Perimeter protection - Performance classification methodology

CEN/TR 16705 aims at providing information to be used for the design of the future activities for making a 'perimeter protection standard'. This CEN Technical Report describes a performance classification methodology for the identification of the desired systems performance for perimeter protection systems. It also gives a conceptual framework for matching the desired performance and the capabilities of a possible solution. Furthermore this CEN Technical Report presents the results of inventories that have been made on current systems and (generic type) products, relevant member states regulations, relevant documents from CEN, CEN/TC 325, ISO and other sources. It should be noted that these inventories cannot be considered complete and any values given should be considered indicative values. The following subjects are not covered by this Technical Report: - threats approaching from the sea side; - threats approaching through the air. It is recognized that with regard to vital infrastructure and very high risk objects the generic system approach indicated in this Technical Report may not suffice and additional checklists and risk assessment tools may be required.

Schutz von Grundstücksgrenzen - Methodologie für eine Leistungsklassifizierung

Protection périmétrique - Méthode de classification de performance

Perimetrijska zaščita - Metodologija razvrščanja zmogljivosti

CEN/TR 16705 zagotavlja informacije za uporabo pri načrtovanju prihodnjih aktivnosti za oblikovanje standarda perimetrijske zaščite. To tehnično poročilo CEN opisuje metodologijo razvrščanja zmogljivosti za identifikacijo želene zmogljivosti sistemov za sisteme perimetrijske zaščite. Prav tako zagotavlja konceptualni okvir za usklajevanje želene zmogljivosti in sposobnosti mogoče rešitve. Poleg tega to tehnično poročilo CEN predstavi rezultate popisov, ki so bili opravljeni na obstoječih sistemih in proizvodih generičnega tipa, ustrezne uredbe držav članic, ustrezne dokumente CEN, CEN/TC 325, ISO in druge vire. Treba je opozoriti, da se ti popisi ne morejo obravnavati kot popolni in da so vse navedene vrednosti indikativne. To tehnično poročilo ne zajema naslednjih tem: - nevarnosti pri približevanju z morja; - nevarnosti pri približevanju po zraku. Ugotovljeno je, da glede na ključno infrastrukturo in proizvode z zelo visokim tveganjem splošni sistemski pristop iz tega tehničnega poročila morda ne zadostuje in so morda potrebni dodatni kontrolni seznami in orodja za oceno tveganja.

General Information

Status
Published
Publication Date
02-Jun-2014
Technical Committee
Current Stage
6060 - National Implementation/Publication (Adopted Project)
Start Date
14-May-2014
Due Date
19-Jul-2014
Completion Date
03-Jun-2014

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SLOVENSKI STANDARD
SIST-TP CEN/TR 16705:2014
01-julij-2014
3HULPHWULMVND]DãþLWD0HWRGRORJLMDUD]YUãþDQMD]PRJOMLYRVWL
Perimeter protection - Performance classification methodology
Schutz von Grundstücksgrenzen - Methodologie für eine Leistungsklassifizierung
Protection périmétrique - Méthode de classification de performance
Ta slovenski standard je istoveten z: CEN/TR 16705:2014
ICS:
13.310 Varstvo pred kriminalom Protection against crime
SIST-TP CEN/TR 16705:2014 en,fr,de
2003-01.Slovenski inštitut za standardizacijo. Razmnoževanje celote ali delov tega standarda ni dovoljeno.

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SIST-TP CEN/TR 16705:2014

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SIST-TP CEN/TR 16705:2014

TECHNICAL REPORT
CEN/TR 16705

RAPPORT TECHNIQUE

TECHNISCHER BERICHT
April 2014
ICS 13.310
English Version
Perimeter protection - Performance classification methodology
Protection périmétrique - Méthode de classification de Schutz von Grundstücksgrenzen - Methodologie für eine
performance Leistungsklassifizierung


This Technical Report was approved by CEN on 25 March 2014. It has been drawn up by the Technical Committee CEN/TC 388.

CEN members are the national standards bodies of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and United
Kingdom.





EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR STANDARDIZATION
COMITÉ EUROPÉEN DE NORMALISATION

EUROPÄISCHES KOMITEE FÜR NORMUNG

CEN-CENELEC Management Centre: Avenue Marnix 17, B-1000 Brussels
© 2014 CEN All rights of exploitation in any form and by any means reserved Ref. No. CEN/TR 16705:2014 E
worldwide for CEN national Members.

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Contents Page
Foreword .5
0 Introduction .6
0.1 Purpose .6
0.2 Approach .6
0.3 Vital infrastructure .6
1 Scope .7
2 Normative references .7
3 Terms and definitions .7
4 Performance classification methodology . 15
4.1 Outline of the approach . 15
4.2 Determining the required the level of protection – picture of the methodology . 16
4.3 Assumptions and starting point making the calculation model . 18
4.4 The questionnaire of the calculation the model . 20
4.4.1 Introduction to the questionnaire . 20
4.4.2 Text of the questionnaire annex data entry sheet . 21
5 Modus operandi . 24
5.1 Introduction . 24
5.2 Aggressor types. 24
5.3 Scenarios . 25
5.4 Toolsets . 25
6 Risk assessment methodology . 25
6.1 General . 25
6.2 Risk – Target identification . 26
6.3 Threats . 26
6.4 Site characterization . 26
6.4.1 General . 26
6.4.2 Site and physical environment . 26
6.4.3 Human and social factors of the environment . 27
6.4.4 Use of the site . 27
6.4.5 Type of access . 27
7 Level of protection . 27
8 Determining functional requirements . 28
8.1 Introduction . 28
8.2 Questions for establishing the functional requirement . 28
9 Elements of possible solutions . 29
9.1 Introduction . 29
9.2 Elements of delay . 29
9.2.1 Overview of elements of delay . 29
9.2.2 Fences . 30
9.2.3 Walls . 31
9.2.4 Barriers . 32
9.2.5 Gates . 32
9.2.6 Roadblockers, Bollards . 32
9.3 Elements of detection . 32
9.3.1 Introduction . 32
9.3.2 Overview of elements of detection . 32
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9.3.3 Detection . 33
9.3.4 Exterior sensors PIDS . 33
9.3.5 Lighting. 33
9.3.6 Entry/exit control . 33
9.4 External elements . 34
9.5 Local law and regulations. 34
10 Inventories . 34
11 On testing . 35
Annex A Security system operational requirements – Q and A . 36
Annex B Framework for perimeter protection systems evaluation . 39
Annex C An environmental and organizational checklist for perimeter protection . 41
C.1 Introduction . 41
C.2 Environmental checklist for perimeter protection . 41
C.3 Organizational checklist for perimeter protection . 45
Annex D A perimeter security technologies classification . 49
D.1 Introduction . 49
D.2 Four families for intrusion detection . 49
D.2.1 Structure of the annex . 49
D.2.2 Structure of the four main Tables D.3 to D.6 . 50
D.3 Stand-alone equipment . 54
D.4 Fence-mounted sensors . 58
D.5 Active Physical security . 59
D.6 Underground sensors . 62
Annex E Inventory of perimeter intruder detection systems (PIDs) . 64
E.1 Introduction . 64
E.2 Combination of two sensors . 65
Annex F Matrix of current systems and (generic type) products . 71
Annex G On Perimeter surveillance and burglary resistance . 86
G.1 Introduction . 86
G.2 Use of detection systems for perimeter protection . 86
G.2.1 Basic requirements for perimeter surveillance systems . 86
G.2.2 Basic principles of the detection systems. 88
G.2.3 Comparison of detection systems . 89
G.2.4 Summary . 89
G.3 Classification for burglary resistance . 90
G.3.1 Recommendations for the assessment of the resistance class. 90
G.3.2 DIN-Standards for burglar resistance . 91
Annex H Pictures of fences, gates and entrance barriers . 92
H.1 Introduction . 92
H.2 Different sorts of fences . 92
H.2.1 Vegetable fences . 92
H.2.2 Wood palisade . 93
H.2.3 Walls . 94
H.2.4 Metallic fences . 96
H.2.5 Combinations of systems . 99
H.3 Supplementary accessories . 100
H.3.1 Razor wire. 100
H.3.2 Sharp pins . 100
H.4 Gates and entrance barriers . 101
H.4.1 Gates . 101
H.4.2 Road obstacles . 102
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Annex I CEN Workshop Agreement CWA 16221 . 104
I.1 Introduction . 104
I.2 Scope of CWA 16221:2010 . 104
I.3 Table of Content of CWA 16221:2010 . 105
Bibliography . 109

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Foreword
This document (CEN/TR 16705:2014) has been prepared by Technical Committee CEN/TC 388 “Perimeter
protection”, the secretariat of which is held by NEN.
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent
rights. CEN [and/or CENELEC] shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.
The elaboration of this Technical Specification has been financially supported by the European Commission
and the CIPS Programme (Grant Agreement N° HOME/2009/CIPS/FP/CEN-001).
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0 Introduction
0.1 Purpose
The increasing need for customers to be able to select and purchase perimeter protection solutions that fit
their needs calls for a generic and structured approach to the assessment of risks, to the identification of
functional requirements, to the classification of perimeter protection solutions, including organizational
measures, and to the design and test criteria for such perimeter protection solutions. This Technical Report is
a step in the development of that approach.
The general goal that has been set is to make a European Standard that is applicable to a wide range of
perimeter protection solutions, covering the needs for basic barriers and entrance solutions to more complex,
high security solutions.
This Technical Report firstly describes the conceptual basis for further development of security performance
requirements, technical specifications and test methods for use in perimeter protection systems in a European
context. The report focusses on the performance classification methodology for the identification of the
desired systems performance.
Secondly this Technical Report presents the results of inventories that have been made on current systems
and (generic type) products that are available to the design engineer in both the public and private sector,
relevant member states regulations, relevant documents from CEN, CEN/TC 325, ISO and other sources. The
results are presented in annexes to this report.
This Technical Report therefore aims at providing information to be used for the design of future activities for
making the 'perimeter protection standard'. It is not intended as a guidance for the actual development of
perimeter protection systems. Nonetheless the information in this report may function as an aid to practitioners
in their choice of appropriate measures in order to meet the diverse requirements.
0.2 Approach
Perimeter protection projects call for the interaction between suppliers of perimeter protection solutions, their
customers and other relevant stakeholders. Only the proper interaction between these parties will lead to valid
analyses and a certified perimeter protection solution.
A sequence of steps leading to the risk assessment, requested level of protection, functional requirements
and basic selection of perimeter protection solution is proposed. The choice of the measure(s) to be taken
depends upon a number of factors which include but are not restricted to: the local environment, the purpose
of the measure(s), type property to be protected and environmental and organizational factors.
Perimeter protection systems or components may be used independently such as a perimeter fence or in
combination with other measures in order to provide a more holistic solution such as a fence and gate. This
approach may be extended to include Closed-Circuit TV systems (CCTV) and Perimeter Intruder Devices
(PID).
To determine the risk involved for a site requiring perimeter protection is, for the most part, comparable to the
analysis required for any given asset. Therefore this Technical Report builds on the work done for risk
analysis by CEN/TC 325 'Crime prevention through building, facility and area design'.
0.3 Vital infrastructure
It is recognized that with regard to vital infrastructure and very high risk objects, the generic approach
indicated in this Technical Report may not suffice and additional checklists and risk assessment tools may be
required. There will be particular threats and modus operandi that should be considered when assessing vital
infrastructure and very high risk objects that are outside the scope of this TR. For this reference can be made
to documents from national authorities, etc.
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1 Scope
This Technical Report aims at providing information to be used for the design of the future activities for making
a 'perimeter protection standard'.
This CEN Technical Report describes a performance classification methodology for the identification of the
desired systems performance for perimeter protection systems. It also gives a conceptual framework for
matching the desired performance and the capabilities of a possible solution.
Furthermore this CEN Technical Report presents the results of inventories that have been made on current
systems and (generic type) products, relevant member states regulations, relevant documents from CEN,
CEN/TC 325, ISO and other sources. It should be noted that these inventories cannot be considered complete
and any values given should be considered indicative values.
The following subjects are not covered by this Technical Report:
− threats approaching from the sea side;
− threats approaching through the air.
It is recognized that with regard to vital infrastructure and very high risk objects the generic system approach
indicated in this Technical Report may not suffice and additional checklists and risk assessment tools may be
required.
2 Normative references
Not applicable.
3 Terms and definitions
For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.
NOTE The terms have been divided into three main perimeter related security categories: General, Electronic
Security and Physical Security. The definitions are taken from existing documents as much as possible. Important sources
are EN 14383-1:2006 [1], the term and definition standard from CEN/TC 325 "Crime prevention through building, facility
and area design", and the Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST) [2].
3.1 General.
3.1.1
access control
set of techniques, means or procedures to control the passage of people and vehicles into and out of
protected areas
[SOURCE: EN 14383-1:2006]
Note 1 to entry: Such systems allow levels of access rights and optionally the traceability of access, ranging from no
entry to free traffic. The access control can be mechanical, human, electronic or a combination of these systems.
3.1.2
burglary
action of breaking into any premises with the purpose of theft
[SOURCE: EN 14383-1: 2006, modified]
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3.1.3
neighbourhood
immediate surroundings of a secure site and their population
[SOURCE: EN 14383-1:2006]
3.1.4
operational requirement
statement of needs based upon a thorough and systematic assessment of the problems to be solved and the
desired solutions
[SOURCE: PAS 68:2013]
3.1.5
perimetric space
space in close vicinity of the building (from the perimeter to the building envelope, including the accesses)
[SOURCE: EN 14383-1:2006]
3.1.6
peripheral space
land and neighbourhood around one or several sites
[SOURCE: EN 14383-1:2006]
3.1.7
risk analysis
identification and evaluation of threats
[SOURCE: EN 14383-1:2006, modified]
3.1.8
risk assessment
categorization of risks and measurement of their likelihood
[SOURCE: EN 14383-1:2006]
3.1.9
safety
freedom from unacceptable risk
[SOURCE: EN 14383-1:2006]
3.1.10
secure area
mechanically and/or electronically enclosed area protected for safety and/or security purposes [1]
3.1.11
security
freedom from an intended risk
[SOURCE: EN 14383-1:2006]
Note 1 to entry: Security is the condition of being protected against danger or loss. It is achieved through the mitigation
of adverse consequences associated with the intentional or unwarranted actions of others. See [7].
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3.1.12
standoff
distance that threat (e.g. vehicle, person, any potential explosive effect) may be allowed to encroach upon a
perimeter or asset
[SOURCE: PAS 38:2013]
3.2 Electronic security.
3.2.1
active infrared
infrared beams transmitted between a transmitter and receiver which are broken when an intruder passes
through
[SOURCE: PAS 38:2013]
Note 1 to entry: The receiver detects this as a drop in signal level.
3.2.2
alarm transmission
automatic transmission of alarm signals from an intrusion detection system to a monitoring centre or to a
private individual
[SOURCE: EN 14383-1: 2006]
3.2.3
dead zone
area bounded by, or laying within the detection zone where a target cannot be detected
Note 1 to entry: That is either intrinsic to the detection system or due to some topographical feature within the
detection zone (i.e. obstacle or hollow).
3.2.4
detection rate (DR)
measure of a system’s capacity to detect an intrusion attempt (true alarm) through the zone protected by the
system
[SOURCE: Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST)]
3.2.5
detection zone
area over which a detection system is configured to monitor for intruders
Note 1 to entry: The detection zone can also have upper and lower bounds: the detection ceiling and the detection
floor.
3.2.6
doppler microwave
unit that emits a microwave field and monitors reflections
[SOURCE: Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST)]
Note 1 to entry: Motions from an intruder cause a change in the reflected signal received by the detector.
3.2.7
dual technology
combination of two separate technologies
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[SOURCE: Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST)]
Note 1 to entry: For free-standing applications these technologies tend to be passive Infrared combined with doppler
microwave, though other combinations exist.
3.2.8
environmental information / conditions
data pertaining to both weather and wildlife events in the vicinity of the perimeter
[SOURCE: Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST)]
3.2.9
electrified fence
detection system comprising horizontal electrical conductors which are energized approximately every 2 s with
typically a 10,000 volt pulse
[SOURCE: Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST)]
Note 1 to entry: This pulse voltage will decrease if the fence is touched or is short circuited to ground and an alarm
condition can be raised.
3.2.10
electrostatic field disturbance
arrays of wires create an electromagnetic field and sense either the current induced in neighbouring wires or
the capacitance between the transmitter and the ground
[SOURCE: Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST)]
Note 1 to entry: The capacitancy varies when an intruder approaches the barrier. Ported coax and leaky feeder
systems come under this definition.
3.2.11
fabric-mounted PIDS
detection systems that are attached directly to the barrier material (as opposed to the fence posts)
[SOURCE: Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST)]
3.2.12
false alarm
alarm not caused by a human breaching the detection zone
[SOURCE: Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST)]
Note 1 to entry: Typically, false alarms are caused by animals, the effects of the weather or may have no obvious
cause.
Note 2 to entry: Alternative definition:
alarm condition which has not resulted from:
a) a criminal attack, or attempt at such, upon/to the supervised premises, the alarm equipment or the line carrying the
alarm signal; or
b) damage, or attempt at such, to the supervised premises, the alarm equipment or the line carrying the alarm signal; or
c) actions by emergency services in the execution of their duties.
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3.2.13
false alarm rate
FAR
measure
...

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