.020 Informacijska tehnika in Information technology (IT) in
tehnologija na splošno general
SIST-TP CEN/TR 16670:2014 en,fr,de
2003-01.Slovenski inštitut za standardizacijo. Razmnoževanje celote ali delov tega standarda ni dovoljeno.
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SIST-TP CEN/TR 16670:2014
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SIST-TP CEN/TR 16670:2014
TECHNICAL REPORT
CEN/TR 16670
RAPPORT TECHNIQUE
TECHNISCHER BERICHT
June 2014
ICS 35.240.60
English Version
Information technology - RFID threat and vulnerability analysis
Technologies de l'information - RFID, analyse vulnérabilité Informationstechnik - Analyse zur Bedrohung und
et de menace Verletzlichkeit durch beziehungsweise von RFID
This Technical Report was approved by CEN on 20 January 2014. It has been drawn up by the Technical Committee CEN/TC 225.
CEN members are the national standards bodies of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and United
Kingdom.
EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR STANDARDIZATION
COMITÉ EUROPÉEN DE NORMALISATION
EUROPÄISCHES KOMITEE FÜR NORMUNG
CEN-CENELEC Management Centre: Avenue Marnix 17, B-1000 Brussels
© 2014 CEN All rights of exploitation in any form and by any means reserved Ref. No. CEN/TR 16670:2014 E
worldwide for CEN national Members.
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CEN/TR 16670:2014 (E)
Contents Page
Foreword .4
Introduction .5
1 Scope .6
2 Terms and definitions .6
3 Symbols and abbreviations .9
4 Threats and Attack scenarios . 10
4.1 Introduction . 10
4.2 Attacks to an RFID System with a Fake Reader . 11
4.3 Attacks to a RFID system with a Fake Tag . 12
4.4 Attacks to a RFID system with a Fake Reader and a Fake Tag . 12
4.5 Attack to a Real Tag with a Fake Reader and a Fake Tag . 13
4.6 Attack to a Real Tag with a Fake Reader . 13
4.7 Attack to a Real Reader with a Fake Tag . 13
5 Vulnerabilities . 14
5.1 Introduction . 14
5.2 Denial of service . 14
5.3 Eavesdropping . 14
5.4 Man in the Middle . 15
6 Mitigation measures . 15
6.1 Introduction . 15
6.2 Mitigation measures for secured RFID Devices . 15
6.2.1 Mitigation measures for tags . 15
6.2.2 Mitigation measures for readers . 15
6.2.3 Mitigation measures for the Air Interface Protocol . 15
6.3 Mitigation measures against attacks . 15
6.3.1 Introduction . 15
6.3.2 Eavesdropping . 15
6.3.3 Skimming . 15
6.3.4 Relay attack . 16
6.3.5 Denial of Service . 16
7 Conclusions . 16
Annex A (informative) Attack scenarios . 18
A.1 Amusement parks takes visitors to RFID-land . 18
A.1.1 Introduction . 18
A.1.2 Threat scenarios . 18
A.1.3 DPP objectives of relevance . 19
A.1.4 Security objectives of relevance . 19
A.1.5 Privacy objectives of relevance . 20
A.2 Purpose of Use and Consent . 20
A.2.1 Purpose 1 . 20
A.2.2 Purpose 2 (with explicit consent) . 21
A.2.3 Purpose 3 (with no explicit consent . 21
A.3 Multi-tag and purpose RFID environment for Healthcare . 22
A.3.1 Scenario description - Emergency. 22
A.3.2 The hospital RFID environment . 22
A.3.3 Arrival at the hospital . 23
A.3.4 Treatment at the hospital . 24
A.3.5 The value of the drug prescribed . 24
A.3.6 Returning home . 24
A.3.7 The home RFID environment . 24
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A.3.8 Drug repeat prescription and out of date drug recycling . 25
Annex B Original Test Set ups and Results . 26
B.1 Test Area . 26
B.2 Equipment . 26
B.3 Overview of the Tests . 27
B.3.1 Introduction . 27
B.3.2 Range tests . 27
B.3.3 Write Tests . 27
B.3.4 Illicit Reading . 27
B.3.5 Eavesdropping . 28
B.3.6 Detection inside buildings . 28
B.3.7 Combined EAS/RFID systems . 28
B.4 Test procedures and results . 28
B.4.1 General . 28
B.4.2 Reading range . 30
B.4.3 Write range . 37
B.4.4 Illicit reading . 41
B.4.5 Eavesdropping . 46
B.4.6 Detection inside buildings . 47
B.4.7 Combined EAS/RFID system . 48
B.5 Analysis of results . 48
B.6 Conclusions . 49
Annex C Additional Test Set ups and Results . 50
C.1 Introduction . 50
C.2 Scope of tests . 50
C.3 Documenting the results . 50
C.4 Equipment required for additional tests . 50
C.5 Description of tests . 51
C.5.1 Activation distance for HF system . 51
C.5.2 Activation distance for UHF system . 52
C.5.3 Eavesdropping tests for HF system . 53
C.5.4 Eavesdropping tests for UHF system . 55
C.6 Test results . 56
C.6.1 Equipment utilised during the tests . 56
C.6.2 Description of Tests . 56
Bibliography . 70
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SIST-TP CEN/TR 16670:2014
CEN/TR 16670:2014 (E)
Foreword
This document (CEN/TR 16670:2014) has been prepared by Technical Committee CEN/TC 225 “AIDC
Technologies”, the secretariat of which is held by NEN.
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent
rights. CEN [and/or CENELEC] shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.
This Technical Report is one of a series of related deliverables, which comprise mandate 436 Phase 2. The
other deliverables are:
— EN 16570, Information technology — Notification of RFID — The information sign and additional
information to be provided by operators of RFID application systems
— EN 16571, Information technology — RFID privacy impact assessment process
— EN 16656, Information technology - Radio frequency identification for item management - RFID Emblem
(ISO/IEC 29160:2012, modified)
— CEN/TR 16684, Information technology — Notification of RFID — Additional information to be provided
by operators
— CEN/TS 16685, Information technology — Notification of RFID — The information sign to be displayed in
areas where RFID interrogators are deployed
— CEN/TR 16669, Information technology — Device interface to support ISO/IEC 18000-3
— CEN/TR 16671, Information technology — Authorisation of mobile phones when used as RFID
interrogators
— CEN/TR 16672, Information technology — Privacy capability features of current RFID technologies
— CEN/TR 16673, Information technology — RFID privacy impact assessment analysis for specific sectors
— CEN/TR 16674, Information technology — Analysis of privacy impact assessment methodologies relevant
to RFID
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Introduction
In response to the growing deployment of RFID systems in Europe, the European Commission published in
2007 the Communication COM(2007) 96 ‘RFID in Europesteps towards a policy framework’. This
Communication proposed steps which needed to be taken to reduce barriers to adoption of RFID whilst
respecting the basic legal framework safeguarding fundamental values such as health, environment, data
protection, privacy and security.
In December 2008, the European Commission addressed Mandate M/436 to CEN, CENELEC and ETSI in the
field of ICT as applied to RFID systems. The Mandate M/436 was accepted by the ESOs in the first months of
2009. The Mandate addresses the data protection, privacy and information aspects of RFID, and is being
executed in two phases. Phase 1, completed in May 2011, identified the work needed to produce a complete
framework of future RFID standards. The Phase 1 results are contained in the ETSI Technical Report TR 187
020, which was published in May 2011.
Phase 2 is concerned with the execution of the standardization work programme identified in the first phase.
This document will provide the additional information of the RFID application that will need to be provided to a
citizen by accessing the source identified on the sign where the RFID application is operating. This information
will be aligned with the details set out in the Recommendation, but some of this might not be available at the
outset, a Technical Report is the preferred form of initial delivery to establish basic requirements.
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1 Scope
The scope of the Technical Report is to consider the threats and vulnerabilities associated with specific
characteristics of RFID technology in a system comprising:
— the air interface protocol covering all the common frequencies;
— the tag including model variants within a technology;
— the interrogator features for processing the air interface;
— the interrogator interface to the application.
The Technical Report addresses specific RFID technologies as defined by their air interface specifications.
The threats, vulnerabilities, and mitigating methods are presented as a toolkit, enabling the specific
characteristics of the RFID technology being used in an application to be taken into consideration. While the
focus is on specifications that are standardized, the feature analysis can also be applied to proprietary RFID
technologies. This should be possible because some features are common to more than one standardized
technology, and it should be possible to map these to proprietary technologies.
Although this Technical Report may be used by any operator, even for a small system, the technical details
are better considered by others. In particular the document should be a tool used by RFID system integrators,
to improve security aspects using a privacy by design approach. As such it is also highly relevant to operators
that are not SME’s, and to industry bodies representing SME members.
2 Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.
2.1
blocker tag
tag forcing the reader to enter in its singulation algorithm
Note 1 to entry: The idea of the blocker tag that looks like a tag that we can have in our pocket, is to emit both ‘0’ and
‘1’ creating a collision and forcing the reader to enter in its singulation algorithm. If the blocker tag emits simultaneously ‘0’
and ‘1’ (that requires two antennas), the reader may never complete its algorithm. The blocker tag should be seen as a
hacker device that is able to generate a denial of service in a legitimate system. We can even assess that a blocker tag
has always a malicious behaviour since it cannot be selective and forbids the reading of one tag whereas it authorises the
reading of the others. Moreover, the blocker tag works like a tag in a passive mode. So, it requires being in the reader field
and it will protect only a small volume around itself. So a blocker tag can be considered as a malicious tag, which prevents
a legal system to read legal tags or as a mitigation technique preventing an illegal reader to read a legal tag.
2.2
blocking
another way to produce a denial of service is to interfere during the anti-collision sequence
Note 1 to entry: Different devices have been developed.
2.3
cloning
impersonation technique that is used to duplicate data from one tag to another
Note 1 to entry: Data acquired from the tag by whatever means is written to another tag. Unless the technology and
application require the interrogator to authenticate the RFID tag, cloning is possible. Cloning the unique chip ID presents a
significantly bigger challenge for the attacker, but some researchers claim that this is possible. There is also a special
case of cloning that needs to be considered where the application accepts multiple AIDC technologies. Cloning data from
an RFID-enabled card can be replicated in magnetic stripe. In some payment card systems, information that might be
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cloned from an AIDC card could be used in payment situations known as 'cardholder not present' for purchases made on
the Internet or by telephone. In this case, the clone is virtual and requires no encoding on another RFID tag.
2.4
denial of service
preventing communication between the interrogator and the tags
Note 1 to entry: There are two main ways to accomplish a "denial of service". The first one is to create electromagnetic
interferences, the second one is to insert a blocker tag in the communication.
2.5
destruction
making the tag definitively unusable without using a logical kill function whenever such a function exist in the
rfid protocol
Note 1 to entry: Destruction may refer to the reader too. Although this attack threats RFID system availability, it’s
different from deny of service because it can’t reactivate and repair it. Destruction is considered as an attack when it’s
practiced without holder’s knowledge. Two destruction types can be distinguished1) Hardware-and 2) Software
destruction. While this can be seen as a security threat to the RFID operator, there are also situations where it might affect
the individual. For example, if a public transport tag is accidentally damaged, then the individual's rights associated with it
can be lost. In a similar manner as for tag removal, tag destruction can be used as a control to protect the privacy
2.6
eavesdropping
passive attack, which consists in remotely listening to transactions between a Real Reader and a Real Tag
2.7
guardian
special device developed by Melanie Rieback from a Dutch University to help citizens to communicate with
their own contactless smartcards
Note 1 to entry: As an active device it can be turned into a blocking tag preventing an attacker to access such
contactless cards. Thus, it can blur any pervasive reading by actively emitting a jamming signal in the sidebands of a
typical RFID tag. Such a mechanism enables multiple functionalities:
— information can be sent to the reader or to the tag for secret key management, authentication, access control;
— monitoring of the RFID environment to warn of possible unsolicited reading;
— creation of collisions to prevent from the possible inquisitive reading.
As a consequence, the RFID guardian is a useful tool to ensure the privacy but it is also an efficient device to create
denials of service. Whereas the blocker tag is designed to carry out a simple load modulation, the RFID guardian is an
active device that requires batteries and that is able to emit is own signal. As a consequence, the distance of use is much
larger.
2.8
jamming
creating a signal in the same range as used by the reader in order to prevent tags from communicating with
the reader
Note 1 to entry: Because the RFID air interface protocol depends on radio signals, an attacker can exploit any such
signals within the range of the communication between interrogator and tag
2.9
man in the middle
object or person interfering in the communication between a real reader and a real tag
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Note 1 to entry: "Man in the middle" attack is often mistaken for relay attack. These are indeed similar but with the
distinctive feature that in this attack the bit stream can be modified in the relay. Since the relay implies the adaptation of
the modulation and of the bit coding by the Fake Reader or the Fake Tag for its use, it is not a problem to change some
bits. This additional feature may take time but it will always be shorter than the timeout of the Real Reader.
2.10
RFlD (1)
radio frequency identification
use of electromagnetic or inductive coupling in the radio frequency portion of the spectrum to communicate to
or from a tag through a variety of modulation and encoding schemes to uniquely read the identity of an RF
Tag
[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 19762-3]
2.11
RFlD (2)
radio frequency identification
use of electromagnetic radiating waves or reactive field coupling in the radio frequency portion of the spectrum
to communicate to or from a tag through a variety of modulation and encoding schemes to uniquely read the
identity of a radio frequency tag or other data stored on it
[SOURCE: RFID Recommendation C(2009) 3200 final]
2.12
relay attack
kind of Man in the Middle attack where fake reader and fake tag are used
Note 1 to entry: The relay attack is based on a specific weakness of the RFID tags that has the possibility to activate
the device without the consent of the user. Indeed, a user is not able to switch off his tag. Thus an attacker can, therefore,
access the tag discreetly, without knowledge of its owner, and relay information through a communication link between the
tag and a remote Fake Reader. The reader will assume that the tag, and by implication the user, is in close vicinity and
provides access to the attacker. Using this attack on cryptographic authentication schemes, the attacker would be able to
convince both Real Reader and Real Tag to share a common secret key. The attacker would not be able to view in
plaintext any subsequent communications. This is not needed as long as it can continue relaying the respective
messages. The attack can be given an active twist by relaying the initial authentication sequence after which subsequent
data is modified and relayed. Relay attacks involve two different devices and as a consequence two attackers that should
coordinate each other except if the relay is really short (an arm’s length for example). The device that will skim the data of
the attacked person is the Fake Reader. The Fake Reader is linked via the relay to the Fake Tag, a Fake Tag that will
reproduce the data of the Real Tag.
2.13
side channel analysis
analysis which allows to find secret information by using the analysis of the RF field during the processes
made by the tag processor
2.14
side channel attack
attack which uses a Side Channel Analysis
Note 1 to entry: In a side channel attack, the information that is usually exploited includes timing information, power
consumption or even electro-magnetic fields. This type of attack requires sufficient time, specialist equipment, and deep
knowledge of the internal systems on which the cryptographic and other algorithms are implemented.
2.15
singulation
identifying an individual tag in a multiple-tag environment
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2.16
skimming
active attack which consists in reading a tag
Note 1 to entry: It includes powering and modulation. It implies distance tag activation without consent of the operator
of the application.
2.17
substitution
action of changing a real reader or tag by a fake one
Note 1 to entry: There are two kinds of substitution:
— Reader substitution: Reader substitution is a kind of smart jamming. During such an attack a Fake Reader radiates a
RF magnetic field in order to perturb a communication between a Real Reader and a Real Tag. The goal of this
perturbation is not to entirely block the communication but to transform the initial reader’s message to access
forbidden zones of the tag memory or to induce misusing of the tag. Depending of the goal of the attacker, all Real
Reader’s messages can be transformed or some messages can be kept unchanged (during initialisation protocol or
Real Tag’s authentication for example). A way of setting up such an attack is to make the Fake Reader
...
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